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Abstract 
     
This  thesis  examines  the  agricultural  risk  management  policies  of  the 
World Bank, UNCTAD and the FAO. Based on documentary evidence and 
interviews, it describes what policy has been, argues that by 2011 
advocates of market-based risk management had largely overcome 
resistance to this policy in each organisation, and examines what caused 
policy evolution 
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Chapter One - Outline of the problem 
    
Introduction 
    
The purpose of this thesis is to study how policy in three Inter- 
governmental Organisations (IGOs) (the World Bank, UNCTAD and FAO) 
towards agricultural risk management developed and changed, and what 
– if any - general conclusions about IGO policy can be drawn from the 
analysis. 
  
 
Both the policy area and the organisations matter greatly. Agriculture is a 
hugely  important  but  highly  risky  business.  Farmers and  governments 
must contend with volatile commodity and input prices, as well as the 
impact of the seasons and climate change, whilst often being unable to 
pass  on  frequently  unpredictable  cost  increases  to  consumers  (FAO 
2011a). For many decades there have been both market based and 
interventionist approaches to managing those risks. 
   
Likewise, many scholars have recognised the increasing importance of 
IGOs: they are ‘ubiquitous’ and ‘It is hard to imagine any policy domain at 
the international level in which I[G]Os are not involved in some way or 
other’ (Joachim, Reinalda & Verbeek 2008a:3). IGOs do not simply collect 
and disseminate information: they are political organisations managing 
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limited resources to achieve results (United Nations 2008:10). Each IGO 
has a mandate for its work. The World Bank for example declares: ‘Our 
mission is to help developing countries and their people reach the goals 
by working with our partners to alleviate poverty’ (World Bank 2011a). 
The World Bank further declares that as a Group, including the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), ‘Together, we provide low-interest 
loans, interest-free credits and grants to developing countries for a wide 
array of purposes that include investments in education, health, public 
administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector development, 
agriculture and environmental and natural resource management’ (World 
Bank 2011). UNCTAD’s mandate is that it ‘promotes the development- 
friendly integration of developing countries into the world economy. The 
organisation works to fulfil this mandate by carrying out three key 
functions: a forum for intergovernmental deliberations, research, policy 
analysis and data provision, and technical assistance tailored to the specific 
requirements of developing countries’ (UNCTAD 2011). FAO states that it 
‘leads international efforts to defeat hunger. Serving both developed and 
developing countries, FAO acts as a neutral forum where all nations meet 
as equals to negotiate agreements and debate policy. FAO is also a source 
of knowledge and information. We help developing countries and 
countries in transition modernize and improve agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries practices and ensure good nutrition for all’ (FAO 2011). 
   
Furnished with these mandates, IGOs such as the World Bank, UNCTAD 
 
and  the  FAO  develop  and  –  as  will  be  seen,  change  –  their  policies 
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towards   different   aspects   of   their   external   environment   (Cox   and 
Jacobson 1973).  Individual IGOs may  at  different times favour specific 
types of solution (e.g. market solutions as opposed to state intervention or 
inter-governmental agreements) to particular problems, or favour certain 
types of arrangements between states (e.g. free trade as opposed to tariffs 
and quotas). However, IGOs usually cannot usually dictate how national 
governments or private firms go about their business, although the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with their leverage 
through lending may try (Leiteritz 2005). 
   
What is IGO policy toward risk management? 
    
From their mandates it is possible to deduce that IGO policy towards risk 
management is not the main activity of an organisation such as the World 
Bank, FAO or even UNCTAD, and has been described as ‘policy unusual’ 
at the World Bank, by comparison to ‘policy usual’, i.e. lending and related 
services (Nawal Kamel, interview, 17 March 2011). Unlike the mainstream 
of World Bank activity – lending – in the area of agricultural risk 
management the World Bank did not commit substantial resources until 
very recently (and then only in conjunction with the private sector), and 
neither did other IGOs. 
  
 
With circumscribed budgets, and mandates, IGO policy in this area can be 
evidenced mainly in three areas: 
13
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(i)  research and advocacy –  making  presentations,  publishing  papers, 
holding conferences 
   
(ii) demonstration – sponsoring and managing trials and 
   
 
(iii) training – educational and management consultancy in the field by 
 
IGO officials. 
   
 
A fourth, involvement in the market, has grown gradually over the last 
decade at the IFC. This fourth may be distinguished from the former three 
as requiring the promulgation of an explicit, formal, public policy towards 
market based risk management   The sum of these activities constitutes the 
majority of IGO activity in this area so IGO policy – implicit and explicit 
together - may be said to be the sum of these activities directed at the 
achievement of specific goals. 
   
The evolution of an idea and of policy 
    
The  ability  of agricultural producers and  others concerned with 
commodity prices to manage their risks using market instruments 
(principally  agricultural  and  other  commodity  derivatives1)  increased 
rapidly from the 1980s until the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Shim 2006, 
Anderson & McKay 2008). Despite the increase in the availability and use 
of these instruments, market based agricultural price risk management as 
   
1 For an explanation of how derivatives work, see Chapter Four, Part II, pp. 143-9. 
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an issue remained in the 1980s a concern almost exclusively of the private 
sector and national regulatory agencies. Although the importance of 
derivatives to the agricultural sector grew steadily, at least in terms of the 
value of derivative contracts traded relative to the value of agricultural 
production2  (European Union 2006) in this early period IGOs, including 
 
those specifically tasked with the agricultural sector, notably the World 
Bank, FAO and UNCTAD, only rarely got involved, in the sense of writing 
papers or arranging conferences, educational programmes or any other 
activity in this area. 
   
This did not begin to change until the early 1990s. The policies then 
adopted by these three IGOs - the World Bank, UNCTAD and the FAO - 
with regard to agricultural price risk management were very different, and 
sometimes even contradictory. Whereas the World Bank and especially 
UNCTAD initiated a number of market-based initiatives, including the rise 
and eventual ‘failure’3 of the World Bank’s major initiative on agricultural 
price risk management, the FAO, notably, did not adopt any such policy. 
There was a glaring disparity in the literature and absence of FAO policy 
for many years, even a scepticism within the organisation which meant 
that its many routes of influence over global agriculture did not advance 
  
 
2   However it should be noted that much volume has undoubtedly been contributed by 
speculators and index investors, and not all agricultural commodities have derivative 
markets (Gilbert 2009a). 
3   I am indebted to Nawal Kamel for her honest use of the word (Nawal Kamel, personal 
 
e-mail, 17 March 2009). 
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market based risk management mechanisms, severely curtailing, even 
countering, the work of the World Bank and UNCTAD. The policies that 
the FAO and UNCTAD adopted with respect to policy towards market- 
based risk management instruments were therefore, for many years, 
radically different. Then the FAO reversed course, almost at the same time 
that UNCTAD policy itself threatened to change, so that the policies of the 
two IGOs briefly almost – but not quite – crossed over each other. This 
puzzle, surely, demands an explanation. It is the purpose of this thesis to 
provide one. 
   
The thesis methodology 
    
The process of analysing this evolution in this thesis is as follows. Firstly, a 
literature survey has been undertaken covering the range of issues to be 
considered. There are three areas that have been reviewed. These are, 
firstly, the many theoretical approaches towards policy formulation within 
organisations, policy coherence between them, and theories of how IGOs 
work. Theoretical insights examining what has often been described as 
the ‘culture’ of organisations, and theories of how organisations work, 
including and especially the concept of ’change agents’ (Rusaw 1998), 
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995) and norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore 
& Sikkink 1998, Madokoro 2010), are shown to be useful in this context, 
depending on the application of organisational theory in general to IGOs 
in particular. Secondly, the specialist studies made on the development of 
policy within IGOs and co-operation between them are reviewed. From 
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the available literature an analysis can be made of how scholars view how 
IGOs establish and change their policies. Thirdly, the literature on the 
evolution of international policy towards agricultural risk management 
since the Second World War and that on the specific relationship between 
agricultural risk management and the environment, is reviewed. 
   
Then, given the theoretical perspective on policy within IGOs derived from 
the literature to be tested, it was necessary to examine which available 
methodologies for resolving the puzzle would be most appropriate. The 
available methodologies, including documentary and interview analysis, 
required particular integration in the highly technical case of policy 
evolution towards market based risk management instruments.at the 
selected IGOs. 
   
Next, given a theoretical perspective, an investigative methodology and 
the results of the study, conclusions must be drawn. What changed within 
each IGO in respect of attitudes towards market based mechanisms for 
agricultural risk management? How did this change take place? What 
were the drivers of this change? To what extent did e.g. a change in 
attitudes towards the environmental implications drive change in policy 
towards agricultural risk management? And finally, given the fact that the 
effects  of  the  GFC  and  environmental  considerations  look  likely  to 
continue to dominate IGO policymaking in the near future, is it possible 
that the support being current evinced by IGOs for market based 
agricultural   risk   management   could   become   permanent,   or   is   an 
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oscillation between support and criticism of market  based solutions to 
these and other problems inevitable?   Such an explanation of policy 
change must be grounded in a theoretical understanding of how policy 
change occurs within IGOs. Finally, as a broad dialectic has been sought 
with a revision of theory based on evidence gleaned from the case studies, 
there must be an input to the theory of IGO policymaking, based on the 
evidence. 
   
This thesis is therefore presented in nine chapters. Chapter Two provides a 
detailed review of the available literature in the areas of relevance:  policy 
development and organisational change, especially in IGOs, the evolution 
of global policy towards commodities, the development of market-based 
mechanisms for risk management in  agriculture and  how these 
instruments have been viewed within IGOs. Chapter Three outlines the 
theoretical framework suggested for IGO policies tested in the thesis, 
derived from the extensive work undertaken on policy analysis within 
organisations, especially IGOs, by leading academic contributors to policy 
analysis (e.g. Park 2005, Clegg 2010), and also presents the methodologies 
to be used in testing the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One. Chapter 
Four outlines the background to policymaking on this subject at the 
relevant IGOs, principally the evolution of international commodities policy 
since   World   War   II   and   the   development   of   market   based   risk 
management instruments for agriculture. The following four substantive 
chapters present a detailed analysis of the evolution of policy towards 
these instruments at  the  World  Bank,  UNCTAD  and  FAO  respectively. 
18
9 
These are three of the principal IGOs with policy in this area: however 
where appropriate reference should and has been made to the policy 
towards market-based agricultural risk management instruments of other 
IGOs, in particular the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD), 
European  Union  (EU),  Common  Fund  for  Commodities  (CFC), 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Food 
Programme (WFP). The period covered is from the inception of policy 
towards these instruments at each IGO to the cut-off date of research for 
this thesis, which was 30th June 2011. 
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Chapter Two: Survey of the Literature 
    
Introduction 
    
This literature survey is divided into two parts.  Because the subject matter 
of this  thesis  concerns policy within IGOs, which are types of 
organisations, it is firstly a delineation of what an IGO is, defining the 
boundaries of the type of organisations to be selected for case studies, and 
an available review of relevant theories of how organisations - IGOs in 
particular - work. Because the thesis concerns policy change, theories of 
policy development and change, including those concerning the influence 
of  ‘change  agents’  in  creating  organisational  and  policy  change  have 
been studied, as well as those of norms (Finnemore 1993, Katzenstein 
1996) and ‘norm cycles’, (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) all in the context of 
both the evolution of policy within individual IGOs and collaboration or 
other forms of association between IGOs. 
   
Secondly, as part of the hypothesis is that political concerns within IGOs 
were a major factor influencing the evolution of the policy debate, 
literature on the evolution of international policy towards agricultural risk 
management since the Second World War and the creation of IGOs 
concerned with these issues is reviewed (briefly, as this subject is treated in 
more depth in Chapter Four). Further, an analysis of the literature on 
agricultural risk management has been undertaken, to provide a 
background to the particular policy issues under consideration at the IGOs 
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that are the subject matter of this thesis. Under this heading literature on 
the specific relationship between agricultural risk management and the 
environment is also briefly reviewed. 
   
Part One – Organisational Theory and IGO policymaking 
    
What is an Inter-Governmental Organisation (IGO)? 
   
 
In  Rethinking International organisations, Dijkzeul  &  Beigbeder  (2003) 
presents a typology of international organisations which clarified the 
currently generally accepted definition of an IGO, that which will be used 
in this thesis: 
   
‘The Yearbook of International organisations, published by the 
Union of International Associations (UIA), defines IGOs as (a) being 
based on a formal instrument of agreement between the 
government of states; (b) including three or more states as parties 
to the agreement; and (c) possessing a permanent secretariat 
performing ongoing tasks’  (Dijkzeul & Beigbeder 2003:3). 
   
This is very similar to a previous Yearbook’s definition: 
    
‘From an organizational perspective three basic characteristics 
identify an international organization: a formal instrument of 
agreement between three or more nation states which serves as 
21
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the constitution of the organization; an international conference 
where representatives of nation states convene and take decisions 
and where representatives of various non–state actors may exert 
influence; and a permanent secretariat for the performance of 
ongoing tasks (a bureaucracy led by a secretary-general) (Judge 
1985:1591). 
   
 
The World Bank, FAO and UNCTAD conform to both of these definitions 
and are included in the Yearbook as IGOs. So too are the EU, IFPRI, the 
OECD and the WFP. IGOs should be distinguished from transnational 
organisations (TNOs), which are international but not governmental (e.g. 
Non-Governmental Organisations) (McGrew 1992, Geeraerts 1995). 
   
How do IGOs work? 
    
A starting point is the recognition that ‘Theoretical exchange in the IR field 
has long been characterized by duelling perspectives, whether in the form 
of the paradigmatic battle between realism and its alternatives, or more 
recently in the rationalism and constructivism debate’ (Fioretos 2011:392). 
The growing global importance of IGOs has given rise to a number of 
conflicting interpretations of how IGO policy is developed. 
22
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.IGOs as instruments of state policy 
    
Realists, whether classical or structural, ‘see’ the world as states with 
defined national interests behaving as unitary actors (Morgenthau 1948, 
Waltz 1979). Realists also tend towards a ‘traditionalist’ view on policy 
formation, arguing that that policy formation is a rational or linear process 
(Grindle & Thomas 1991). IGOs (and their bureaucracies) are conceived as 
mere ‘mirrors’ of the state system (Strange 1998:215).   One early 
proponent went so far as to argue that IGOs were mere fronts for national 
self-interest, that the establishment of an IGO indicated nothing more than 
that ‘between the states a limited agreement has been reached upon an 
institutional form for multilateral conduct of state activity in a certain field’ 
(Myrdal 1955:5). In such studies, ‘international organizations are little more 
than conference venues’ (Reinalda & Verbeek 1998a:13). 
   
Later scholars agreed that at least ultimately IGOs will act to represent the 
broader interests of the states that created them (Jacobson 1979, Nielson, 
Tierney & Weaver 2006), illustrated by the argument that the World Bank 
is   ‘controlled   or   substantially   influenced   by   its   major   shareholders’ 
(Williams 2008:3). This is an argument that goes back a long way: at its 
most straightforward it is an assertion that voting, investment and the US 
appointment of the President constitute ‘an iron-clad guarantee that the 
activities of the World Bank must be of such a nature as to reflect primarily 
U.S. economic, financial and political interests’ (Feder 1976:344). In 
materialist studies the IGO is considered as an instrument wholly, or at 
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least principally, under the conscious goal-oriented direction of the 
constituent member states (Hoffmann 1970, Krause & Nye 1975, Keohane 
& Nye 2000) and so having ‘minimal or no influence on state behavior’ in 
the words of one realist author (Mearsheimer 1994:7). Such Principal- 
Agent (P-A) theory has been said itself to provide a solid explanatory basis 
for the  influence of international bureaucracies, albeit one where only 
common agency can provide the explanation (Nielson & Tierney 2003, 
Pollack 1997, Vaubel 2006). Likewise delegation to IGOs is explained 
through similarities in institutional embedding, mandate or principals 
(Biermann & Siebenhũner 2009:6). However, delegation was where IGO 
boundaries lay, and autonomy lay beyond them: neorealism and the 
associated P-A theory of IGO behaviour was thus inevitably circumscribed 
by the assumption that IGOs set agendas (or had them set for them) to 
further international governance in the areas with which they were 
designed to deal. 
   
A similar process to that described above can be seen at the level of 
national government policies, described as ‘bureaucratic 
compartmentalisation’  whereby  it  was  alleged  e.g.  that  because 
agricultural research institutes, in many countries, are either part of or 
report to Ministries of Agriculture, the primary responsibility for natural 
resource policy making, in matters such as conservation or pollution 
prevention, may be with a Ministry of the Environment or some other 
multisectoral body, ‘Leaders of agricultural research institutes may be 
reluctant to cooperate too closely (or even share is findings) with senior 
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officials of a Ministry of Environment for fear of undermining the 
production and farm-income objectives of their parent Ministry’ (Tabor & 
Faber 1998:4). 
   
An alternative – not entirely contradictory – perspective to neorealism 
suggested that as the problems facing states and IGOs grew, it was 
expected that the scope for global administration would expand (Haas 
1990). Functionalism examined the political as well as technical processes 
of integration of governance functions globally (Katzenstein, Keohane & 
Krasner 1998). A public-management perspective rests on the assumption 
that organisations are task-fulfilling agents addressing certain societal 
conditions (Babb 2003:4) and this approach dovetails with the ideas of 
functionalism. There have been studies on the extent to which and the 
reasons why nation states delegate authority to IGOs (e.g. Nielson & 
Tierney 2003).   As noted in a recent study of World Bank accountability 
(Clegg 2010a:12-13) there has also been debate in academic analysis of 
IGOs as to the extent to which states cooperated in order to further 
national interests compared with their failure to do so effectively (Lamy 
2001:193-5, Keohane 1986:10-25). As the EU threatened to usurp state 
roles in Europe, functionalists dared to hope that ‘international institutions 
have been the bricklayers of a better world, or at least a better Europe’ 
(Strange 1998:215). At the working level, UN and EU voting patterns also 
became a subject of study (Knight 1970. Kim & Russett 1996). 
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For many years, however, academic attention on IGOs tended to 
concentrate on the major issues of the day, which had severely limiting 
effects on the choice of IGOs and case studies. So for example during the 
Cold War Allison (1971) produced his famous analysis of decision-making 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. What analysis there was of decision- 
making within IGOs did involve an emphasis of the external environment 
in which they operated. The organisational environment represents the 
forces external to the organisation itself:  it implies that no organisation is 
self-sufficient  (Brechin  1997:173).  The  environment in  organisational 
theory represents all the forces and elements that are ‘outside’ the 
boundaries of the organisation. It includes ‘anything out there’, seeing 
organisations as incomplete and ‘loosely-coupled’ systems. IGOs were 
argued to work within both a general environment of world power 
relations that was common to all international organizations and a specific 
environment that  included factors relevant to  the specific functions of 
each organization (Cox and Jacobson 1973:5).   The 1970s did see a 
renewed  interest  in  international  bureaucracies (e.g.  Weiss  1975)  and 
there were a few studies that analysed bureaucratic behaviour within and 
across  IGOs  e.g.  Weiss  &  Jordan  1976,  Hopkins  1976,  (reviewed  in 
Reinalda & Verbeek 2004) but this work had reached back to an earlier 
generation of research, notably to the influential work of Weber (1921). 
Weber had stressed the rational character of contemporary bureaucracies, 
so research in the Weberian tradition argues that bureaucracies have a 
number of core features: hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and expertise 
(Barnett  &  Finnemore 2004:  18).  Even  the  sternest critic  of  a  socialist 
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system could say that ‘Bureaucracy is management bound to comply with 
detailed rules and regulations fixed by the authority of a superior body’ 
and therefore in itself, ethically neutral (Von Mises 1944:45). As Weber 
emphasised,  knowledge   and   expertise  are   crucial   characteristics   of 
modern bureaucracies. Many early studies of IGOs therefore fitted into 
formal institutional analysis – the formal structure, organisation and 
bureaucratic hierarchy of IGOs (Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986; for an 
exception see Le Pestre 1986). Critics of functionalism pointed out that 
functionalists predicted that technicians and other experts would produce 
non-political  solutions  to   pressing  transnational   problems,  but  they 
ignored  the  ‘possibility  that  international  organizations  and  their  staff 
might develop objectives of their own, not necessarily compatible with the 
performance of the function for which they were designed’ (Reinalda & 
Verbeek 1998a:12). Whether these objectives can be assessed as rational 
preferences,  in   the   economic  sense,  is   another   debate   (Nicholson 
1998:82). 
    
But as Dijkzeul & Beigbeder (2003) point out, this was followed by an 
academic move away from the analysis of decision-making towards 
implementation, without this actually creating much interest in empirical 
studies in the area. International Relations research paid comparatively 
little attention to IGO behaviour. With a concentration of research on 
‘international regimes’ in the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a 
comparative lack of research into the behaviour of IGOs. It has been 
suggested that this indifference was driven partly by what was deemed 
27
18 
the ‘apparent irrelevance of formal organizations’ during the Cold War 
(Martin & Simmons 2002:193) especially the UN (Katzenstein, Keohane & 
Krasner 1988:651). As Kratochwil and Ruggie pointed out, ‘students of 
international  organization  have  shifted  their  focus  systematically  away 
from international institutions, toward broader forms of international 
institutionalized behaviour” (Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986: 753-754). Later, 
neoinstitutionalism examined regime approaches (De Senarchens 1993). 
However the move to regime theory did not lead to anything like an 
explosion in empirical analyses of IGOs themselves, despite the rise of 
organisational studies in other disciplines. Many of these studies portrayed 
organisational behaviour as driven by formal and informal norms, rules 
and understandings (March & Olsen 1989). This led to the observation 
that ‘The gap between the study of international organisations and the 
sociology  of  organisations  is  deep  and  persistent’  (Ness  &  Brechin 
1988:246). 
    
In parallel with realist and functionalist approaches to international 
relations, however, both of which shared a common base in material 
conceptions of power and influence, commentators could see there was a 
move towards treating the market as ‘the central, enduring fact of the 
world economy and development economics as having been essentially a 
blind alley (Bauer 1972, Lal 1983). This move has been characterised as 
the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 2000) The World Bank claimed 
that ‘the record of development and the growing store of empirical work 
have heightened recognition of the importance of markets and incentives 
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–  and  of  the  limits  of  government  intervention  and  central  plannng’ 
(World Bank 1985:1). ‘The market, however, is one of the world’s most 
compelling social, not natural, factors’. (Abdelal 2010:66).   Neoliberal 
approaches therefore emerged which placed ideas, and especially liberal 
ideas, at the forefront of analysing international relations. Whereas neo- 
realists saw IGOs as vehicles for the interests of major states, neoliberals 
envisaged them as part of international institutions that may help 
international cooperation by lowering transaction costs, for instance 
through the provision of information about other states (Keohane 1984, 
Reinalda & Verbeek 2004a).  But what both accounts had in common is a 
refusal to see IGOs as operating independently, except where – according 
to a rationalist account – states have consciously delegated authority to 
IGOs to execute specific, bounded tasks. In the neoliberal conception in 
extremis, international organisations are still   ‘empty vessels that simply 
reduce transaction costs’ (Checkel 1998:331). 
   
IGOs as institutions 
    
So far as the study of IGOs was concerned, a response to the prevailing 
dichotomy between neorealism and neoliberalism in the study of IGOs 
was neoinstitutionalism, in which three separate strands of thought were 
identified (Hall & Taylor 1996).   Sociological institutionalism (Finnemore 
1996a, Barnett & Finnemore 1999) aimed to reach beyond Weber: ‘Rather 
 
than  taking  as   a   starting  point  the  structure  and  purpose  of  an 
organisation as defined by outside actors, neoinstitutionalism looks at the 
29
20 
actual organisational dynamics within institutions’ (Barkin 2006:34, March 
 
& Olsen 1989). 
   
 
Functional institutionalism, by contrast, focused on the rules and 
procedures within organisations: most studies of IGOs recognise that the 
bureaucracy at least may be relevant to the decision-making process. ‘Four 
major themes surface in the literature about international secretariats: the 
leadership that can be exercise in forging agreement between member 
states, the organization’s ability to affect the policy agenda, the impact of 
intra- and inter-organizational turf wars and the loyalty conflicts 
experienced   by   international   civil   servants’   (Reinalda   &   Verbeek 
2004a:19).’ 
   
 
Finally historical   institutionalism – the ways in which norms and 
procedures within particular institutions have evolved over time – 
suggested that institutional histories are path-dependent, limiting the 
extent to which the analyst can generalise across institutions (Hall & Taylor 
1996, Fioretos 2011).   Proponents also claimed that an institutionalist 
approach was useful on the grounds that more than simply arguing that 
social structure matters, an institutionalist approaches tells us what the 
social structure is (Finnemore 1996a:327). 
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The policymaking process 
    
Political analysts have often argued that the policy-making process is by no 
means the rational activity that they suggest it is often held up to be in 
much of the standard literature. Indeed, they argued, the metaphors that 
have guided policy research over recent years suggest that it is actually 
rather messy, with outcomes occurring as a result of complicated political, 
social    and    institutional    processes   which    are    best    described   as 
‘evolutionary’ (Juma & Clarke 1995). As a result, policy-makers ‘muddle 
through’ (Lindblom 1959). Non-linear might also not be evolutionary: it 
has also been suggested that the accumulation of micro level failures or 
inconsistencies that cannot be tolerated or explained causes tectonic shifts 
in  policy  (Hall  1993).  This  spectrum  has  been  summarised  in  the 
contention – specifically applied to public policy for agriculture - that ‘The 
whole life of policy is a chaos of purposes and accidents. It is not at all a 
matter of the rational implementation of the so-called decisions through 
selected strategies’ (Clay & Schaffer 1984:192). Policy-making within IGOs 
has frequently been analysed as just such a political process as much as an 
analytical or problem solving one, (e.g. Park 2005, Clegg 2010), with 
concomitant  suggestions  that  IGO  policy  is  frequently  not  properly 
thought   through,   not   properly   co-ordinated,   and   poorly   executed 
(Dijkzeul 1997, Dijkzeul & Beigbeder 2003, Winters 2004). 
   
Organisational sociology and institutionalist theory focused primarily on 
how an organisation such as an IGO acquires specific rules, structures and 
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norms, and on the effect that this process has on the organisation’s 
activities and behaviour, without commensurate assumptions of hierarchy 
or rationality (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Finnemore 1993, Jepperson, 
Wendt & Katzenstein 1996).   According to Babb (2003), sociologists have 
repeatedly observed  that the connection between actors’ explicit 
intentions and organisational outcomes can be tenuous at best (March & 
Olsen 1976). Organisations moreover are recognised as acting in 
ambiguous and confusing environments, often making use of limited 
technologies and conflicting mandates that make it difficult for them to 
achieve their mission (Lindblom 1959, March & Olsen 1989, Babb 2003:5). 
It has been suggested that this is especially true of public sector 
organisations: ‘Government organisations are not, in Weber’s sense, 
rationally constructed. This might be true if at least three conditions are 
met: people understand completely and explicitly define organisational 
problems, issues, and possible solutions; managers control inputs, resource 
levels, and outputs; and people make decisions without the influence of 
their own assumptions, beliefs and feelings’ (Rusaw 1998:7). The 
implication, however, is that they are not met. 
   
The constructivist turn in IGO analysis 
    
Quite early in the study of IGOs the extent of their self-absorption and 
indifference to external influence was noted: an initial example was that 
the creation of the League of Nations after the First World War spawned a 
literature on how international bureaucracies worked, which was then 
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added to by the creation of the United Nations with its many agencies 
following the Second World War. Famously the agencies of the League of 
Nations continued to operate virtually normally for the first eight months 
of World War II (Ranshofen-Wertheimer 1945). With the creation of the 
European Community (EC), research placed a special emphasis on the role 
of the Commission as an emerging supranational bureaucracy (Benner, 
Mergenthaler & Rottmann 2007:6). Beyond the strictly administrative 
functions of the secretariat, IGOs can and do have bodies that deal with 
scientific research, technical standards, adjudicating disputes, and 
interactions with member countries (Barkin 2006:29) (although this has 
never applied to risk management). Moreover, ‘there is a notable variation 
in  the  role  and  influence  of  these  international  bureaucracies  that  is 
difficult to explain through their mandate, resources and function’ 
(Biermann  &  Siebenhũner  2009:4).     Views  of  IGOs  as  self-centred, 
however, and largely independent of the interests of the nation states that 
fund them, have been characterised as ‘constructivist’ works which have 
tended to  focus on exploring what have been described as the more 
‘subtle’ forms of power exerted by IOs, ‘through which they are able to 
manufacture autonomy from their state-masters’ (Clegg 2010a:13).   A 
constructivist view envisages a rationalist conception of international 
relations, whether realist or liberal, as inherently ‘restricted ‘(Reinalda & 
Verbeek  2004a:24)  –  static,  incapable  of  understanding  fluidity, 
uncertainty and contingency. Constructivists say that interests should not 
be taken as given, and norms (discussed below) are more important than 
rationalists  conceive.  ‘They  allow  for  the  possibility  that  behaviour  in 
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international relations is not interest-driven, but rather motivated by 
identity and related beliefs, norms and values’ (Price & Reus-Smit 1998, 
Ruggie 1993, 1998, 1998a, Weldes 1998, Checkel 1998, 1999, Reinalda & 
Verbeek 2004a). 
   
Recent constructivist work on IGOs has therefore attempted to drive a 
wedge between the focus of sociological institutionalism on rational, 
Weberian bureaucracies and the focus of organisational theory (following 
Thompson 1967) on the empirical facets of organisational culture in 
individual international bureaucracies, analysing bureaucracies as ‘social 
processes and collective entities constituted by their distinct organizational 
cultures, structures and behaviours’ (Biermann & Siebenhũner 2009:8). 
  
 
Even in some early case studies this point was made explicitly: an early 
example   was   a   review   of   the   UNCTAD   Secretariat:   ‘whereas   the 
conception of a hierarchical organizational system is ‘one with a carefully 
delineated  authority  structure  founded  soundly  on  rational  roles 
legitimized by protocol, procedures, manuals and in other formal ways’ 
(Brown 1980:241), and officially, the UNCTAD Secretariat followed a 
hierarchical pattern, the planning and execution of work was claimed to 
follow  a  ‘more  democratic  format’    (Brown 1980:242),  and  had  been 
found to have had a contribution to UNCTAD’s policies on trading 
preferences (Bhattacharya 1976). Brechin (1989) applied ideas from 
institutional  and  contingency  theory  to  forestry  projects  of  IGOs.  A 
number of case studies were also written on the response of international 
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organisations to humanitarian disasters, particularly in respect of 
peacekeeping operations, many identifying flaws with the functioning of 
these organisations (Weiss & Pasic 1997, Whitman 1999, Chayes, Chayes & 
Raach 1997, Walkup 1997, Djikzeul 1997, 2000). A conclusion authors 
frequently drew was that the management of United Nations agencies 
was in need of reform (e.g. Beigbeder 1996), even that IGOs may 
frequently exhibit a ‘pathology’ or organisational dysfunction (Babb 2003), 
such that their behaviour appeared at odds with their organisational 
mission – or, as some authors suggested, behaviour that simply does not 
make sense (Beer & Eisenstat 2000) or at least as having bureaucratic 
problems associated with organisations of their size (Weaver & Leiteritz 
2005). 
    
Donors and policymakers alike are now able to refer to analyses of specific 
policy formation within IGOs that have opened the ‘proverbial black box’ 
of IGOs (Park & Vetterlein 2010:xi) and explored the policy-making process 
within them – largely from a constructivist perspective. Constructivist 
scholars  see  IGOs  as  actors  in  their  own  right,  playing  a  significant, 
growing and identifiable role in international political economy (Barnett & 
Finnemore 1999,2004, Dijkzeul & Beigbeder 2003). Reinalda & Verbeek 
identified studies showing IGOs as agenda setters (e.g. Pollack 1997, 
Reinalda and Verbeek 1998), adjudicators (Alter 2001) and teachers 
(Finnemore 1996) and as affecting decision-making processes (Reinalda 
and Verbeek 2004). A range of studies of IGO policies have now emerged, 
including  in  technical  subject  areas  (e.g.  Reinalda  and  Verbeek  1998, 
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2004, Joachim, Reinalda & Verbeek 2008), Apart from general critiques of 
the way the World Bank worked (Mallaby 2004), case studies of World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy formulation have been 
written (e.g. Park 2005, Best 2005, Weaver & Leiteritz 2005, Leiteritz 2002, 
2005, Momani 2005, 2010, Broome & Seabrooke 2007, Chwieroth 2010, 
Moschella 2010). There now has also been work on accountability within 
the World Bank (Park 2007), on the social policy of the World Bank 
(Vetterlein 2007, Williams 2008), on the development of the idea of social 
capital at the World Bank (Bebbington, Woolcock, Guggenheim & Olson 
2006) and on the theoretical implications of World Bank poverty policy 
(Clegg 2010), as well several critiques of World Bank Development policy 
in  general,  picked  out  through  a  range  of  case  studies  (e.g.  Fine, 
Lapavitsas & Pincus 2001, Bayliss, Fine & Van Waeyenberge 2011), both of 
these texts including analyses of the evolution of World Bank policy 
towards agriculture specifically (Pincus 2001, Oya 2011). Other studies 
have shown that the composition of staff is a decisive factor for policy 
change in IGOs (Vetterlein 2007:529, Chwieroth 2007) and that policy 
change within the World Bank is more likely to take place when it ‘fits’ 
with the existing organisational culture, i.e. when the ideas behind policy 
change are ‘adjacent’ to the ideas already extant and circulating within 
the IGO (Nielson, Tierney & Weaver 2006). Scholars have sought to use 
case studies to show that external and internal triggers are related and 
reinforce each other (Vetterlein 2007:515).  These studies ought to serve 
the process of identifying best practice, correcting previous errors and 
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A typical constructivist conclusion about the role of an IGO (in this case 
the IMF) is that it works as ‘a diffuser of technical knowledge, a soothsayer 
to audiences in the international political economy, and a weapon to be 
used by domestic political audiences’ (Broome & Seabrooke 2007:596). It 
should be noted also that these case studies have been conducted against 
a backdrop of a significant literature on the purpose, selection criteria, 
analytical significance, advantages and pitfalls of the case study approach 
to international relations generally (Bennett 2004, Bennett & Elman 2006, 
2007, Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004). 
Policy change at IGOs 
Management  science  is  replete  with  analyses  of  how  change  occurs 
within  organisations –  much  of  it,  however, of  change  within  private 
sector organisations, the lessons from which may not be applicable in 
whole or part to IGOs. That decisions are not entirely ‘programmed’ was 
argued  by  Simon  (1977),  but  this  approach  did  not  dominate 
management science for many decades. As it began to do so, policy 
change as a ‘tectonic’ response to the gradual accumulation of factors was 
postulated (Hall 1993). More recently, organisational change has been 
seen as processual, involving the application of an understanding of a 
complex and chaotic organisational reality (Kritsonis 2005). Unforeseen 
consequences of planned organisational change, resistance, political 
processes,    negotiations,    ambiguities,    diverse    interpretations    and 
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misunderstandings  are  part  of  this  (Balogun  2006).  Change  therefore 
must be seen as an ‘open, continuous and unpredictable process, without 
any clear beginning or ending‘ (Balogun 2006:27). 
   
And as a result of these pressures, internal and external, there may be 
significant variation in an organisation’s activities over time, which has 
been described as organisational slippage: a process that transforms core 
organisational goals causing organisations to develop in ways that would 
surprise – or even shock – the original founders (Babb 2003:7). 
Organisations have also been said to have a tendency towards what has 
been  called  mimetic isomorphism, i.e.  they  tend  to  imitate  other 
organisations that  appear to  be successful (DiMaggio &  Powell  1983). 
Thus a second potential source of organisational behaviour is coercive 
pressure emanating from more powerful organisations 
   
Studies also referred to organisational memory – shared interpretations of 
the past in organisational learning – the creation, retailing and transfer of 
knowledge, envisaging learning as not just a technical but a social process 
(Casey 1997, Easterby-Smith, Araujo & Burgoyne 1999). Recent studies of 
learning  inside  the  United  Nations  have  often  focused  on  the 
accumulation of UN experience in peacekeeping (e.g. Benner & Rottmann 
2008) using a definition of organisational learning as   ‘a process of 
cognitive change through the questioning of the means and/or ends of 
addressing problems. The process manifests itself in the development and 
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actions’ (Benner, Binder & Rotmann 2007:41). However critics have 
suggested that determining and operating on universal and generalized 
rules (for peacekeeping) might not be possible in the case of peace- 
building because of the historic specificity of the individual cases (Barnett 
2005). 
    
By contrast, in an evidenced-based Harvard Business School study of why 
change initiatives frequently fail within firms, Kotter lists eight reasons for 
their failure, noting that change takes time and skipping any step 
frequently  fails  to  produces change.  All  too  often,  he  asserts,  change 
agents do not systematically plan for creating short-term wins, declare 
victory too soon and fail to consolidate their gains as ‘new approaches are 
fragile and subject to regression’ (Kotter 1995:66). To achieve successful 
change, he argues, it is first necessary to 1, Establish a sense of urgency, 2. 
Create a guiding coalition: Kotter observes:   ‘Efforts that don’t have a 
powerful enough guiding coalition can make apparent progress for a 
while. But, sooner or later, the opposition gathers itself together and stops 
the change’ (Kotter 1995:63). 3. Develop vision and strategy 4. 
Communicate the change vision 5. Empower broad-based action 6. 
Generate short-term wins 7. Consolidate gains and produce more, and 
finally 8. Anchor new approaches to the culture. This list is important 
because it provides a checklist against which attempts to change policy 
towards market based risk management instruments within IGOs can be 
viewed. 
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Periodic reviews of the theoretical basis of change within organisations 
have  been  made  (e.g.  Kritsonis  2005).  By  comparison  however  case 
studies do not tend to incorporate a theoretical basis such as this for the 
analysis of policy change at lower levels within an organisation (e.g. 
Pettigrew 1973).   Commentators on IGOs have repeatedly stressed that 
they face a complex, changing and heterogeneous task environment, that 
there is no technically rational basis on which to evaluate their 
performance, that there is a  lack  of means to  direct the quantity and 
quality of employees and departments, and that organisational autonomy 
may be limited (e.g. Haas 1990, Brechin 1997, Babb 2003). In short, they 
can be described as presenting a potential management nightmare as 
managers may have complicated and even contradictory objectives, may 
not have access to clear signals of performance: for example in the words 
of Kornai (1986), that they face ‘soft budget constraints’. So Finger & 
Macharinos-Ruchat argue that the organisational transformation that 
UNCTAD underwent during the 1990s was: ‘the result of a complex 
interaction between internal dynamics and external pressures. Such 
pressures generally stem from the various stakeholders, the customers, 
and/or the owner(s) (Finger & Macharinos-Ruchat 2003:142). They 
explained how a public organisation such as UNCTAD ‘can and did 
transform from a what they described as a basically bureaucratic one with 
a developmental paradigm which looked to non-market solutions into an 
organisation  concerned  with  efficiency,  transparency,  and 
competitiveness, which they characterise as ‘an entrepreneurial 
organisation in the sociological sense of the word, not necessarily in the 
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economic sense’ (Finger & Macharinos-Ruchat 2003:144). Use of the term 
 
‘transformation’  would  suggest  an  irreversible  process  –  and  perhaps 
imply its desirability. However, as will be seen below (Chapter Seven) in 
relation to at least one of the policy areas ‘transformed’ within UNCTAD – 
policy on market based risk management instruments (for agriculture and 
other commodities), this has not been the case.  No such examination of 
the  change  in  attitudes  and  policies  within  FAO  exists:  there  do  not 
appear to be any equivalent studies to that of Finger and Macharinos- 
Ruchat for FAO. 
   
The role of norms in IGO policymaking 
    
Constructivist theorists of how organisations work have promoted a 
number of different concepts in explaining how IGOs work. Constructivists 
hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational 
as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as 
instrumental dimensions; that they express both individual and collective 
intentionality; and (with varying degrees of insistence) that the meaning 
and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and 
place (Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986, Ruggie 1998:879). At its most 
straightforward constructivism reduces to a manifesto: ‘All policies are 
grounded in ideas’ (Park & Vetterlein 2010a:4).   The most general term 
used for these factors are norms, a concept still in widespread current use 
(e.g. Park 2003, 2005, 2006, Clegg 2010a). Norms were defined by 
Finnemore    (who    analysed    institutional    theory    on    international 
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organisations as teachers of norms (Finnemore 1993)) as ‘shared 
expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors’ 
such that ‘[u]nlike ideas which may be held privately, norms are shared 
and social; they  are not  just subjective but intersubjective’  (Finnemore 
1996: 22–23). A more recent definition holds that ‘Policy norms have been 
defined as shared expectations for all relevant actors within a community 
about what constitutes appropriate behaviour, which is encapsulated in 
Fund [IMF] or [World] Bank policy’ (Park & Vetterlein 2010:4, italics in 
original). The concept has not been without its critics, even from 
constructivists themselves who have suggested (amongst other criticisms 
of especially ‘mainstream’ constructivism, e.g. Reus-Smith 2002) that they 
amount to nothing more than shared expectations (Onuf 2002). 
   
One important question about norms is how they change. Those who 
have most recently advanced and debated the concept of policy norms 
have not suggested that they are immutable, and indeed have specifically 
suggested that they are not (Park & Vetterlein 2010a:5). They suggested a 
series of stages for policy norm change within an IGO, essentially a process 
of rise and fall. The rise is a period in which the policy norm is ‘increasingly 
seen to be the right thing to do by relevant actors to the point where it 
solidifies as a policy norm’ (Park & Vetterlein 2010:5) - or it fails (Leiteritz & 
Moschella 2010). If it succeeds, the policy norm stabilises ‘such that it 
becomes taken for granted’ (Park & Vetterlein 2010:5) and itself exercises 
power and commands obedience. Then, finally, the policy norm declines. 
In their conclusion the editors add that the policy norm’ may regenerate in 
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the  future’  (Park  &  Vetterlein  2010b:236),  a  suggestion  that  will  be 
explored (and  defended) in  practice in  subsequent chapters. However 
they also caution that for a norm to change, something powerful must 
propel it, because ‘norms are not merely external to actors (and therefore 
only a constraint on actions) but are constitutive of actors’ identities, which 
determine their dispositions’ (Park & Vetterlein 2010b:240). 
   
Examples of norms cited in the International Relations literature range 
widely, e.g. from womens’ suffrage and the use of land mines (Finnemore 
& Sikkink 1998), to the ‘struggle’ against apartheid (Klotz 1995) to capital 
controls (Abdelal 2010, Chwieroth 2010). What is noticeable about these 
particular norms – and their attraction for constructivist scholars - is that 
they can all potentially inform the debate about the extent to which IGOs 
can influence state behaviour, that they may that in certain circumstances 
lead states to redefine their interests or even their sense of self (Ruggie 
1998:868, Blyth 1997) Whether they are in any sense objectively ‘true’ or 
not is argued to be irrelevant; they may even parallel what Schein (1985) 
calls organisational ‘mythology’. The mythology gives the organisation’s 
members some principles regarding good and bad actions and characters 
in that culture (Schabracq 2007:17). Mention should also be made of the 
possibility that what has been described as a ‘norm complex’ may emerge 
(Bernstein 2001:6, Wiener 2009). A norm complex emerges when a 
number of different norms all point, at least for a period, to a single policy 
preference. 
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One important and much discussed set of international norms is that the 
economic welfare of developing countries can best be advanced by the 
adoption of ‘properly’ functioning markets and market economies and 
associated institutions: extending the reach of markets into society and 
making them work well (Stiglitz 1998). This collection of norms – often 
described as the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) (Birdsall & Fukuyama 
2011) has been criticised as ‘a complete, although in the end highly 
unsatisfactory, system for further foisting market discipline upon the 
underdeveloped  world  in  the  pursuit  of  poverty  reduction’  (Carroll 
2010:12), and also that although Stiglitz provided a new conceptual 
framework, he failed to link it up with a viable operational strategy (Pincus 
&  Winters  2002).  Although  widely  recognised  as  adopted  within  the 
World Bank and the IMF, it was eventually adopted – at least temporarily - 
by most divisions of UNCTAD - though not without angst and dissension 
(Finger& Magarinos-Ruchat 2003) and even eventually (so far as risk 
management  is  concerned)  at  the  FAO,  as  discussed  below  (Chapter 
Eight). 
   
The policies identified as constitutive of the Washington Consensus and 
the PWC did not explicitly include what has been described as ‘the 
privatization of risk’ (Eatwell 1997:6, Eichengreen 2008), but market based 
risk  management  policies  are  consistent  with  privatisation,  the 
liberalisation  of   foreign   direct   investment,   deregulation  and   secure 
property rights (Toye 1987, Eatwell 1997, Williamson 2000:252-3). As has 
been suggested, ‘neo-liberalism has been about the state promotion of 
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private capital in general and of finance in particular’ (Bayliss, Fine & Van 
Waeyenberge 2011a:8).  The associated market oriented policy norms of 
the Washington Consensus and its subsequent evolution can be accepted 
as a starting point for the analysis of the development of IGO policy 
towards market based risk management instruments. 
   
That IGOs have functioned as ‘norm diffusers’ has been well documented 
in the literature. The performance of the IMF during the first phase of the 
Washington Consensus is frequently cited in this context and similar claims 
have been extended towards the role of the World Bank more recently 
(e.g. the historical materialist approach taken in Carroll 2010). There has 
also been work analysing the converse: on the way in which external 
actors,  such  as  ‘transnational  environmental  advocacy  networks’  (Park 
2005:112) have made IGOs into ‘norm consumers’ rather than the 
originators of norms (Park 2005:112). One example of policy (and 
structural) change within a UN organisation is a study of the United 
Nations Office for Project Services (Dijkzeul 2000). Another is an analysis of 
structural change within UNCTAD (Finger & Macharinos-Ruchat 2003). 
   
IGOs interacting with one another 
 
  
 
An early review suggested that the literature of organisation theory had 
little to say about the interaction of organisations, despite its importance to 
international relations (Gordenker & Saunders 1978). Part of the absence 
was due to scepticism: Harold Seidman, a distinguished scholar of public 
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administration, once mocked ‘interagency coordination’ as a public 
administrator’s – and academic’s – philosopher’s stone (Bardach 1998:v). 
Collaboration has been said to have improved in practice over time – in its 
most interesting manifestations it has been suggested to go beyond 
traditional cost sharing in order to achieve economies of scale, and extend 
to the creation of joint-production capabilities, both in service delivery and 
in regulatory enforcement (Bardach 1998). If this is true it may go some 
way to explaining the development of theories of collaboration. For 
example, resource dependence theory holds that although agencies in 
general value autonomy and therefore eschew collaboration, if a local 
agency’s resource base depends on some other agency, the focal agency 
will  be  quite  willing  to  collaborate  with  the  other  agency  (Alexander 
1995). Resource dependency theory is limited, however. It aims to predict 
whether the focal agency is willing to try to collaborate with some other 
agency. It does not try to predict whether the efforts will succeed or what 
the agency will define as success, nor does it say which other agencies a 
focal agency will turn to when it has a choice of plausible collaborators. In 
practice, agency managers often have a great deal of latitude with respect 
to  definitions  of  success  and  collaborative  choices,  and  ‘if  we  are 
concerned with the creation of value-creating collaborative capacity rather 
than simply with the surface activity of collaboration, we must attend to 
these  questions’  (Bardach  1998:24).  Moreover,  ‘Resource  dependence 
may follow collaboration rather than the other way around….This sort of 
process is likely to proceed along several dimensions at once, with the 
mutual contribution of resources being contingent on the emergence of 
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some sort of common vision, a climate of mutual trust, and a technical 
capacity to make use of mutually configured resources to good effect‘ 
(Bardach 1998:24-25). It has also been suggested that changes in IGO 
behaviour may derive from the IGOs’ interactions with each other, as well 
as other international organisations (Jönsson 1986, 1993, Nielson & 
O’Keefe 2010). 
   
Discourse and depoliticised technology 
 
   
Frequently the linguistic aspect of policy formulation has been expressed 
as  a  discourse (e.g.  Grillo  1997),  which  has  been  characterised  as  ‘a 
configuration of ideas which provides the threads from which ideologies 
are woven’ (Sutton 1999:6); the term is also applied to dialogue, language 
and  conversation. It  has  been  described  as  in  a  broad sense  utilising 
textual data (Apthorpe 1986).  As noted above, policy at IGOs towards risk 
management in the time frame under consideration principally involved 
advocacy which renders the discussion of discourse potentially significant. 
   
A  further identification has  been made  of  dominant discourses which 
work by setting up the terms of reference by disallowing or marginalising 
alternatives (Shore & Wright 1997).   The term ‘political technology’ has 
been used to describe the process whereby policy is often ‘depoliticised’, if 
such depoliticisation is in the interest of a dominant group. A political 
problem is removed from the realm of political discourse and, recast in the 
neutral language of science, it is represented as objective, neutral, value- 
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free, and often termed in legal or scientific language to emphasise this. 
This reflects the ‘technology of politics’, the way various means are used to 
work within a political agenda. This masking of the political under the 
cloak of neutrality has been suggested to be a key feature of modern 
power (Shore & Wright 1997). This insight may be applied to discourse 
analysis of texts, the importance of which has been argued for by Van 
Dijk, who suggested that the exercise and maintenance of social power 
presupposes an ideological framework, which consists of socially shared, 
interest-related  fundamental  cognitions  of  a  group  and  its  members, 
mainly acquired, confirmed, or changed through communication and 
discourse (Van Dijk 1989). Policy as advocacy is not without its critics. For 
example, it has been argued that research, advocacy and practical 
implementation are not necessarily mutually consistent, nor independent. 
Not only might gaps emerge between advocacy and research that may be 
substantive (endemically so) but also functional, enabling the World Bank 
to maintain its dominant position, and suppress criticism by ignoring, 
incorporating and managing it (Fine, Lapavitsas & Pincus 2001, St Clair 
2006). Policy which claims to be exemplary in some way ‘is presented in 
language chosen mainly to attract and persuade one of this. It normally 
neither invites nor accepts refutation, especially when it takes a high moral 
posture; rather, by every trick and trope in the book, its hallmark is non- 
refutability (Apthorpe & Gasper 1996)’ (Sutton 1999:14).  This dovetails 
with  the  concept  of  the  economist  as  an  ‘objective  expert’,  prevalent 
within the World Bank (Williams 2008:42) and the IMF. Such approaches 
have been criticised on the grounds ‘ the discursive positions of dominant 
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institutions consistently exclude reflections on political economy and 
politics and thus lead to technical interventions that, even if well 
intentioned, can never succeed in addressing the problems they set out to 
tackle, because they are unable to operate upon the ‘real’ source of those 
problems’ (Bebbington, Woolcock, Guggenheim & Olson 2006:5) and that 
‘such institutions will always generate discourses that divert attention from 
overtly political questions’ (Bebbington, Woolcock, Guggenheim & Olson 
2006:6, Best 2008). 
 
   
The ‘technical’ aspects of risk management policy, including for agriculture 
 
- and they can be very technical – will be shown as lending themselves to 
just this kind of depoliticisation and masking. A serious caveat must be 
added at this point, however. Just as the concept of the change agent 
normally  carried  positive  connotations,  so  that  of  political  technology 
raises the spectre of deliberate suppression of facts, the provision of 
misleading information, or the existence of prejudice. Such assumptions 
may not be justified and certainly require careful scrutiny in the context of 
a highly technical piece of policymaking such as risk management that is 
nonetheless replete with political overtones and consequences. 
   
A further difficulty may be the technical nature of many of the 
organisations and policies themselves, such that detailed analysis of the 
subject matter of policy and decision-making at the ‘horizontal’ can only 
be reliably undertaken by those close to the organisations themselves – 
but these would also arguably be those with the least objectivity, and 
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perhaps also little incentive, to undertake such an analysis. In this regard it 
has  been  suggested  that  IGOs  operated  within  a  highly  individual 
‘language of expertise’ (Barnett & Finnemore 2004:50, Adler & Bernstein 
 
2005:304). And thus, from a constructivist perspective, ‘It may not be 
sufficient to conceptualize an organization’s interests simply in terms of 
survival (i.e. tasks, personnel and budget). International organizations’ 
preferences may stem from substantive perspectives on certain 
international policy areas. Such perspectives may originate in the technical 
nature  of  international  organizations,  which  transpires  in  the  large 
number of ‘technical’ personnel’ (Reinalda & Verbeek 1998a:7). 
   
The transmission of norms - policy communities and networks 
    
Despite the differences in methodological perspective, emphasis and even 
substantive focus, it has been suggested that contributions to the new 
institutionalism all shared a deep interest in the interplay between 
structures and the agency of actors operating within or across them 
(Mintrom & Norman 2009:656). Whilst business analysts have often 
focused on such concepts as raison d’ être, mission statements, or 
organisational vision (e.g. Schabracq 2007), according to Babb (2003), 
some organisational theorists have emphasised that organisations are 
structured by the norms and values of their members, which determine 
the sorts of options that are considered legitimate (Wiener 2007). Internal 
organisational subcultures serve as an important basis for stability and 
continuity  (Smircich  1983),  but  these  are  only  one  way  that  informal 
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norms structure organisational behaviour. Much broader sets of norms 
can structure organisational activity, and these can and do change over 
time. It has been argued that perhaps most important are the norms of 
professionals, who ‘colonise’ organisations and structure organisational 
activities according to their own codes of ethics and ways of thinking 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For example, it has been suggested that 
doctors  in  hospitals  sidestep  established  bureaucratic  hierarchies,  and 
even  impose  their  own  structure  on  organisational  practice  (Friedson 
1970). Professionals evolve new techniques and ways of thinking and so 
organisations change (Babb 2003). This process has been analysed as 
horizontal (Landsberger 1961) whereby relationships in general within an 
organisation, and interdepartmental conflict in particular, are to be 
understood primarily as the result of intense personal ambitions and 
rivalries and as the result also of clique struggles between groups whose 
membership is determined not so much by departmental membership as 
by criteria such as religion and age, criteria that are irrelevant from the 
formal organisation's point of view (Kolb & Bartunek 1992). The ‘new 
institutionalists’  (e.g.  Lindblom 1980,  Brewer &  De  Leon 1983,  Gibson 
1999) drew on political economy theory to stress that:  (a) decision makers 
are pursuing their own personal goals, e.g. increasing their influence and 
protecting their job; and (b) decision makers work to modify institutions to 
help them achieve these goals. This view of the policy making process has 
been suggested to be particularly relevant for e.g. studying wildlife 
management in developing countries. As Gibson observed, ‘New 
institutionalists provide tools useful to the study of African wildlife policy 
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by placing individuals, their preferences, and institutions at the centre of 
analysis. They begin with the assumption that individuals are rational, self– 
interested actors who attempt to secure the outcome they most prefer. 
Yet, as these actors search for gains in a highly uncertain world, their 
strategic interactions may generate suboptimal outcomes for society as a 
whole. Thus, rational individuals can take actions that lead to irrational 
social outcomes’ (Gibson 1999:9–10).  New institutionalism is not limited 
to explaining ecosystem management policymaking in developing 
countries. The effect that individual actor goal seeking behaviour had on 
how analytical ecosystem health models were used to manage national 
forests in the United States (USA) during the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s has also 
been documented (Healy & Ascher 1995). 
   
Theory also exists on the way individuals work within organisations to 
develop policy, which can be extended to the way in which policy norms 
are established and developed within organisations. These have been 
characterised within (and between) organisations as policy networks 
(Wilks & Wright 1987, Rhodes 1981, 1988, 1997, Marsh & Rhodes 1992, 
Schnettler 2003,  Besussi  2006)  and  policy communities (Coleman  & 
Skogstad 1990, Haas 1992). Both concepts have been subject to 
incremental theoretical contributions and periodic detailed reviews (e.g. 
Atkinson & Coleman 1992, Skogstad 2005). Haas defined an epistemic 
community as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy- 
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas 1992:3, Adler 
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& Haas 1992) The idea was applied to issues such as the role of scientists 
in arms control (Adler 1992). Sutton emphasised the exclusivity of the 
policy community – there are outsiders as well as insiders (Sutton 1999:6). 
In her view, epistemic communities may for example express strong 
opinions about the way policy decisions should be made, and if more 
senior decision-makers agree with these positions, they may invite the 
experts into the circles of power, thereby providing an opportunity for 
such communities to have a substantial influence on the policy process 
(Sutton 1999:7). Norms are frequented suggested to be diffused through 
a policy network/coalition.  a group of individuals and/or organisations 
who  share  similar  belief  systems,  codes  of  conduct  and  established 
patterns of behaviour: in summary, shared norms (Barnett & Finnemore 
2004).  There  has  been  much  debate  in  the  political  science  literature 
about what policy networks and epistemic/policy communities are and 
how the concepts differ from one another. In one approach a policy 
community is defined as a stable, tightly-knit group of relationships, with 
more restrictive membership and greater insulation from other institutions 
than a policy network (Rhodes 1981, 1988). In this definition, a policy 
network is by contrast a broader system of relationships, which are less 
stable and less restrictive. A policy community can therefore be seen as a 
subset of a policy network. In a second approach policy communities are 
envisaged more broadly, as a group of actors who share an interest in the 
same policy area and succeed in influencing policy over time (Wilks & 
Wright  1987,  Coleman  &  Skogstad  1990).  In  this  definition  a  policy 
network  refers  to  the  system  of  relationships  that  links  the  policy 
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community together. Policy networks and communities provide a means 
policy norms can be integrated with policy development. Schnettler 
declares that ‘As Castells put it:   ‘Networks constitute the new social 
morphology of our societies’ [Castells 1996:469]. This new ‘social 
morphology’ is characterized by the ubiquity of network-like bonds, on the 
micro- (interactional networks), the intermediate (interorganisational 
networks) and the macro-structural levels (international networks)’, 
(Schnettler 2003:201). Schnettler concedes that the ‘co-operation’ implied 
by networks is represents ‘intrinsically vague’ terms (Schnettler 2003:202). 
It has been argued e.g. that the PWC gained credence inside the IMF 
because of the common professional education of staff members 
(Chwieroth  2007),  and  because  advocates  of  the  PWC  held  senior 
positions within the IMF (Abdelal 2007). 
   
Other commentators on IGOs have taken a different perspective on the 
significance of an epistemic community, arguing for example that along 
with moral authority, the other primary source of independent IGO power 
in international politics is control over, and ability to create, information, 
and that one way in which IGOs exercise this control is through ‘epistemic 
communities’ (Barkin 2006:24). It has been suggested that these insights 
had  a  narrowing  effect  in  terms  of  the  wider  theoretical  disparities 
amongst international relations theorists noted above: ‘Work on epistemic 
communities and, more recently, on transnational policy networks has 
brought research on international regimes closer to the insights offered by 
constructivists’ (Checkel 1998:329). 
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The role of individuals – change agents, policy and norm entrepreneurs 
    
There is substantial overlap between the theoretical categories used by 
management theory and public policy analysts: most notably the use of 
the terms ‘change agent’ and ‘policy entrepreneur’ which are if not 
interchangeable then at least highly correlated. The concept of a ‘change 
agent’ was first developed by Bridger (Ambrose 2001). In relation to public 
sector organisations, it has been suggested, change agents are individuals 
who have an interest in transforming them and who, it is claimed, use 
skills of thinking holistically, planning, coordinating and facilitating to 
enable transformation to occur. They can be either insiders within public 
sector organisations or consultants but possessing exceptional human 
relations skills (Rusaw 1998, Schabracq 2007). But it is not clear from the 
literature at what level within an organisation a change agent must work: 
highly relevant to the issue of how policy towards market based 
agricultural risk management has evolved within IGOs is the way in which 
policymaking on such technical issues as these have persistently been 
devolved to the middle management level of the organisation. 
   
In his pioneering use of the term policy entrepreneur, Kingdon (1995, 
originally 1984) noted that policy entrepreneurs “could be in or out of 
government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or 
research organizations. But their defining characteristic, much as in the 
case  of  a  business  entrepreneur,  is  their  willingness  to  invest  their 
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resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope 
of a future return” (Kingdon 1995:122).The literature on public 
management now contains many analyses of the work of public 
entrepreneurs (e.g. Schneider, Teske & Mintrom 1995, Osborn 2005, Van 
der  Steen  &  Groenewegen  2009,  Oborn,  Barrett  &  Exworthy  2011). 
‘Individual leadership, then, means that an international civil servant is 
able  to  affect  decision  making  on  the  basis  of  his  or  her  own  policy 
agenda. The prime example is UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, 
but similar claims have been made for others, such as the chairman of the 
European Commission’ Walter Hallstein (Reinalda & Verbeek 2004a:20). 
Policy entrepreneurs in IGOs have been credited with everything from the 
acceleration of regional integration within the European Union (Sandholtz 
1992, Ross 1995), ‘the cases of Tommy Koh in the Law of the Sea 
negotiations,  Mustapha  Tolba  of  the  UN  Environmental Program,  and 
Jean  Monnet in  the  European  Community  are  often  cited’  (Moravcsik 
1998:3).   As   noted   by   Reinalda   &   Verbeek   (2004)   however,   the 
concomitant analytical result, however, has been to tend to regard the 
international bureaucracy of an IGO – the secretariat - as a unitary actor, 
represented by the organization's administrative leader, the secretary- 
general (e.g. Madokoro 2010). 
  
 
Attempts  to  develop  a  theory  of  public  policy  entrepreneurship  has 
focused on the idea of public agents as nominal stewards of resources that 
are commonly or jointly owned by members of a community, a concept 
that   leads   easily   to   related   concepts   such   as   resource   allocation, 
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externalities, public-private cooperation and the drawing of parallels 
between private and public sector entrepreneurship. (Ostrom 2005, Klein, 
Mahoney,  McGahan  &  Pitelis  2010).  ‘A  public  entrepreneur  may  be 
defined as a person who creates or profoundly elaborates a public 
organization so as to alter greatly the existing pattern of allocation of 
scarce public resources’ (Lewis 1985:9).There has also been a suggestion 
that  public entrepreneurship may  be  inappropriate, even incompatible 
with democratic values and not suitable for use in public bureaucracies. 
Certainly, the link to neoliberal conceptualising about IGOs is explicit: IGOs 
may become ‘entrepreneurial’ (Finger & Magarinos-Ruchat 2003). 
   
Finally, there is the concept of a ‘norm entrepreneur’ (Finnemore & Sikkink 
 
1998). However, Finnemore and Sikkink do not offer a clear explanation 
about what strategies and means norm entrepreneurs applied in 
persuading other actors on the process and more work remains to be 
done in this area (Madokoro 2010:2). 
   
Why individuals act as change agents, policy or norm entrepreneurs is 
another subject: there are some advocates of rational choice models (e.g. 
Cox and Jacobson 1973, Strange 1998) but although criticisms are well 
described in the literature there is no consensus on a replacement model 
of individual behaviour any more than for the organization as a whole 
(Nicholson 1998).   Instead, a range of not always wholly compatible 
interests has been suggested e.g. improving services to their own 
communities, sharing the burden for increasing benefits, the stimulus of 
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innovation, the respect they receive from others, as well as the income 
they derive from their positions in the public service for those who are not 
entirely volunteer workers (Mintrom 2000). Moreover, change if it is to be 
successful requires 'transitional' environments where knowledge and 
experience can be learned and developed, and where new structures and 
working practices can be tested and refined (Ambrose 2001). 
   
Towards a Synthesis? 
 
   
Most recent case studies of IGO policy, though starting predominantly 
from a constructivist perspective, have accepted that both approaches can 
have merit, or even be combined.  So for example ‘the study of decision 
making  within  international organizations needs a  more relaxed, 
pragmatic attitude towards the rationalist/constructivist divide that 
currently characterizes the international  relations discipline. This requires 
us to focus on those elements that suggest the compatibility of rationalist 
and   constructivist   arguments,   rather   than   on   their   incompatibility’ 
(Reinalda & Verbeek 2004a:11-12).  Again, ‘A rigorous non-rigid approach 
also calls for bridging the exaggerated divide between “rationalist” and 
“constructivist” approaches’, has been suggested (Benner, Morgenthaler & 
Rottmann 2007); and ‘rationalism and constructivism have more in 
common  than  stylizations  of  them  as  containing  different  ontologies 
would suggest… we should seek “to integrate their insights rather than 
pitting them against one another in a gladiatorial contest’ (Keohane 2006: 
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76). Hence the suggestion that ‘I argue for a third way—one that 
synthesizes both approaches’ (Vetterlein 2007:514). 
   
For example one recent analysis, of the World Bank Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper initiative, drew the conclusion that ‘Using a morphogenic 
model to synthesise the agential influence of state preferences and the 
structural influence of social environments, the insights of the two 
dominant approaches to the study of I[G]Os can be incorporated to 
provide a more nuanced analytic framework for comprehending 
contemporary processes of change within international organisations’ 
(Clegg 2010:60). In another recent study of IMF policy the view was 
expressed  that  ‘the  limited  explanatory  power  of  extant  hypotheses 
derives from their one-dimensional focus on one set of variables over the 
other – be it the economic interests of powerful members or the technical 
expertise of IMF staff’ (Moschella 2010:9). 
   
Insofar as this is a conclusion that neither a P-A nor a constructivist 
approach can completely explain the evolution of IGO policy – IGO policy 
cannot be completely explained away by donor states’ wishes, nor entirely 
by internal factors – this is surely uncontentious. But although the answer 
may lie in between and both approaches have value, the question 
originally posed remains relevant for further empirical analysis: to what 
extent do IGOs exercise policy autonomy? How can their behaviour be 
explained? And what drives policy change at IGOs in regard to specific 
policies? 
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Part Two: Agricultural Commodities and Risk Management 
    
The literature on international commodity policy 
    
The welfare effects of price stabilization on a closed economy have a long 
tradition of analysis in the literature, being investigated by inter alia  by 
Waugh (1944), Oi (1961), Massell (1969, 1970), Newbery & Stiglitz (1979) 
Gilbert (1985) and Choi & Johnson (1990), without any firm conclusion 
being drawn as to the welfare implications of freely fluctuating market 
prices,  although  it  has  been  suggested  that:  ‘The  predictions  of  the 
(Massell 1969) model are readily derived … and are quite precise:   (i) 
producers gain and consumers lose from price stabilisation if the source of 
instability lies on the supply side; (ii) consumers gain and producers lose 
from price stabilisation if the source of instability lies on the demand side; 
(iii) in both cases, gainers could afford to over-compensate the losers, so 
there are net benefits from price stabilisation (Newbery & Stiglitz 1981:18). 
It has also been argued that whilst international commodity agreements 
are difficult to achieve, a small country can reduce the impact of external 
shocks by pursuing domestic price stabilization independently (Choi & 
Johnson 1990:13). 
   
Both reviews of international commodity policy before and after World 
War II have been written (e.g. Rowe 1965) as well as specialist studies of 
individual commodity agreements (e.g. Fox 1974).  Following World War II 
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it was the famous economist John Maynard Keynes who suggested that 
pre-war experience of piecemeal commodity price stabilisation by 
producers should be replaced by comprehensive regulation by 
governments  working  through  an  international  organisation  (Keynes 
1943). The originality of Keynes’s proposal (his work on commodities is 
reviewed in Dimand & Dimand 1990) was that stabilization would be (i) 
comprehensive and (ii) controlled by governments or international 
organisations and not, as in the interwar period, by producers. After World 
War II economists began to question long-standing notions of increasing 
commodity scarcity, associated with the ideas of Malthus (1820), Ricardo 
(1817) and Hotelling (1931). Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) 
independently offered the hypothesis that, because of differing elasticities 
of income and demand, prices for primary commodity exports would fall 
relative to manufactured imports. Consequently, the net barter terms of 
trade  for  commodity  producing  developing  countries  would  decline. 
Soon thereafter, the two ideas were combined so that the ‘commodity 
dependency’ problem was characterised by theorising declining terms of 
trade and volatile export earnings. Generally economists argued that 
instability of export earnings limited development through adverse effects 
on income, inflation, savings and investment. As a consequence 
international development efforts were extended to key commodity 
markets as well.). This idea was behind the Prebisch Report and the 
creation  of  UNCTAD  (Prebisch  1964),  the  story  recounted  below  in 
Chapter Four. Much of the literature in succeeding decades regarding the 
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implementation of  international commodities policy  is  therefore in  the 
form of publications from United Nations IGOs (e.g. UNCTAD 1974). 
   
Not all economists agreed with the prevailing interventionist views of 
commodity markets. The neoclassical economist Milton Friedman, for 
example, disputed the benefits of managing commodity income variability, 
stressing instead the importance of private savings rather than public 
stabilisation schemes in solving the ‘producer income problem‘ (Friedman 
1954).    Johnson &  Mellor (1961)  were among the first economists to 
attack the pro-urban policies and subsequent neglect of agriculture 
prevalent in  many  developing countries, arguing  that  development in 
most poor countries depended largely on the agricultural sector, whilst 
Schultz   (1964)   argued   that   agricultural   households   in   developing 
countries, while poor, were efficient and responded to economic 
incentives. 
   
There were also academic analyses critical of the many schemes that 
developed to implement commodity price and supply management. Early 
on Bauer & Parish had already expressed the view that the stabilisation 
objectives of most marketing boards were ill defined and potentially more 
of a guise for taxation than a successful development mechanism (Bauer & 
Parish 1952). In the context of West Africa, Bauer (1954) went further, 
challenging the notion that output markets were inefficient and arguing 
that marketing boards were largely a mechanism for exploiting small 
farmers. Quiggin & Anderson (1979, 1981) discussed the limits of price 
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bands  and  buffer  funds.  Other  commentators  noted  the  wide-spread 
failure of domestic stabilisation schemes of all sorts and linked the failure 
to the nature of commodity prices and underlying models of storage 
(Wright & Williams 1991). Examining the time-series properties of 
commodity prices, Deaton (1992) argued that the series did tend to be 
mean-reverting - a condition for a successful stabilisation fund - but that 
the reversion took place over years; consequently, successful stabilisation 
funds needed impractically large lines of credit. Later it was demonstrated 
theoretically that, even with hedging, commodity price movements would 
eventually bankrupt stabilisation schemes (Larson & Coleman 1994). While 
the argument that volatility reduced investment and subsequently led to 
lower rates of growth in commodity-dependent countries was perhaps 
intuitively appealing, empirical studies found only weak empirical evidence 
of  a  direct  link.  Using  data  from  Malaysian  rubber  plantations,  Caine 
(1954) challenged the negative link between revenue instability and 
investment.  Later,  MacBean  (1966)  also  challenged  the  findings  using 
cross-country data, as did Knudsen & Parnes (1975). Deaton (1992) found 
that  that,  for  Africa  overall,  expansion  periods  for  investment  and 
ultimately Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were greater during periods of 
increasing export prices than were the contractions during periods of 
falling prices. Conversely, Dawe (1996) calculated instability indices for a 
cross-section of countries by taking account of the share of exports in any 
given economy and found that export instability was negatively associated 
with growth and investment. Increasingly, economists began to ask 
whether the link between low growth and volatile commodity markets 
63
54 
had  more  to  do  with  government  mismanagement  than  a  failure  of 
private investment (Bevan, Collier & Gunning 1990). Gelb & Bourguignon 
(1988)  provided  evidence  for  this  contention  from  Venezuela  as  did 
Bevan, Collier & Gunning (1999a) for the coffee market in Kenya, where it 
was also found that large shocks depress the marginal efficiency of 
investment, and later for Nigeria and Indonesia (Bevan, Collier & Gunning 
1999). Moreover, Hausmann & Gavin (1996) argued that uncertainty over 
commodity-dependent  government  revenues  (and  fiscal  management) 
had a cascading negative effect on the economies of Latin America. 
Newbery & Stiglitz (1981) modelled the risk reduction benefits of price 
stabilisation (absent from the Waugh-Oi-Massell framework that implicitly 
assumed risk neutrality) concluding that the Massell model was flawed in 
ways that exaggerated the benefits of stabilisation. An important and 
frequent finding was that the welfare gains that were possible from price 
stabilisation were relatively small (e.g. Anderson, Blitzer, Cauchois & Grilli. 
1981, Myers & Oehmke 1988, Wright 1988, Kannapiran 2000). Moreover, 
the practical implementation of stabilisation schemes raised many thorny 
problems to be overcome by programme administrators (Anderson, Hazell 
& Scandizzo 1977). These included the difficult-to-assess supply 
responsiveness to induced stability (e.g. Just 1975, Griffiths & Anderson 
1978). 
  
  
Despite all these counterarguments, as late as 1992, Maizels wrote his 
book on ‘Commodities in Crisis’ which was mainly concerned with the 
implications of rapidly falling real commodities earnings for developing 
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countries and what international intervention should be made to effect 
better terms of trade (Maizels 1992). As noted below, Maizels was part of 
the intellectual force behind the original motivation of UNCTAD. Whilst 
international commodity price stabilisation policies failed, the USA (and 
the EU) had in place agricultural subsidy policies, which have been 
substantially criticised (e.g. Harwood, Heifner, Coble, Perry & Somwaru 
1999). 
   
 
A much more cynical and critical view of the possibilities for international 
commodities agreements was presented by a former practitioner in 1995, 
just three years after Maizels wrote his book (Raffaelli 2009). Studies that 
have  been  described  as  ‘influential’  assisted  this  critical  process 
considerably (Varangis, Larson & Anderson 2002:5). These authors were 
from the World Bank, and many of the surveys of international 
commodities policy advocating a more positive attitude towards 
liberalisation were from authors connected with this important pro-market 
IGO (e.g. Akiyama 2001). When as will be seen in succeeding Chapters the 
GFC appeared briefly to prompt rejuvenated interest in international 
commodity price management, these ideas briefly found support again in 
different IGOs (e.g. FAO 2008). 
   
Agricultural Production Risks and the history of their management 
    
It has long been widely perceived that vulnerability to risks is among the 
most  important  problems  faced  by  commodity  producers,  including 
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farmers,  in  both  developing  (e.g.  Roumasset,  Boussard,  &  Singh  1979, 
Dehn 2000) and developed economies (e.g. Just & Pope 2001, Bielza, 
Stroblmair & Gallego 2007) alike. Both the fact of this vulnerability and the 
severe consequences when risks eventuate, e.g. the bankruptcy of farmers, 
have long been held both by institutions and academics to be serious 
obstacles to the welfare of farmers and ultimately of the whole community 
(e.g. Anderson, Dillon & Hardaker 1977, World Bank/UNCTAD 1996, 
Huirne, Hardaker & Dijkhuizen 1997).  This concern has been accentuated 
by  recent perceptions that  the  risks  facing  agricultural producers have 
been increased by the effects of climate change and recent rapid changes 
in the demand for and value of agricultural production (Kevin Parris, 
interview, 15 December 2008). 
   
Although  commodity  producers,  including  farmers,  face  many  risks, 
ranging from production problems through to the availability of credit 
(Anderson &  Dillion 1992,  Chowdhury 2004,  Soumah 2001, Mohamed 
2006), one of the principal risks they face is of price volatility: IGO policy 
towards the means of control of such risks are the main subject of this 
thesis. Turning to the literature on agricultural risk management, the 
available literature is found to be correspondingly extensive. Agricultural 
soft commodity risk management has a long history.  There are a number 
of reviews of conceptual approaches to risk management strategies by 
faming households that make clear that there are a range of contrasting - 
indeed conflicting - approaches to decision-making by farming households 
(e.g.   Alderman   &   Paxson   1992,   Legesse   2000).   Siegel,   Alwang   & 
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Canagarajah (2001) developed a taxonomy of risk-coping strategies for 
rural households. First should be considered the ‘traditional’ non-market 
mechanisms used by resource-poor agriculture, sometimes referred to as 
‘survival algorithms’ (Lipton 1968), ‘coping’ strategies (e.g. Frankenburger 
 
& Goldstein 1990, Legesse 2000), ‘environmentally conservative strategies’ 
 
(Perrings  1996),  and  ‘informal  risk  sharing  arrangements’  (Fafchamps 
 
1999). These algorithms have been described as ‘environmentally 
conservative practices characterised by the substitution of low value but 
robust crops or livestock suitable for both market production and direct 
consumption. They [practitioners] tend to avoid high market value but 
environmentally susceptible crops or livestock that are not directly 
consumable’ (Perrings 1996:31). Diversification of crop production, in 
particular, has been frequently identified as a traditional agricultural risk 
management tool (e.g. Samuelson 1967, Walker, Singh & Jodha 1983, Ellis 
1998) although in the context of risk, agriculture diversification has had its 
critics (e.g. Dercon 2002). A substantial literature exists on the nature of 
traditional agricultural risk management tools, for example savings, 
especially in the form of real assets such as grain and livestock (Binswanger 
&  Rosenzweig  1986,  Rosenzweig  &  Wolpin  1993,  Dorward,  Kydd  & 
Poulton 1998) and informal risk sharing arrangements, which have been 
characterised as  consumption credit and  assistance in kind (Fafchamps 
1999), mutualisation (Cordier 2000) and gifts and mutual credit, either 
with members of the same community or distant relatives, all reviewed by 
Kurosaki & Fafchamps (2000) and most recently (and popularly)   by 
Banerjee &  Duflo (2011).  These have also been referred to  as  ‘ex-ante 
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strategies‘ by proponents of market based risk management instruments. 
Examples of ex ante strategies include the accumulation of buffer stocks as 
precautionary   savings   and   the   diversification   of   income-generating 
activities through changing labour allocation (working in farm and non- 
farm small businesses, and seasonal migration) or varying cropping 
practices (planting different crops, including drought-resistant variants, 
planting in different fields and staggered planting over time, intercropping, 
and relying on low-risk inputs) (Hess, Richter & Stoppa 2002). 
   
To the concept of traditional risk management systems has in more recent 
years been added the term ‘Integrated Pest Management’ (IPM), which 
has been defined by USDA as  ‘the use of complementary control tactics 
(e.g. crop rotation, resistant varieties) to manage pests within a sustainable 
production system that minimises economic, environmental and health 
risks’  (Hutchison  2005).  The  existence  of  these  ‘survival  algorithms’,  of 
‘traditional  methods’  of  risk  management,  and  of  IPM,  is  especially 
 
important for this thesis because their existence might suggest to critics of 
 
‘modern’  or  ‘market’  based  risk  management  instruments  that  ready 
 
alternatives exist (Dasgupta, Meisner & Wheeler 2004). 
    
According to Hardaker (2006), until relatively recently prior to his date of 
writing,  risk  got  little  or  no  attention,  at  least  in  farm  management 
research and advisory work. His suggested reasons for this were a) A 
culture of pretended certainty, which he suggested still existed to some 
extent when he wrote – who would take notice of an adviser (or political 
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leader), he asked rhetorically, who admitted, however truthfully, that he or 
she really had very little idea about what the future might bring b) No 
widely accepted theoretical framework that allowed any form of risk 
analysis to be rationalised; consequently, no well-developed and widely 
accepted methods of analysis c) In any event, with no or few computers 
and little specialist software, it was all too hard (Hardaker 2006:593). 
Hardaker further argued that the markets for some of these products were 
rather ‘thin’ (i.e. illiquid) and many of the contracts that are written are 
‘commercial in confidence’ so it is hard to judge the scale and pace of 
developments. Hardaker also made oblique reference to the failure of 
leading risk management firms Drexel Burnham Lambert and Woodhouse, 
Drake and Carey, which had both occurred relatively recently prior to his 
writing, although he was relatively optimistic about future research 
(Hardaker 2006). 
   
By contrast, there is substantial academic and business review literature on 
crop insurance programmes (e.g. Kramer 1983) and on sophisticated 
agricultural risk management instruments themselves such as futures and 
options, starting from the 1970s (e.g. Anderson, Hazell & Scandizzo, 1977, 
Barry 1984, Hazell, Pomareda & Valdes 1986, Fleisher 1990, Hardaker, 
Huirne & Anderson 1997, Just & Pope 2001).   One of the first such 
theoretical studies was by Newbery & Stiglitz (1981) whilst practical advice 
was given by Gemmill (1988). He observed that price fluctuations may 
well be necessary for the allocation of resources but was sometimes 
perceived as ‘excessive’ under free-market conditions, with the result that 
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resources are misallocated and farm incomes fluctuate unnecessarily 
(Gemmill 1988:1).   Priovolos & Duncan (1991) was the first World Bank 
intervention in the field whilst Claessens & Duncan (1993, 1994) showed 
how markets could be used to achieve many of the sectoral stabilisation 
objectives of many existing programmes in what Varangis, Larson & 
Anderson (2002) describe as a ‘sustainable’ way. Much of this literature 
concerns issues such as the evolution of US federal crop support (e.g. 
Skees 1999, Skees 2000, Dismukes & Young 2008). 
   
Literature on the benefits of market based risk management is centred on 
the implications of risk management for farmers’ economic welfare. In this 
context Lence pointed out that: ‘The promotion of instruments such as 
futures  to  manage  commodity  producers’  price  risks  is  based  on  the 
implicit assumption that they are conducive to improvements on the 
wellbeing  of  their  adopters’  Lence  (2002:1).  In  similar  vein  Varangis, 
Larson &  Anderson (2002)  argued that  the incidence of risk  and  risk- 
averse behaviour in farming has been widely perceived to be important 
for policy makers. Fluctuations in farm incomes, particularly the risk of 
catastrophic loss, may present difficult welfare problems for farmers. One 
review quoted an anecdote that ‘it has happened in some countries that 
farmers burned down their coffee trees in response to exceptionally low 
prices, with the result that they were unable to benefit from the tripling of 
coffee prices which occurred just a few years later’ (Hao 2010:155).There 
are also important spillover effects on other rural households and 
businesses.    Destroyed    crops    and    livestock    reduce    employment 
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opportunities, with serious implications for the landless rural poor in 
developing countries, and add to unemployment problems in other 
countries.  Destroyed  crops  and  stock  also  lower  farm  output  and  so 
reduce  turnover  for  agricultural  merchants  and  agro-processors. 
Moreover, reduced farm incomes have negative multiplier effects on 
income and employment for many rural non- farm businesses and towns 
(Powell & Mandeville 1978, Haggeblade & Hazell 1989). As Lence argued, 
as a result systematic econometric approaches with historical data to the 
issue of analysing the impact of agricultural risk management on farmers’ 
income and wealth are not therefore possible owing to the high volatility 
of much data (e.g. prices and output) and the absence of long time series 
on producers’ behaviour before and after the adoption of agricultural risk 
management practices. ‘Not surprisingly, there are no studies pursuing 
this line of research’ (Lence 2002). 
   
Arguments therefore have tended to revolve around principles. Alizadeh 
 
& Nomikos (2005), writing for the Futures and Options Association cited 
these and other academic papers in arguing for the superiority of market 
based  risk  management  mechanisms  over  interventionist  approaches. 
First,  using  agricultural  derivative  products  gives  producers  the 
opportunity  to  participate  in  risky  activities  which  they  would  not 
otherwise undertake (Kolb 1997). Second, trading away price risk using 
agricultural derivatives results in a more efficient allocation of resources 
compared to using on-farm methods for avoiding risk (Myers 1991, 
Hardaker, Huirne & Anderson 1997). Third, use of price risk management 
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strategies is likely to stabilise farmers’ income, which in turn implies more 
stable expenditure on farm inputs and family consumption, thereby 
providing greater security for rural businesses and society as a whole 
through increased rural employment. A downturn in farm incomes and in 
spending  by  farm  families  could  lead  to  the  closure  of  some  local 
businesses and to a withdrawal of services, yet these lost facilities may not 
be fully replaced when farmer’s incomes recover later (Hardaker, Huirne & 
Anderson 1997). The adoption of new technology may also be less than 
optimal (Hao 2010). Finally, if farmers can manage market risks effectively 
there   will   be   less   pressure   for   taxpayer-funded   support   prices   or 
emergency aid packages and a corresponding increase in the business 
resilience of the farming industry. 
   
This implicit assumption is in turn based on the belief, that ‘per capita 
growth rates are significantly reduced by large discrete negative 
commodity price shocks’ (Dehn 2000:2). In the context of a developing 
country Kazianga & Udry (2006) developed a measure of income variance 
arising from deviations of rainfall from their long run average (in 
conjunction with regression estimates of the expected farm profits). They 
found that this variance had significant positive effects on the amount of 
money rural households in Burkina Faso save. Kazianga and Udry (2006) 
found that anticipated income fluctuations had significant negative effects 
in the schooling participation and attendance for the children of the 
households again in Burkina Faso. Transitory income from rainfall shocks 
was found to have significant negative effects in schooling participation 
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and positive in drop outs from school in rural Madagascar as well (Gubert 
 
& Robillard 2006).  Price or yield shocks may result one or more family 
members taking  an  additional  off-farm job or  even migrating.  In  both 
cases this may involve withdrawal of a child from school resulting in an 
irreversible loss of potential human capital (Duryea, Lam & Levison 2007). 
As will be seen below advocates of market-based risk management 
instruments cite such studies in their defence. The majority of this literature 
- either explicitly or implicitly - supports the use of agricultural risk 
management  instruments,  partly  based  on  the  perception  that 
government government-subsidised agricultural insurance is costly, 
complex, and  leads  to  potentially significant  inefficiencies (Skees 2000, 
2003). 
    
In parallel with the demise of the ICAs (Gilbert 1996) although the 
development possibilities of commodity futures and options Exchanges 
had been visualised much earlier (Powers & Tosini 1977) the 1990s saw a 
rapid expansion of such Exchanges internationally, all of which published 
their own marketing documents promoting market agricultural risk 
management (e.g. Chicago Board of Trade 1996). Much of the literature 
also derived from the IGOs under study themselves (which will be 
discussed in depth in the substantive chapters below) or in literature 
sponsored by them, both on price risk management instruments such as 
Exchange-traded agricultural futures and options (e.g. World 
Bank/UNCTAD 1996, Varangis & Larson 1996, World Bank 2001, Scott 
2005)  and  later  derivations  such  as  weather--based  risk  markets.  (e.g. 
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Dischel 2002). Towards the end of the period under study the literature is 
focused increasingly on weather derivatives, which it was claimed could 
be used to cross-hedge agricultural production risk. The underlying 
assumption was that certain weather events (such as rainfall or 
temperature) are highly correlated with crop losses (Varangis, Skees & 
Barnett 2002:286). 
   
Although there have also been numerous accounts of the development of 
commodities and risk management techniques and instruments in 
individual countries (e.g. Vargas-Hill 2006, Ahuja 2006), and as noted 
above plenty of argument about their benefits, literature on how much 
use is made of agricultural price risk management instruments is sparse. 
Only  single  percentage  estimates  are  usually  expressed  (e.g.  Sakong, 
Hayes & Hallam 1993, Harwood, Dismukes, Vandeveer & Heifner 2000, 
Alizadeh & Nomikos 2005). Alternatively there are references to the 
difficulties of using these instruments in developing countries, (e.g. 
Claessens &  Duncan  1993,  Akiyama  2001,  Giné,  Townsend  &  Vickery 
20084). A report from India to those carried out in developed economies 
 
with respect to the practical use of derivatives suggested that the use of 
futures markets in India by farmers had been constrained by transaction 
costs, and lack of knowledge, as well as by government legislation and 
regulation, the functioning of Exchanges in India, basis risk, and lack of 
liquidity  in  the  relevant  markets  (Ramaswami,  Ravi  &  Chopra  2003). 
Potential problems associated with the use of commodity exchanges in 
 
4 A more well-known work came outside the cut-off date for this thesis: Cole S, Giné X, 
Tobacman J, Townsend R, Topalova P & Vickery J 2012, 
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developing market economies by LDC governments or companies had 
already been identified by the time of the policy developments within 
IGOs   with   respect  to   the   use   of   market   based   risk   management 
instruments in developing countries. These included exchange rate risks, 
credit  constraints,  and  basis  risk,  where  the  correlation  between  the 
futures price and the current (or ‘spot’) commodity price is low, including 
reasons  of  quality  differentials  and  transport  costs,  and  the  futures 
contract therefore provides poor protection against adverse price 
movements  in  the  underlying  commodity  (Morgan,  Rayner  &  Vaillant 
1999), To this can be added the higher relative cost of derivative 
instruments (e.g. rainfall insurance) in developing by comparison to 
developed markets (Giné, Townsend & Vickery 2008), In fact, supply chain 
intermediaries tend to be the main users of agricultural derivatives in 
developing countries (Dana & Gilbert 2008). Yet the use of futures and 
options by producers is limited even when information is plentiful and 
accurate, communication is good, awareness of opportunities is high and 
the advantages  would appear strong (Pannell,  Hailu, Weersink &  Burt 
2007, Garrido & Zilberman 2008), 
 
   
Agricultural risk management and the environment 
    
The literature in this area needs to be reviewed because of the hypothesis 
that objections to market based risk management instruments relied on 
environmental objections. However, studies of the relationship between 
agricultural  risk  management  and  the  environment  that  do  exist  are 
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remarkably few and recent, most dating from the last decade. What little 
research there has been into the impact of agricultural risk management 
instruments on the environment has focused on two major potential 
effects: extensive and intensive. The extensive effect is any increase in 
production flowing from the adoption of risk management techniques, 
whilst the intensive effect is any change in resource input use and 
management. Whilst it was reported that approximately 15 million new 
acres were brought into cultivation as a result of subsidised crop insurance 
in the USA, mostly on lands that would not be normally cultivated (Keeton, 
Skees & Long 1999), there have not been any conclusive studies on the 
extensive implications of market based agricultural risk management use: 
no one knows with any degree of reliability whether the contention that 
marginal land will be brought into agricultural production as a result of 
derivative use is true, false or a matter of statistical probability dependent 
on a number of factors (Wu 1999).  The extensive argument however has 
another important dimension for critics of agricultural risk management: 
crop specialisation. World over, crop diversification as noted above has 
been regarded as the most common and effective risk management 
strategy that is employed by farm households (e.g. Ramaswami, Ravi & 
Chopra 2003). It has been suggested that ‘Many factors may contribute to 
a  farmer’s  decision  to  diversify.  The  underlying  theory  suggests  that 
farmers are more likely to diversify if they confront greater risks in farming’ 
(Harwood, Dismukes, Vandeveer & Heifner 2000) – which risk 
management mechanisms would be expected to reduce. However 
although as will be seen below (notably in Chapter Eight) criticism of 
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market based risk management mechanisms has suggested that crop 
specialisation, even monocropping, may be an outcome of the use of such 
mechanisms, there is no evidence either way, even in a book dedicated to 
the subject of the relationship between risk management and the 
environment (Babock, Fraser & Lekakis 2003). 
   
This is not, however, the only aspect of the impact of agricultural risk 
management on the environment. There is also the ‘intensive’ aspect 
(Metcalfe & Zilberman 2001, Metcalfe, Sunding & Zilberman 2002). The 
empirical evidence from studies carried out in the US is mixed (Quiggin 
Karagiannis & Stanton 1993, Smith & Goodwin 1996, Babcock & Hennessy 
1996 in favour of risk management,   Horowitz & Lichtenberg 1993, 
Goodwin, Smith & Hammond 2000 against). However these studies are 
few and far between and evidently also contradictory in their results. 
Moreover, various measures of environmental quality may respond 
differently to risk management strategies. The literature was reviewed by 
Babcock, Fraser & Lekakis (2003) but they accept that there is an absence 
of conclusive evidence. 
   
Conclusion 
 
  
 
The available literature across the areas of research of this thesis is 
substantial but unbalanced. There is a great deal available on theories of 
change within organisations, particularly on change within large - and 
even  more  especially,  large  and  publicly-owned,  Western  firms.  This 
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literature on strategic change is closely connected with management 
science and the business schools of Western universities. 
   
There is by contrast less material available on change within public sector 
organisations, although there is now a welcome series of case studies on 
the evolution of policy norms within IGOs on which to draw. It is possible 
to  conclude  that  there  is  no  single  agreed  theory  of  policy  evolution 
within IGOs or policy coherence between them – or even a common 
understanding of what IGO policy actually is. However It has been 
suggested that constructivism could be seen as occupying middle ground 
between postmodernist theory and rational choice theorists, including 
neorealists; with the former, they share a largely common epistemology – 
with the latter, shared ontology, as well as concepts of identity and 
discourse (Checkel 1998:327). 
   
With respect to agricultural risk management there is a dichotomy. There 
is ample available on the history of international commodities policy. There 
are many academic studies on the theoretical benefits and technical 
aspects of agricultural  risk  management,  especially  in  the  form  of 
derivative contracts (and much advocacy from IGOs themselves, as will be 
seen in succeeding Chapters). There is much less written on how much 
use is actually made of derivatives by farmers, whilst a study of the limited 
academic literature available fails to reveal any empirical studies providing 
conclusive evidence of either the extensive or the intensive case for or 
against  the  use  of  agricultural  risk  management  instruments  from  an 
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environmental perspective. The result is that no remotely satisfactory, let 
alone comprehensive and conclusive, answer to the question has yet been 
provided. 
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Chapter Three: Theory and Research Methodology 
    
Theory selection 
   
 
The field of inquiry has a range of competing views on how IGO policy is 
best analysed: that debates over theory recur so regularly offers proof, it 
has been suggested, that no approach can sustain claims to monopoly on 
truth - or even on useful insights (Ruggie 1998:882). Nevertheless the 
choice of theoretical framework inevitably involves selection amongst this 
impressive, but perhaps inchoate and certainly overlapping, variety of 
different theoretical approaches to IGO policy. 
   
This problem does not apply to simpler questions of policy. The question of 
whether, for example, to install traffic lights at a particular crossroads (to 
take a straightforward example) is a policy decision which falls to one 
specific authority (in Australia for instance usually a local council or shire). 
The factors that influenced this decision and the wider policy inputs (inter 
alia traffic flow and accident information, the number of local residents 
petitioning, and the proximity of local elections) and policy considerations 
(e.g. expenditure priorities and the domino effect on other local demands 
for traffic lights) can be relatively easily identified and examined. And the 
outcome – a set of traffic lights (or not) is relatively easily identifiable. At a 
much more complex level the decision by the UN to intervene as a 
peacemaker carries  a  similar  binary,  or  almost  binary,  outcome:  either 
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there is a peacekeeping intervention or there is not, although in this case, 
unlike the standardised traffic lights with only the frequency of light 
changes  to  be  determined,  there  are  many  variables  to  be  settled, 
including major resource commitment decisions, even if the decision is in 
favour of intervention, and many different positions that can be identified 
to a greater or lesser extent with the interests of national and other major 
international actors. 
   
Risk management policy within the IGOs is different: Informing the choice 
of theoretical framework is the fact that in a world where capital flows 
have become increasingly private, and where in particular, one way 
international actors have responded to these new ambiguities is by what 
has been noted above as the ‘privatization of risk’ (Eatwell 1997:6), 
derivative market instruments have neither been created by, nor directly 
used by, IGOs as part of development policy. Nor are they much used by 
individual states: although it is just possible to argue that the USA has a 
vested interest in their promotion because of the prevalence of commodity 
exchanges  in  the  USA,  this  is  a  weak  argument  as  most  developing 
country risk management instruments would not work through US 
exchanges. In the case of risk management mechanisms, apart from the 
legal frameworks in place to permit market based solutions - here the 
reluctance of the Indian Government to permit the trading of agricultural 
derivatives may be mentioned (Ahuja 2006) - the role of governments – 
and IGOs - is secondary – the influence sought is over the behaviour of 
potential market participants. Much of the theoretical discussion revolving 
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around constructivism vs. materialism and the role of supranational actors, 
including IGOs, concerns the influence that  IGOs may  have,  as  policy 
norm originators or diffusers, in influencing state actors. The focus of this 
thesis is on the development of policy mainly as research, advocacy and 
training within the IGOs themselves. The reciprocal influence of policy as 
research, advocacy and training within the World Bank, UNCTAD and the 
FAO on national actors is another subject: whilst explaining the way ideas 
change over time requires an understanding of how they evolve jointly 
and, one might add, reciprocally, the influence of an IGO over such a 
widely held norm as preference for market based risk management by 
governments worldwide may well be quite limited. 
   
Policy as Research, Advocacy and Training 
    
Limited in design and in effect it may be, but IGO policy towards market- 
based risk management instruments has mainly been one of the 
commitment of human resources internally (and assistance provided to 
outside organisations) and the degree of emphasis placed on the issue 
within  the  organisation.  Collaboration  with  the  private  sector,  the 
provision of expertise (e.g. by UNCTAD to Exchanges in developing 
countries), the writing of papers suggesting how farmers could use market 
risk management instruments: these are all evidence of policy as research, 
advocacy and training within the IGO – campaigning might not be too 
strong a word - for a particular set of largely private sector institutions and 
their actions. 
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As a result, risk management policy in the World Bank, UNCTAD and the 
FAO has been ‘ill-defined’ by comparison to many other policy areas. Some 
commentators have suggested that there has been no policy at all – for 
example one World Bank official claimed that in respect of policy towards 
agricultural risk in developing countries that there was ‘no sort of policy – 
just a question of, can we see if things can be done to solve problems?’ 
(Marc Sadler, interview, 16 March 2011), However as noted above policy 
within an IGO has been defined differently, as encompassing research, 
advocacy, and training. Policy in the sense of the allocation of resources 
internally did not eventuate within the World Bank until right at the end of 
the period under analysis, and in the other two IGOs, not at all. There 
were few points of binary decision – and no clear outcomes, except within 
the IGOs themselves. 
   
A constructivist approach to policy as research, advocacy and training 
    
Constructivism embraces a range of different conceptions of policy 
evolution.  The  assertion  that  policy  –  including  policy  as  research, 
advocacy and training - within IGOs is purely a function of the 
organisation’s  internal  dynamics,  can  never  be  found  in  any  of  the 
literature and borders on a caricature. No analyst of IGO affairs even in the 
most trenchant rejection of a materialist conception of IGO policymaking 
has ever doubted that the external environment of an IGO plays an 
enormous,  even  decisive,  role  in  the  creation  of  policy  within  it.  The 
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direction of the causality may be questioned, however, and there are 
certainly plenty of examples from the literature of IGOs becoming norm 
leaders, or even creators in part (e.g. Chwieroth 2007, Momani 2010). As 
noted  above,  there  are  also  examples  of  IGOs  functioning  as  norm 
diffusers (e.g. Carroll 2010).  But there cannot be claims that an IGO can 
ever exist without its external environment, so no controlled experiment 
can take place of an IGO doing so, and the analysis in the case studies 
following will add to the literature that demonstrates frequent and close 
correlations – and continuous interactions - between changes in the 
external environment of an IGO and its internal policymaking (e.g. 
Moschella 2010).  Moreover, as will be discussed in more depth below, the 
dispersion  of  norms  within  and  by  IGOs  is  a  function  of  the  way 
individuals behave in groups, and no constructivist theory denies the 
influence of the external environment through the transmission of ideas 
on individual views and hence behaviour within IGOs themselves. Such an 
extreme form of constructivism is therefore not the theoretical framework 
of choice. 
   
The majority form of constructivism, the framework in which the case 
studies of this thesis are situated, has on the other hand concentrated on 
rejecting, or at least subjecting to severe questioning, the extent to which 
IGO policy has been determined as a function of a response, often 
characterised as a ‘rational’ response, to the demands, requests, and 
interests of the national, state actors, as rationalist scholars (and frequently 
politicians in their public remarks) have suggested they do – or in some 
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sense should do.  These constructivists, amongst whom can be numbered 
most of the current leading scholars in the field, have supported the belief 
ideas as decisive factors - contingent, frequently contested –and subject to 
review within the IGO itself as well as in numerous aspects of the external 
environment of the IGO. In emphasising the role of ideas within IGOs 
constructivists have turned to a wide range of alternative explanations for 
IGO policy and behaviour. They have drawn as noted above on theories 
of bureaucratic policymaking and institutional evolution (e.g. Barnett & 
Finnemore 2004,  Chwieroth 2007,  Leiteritz 2005,  Momani  2005, 
Moschella 2010, Park & Vetterlein 2010a), although Moschella notes that 
the bureaucratic explanation has merits but also limitations. In particular, 
by focusing on only the IGO’s own staff this explanation discounts the 
importance to the IMF of those agents (such as member countries, 
academic economists, and private-sector actors) whose actions are crucial 
for the implementation and thereby persistence of specific policies 
(Moschella 2010:4). 
   
In terms of the empirical aspects of the external environment of IGOs 
during the period under study, it is right to recognise that the evolution of 
policy towards agricultural risk management took place in an external 
environment in which many, and more significant (at least in terms of the 
amount of capital committed) changes were occurring, highly relevant to 
IGOs themselves: the World Bank and the IMF in particular were active 
players. One example is the liberalisation of cross-border capital flows 
(Barnett & Finnemore 2004), another privatisation (Williamson 2000), and 
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a third, the internationalisation of global trade in goods and services 
(Abdelal 2010). Notably the GFC did little to derail any of these prevalent 
norms within either the World Bank or the IMF (Moschella 2010). 
   
Constructivism ‘plus’ 
    
The theoretical approach advanced here is therefore that of constructivism 
 
‘plus’, synthesising the assumptions of the evolutionary theoretical 
framework of how policies are developed advanced by Moschella (2010) 
with theories of organisational change derived from management theory 
consistent with the approach recently taken to attempt to go ‘beyond’ 
sociological institutionalism (e.g. Biermann & Siebenhũner 2009). 
   
Some theories of organisational change (‘plus’) have already been 
supported by constructivist theorists, notably the combination of concepts 
of policy networks and communities within the ‘culture’ of the IGO which 
may have great relevance to the issue of agricultural risk management 
within IGOs and devolution of policy to lower levels of IGOs (e.g. Nielson, 
Tierney & Weaver 2006, Clegg 2010). For example, UNCTAD officially 
designated a group of ‘experts’ on risk management and held regular 
‘expert  meetings’  (e.g.  UNCTAD  2010).  Is  this  sufficient  evidence  of  a 
 
‘policy network’? In the substantive chapters below an answer is sought to 
the question of whether such a policy community or network exists with 
respect to risk management within and between IGOs. Whether self- 
definition counts as sufficient in this case may be disputed; one question is 
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how such a network or epistemic/policy community is to be defined, and 
where do its boundaries lie? What constitutes ‘access to privileged 
information’?  Although documents on risk management can be freely 
downloaded, for example from the UNCTAD website, and there are many 
individuals who understand the basics of risk management theory and 
practice  (e.g.  from  the  syllabus  all  those  thousands  who  have  the 
Chartered Financial Analyst qualification) this may be different from an 
understanding of the application of these principles to the specific 
conditions of commodity risk management in developing countries, or the 
time to commit to an IGO policymaking process, or the credibility to be 
invited  to  expert  meetings,  participate  in  Panel  Meetings  (e.g.  at  the 
annual Swiss Futures and Options Association (SFOA) Burgenstock 
meetings frequently attended by UNCTAD), let alone to consult or work 
for an IGO in a risk management capacity. An investigation must therefore 
be made into the dissemination of information about agricultural risk 
management within IGOs to determine the plausibility of the application 
of these concepts to this issue. It will also be an important part of the 
substantive chapters to follow, to investigate the extent to which theories 
of policy devolution can be corroborated by the evidence from the 
development of IGO policies towards market based risk management 
instruments. 
   
The FAO, as opposed to the World Bank and UNCTAD, has a large cadre 
of field officers working with agricultural producers on a day to day basis. 
Their role in the development of policy must merit analysis to determine 
87
78 
the extent to which, for example, silent opposition to the promotion of risk 
management  solutions  was  created  by  perceptions  of  the  ‘complexity’ 
and’ inappropriateness’ of market solutions for small-scale producers in 
developing countries. This in turn necessitates an understanding of e.g. 
the extent to which FAO policy on such issues as agricultural risk 
management can be moulded by middle-ranking international officials 
rather than imposed entirely from above. 
   
By contrast to this recognition of the potential importance of policy 
networks, although sociological institutionalists always recognised the 
highly-interactive and mutually-constitutive character of the relationship 
between institutions and individual action (Hall & Taylor 1996:948) there 
has been much less interplay between the constructivist interpretation of 
international relations and the roles of specific individuals within IGOs, 
despite the obvious point that ‘institutions are built, steered and governed 
by people’ (Bebbington, Woolcock, Guggenheim & Olson 2006:xi). This 
lends some force to one of the earliest criticisms levelled against 
constructivism, which was that it ‘lacks a theory of agency. As a result, it 
over emphasizes the role of social structures and norms at the expense of 
the agents who help create and change them in the first place’ 
(Checkel 1998:325). 
    
Similarly yet perhaps oppositely, it has been suggested that the early 
emphasis on the individual as change agent in organisational theory 
generally has not helped integrate theories of institutional change, on the 
88
79 
grounds that in any given instance of policy change, it is usually possible 
to locate an individual or a small team that appears to have been a driving 
force for action. But in all such cases, the individuals, their motives, and 
their ways of acting will appear idiosyncratic (Mintrom & Norman 2009). 
To break this theoretical impasse, scholars suggested that policy 
entrepreneurship needed to be studied in a manner that paid attention 
simultaneously to contextual factors, to individual actions within those 
contexts, and to how context shaped such actions – so the framework of 
this research involves seeking to focus on ‘identifying the actors who seek 
to influence policymaking with their ideas, ascertaining the institutional 
conditions under which these actors have more or less influence, and 
understanding how political discourse affects the degree to which policy 
ideas are communicated and translated into practice’ (Campbell 2002:21). 
This research further assumes that the individuals working within IGOs are 
motivated by a range of different objectives, most of which fall within the 
definitions of professional and group preferences (views of how the 
organisation should develop, and working relations within it), as opposed 
to individual or personal preferences e.g. for promotion, money or prestige 
(Nicholson 1998:89), an assumption wholly consistent with the idea of a 
policy network of experts (in this case on risk management). 
   
The concept of norms and its importance to theories of international 
organisations was reviewed in the literature survey: criticism of the 
extensive use of the concept of norms seems inappropriate when 
confronting policy as discourse – shared expectations about the way in 
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which certain problems can best be solved (e.g. the problem of risk in 
agriculture) within a technical epistermic community such as that of risk 
management is what will cause and direct policy, mediated through 
individuals. Opening up the black box of an IGO in such a way, as 
constructivist scholars have already sought to do, can provide a further 
opportunity to integrate the literature that exists on policy 
entrepreneurship as a valuable route to an explanation of IGO 
policymaking (Moschella 2010:30). Were the individuals who drove risk 
management policy change within the IGOs analysed pure policy 
entrepreneurs, or were they engaging with the world outside the IGO in a 
wider sense as norm entrepreneurs? Or were they both? The choice of 
words is important – from the literature policy entrepreneurship refers 
mainly to public sector entrepreneurship that concerns the allocation of 
resources; by contrast norm entrepreneurship concerns changing beliefs 
about proper or desirable conduct in a community by calling attention to 
issues or even ‘creating’ issues by using language that names, interprets, 
and dramatises them   (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:897). Constructivists 
typically turn to norms as the ontological mechanism through which IGO 
policy is altered, as well as a principal way in which the IGOs themselves 
influence state action. In most cases, for an emergent norm to reach a 
threshold and move toward the second stage [of widespread acceptance], 
it must become institutionalized in specific sets of intemational rules and 
organizations’ (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:900). A major exception to this 
generalisation, however, must be ‘practical’ norms (focusing on commonly 
accepted notions of ‘best solutions”’ (Katzenstein 1996: 5).that themselves 
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consist  of  insistence  upon  a  private  sector  solution  to  an  empirical 
problem, such as risk. The substantive chapters of this thesis concern the 
fate of such a policy norm – that of the desirability or otherwise of market- 
based mechanisms for agricultural risk management 
   
In the context of the evolution of IGO policy towards market-based 
agricultural risk management instruments, the idea of the change agent 
and the need for transitional environments may prove highly relevant and 
warrants study, as IGO policies certainly changed over time, perhaps partly 
as a result of the work of change agents. Are there ‘change agents’ in 
IGOs, and how can they be identified? Even if they can be identified, to 
what extent are individual change  agents  within IGOs responsible for 
these changes in IGO policy? And to what extent do public entrepreneurs 
enable change such that, as one group of scholars researching the subject 
emphasised, ‘Ideas and coalitions that appeared firmly entrenched and 
impervious to change are washed away more quickly than seemed 
possible’ (Schneider, Teske & Mintrom 1995:3). This involves a difficult 
counterfactual: what would have happened within these IGOs if certain 
individuals had not been there?   There is much literature on the role of 
change agents generally but not on how to conceptualise organisations in 
their absence.  In applying this insight to the study of the evolution of risk 
management policy within IGOs, then, it will be necessary to look for 
change agents, their methods of working, the obstacles they face, and 
their achievements. Also, were there ‘transitional environments’ within 
IGOs – and if not, did their absence hamper successful policy change? 
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Finally, it should be noted that in many cases, as noted above, policy 
towards risk management at the IGOs under consideration involved 
advocacy, not action: the policy innovation was to open the IGO up by 
blazing a paper trail, to encourage inter-IGO co-operation, and to launch 
case studies – not necessarily to achieve the diversion of large resources 
into the area of work. Where IGO policy is largely confined to research, 
advocacy and training, as it largely was for agricultural risk management, 
the concept of norm entrepreneur may have more applicability than that 
of public entrepreneur as frequently conceived in the literature. The 
concept of norm entrepreneur is a familiar one even if the language is not: 
in the past, historians identified such individuals – from British history one 
might cite William Wilberforce and slavery, Florence Nightingale and the 
medical treatment of wounded soldiers   - but historians did not then 
identify them as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ or ‘change agents’, just influential 
individuals.  The two individuals concerned (and their successors as norm 
entrepreneurs) though worked in very different ways. ‘Wilberforce’ norm 
entrepreneurs agents work outside the bureaucracies and other agencies 
in which they seek to change behaviour, utilising their own position and 
standing in other, more influential circles. ‘Nightingale’ norm 
entrepreneurs, on the other hand, work inside the organisations they seek 
to change as what is normally understood as change agents. The role of 
international bureaucrats working as policy entrepreneurs or change 
agents may be both: they may influence their own organisation, and they 
may influence the outside world. And individuals may work from outside 
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an IGO, and then join it as officials, a potentially fraught process (Barnett 
 
2005a), made easier if they are already members of the relevant policy 
network (identifiable by e.g. working as consultants prior to their 
appointment as officials). 
   
The theoretical framework of constructivism ‘plus’ needs to keep open 
both possibilities:  Where attempts were made to move policy from just 
research, advocacy and training to resource allocation, the correct 
theoretical  perspective  for  analysis  is  surely  that  of  policy 
entrepreneurship. Where the norm in question is gaining ascendancy – is 
in the upward part of the norm cycle (Park & Vetterlein 2010a:20), the 
individual bureaucrat within the IGO may be operating at a number of 
different levels. 
   
First, the official may work as a ‘Nightingale’ change agent within the IGO 
itself.   This may involve activities of persuasion – but it may well equally 
involve independent initiatives, testing the boundaries of what discourse is 
permissible under the banner of the IGO. As will be discussed below, was 
a characterisation of the way ‘policy as advocacy’ evolved at the FAO and 
UNCTAD. Particular care must be given to avoiding any one-sidedness in 
this analysis:  implicit in most descriptions of the work of ‘change agents’ is 
that their goals are in some sense desirable: unfortunately, change agents 
may  be  working  in  opposite  policy  directions  in  different  IGOs,  and 
perhaps equally convinced of the desirability of their proposed change in 
IGO policy. 
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Second, the official may work as a policy entrepreneur within the IGO, if 
there is scope for the introduction of policies that go further than just 
research, advocacy and training to involve the allocation of public 
resources. This was the route taken  within the World Bank  by  Nawal 
Kamel, who had already had successful experience of working as a policy 
entrepreneur within the Bank in another area (Momani 2010:38). 
   
Supranational policy entrepreneurs within IGOs could be motivated by 
similar concerns to those working in other public organisations, except for 
local concerns, although to include the role of policy entrepreneurs within 
a constructivist framework is not, however, necessarily to make 
assumptions  about  the  motivations  or  objectives  of  the  individuals 
involved. As to their required qualities, a working hypothesis would be 
that they are similar, but not identical, to those that have been outlined as 
integral to the leadership function in national public sector organisations: 
expertise, influence, inspiration and coalition building (Rusaw 1998). 
   
Thirdly, there may be work as a norm diffuser in the outside world: the 
self-declaration of the World Bank as a ‘Knowledge Bank’ implied this kind 
of activity: an ascendant norm may be expected to be found supported in 
e.g. one part of the world and not in another. The cited neoliberal norms 
of development expressed in the PWC are an example of a norm that IGOs 
such as the World Bank diffused throughout the development community 
and to nation states themselves. 
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However any theoretical model of IGO policymaking adopted must also 
be   able   to   account   for   policy   oscillation  –   supporters   of   the 
‘transformation’ at UNCTAD from their normative standpoint described it 
as a ‘retrogression’ (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009).  Advocates of 
the concept of policy norms who have examined World Bank policy have, 
as noted above, readily recognised that norms are subject to 
transformation over time (e.g.  Park  2005, 2007,  Clegg 2010).  This has 
been described as the ‘norm cycle’. The insight of historical institutionalism 
that ‘ the modern international system is far from rationally designed, and 
its normative cohesion is not as widespread or deep as some accounts 
suggest’ (Fioretos 2011: 389) is apposite here. While stable over particular 
periods, they always remain flexible by definition (Wiener 2007: 49). The 
theoretical framework of constructivism ‘plus’ suggests that norms may 
prove more fragile, even more temporary, than their proponents have 
suggested. 
   
Yet if constructivism ‘plus’ can now embrace insights from disciplines as 
wide as management theory and even the psychology of organisations, is 
there a risk that constructivism has been stretched so far as to become ‘the 
new and improved theory of everything’? (Blyth 2010:71) Blyth answers 
no   –   constructivists   have   learned   from   the   weaknesses   of   other 
approaches that a single theory of political economy, constructivist or 
otherwise, is neither possible nor desirable, and that such a theory might 
even  be  impossible  (Blyth  2010:71),  It  is  more  modestly  that  as  an 
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analytical language, constructivism emphasises ‘identities, norms, 
knowledge    and    interests’,   whereas   rationalist    language    employs 
‘preferences,     information,     strategies,     and     common     knowledge’ 
 
(Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner 1998:678). 
    
One aspect of this recent caution against a single all-embracing theory is 
that the choice of this theoretical framework must itself be associated with 
several  caveats  so  far  as  the  wider  study  of  IGO  policymaking  is 
concerned. What seems to have been an underlying assumption is that all 
policies can be considered in the same way, and across organisations, for 
example through a focus on the collective views that actors hold about 
the IGO itself being central to its activities (Broome 2008). The theoretical 
framework adopted here enhances the constructivist approach to relax 
that assumption and alter that focus. The three additional principles, or 
caveats, of constructivism ‘plus’ therefore are: 
   
Firstly, the way in which a specific policy within an individual IGO is 
formulated may change over time. Constructivist and materialist 
explanations may therefore alternate in plausibility to explain the same 
policy. In a related way, policies may move up and down a hierarchy of 
concern. 
   
Secondly, different explanations of how policy is created and evolve may 
in theory differ between IGOs. Whereas one IGO may respond in 
significant degree to external influences, another may be more internally 
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determined. This point has already been recognised by constructivist 
authors, e.g. in relation to the World Bank’s possible ‘high degree of 
autonomy’ (Vetterlein 2010:94) relative to other IGOs and its alleged 
hypocrisy’ (Weaver 2008). 
   
Thirdly, different policies may be differently determined within the same 
IGO. One size may not fit all – what has been described as ‘problem 
structure’ (Campe 2009:146). So whereas one study analysing change 
inside the World Bank suggested that ‘Internal advocates facilitate policy 
change in IOs by strategic use of external pressure. In doing so, they shape 
the content of that change’ (Vetterlein 2007:529), constructivism ‘plus’ 
would suggest that this need not necessarily be a generalizable result for 
all policy change within the Bank. The implication is that there may not be 
any one ‘Bank's world’ (Weaver 2007), but in fact, many. As one 
commentator observed: ‘In an organization such as this there are going to 
be disputes and disagreements and problems of communication and 
coordination’ (Williams 2008:5). Some policies may be created ‘beyond the 
reach’ of NGOs, for example. More technical policies, which may include 
those with less direct effect on the national interests of member states, 
may  be  expected  to  exhibit  a  higher  degree  of  constructivist 
determination than those with centrality. There are many variables which 
distinguish  policies  amongst  themselves that  may  make  different 
theoretical frameworks appropriate. Whereas the technical area of risk 
management policy may be entirely appropriate to view through the lens 
of constructivism ‘plus’, emphasising the role policy entrepreneurs play in 
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policy formulation, this may not prove appropriate to examining broader 
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policy questions in which significant national political interests play a more 
obvious, public and decisive role. 
   
The theoretical framework concerning a technical policy area such as risk 
management should also encompass the concept of an epistemic 
community and policy network, which may create, change and even 
dominate policy. One question to be answered is whether such a network 
could be said to have existed, its composition and extension, and what 
influence it possessed. 
   
This set of assumptions implies that each individual policy requires analysis 
before its determination can be assessed. No one theory of policy 
determination is likely to succeed. 
   
From theory to methodology - the interpretative approach to policy 
analysis 
  
 
Constructivism in general has been confined to (and almost defined by) a 
theoretically intermediate position between positivism and postmodern 
epistemological radicalism (Adler 1997; Checkel 1998) and constructivism 
‘plus’   is  certainly subject to  the same  sociological inclinations (Wendt 
 
1992:393) as compared to Onuf’s more linguistic interpretations (Onuf 
 
2002) as from the start these constructivists drew on the new 
institutionalism in sociology for inspiration (Finnemore1996).  In practical 
terms, this implies a focus on events, including publications as events, and 
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even individuals and their expressed views, as well as their actions. 
Constructivists have also sought to draw on historical institutionalism to 
place events in a historical sequence, by comparison to e.g. a linguistic 
focus on discourse or textual analysis. That is for the purpose of this 
research; in a different theoretical framework a textual analysis of IGO risk 
may prove fruitful (e.g. the use of the word ‘environment’ in UNCTAD 
texts on risk management). 
   
This focus on events is not to meant to imply a positivist approach. 
Constructivist approaches to international relations have tended to rely on 
interpretative method (Neufeld 1993), although not all self-declared 
constructivist theorists would necessarily insist upon it (Jepperson Wendt 
&  Katzenstein 1996:67). The interpretative approach is appropriate in this 
case because much of the debate under question concerns values, many 
of which will not be expressed, and beliefs, some of which have equally 
never been openly presented, and norms that exist in the world outside 
the IOG. To rely exclusively on what has been said, written and done, 
without considering equally what has not, would surely tend to a rejection 
of the hypothesis of disagreements within the IGOs studied and of 
oscillation in support for market based agricultural risk management 
instruments within IGOs purely as a reflection of their external 
environment, growth in knowledge and understanding of the financial 
instruments involved, and cross-fertilisation of ideas. A positivist approach 
in which the existence of multiple interpretations of the data was 
specifically excluded would run the risk therefore of gliding over precisely 
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the  semantic  and  linguistic  twists  and  policy  nuances  on  which  any 
analysis of the political conflict within IGOs must at least in part rest. 
   
By contrast interpretative analysis appears well suited to the task of sifting 
through  highly  value-laded  statements,  documents  and  policy  shifts. 
Yanow declared that: ‘Interpretive methods are based on the presumption 
that we live in a social world characterised by the possibilities of multiple 
interpretations. In this world there are no ‘brute data’ whose meaning is 
beyond dispute. Dispassionate, rigorous science is possible – but not the 
neutral, objective science stipulated by traditional analytic methods (as 
represented by the scientific method)’ (Yanow 2000:5).  In her view, each 
individual piece of policy contains within it, according to an interpretative 
approach, a series of hidden meanings (in the literary criticism sense of the 
term). As Yanow observes ‘An interpretative approach to policy analysis, 
then, is one that focuses on the meanings of policies, on the values, 
feelings, or beliefs they express, and on the processes by which those 
meanings are communicated to and ‘read’ by various audiences (Yanow 
2000:14). The actors under investigation – in this case what I have 
suggested are members of an international epistemic community 
concerned with the theory and practice of market based risk management 
– attached (and still attach) meanings to their actions (and statements), 
meanings are precisely ‘ shaped by a pre-existing field of intersubjective 
meanings   embedded   in   language   and   other   symbols’      (Reus-Smit 
2002:495) 
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Case Study Selection - why choose these three IGOs? 
    
What has been followed in this research is what has been described as the 
 
‘case study method’ in international relations (Bennett & Elman 2006). 
Whilst the role of IGOs, and the significance of agriculture and the 
importance of risk within it, is not likely to provoke dispute, the choice of 
case studies requires explanation.  Comparative case studies can be either 
cross-sectional (as in this thesis) or historical. Either different institutions 
can be analysed in the same time frame – which has the advantage of 
keeping external factors constant (but only in the widest sense) or the 
same institution can be examined in a different time frame (Odell 2001). 
   
There are also two ways case comparative case studies may be selected: 
theory testing (‘top-down’) or problem solving (‘bottom-up’). A ‘top-down’ 
case study selection process typical of a researcher outside the subject 
area starts with the subject matter in general, with a theory about causes 
of events, relationships or other analytical issues, and selects appropriate 
examples to compare based on likelihood, typologies and other methods 
(Bennett & Elman 2007). Whilst the World Bank, UNCTAD and the FAO 
are three IGOs that have been actively involved in agricultural risk 
management issues, and are obvious candidates for study there are other 
IGOs that are involved in agricultural risk management policy – the 
Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) most obviously, but also the 
Organisation for European Economic Development (OECD) and the 
development banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) - even the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) takes an obvious interest.   At a 
functional level, some purely national organisations take on many of the 
characteristics of IGOs. The most notable in this area of study is the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) which in many respects, 
particularly statistics and policy analysis, stakes out an international role 
(USDA 2008). To a lesser extent this role is reflected in the publications of 
other leading government agricultural bodies, such as the UK Department 
of the Environment, Fisheries and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Australian 
Department of Agriculture. Publications from the USDA in particular are 
also interesting for comparison with IGO publications. 
   
A ‘bottom-up’ case study approach on the other hand, starts from ‘an 
 
empirical puzzle’ (Klotz 2008:55), with the parameters of case selection 
 
‘dictated by social realities and historical circumstances’ (Klotz 2008:55). 
This can include experience and a specific problem to be addressed within 
the range of case studies themselves – so that the case studies are integral 
to the research question itself – as has been observed, what can be 
described as a problem-solving case study is ‘designed to help solve a 
particular  problem  rather  than  mainly  to  contribute  to  theory’  (Odell 
2001:167). In such a case study, the researcher is interested primarily in E, 
chooses two or more cases to illustrate variance in E, such as a success and 
a failure in attempts at economic cooperation, and investigates what 
antecedents could have produced the difference (Bennett 2004:64). This 
was the reason for selecting the World Bank, UNCTAD and the FAO – the 
conviction that the most detailed analysis could be done by studying the 
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three IGOs most familiar to the researcher with policy in this area and 
where there was a problem to be solved about why that policy differed 
between  these  particular  IGOs.  There  are  implications  for  the 
methodology in this, especially in terms of potential bias, and they are 
discussed below. Notably, the three IGOs selected for study are disparate 
in size, as shown in the table below: 
   
Table 1: Size of IGOs 
   
 
 
IGO 
Number of 
Employees 
Administrative Budget 
(US$m) 
UNCTAD 400 [20] 95 
FAO 3000 1,005 
World Bank 9000 [900] 2,250 
 
Notes to the table: 
 
1. World Bank data are taken from the Annual Report of the World Bank 2010 (World 
Bank 2010). 
2. UNCTAD data are taken from the Annual Report of UNCTAD 2009 (UNCTAD 2009). 
3. FAO staff numbers are derived from the Medium-Term Plan, 2009-2015 (FAO 2009) 
and the FAO budget from a press release1. 
4. These numbers do not reflect the number of staff working on agricultural issues – this 
number is hard to estimate for the World Bank and UNCTAD as staff may devote part of 
their time to agriculture, but the numbers in brackets are an informal estimate of full -time 
equivalents derived from officials at the institutions themselves. 
   
And in both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ case selection, it should be born 
in mind that case study findings are usually contingent and can be 
generalized beyond the type of case studied only under specified 
conditions (Bennett & Elman 2007). 
                                                            
1 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/81403/icode/ 
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Sources of Evidence 
    
What methods are available to the interpretative analysis of case studies? 
Here again  the principal methods of interpretative analysis  lend 
themselves to the subject matter under consideration. Having reviewed 
these methods Brechin, summarised the approach of his book, Planting 
Trees in the Developing World (1997), which followed his earlier Ph.D. 
thesis along similar lines (Brechin 1989) thus: ‘This book is based on 
qualitative research, using primary and secondary sources such as 
published literature, organisational documents, and other publications, 
complemented with site visits and a large number of personal interviews’ 
(Brechin 1997:xiii). Over a decade has passed and although the availability 
of information from IGOs has improved dramatically with their publication 
on the Internet, and personal interviews have been rendered somewhat 
easier in many examples of academic research as travel has become more 
inexpensive in  real  terms,  the  proposed research methodology of  this 
thesis remains unchanged from that of Brechin and those who have 
followed him: documentary analysis and interviews remain the core of 
IGO policy analysis. 
   
There are usually in any IGO policy analysis many IGO documents to 
analyse as well as those from other sources, policy initiatives to study, and 
the additional possibility existed of interviewing the key individual 
participants in the policy process to attempt to identify their local 
knowledge, similarities and differences in perspective, and analysis of how 
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and why policy towards private sector agricultural risk management 
institutions changed and how assessments of the environmental 
implications also changed along with political and administrative 
evaluations. These three elements: documentary analysis, interviews and 
studying acts, form the research methodology used in the substantive 
chapters below. 
   
Especially important in the context of observing policy change is that 
arguments evolve and policy changes over time, often back and forth. 
Analysis of how and why policy evolved must therefore for each IGO 
involve presenting documents, interviews and acts in an essentially 
chronological order as the basis of their categorisation and evaluation. 
   
Documentary Analysis 
 
   
The starting point for interpretative analysis, according to Yanow (2000) 
and Van Dijk (1989) is usually documentary analysis. ‘Whatever the power 
of  directors,  top  politicians,  corporate  boards,  professors,  judges,  or 
doctors in face-to-face discourse, their real power seems to have formal 
consequences only when somehow ‘fixed’ in writing or print. Therefore, 
many types of formal dialogues, such as meetings, interviews, or debates, 
have a written counterpart in the form of minutes, protocols, or other 
official transcripts that define the ‘record’ of the encounter, and are often 
the institutional or legal basis for any further action or decision making’ 
(Van Dijk 1989:41). Especially important will be ‘those stages of policy 
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development that are realised in a linear but interrelated series of written 
texts’ (Wallace 2003:159, Bazerman 1994), a point which has been 
reinforced by the dissemination of many IGO policy documents through 
the Internet, many now hyperlinked (e.g. UNCTAD 2010), although some 
have vanished from the Internet (e.g. Van Diepenbeek Van Empel,  Duff, 
Costa, Ortiz, Wortelboer, Rozenbdaal, Faber & Scott 2002, and those of the 
papers of the International Task Force on Commodity Questions (ITF) that 
are not available through archiving on the World Bank website) . 
   
A significant part of the raw material for the investigation of the possibility 
for internal disagreements within IGOs as to the political desirability of 
market-based solutions for risk management problems faced by farmers, 
the desirability by extension of collaboration with other agencies on these 
types of solutions, and even their potential environmental implications, are 
therefore the publications of these institutions. For example it is interesting 
to note that in IGO documents concerning agricultural risk management, 
there are no mentions of IGO capacity to assess environmental 
implications. 
   
One of the key issues with documentary analysis, predictably, is the 
identification of relevant documents.   Identifying documents within an 
IGO policy analysis is easier than for example within a Government 
Department because of the public availability of all but wholly internal 
documents and working papers. Individuals who have worked for the 
IGOs under study confirm that there have been few documents on risk 
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management retained wholly for internal use (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 
 
April 2009). 
    
In respect of documents concerning risk management published by the 
IGOs under study, it is therefore possible to identify practically all of them. 
For UNCTAD, there are over two hundred documents located on the 
UNCTAD commodities website, which can reasonably be identified as the 
on line repository of all published UNCTAD documents concerned with 
agricultural  risk  management.  All  of  these  documents  concern 
commodities risk management techniques of various types and there is no 
other department of UNCTAD that has been concerned with risk 
management. However, even this comprehensive list of documents is not 
exhaustive as it does not include presentations made as part of UNCTAD’s 
role as an executive/advisory agency, or many conference presentations 
made by Lamon Rutten and other UNCTAD officials. Fortunately Lamon 
Rutten collected his own papers and presentations at UNCTAD in a 
personal CD-Rom, which contained 86 papers and 38 PowerPoint 
presentations. 
   
This analysis is intended to complete a review of all the documents that 
discuss agricultural risk management from IGOs referenced within the 
bibliography. The possibility remains that there have been other 
documents published, but if so they have not been referenced in the most 
frequently cited publications on the issue, nor are they obtainable from 
the  usual  sources.  One  partial  explanation  of  this  was  the  fact  that 
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following UNCTAD IX at Midrand in 1996, when general commodity work 
(such as the gathering of statistics) was scaled down, a large number of 
documents were destroyed, including for example reports on the 
functioning of the International Tin Council and work on value chain 
management. It is extremely fortunate therefore that the work on risk 
management covered by this thesis (a) was not included in the 1996 cull, 
and indeed stood in opposition to it and (b) that after the early 1990s 
virtually all UNCTAD documents were produced in soft copy and stored, 
either by the authors themselves, by UNCTAD or by both. 
   
For FAO, in stark contrast, there are few documents in the 1990s or even 
beyond that even mention risk management, although there are many 
that  had  they  been  produced  in  conjunction  with  UNCTAD  almost 
certainly would have done (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). 
It is remarkable just how few FAO documents mentioning risk 
management there are, even given that FAO has traditionally regarded 
agricultural and commodities risk management as outside its purview (as 
discussed below in Chapter Eight). However in such a large organisation 
which migrated to the Internet only gradually it is not possible to be 
absolutely certain that all FAO documents are on the FAO website. Other 
IGOs in the agriculture space exhibit a similar paucity of documentary 
examination of futures and options. For the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), for instance, there are very 
few documents that mention risk management, and then only in placing 
summaries of World Bank  Development Reports on their  website. The 
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International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) only began to 
publish on risk management as late as 2006, and this despite a mission 
statement  that  includes  the  overcoming  of  poverty  by  increasing  the 
access of the poor to financial services and markets. Even then the 
reference was indirect, to the possibility that major international inspection 
companies could use warehouse receipts as part of a ‘collateral 
management system’ which could ‘reduce seasonal price variability and 
provide conditions for the development of more sophisticated price 
insurance  instruments  such  as  futures  and  options’    (Poole  &  Buckley 
2006:41).   A similar theme can be perceived in a report of the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IADB), which stated that a the reduction of 
systematic risks in the rural sector could be achieved through the 
promotion and validation of various risk control techniques such as 
commodity   futures,  and   forward   markets,   hedging,   and   insurance, 
without any description of the IADB’s role in this process (IADB 1998:7), 
the IADB’s programmes being focused on lending. Finally, the OECD has 
published little specifically on agricultural risk management (e.g. OECD 
2000) but its concentration on agro-environmental indicators has resulted 
in a series of published documents (OECD 2001, OECD 2008). A separate 
part of OECD also published documents on agriculture more widely which 
include comments on risk management (e.g. OECD 2006). 
   
On the other hand, by comparison to agency documents, media coverage 
 
- the precise starting point Yanow suggests - is relatively sparse on this 
issue, but has been analysed to determine whether there is any insight to 
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be gained, especially in relation to perceptions of the political desirability 
of market based solutions to risk management problems and also the 
specific relationship between agricultural risk management and the 
environment.   Finally one must mention the academic world itself. 
Important policy participants within IGOs – notably Alfred Maizels – came 
from and went back to the academic world. As Marcelo Raffaelli – himself 
a career national and international civil servant – noted in relation to the 
debate over commodities policy at the highest levels, ‘The weight of 
opinions from academic circles is a factor of great importance’ (Raffaelli 
2009:31). 
Utilising the texts 
Using texts as a way of understanding policy development and change 
within IGOs presenting the themes, patterns and categories of analysis 
that are important to a constructivist approach to a problem is therefore a 
crucial starting point in the research methodology of this study. Although 
the route of discourse analysis has not been followed, in this qualitative 
research the evidence must be analysed within context - making sense of 
it on face value, checking interpretations against different texts for 
consistency (Milliken 1999), and then analysing texts terms of how they 
relates to the wider matters they interact with or which locate them in the 
discourse of the IGO. Following common practice there is use of typical 
quotations to justify conclusions (Schilling, 2006), However, the problem is 
that it is prima facie unlikely that texts will be clear, simple or stable if there 
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are conflicting, and in some cases ‘underground’ meanings and policy 
positions being expressed. Quantitative analysis will need to be at least 
supplemented by a wider conversation and content analysis placing texts 
in their organisational and political context.  In particular, there will need 
to be interviews. 
   
Interviews 
    
Agency  documents,  which  Yanow  specifically  mentions  (Yanow  1996, 
 
2000), and which are central to this analysis, are a stepping stone to the 
next   aspect   of   the   interpretative   analysis,   which   is   conversational 
interviews with the key actors in the policy process. Who are the key 
actors who need to be approached as part of an interpretative analysis? 
The interpretative approach would suggest the broadest possible range of 
potential interviewees, as insights may come from unexpected quarters. In 
addition to the obvious – agency officials and consultants themselves – 
there have been frequent participation in agency meetings and even in 
drafting documents by individuals from private sector organisations. 
   
The criteria for selection of individuals to interview were therefore as 
follows: 
  
 
1.  Individuals  who  worked  for  the  IGOs  under  study  and  who  were 
directly involved in risk management issues during the study period. 
Fortunately, since the writing of publicly available documents constitutes 
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an important part of the day-to-day work of IGO professional staff, there 
are few of the dozens of individuals within the IGO agricultural risk 
management policymaking process at the middle management level who 
have not written on the subject; 
   
2. Individuals who worked for the IGOs under study during the study 
period and who were not directly involved in risk management issues but 
who may have had an opinion about risk management or participated in 
policymaking within the IGO which had a bearing on the IGO’s work on 
risk management. This group included some, but not all, of the officials 
working for the IGOs under study who had a direct concern with 
environmental issues (e.g. working on the construction and publication of 
agro-environmental indicators for OECD); and 
   
3. Other interested parties and commentators, notably academics. 
 
   
The individuals who wrote IGO documents are frequently well placed to 
explain  at  least  their  own  perception of  these issues, which is why  a 
further method of analysis adopted in this thesis has been to conduct a 
series of interviews with authors of IGO documents and other participants 
within the IGO policymaking process. The interview technique adopted in 
this thesis has been that of specific questions put to interviewees, in 
particular to those directly involved in IGO policymaking, but in addition 
there were also numerous possibilities for interviewees to make additional 
comments and provide insights, often off the record, hence the need for a 
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semi-structured  approach.  This   was   also   why   interviews  were   not 
recorded. The background to an interview technique is conversation 
analysis, which does ‘… not presume the existence of fixed meanings in 
words and idioms. It presumes that meanings are embedded in layers of 
contexts, negotiated interpretations and lifeworld knowledge [the 
researcher must] immerse himself [or herself] in the language of the 
organisation and in the work context and work in which that language 
was created’ (Yanow 2000:3). In conversation analysis, transcripts try to 
capture not only what was said, but also how it was said. 
   
There are specific practical techniques, however, which are directly 
applicable to interviews. Yanow suggests that ‘Persons interviewed are 
asked to suggest others with whom the analyst should talk, and interview 
transcripts  (whether  from  notes  or  tapes)  themselves  then  become 
subjects for further analysis). Document analysis and conversational 
interviews may  be  preceded  by  or  supplemented with  observation of 
(with  varying  degrees  of  participation  in)  legislative  debates,  interest 
group meetings, implementing agencies, and community groups’ (Yanow 
2000:31). When used together, these three methods are often referred to 
as participant observation. And for this study, to determine the cause of 
the difference in perceptions was the main purpose of the interviews 
conducted with officials and advisers to the IGOs under study. 
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The policy interpretation of acts 
    
The last aspect of an interpretative field study is the analysis of acts 
themselves. Yanow concedes that ‘Analysing acts can be the most difficult 
of  these  analytic  categories,  because  they  are  the  least  visible  to  an 
outsider and their meanings are the least accessible (Yanow 2000:76). 
What are the ‘acts’ of IGOs in respect of policy towards market based risk 
management instruments? One particular and obvious difficulty for an 
IGO is that of distinguishing between an act and a text. One of the main 
roles of an IGO is to publish; another is to hold conferences out of which 
usually flow documents. A third is to attend other the meetings of other 
organisations, for example farmers’ co-operatives, to make presentations 
and set out arguments. All these elements of IGO activity can be captured 
(where  there  are  records)  through  different  forms  of  documentary 
analysis. There is another category of policy, which may be characterised 
as an ‘act‘, however, that of the provision of technical advice, where there 
may be few or no records, although in some cases (e.g. the International 
Task Force on Commodities) programmes were written up and presented 
to annual meetings. To analyse IGO acts, therefore, a process of 
questioning interviewees is necessary to determine what technical advice 
has been provided and under what circumstances. 
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Subjectivity and the Analyst Standpoint 
    
The question of the perspective of the researcher and ‘bias’ has also been 
discussed in the literature - a certain bias, a perspective, is seen within the 
interpretative tradition as inevitable (Hawkesworth 1988).   However the 
importance of participant-observation for the research methodology of 
this thesis in general, and interviews in particular, would always have been 
a necessity. It is an inevitable part of the interpretative analysis 
methodology adopted in this thesis (and indeed of common sense in this 
case) that there will be an authorial perspective. The first reason for this is 
that the author has been part of the policy process from a relatively early 
stage as a consultant to UNCTAD and author of policy papers within the 
organisation, during precisely the period of ‘transformation‘ of the 
organisation; and so has written papers that are part of the subject matter 
under review. Hence the author has a position so that the text (in the 
widest possible sense) cannot be viewed ‘objectively’. This authorial 
position has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages are 
firstly, familiarity with the subject matter, and secondly, relatively easy 
access to the many of the policy participants at middle management level. 
The disadvantages may be the introduction of bias and unconscious 
selection of material.  Yanow makes the point from interpretative analysis 
that:  ‘the expectations that one brings to a policy analytic project derive 
from  one’s  prior  experience,  education  or  training.  Where  there  is  a 
‘mismatch’,  the  ensuing  puzzle  or  tension  creates  the  opportunity  to 
 
explain why the policy or agency is doing things ‘differently’. The impulse, 
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often, is to assume that the different way is ‘wrong’. ‘They’ don’t know 
how to do things ‘right’.  Of particular relevance to this research is the 
analogous  comment  that  ‘Scholars  succumb  to  crypto-normative  bias 
when they use learning as a synonym for their own expectations of best 
behavior  of  international  organizations’  (Benner,  Mergenthaler  & 
Rottmann 2007:16). An interpretative approach urges us to see such 
differences as different ways of seeing, understanding and doing, based 
on different prior experiences’ (Yanow 2000:8). Authors can only strive 
against  such  bias  and  warn  their  readers  of  its  potential  existence, 
although equally, it would be a mistake to assume that all authors‘ 
contributions to a project would necessarily engender advocacy: the 
reverse might surely on occasion be the case. 
   
Authorial bias is not the only potential cause of subjectivity, however, Note 
should be taken of Dijkzeul’s observation that ‘Social researchers often find 
themselves in a double bind. To collect data for their research, they need 
the cooperation of the people that they may criticise or expose with the 
outcomes of their research’ (Dijkzeul 2000:xiii). This is very apt for the 
interviews conducted as part of this research. Derivative markets have 
themselves been the subject of media criticism and the international 
political climate in which these interviews were conducted was vastly less 
sympathetic to purely market solutions than that which commenced in the 
early 1990s when IGOs began to promote market-based risk management 
instruments for farmers. 
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As supporters of interpretative analysis argue, however, there is no 
compulsion or need to adopt advocacy; the researcher can use their 
participation and knowledge to act as translator of ‘the diverse dimensions 
of debate pertinent to particular policy questions’ to a wider audience 
(Hawkesworth 1988:94). According to Yanow (1997) this can lead to a 
position of ‘passionate humility’ – combining a strong belief with the 
perception that one may be wrong. 
   
Conclusion 
 
   
The theoretical framework of this thesis starts from constructivist concepts 
of IGO autonomy, but seeks to expand the constructivist conception of 
policymaking to the comparative analysis of the role of policy 
entrepreneuers between IGOs. In doing so the framework agrees with the 
opinions of previous commentators that the disciplines of policymaking 
generally as well as business administration, public administration, and 
international relations can benefit mutually from more interaction, and 
have much to offer to the analysis of IGOs (e.g. Babb 2003). 
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Chapter Four:   Commodities policy from international agreements to 
market   based   risk   management  mechanisms   using   derivatives   and 
(maybe) back again 
   
Part 1: Administrative Mechanisms 
   
 
Introduction 
    
This chapter aims to place the history of IGO  policies towards market 
based risk management instruments in the wider historical and political 
context in which they were developed. To explain this context involves 
describing two primary elements: firstly, the chequered history of the 
history of commodity pricing and international commodities agreements 
(ICAs) after World War II, and secondly the controversial rise of derivative 
markets: how derivatives work, and what risks their use entails. 
   
The ‘commodities problem’ and how to solve it 
    
Viewed from the standpoint of the period before the development of 
market-based risk management instruments and markets for them, there 
were in principle several ways in which the international community could 
– if there were sufficient political will - approach the perceived problem of 
fluctuations in commodity export earnings which led to regular balance of 
payments   crises   for   both   exporting   and   importing   nations   –   the 
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‘commodities problem’ - as well as to longer-term economic problems, 
including constraints on economic growth and difficulties for poverty 
reduction programmes. The British economist Alfred Maizels identified 
three different, though not incompatible, approaches to solving the 
commodities problem: 
   
(a) Supplementary financing. This approach, that as envisaged by Keynes 
(1943) would be to offset unforeseen and prolonged declines in real 
commodity export earnings due to falls in export volumes or - more likely - 
adverse commodity price movements, by so-called ‘supplementary 
financing’ – loans - from international sources. This approach would not 
involve managing prices through intervention in the commodity markets 
themselves, nor would it involve providing assistance to farmers or other 
market  participants  adversely  affected  by  declines  in  prices.  Rather,  it 
would concentrate on providing financial assistance directly to affected 
governments. 
  
 
(b) Agricultural import subsidies. A second approach would be to apply a 
version of the various systems of price support for domestic agricultural 
production already operated by developed market economies (DMEs) to 
their imports from developing countries. This would essentially mean 
subsidising agricultural (and possibly other) commodities from developing 
countries for periods when import prices fell below some pre-determined 
level. This policy could be combined with other policy tools such as quota 
arrangements and ceiling prices to offset the cost to importing nations, 
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e.g. as the EU was to do for agricultural imports from African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries for many years. 
   
(c) Buffer stocks A third approach, originally proposed by Keynes, would 
be to create some appropriate form of supply management (e.g. through 
extensive buffer stocks) to balance world commodity supply and demand 
over a period of years at ‘fair’ prices which would be adequately 
remunerative   to   the   majority   of   exporting   countries,   while   being 
acceptable  to  importing  countries  (Keynes  1938,  Dimand  &  Dimand 
1990).  Keynes believed that there must be some form of control in order 
to achieve the greater stability of the prices of primary products which 
seemed to him an obvious prerequisite for the stable, expanding world 
economy that laissez-faire before World War II had failed to deliver. Keynes 
therefore advocated buffer stocks as the proper way to maintain stable 
prices, in the sense of prices which followed reasonably closely the current 
long-period trend of demand and supply condition, and which would give 
greater stability to producers’ incomes in the short and long term (Rowe 
1965: 156). 
    
But when even Maizels, their strongest advocate, looked back at the end 
of his career, he conceded that all three of these very different approaches 
had ‘a long history of international negotiations, though only of limited 
effective action‘ (Maizels 1992:43). Their history is recounted below. 
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The History of International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) 
    
Known ICAs date back at least to the 1902 Brussels Sugar Convention, 
which ended what had proved uneconomic and unfair practices – export 
dumping of sugar following overstimulation of beet-sugar production in 
several European countries (Pigman 1997, de Moura Filho 2006). World 
War I saw a number of ICAs created, although these were liquidated after 
the war. The League of Nations (the interwar precursor organisation to 
the United Nations) paid close attention to commodity questions. In the 
commodity studies the League commissioned in 1921, 1927 and 1937, in 
the report of the London Monetary and Economic Conference in 1935, 
there was shown a cautious attitude to ICAs and a reluctance to accept 
their becoming permanent or pursuing prices detrimental to consumers 
(Law 1970). Nevertheless the interwar years did see ICAs: ‘By 1929 control 
schemes were becoming quite numerous (Rowe 1965:127). A first 
agreement on tin, involving governments of exporting countries, came 
into force in 1931, to be renewed three times (Fox 1974), ICAs on tea and 
wheat were made in 1933 and an ICA on rubber was concluded in 1934, 
equally by governments of exporting countries and the colonial powers 
(Rowe 1965:149).  Control schemes were also concluded interwar among 
either associations of exporters (sugar and tea) or the largest mining 
companies (copper) but with the support of the governments of the 
countries involved. The 1933 wheat ICA and the 1937 sugar ICA went 
furthest, bringing together governments of both exporting and importing 
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countries. Although the former became inoperative barely one year after 
its negotiation, the sugar agreement lasted many years (Raffaelli 2009:2). 
   
Such  ICAs  as  these  were  seen  by  governments  and  producers  alike 
interwar as ‘a rational response on the part of producers (and consumers 
to a lesser extent) to the commodity price slump of the 1930s.  Prices had 
been low in real terms: this was thought to be due to supply imbalances in 
relation to demand, so buffers, it was thought, would cut overproduction, 
raise prices in the slump and, thereby, better balance global supply and 
demand’ (Morgan 2001:141). Keynes too viewed these ICAs in principle 
favourably.  Having  seriously  proposed  global  commodity  price 
stabilisation immediately prior to World War II through a series of 
international buffer stock schemes designed to compensate for the low 
levels of private storage in commodity markets (Keynes 1938), he then 
went further, proposing a world currency based on a price index of the 
thirty most-traded commodities. ‘By linking currencies to the index, he 
argued,  commodity  prices  and  price-related  swings  in  trade  earnings 
would be largely stabilised in an automatic fashion’ (Varangis, Larson & 
Anderson 2002:2). 
   
With the onset of World War II, ‘all schemes in force ceased to be 
meaningful, either immediately or in due course’ (Raffaelli 2009:3). Yet 
there were some agreements concluded even during World War II itself: 
political considerations for example .led to the conclusion of the Inter- 
American Coffee Agreement (IACA) of 1940. While Keynes’ radical ideas 
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were not incorporated into the charters of the Bretton Woods institutions 
founded immediately after World War II (the IMF and World Bank), 
thereafter  the  issue  of  commodity  price  stabilisation  was  never  to 
disappear from the international agenda. In practice, in the years 
immediately after World War II although no one grand scheme was 
adopted along any of the three lines identified by Maizels, piecemeal 
measures, often affecting individual commodities, did find a place in 
international negotiations, as: ‘the lessons of the 1930s had been at least 
partially learned. Wild and wide price fluctuations were, in the end, in no 
one's interest’ (Raffaelli 2009:3). For example, ‘in the discussions at the 
International Tin Study Group from 1948 onwards it was throughout 
assumed  that  the  buffer  stock  and  the  control  of  exports  should  be 
integral parts of any inter-governmental regulation agreement and both 
aspects  ..[were] in  the  international tin  agreements..[after].. 1956’  (Fox 
1974:139). 
    
The post-war Havana Conference of 1947 was however unsuccessful in 
establishing an International Trade Organisation and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of the same year allowed 
commodity agreements only in exceptional circumstances and bound to 
strict conditions (Koning, Calo & Jongeneel 2004:4). International opinion 
was divided,   as the Havana Conference did succeed in producing a 
complete but moderate statement of policy regarding ICA's, to be found in 
Chapter VI of the 1948 Havana Charter, favouring them to reduce 
excessive  price  volatility  and  create  prices  both  fair  to  consumers  yet 
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providing  a  reasonable  return  to  producers.  Under  GATT  there  came 
about an internationally agreed procedure for the establishment of 
commodity agreements, and also agreed principles to which the 
agreements must conform, which were that ICAs were acceptable where 
there was a ‘burdensome surplus’, where there was a serious hardship to 
producers,  or  where  unemployment  was  widespread  and  there  was 
undue hardship to workers. Under these circumstances, a GATT member 
could ask the UN for a study group on the commodity. Then all UN 
members would participate in any resultant scheme, in which both 
producers and consumers would be involved for an initial five years.  The 
UN created an Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International 
Commodity Agreements, which was followed in 1954 by a Commission 
on International Trade. FAO created its own committee on commodity 
problems in the field of agriculture (Rowe 1965:161). Rowe commented 
on ‘the staff of gardeners which was in due course appointed to stimulate 
[and] supervise the growth of the promising young fruit tree which had 
been thus established’ (Rowe 1965:161). 
   
Although  the  USA  even  as  early  as  at  the  Havana  Conference  was 
opposed to the use of ICAs on a permanent basis, the position of the 
majority of UN nations thereafter moved toward progressively more 
enthusiasm in the support of ICAs. In 1954, for example, the General 
Assembly, the highest and most general organisation in the UN system, 
recommended to Member States that when (not if) governments adopted 
measures affecting the price of primary commodities they should consider 
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terms of trade, fair wage levels and a goal of reducing disparities in living 
standards  between  developing  countries  and  DMEs  (United  Nations 
1954:1). 
    
With the steady growth in the global economy through the 1950s and 
 
1960s giving rise to generally high returns from commodity investments, 
reversion to the conditions prevailing in the 1930s became as one 
commentator observed ‘almost unimaginable’ (Gilbert 1996:2) This did not 
deter agreement on ICAs: during the 1950s old ones were renewed and 
new ones covering a wider range of commodities were added, for 
example, the International Sugar Agreement (1954–83), the Tin 
Agreement (1954–85), and the Coffee Agreement (1962–89). Depending 
on the general price level at the time, the emphasis oscillated between 
establishing control activity to smooth price fluctuations, as in the early 
1950s, to pursuing controls to change terms of trade or halt price trends 
(Law 1970).  Increasingly, the volatility, not the level, of prices was seen as 
the main  problem although, in  a  similar fashion to  the earlier  period, 
‘buffer  stocks  were  still  seen  as  the  main  policy  instrument’  (Morgan 
 
2001:151). The idea behind the DME agreement to buffer stock plans was 
both to meet what Keynes had considered the legitimate interests of 
producers of commodities in enjoying greater price stability, but also less 
vocally  to  ensure that  in  the  long  term  prices  moved downwards, as 
supply and demand became balanced. Of thirty-nine ICAs established 
between 1931 and 1982, half specified some form of stock policy and 
most referred to coordinated national stocks. Internationally administered 
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stocks tended to be less common but were a feature of the tin, cocoa, 
rubber and sugar agreements (Morgan 2001:151). 
   
In parallel, an alternative approach emerged, to link lending with 
commodity volatility (ITF 1999). A succession of proposed internationally- 
backed compensatory financing schemes followed the Bretton Woods 
conference, including the 1953 Olano Proposal for a Mutual Insurance 
Scheme, the 1961 Development Insurance Fund, the 1962 Organisation 
of American States Proposal, the Swedish and Brazilian Proposals at the 
Committee for International Commodity Trade meetings and the French 
Proposal for Market Organisations, all debated in 1963 alone (Varangis, 
Larson & Anderson 2002). 
   
The Prebisch Plan and the formation of UNCTAD - why supplementary 
financing never really took off 
   
The history during the 1960s of proposals for Supplementary Financing - 
and an organisation to manage it - are worth recounting in view of the 
parallels  that  can  be  drawn  with  the  subsequent proposal within  the 
World  Bank  for  a  market-based  system  to  achieve  much  the  same 
objectives described below (in Chapter Five). 
   
As  predominantly  commodity-based  economies,  the  post-war 
governments of developing countries regularly expressed concerns about 
declining terms of trade and price volatility as well as the protectionist 
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policies   of   DMEs   that   limited   their   export   markets,   especially   for 
agricultural products. Some developing countries were in many cases 
either excluded from the preferential tariff agreements signed by 
industrialised countries with their former colonies, or dissatisfied with their 
scope and sceptical of their long-term viability. Their complaints found an 
echo in the theories developed by the Argentinian economist, Raul 
Prebisch, who eventually became the first Secretary-General of UNCTAD. 
The Prebisch hypothesis was that that there were inexorable forces at 
work  tending  to  reduce  the  prices  of  commodities  relative  to 
manufactured products. Deteriorating terms of trade of developing 
countries caused by a rapid, extensive and sustained fall in commodity 
prices impaired their capacity to import the capital equipment, expertise 
and other resources required for growth. This deterioration in terms of 
trade undermined the achievement of the objectives for which 
international resources such as international aid to developing countries 
were provided (Prebisch 1950, Pingus 1967:43). 
   
Actual financing mechanisms aimed at compensating low income 
countries for the macro-economic impacts of price- and terms of trade 
shocks also date back to the 1960s.  In 1963, the first significant move 
towards a supplementary financing scheme was taken when the IMF - 
although it did not then and never did accept the validity of the Prebisch- 
Singer thesis even as modified by Spraos (Prebisch 1950, Spraos 1983, 
Sapsford & Singer 1998) – set up the Compensatory and Contingency 
Financing Facility, which provided non-conditional balance of payment 
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short term (3¼–5 year) loans - to member countries experiencing sharp 
declines in commodity export earnings as a result of external shocks.  And 
in 1969 the IMF established a Buffer Stock Financing Facility to support 
governments’ contributions to International Commodity Agreements. Prior 
to the mid-1980s both funds were drawn on extensively, despite their 
relatively high interest rates - although most borrowers were middle- 
income countries (Gibbon 2005:12). 
   
At the same time as the IMF created its first facility, pressure from 
commodity producing developing countries resulted in the staging of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in 1964 
(UNCTAD   I),   which   in   turn   led   to   the   creation   of   another   new 
organisation,   the   eponymous   UNCTAD.   UNCTAD   I   was   far   more 
concerned about price levels than price stability:   ‘Poorer, commodity 
producing countries, supported at UNCTAD by the government of France, 
sometimes appear to claim that higher commodity prices, secured by 
international  agreement,  are  a  source  of  instant  prosperity’  (Pingus, 
1967:43-44)  so  ‘…much  of  the  discussion  of  commodity  agreements 
stresses price stability as an objective at least coequal with higher prices. 
Thus the UNCTAD resolution on the subject called for ‘suitable 
international arrangements…designed to increase and stabilise primary 
commodity export earnings, particularly of developing countries, at 
equitable and remunerative prices’. Poor countries want higher prices, or 
no decline in prices, and ‘stabilisation’ objectives are primarily a tactic 
toward that goal’ (Pingus 1967:43). The same observation had been made 
130
119 
more than two decades previously even before post-war ICAs had come 
into being:  ‘In practice, ‘stabilisation of prices’ commonly means boosting 
prices above equilibrium levels, not moderating fluctuations around an 
economic level’ (Davis 1942:401). Nor was UNCTAD 1 an isolated example 
of  the  UN's  enthusiasm  for  extending  international  commodity 
agreements (Law 1970:87). Although the official rhetoric of the multi- 
commodity ICA negotiations, which took place in Geneva subsequently 
under the auspices of UNCTAD, now related to the variability rather than 
the level of prices, and the buffer stock fully displaced export controls as 
the intervention instrument of choice, in practice much of the debate 
indeed concerned the level about which prices would be stabilised. 
Resolution 93(IV) of UNCTAD echoed the Havana Charter in seeking to 
stabilise prices around levels which would be ‘remunerative and just to 
producers and equitable to consumers’ (UNCTAD 1976).  In a similar vein, 
the Brandt Report called for ‘the stabilisation of commodity prices at 
remunerative levels’ (Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues 1980:158). 
   
The initial proposal to create a Supplementary Financing Facility, which 
would operate effectively to underwrite the foreign exchange balances 
required for internationally agreed five-year development plans of 
individual developing countries was put forward by Prebisch in his report 
for UNCTAD I (Prebisch 1964). Prebisch pointed out that while the IMF 
compensatory financing  facility  was  already  available  to  tide  countries 
over a period of temporary balance of payments difficulties caused by 
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export shortfalls, it was neither designed to deal with the longer-term 
problems caused by a downward trend in the terms of trade nor large 
enough to do so (Prebisch 1964). The legacy of this argument in 
international commodity policy has been substantial. 
   
In the short term, Prebisch’s argument received wide support at the 1964 
 
UNCTAD Conference, where the delegations of Sweden and the United 
Kingdom jointly proposed – a proposal accepted by the Conference – a 
recommendation to the World Bank to study the feasibility of a scheme to 
provide longer-term financial support to developing countries in order to 
help them avoid disruption of their development programmes ‘as a result 
of adverse movements in export proceeds which could not be dealt with 
by  short-term  balance  of  payments  support’  (UNCTAD  1964:18).  As 
Maizels noted, in its study of the proposal, World Bank/International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) staff concluded that the 
problem of adverse movements in the export proceeds of developing 
countries was indeed a sizeable one, because of the resulting disruption to 
development programmes. They concluded that the existing IMF facility 
did not meet the problem, but importantly also that a feasible scheme of 
supplementary financing could be developed. The scheme prepared by 
IBRD staff provided for prior agreement between a member country and 
the proposed Agency administering the scheme on export projections, 
development programmes and policies, and appropriate domestic 
adjustments to offset export shortfalls. If a country kept within this 
agreement, a shortfall in volumes or export revenues below pre-agreed 
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projections would provide a  prima facie case for assistance under the 
scheme, provided that such other finance that may be available, including 
from the IMF, was also obtained, and that economies in foreign exchange 
expenditure would be effected in various (unspecified) ways that would 
not disrupt the country’s development programmes. A key assumption of 
the proposed scheme was that the necessary finance would be additional 
to,  and  not  a  substitute  for,  existing  aid  programmes.  An 
Intergovernmental Group on this subject, established in UNCTAD, now 
granted a Secretariat and headquartered in Geneva, examined the IBRD 
scheme in great detail. While the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group 
concluded that a scheme on the lines proposed could be viable, there was 
a consensus that it would be of little value if available resources were 
diverted  from  basic  development  finance  for  the  purpose  of 
supplementary financing. UNCTAD then invited the World Bank to 
consider developing detailed arrangements for supplementary financing 
and, if appropriate, to consider introducing them. However, perhaps 
predictably enough, whilst UNCTAD worried about a potential diversion 
of resources, the scheme failed to gain sufficient support at the World 
Bank thanks to the very limited support among potential donors for 
additional contributions for supplementary finance (Maizels 1992:44). 
National finance ministries from donor countries had already criticised the 
IBRD’s  scheme  as  implying  an  open-ended  commitment  for  donor 
countries  if  the  amount  of  supplementary  financing  were  to  depend 
purely on the export shortfalls from pre-agreed levels. Prices could 
potentially fall dramatically:   little analysis was required to demonstrate 
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that in a period of general commodity price recession, claims on the 
proposed Facility could be very large indeed, and who would pay? World 
Bank staff in response proposed that in the event of the total global level 
of export shortfalls eligible for financing in any one year exceeding the 
financial resources available, a rationing scheme would allocate funds 
amongst competing claims. 
   
So whilst the Bank scheme met with general approval by many 
governments,  it  was  subject  to  criticism,  particularly  by  the  Federal 
Republic of Germany, because of its complexity, its uncertain financial 
requirements, and the doubt as to whether recipient countries would be 
prepared to commit themselves to the ‘policy package’ unless they were 
assured that supplementary financing would cover the whole, or almost 
the whole, of a possible shortfall (Maizels 1992:45). Germany therefore 
proposed ‘a much simpler scheme involving the establishment of a limited 
fund, claims on which would be reviewed by a Joint Committee 
representing the IMF and the Agency administering the scheme. The Joint 
Committee would have wide discretion in determining whether there was 
a shortfall in export proceeds and the Agency would have discretion to 
decide the amount and conditions of supplementary financing, taking into 
account the needs and performance of the country concerned and the 
availability of resources’ (Dell 1967:488). 
   
However, even this reduced scheme did not attract majority approval 
either, partly because it the majority view was in favour of pre-agreed 
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criteria for disbursements, but also because notably, even in this earlier, 
and supply-management based, proposal for the establishment of an 
International   Commodities   Agency,   the   amount   of   discretion   and 
authority that was envisaged as devolved to the proposed new Agency 
was a matter of concern for national Governments and the World Bank 
alike. The World Bank was then pressed further by UNCTAD to work out 
the  details  of  a  discretionary  scheme.  In  response,  the  Bank’s  then 
President George Woods reiterated the need to defer consideration of the 
scheme, but added: ‘should a developing country, for reasons outside its 
control, experience an unexpected shortfall in its export earnings which 
threatens to disrupt its development programme, the Bank Group would 
examine the case on its merits with a view to determining whether and 
how it could shape or modify its lending and other operations for that 
country in such a way as to help the country to overcome the difficulties‘ 
(Maizels 1992:45). This view was repeated in further communications from 
the  Bank  and,  although  representatives  of  developing  countries 
questioned the validity of the Bank’s position, the impetus for establishing 
any supplementary financing facility or an Agency to administer it was 
soon lost completely in view of the opposition of the main developed 
countries to providing additional finance for this specific purpose (Maizels 
1992:45). 
 
   
Maizels speculated in his 1992 book as to what role the proposed 
Supplementary Financing Facility, and its associated Agency would, had it 
been established, have played in subsequent decades. Though the Facility 
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was intended to apply to total foreign exchange shortfalls, whether arising 
in commodity trade or elsewhere, the overwhelming majority of claims on 
the Facility in the 1980s from developing countries would have related to 
non-oil commodities, at least up to the downturn in oil prices in 1986. The 
existence of such a Facility may at least have assisted commodity-exporting 
countries to withstand, to a greater or lesser extent, the severe payments 
difficulties caused by the prolonged period of depressed commodity prices 
(Raffaelli 2009). The principal difficulties of funding would have surfaced 
quite rapidly, however. The Facility was conceived essentially in relation to 
unfavourable world market changes which threatened to undermine the 
development programmes of a number of individual countries. At that 
time, during the 1960s, when the world economy was growing relatively 
rapidly, it was not expected that the Facility would need to support more 
than a limited number of development programmes. The total finance 
required to operate the scheme was estimated by the IBRD staff in 1965 at 
US$300–400 million a year for an initial experimental period of five years. 
At   1980   prices  (of   manufactures),  this   amount   would   have   been 
equivalent to some US$0.9– 1.3 billion, and at 1990 prices to rather more, 
US$1.2–1.6  billion  (Maizels  1992:46).  These  amounts  would  not  have 
been  of  themselves  sufficient  to  guarantee  government  budgets  (but 
make an interesting comparison with the much smaller amounts 
contemplated a  decade later at  the World Bank,  discussed in Chapter 
Five). Even then, the money was not forthcoming from potential donor 
governments. Secondly, there was not then - and is not now - any 
consensus, even within the World Bank let alone between donor and 
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developing countries, on the basis on which access to such a fund would 
be permitted. Quite apart from defining country eligibility (e.g. commodity 
dependence,  low  relative  GDP),   there  was   also   the  moral  hazard 
argument that the facility, had it existed, might have encouraged 
commodity dependence and discouraged, at least to some extent, 
diversification  and  economic  development.    As  noted  above  (Chapter 
Two) there were already a number of economists (e.g. Friedman 1954, 
Bauer & Parish 1952, Schultz 1964, Bauer 1972, Lal 1983) who had never 
been comfortable with the idea of commodity price stabilisation through 
international intervention, and whose voice grew progressively louder 
during the period of the Washington Consensus and the ‘counter- 
revolution’ against development economics, and who specifically opposed 
ICAs (Toye 1987). 
   
UNCTAD,  the  Integrated  Programme  for  Commodities  (IPC)  and  the 
 
Common Fund for Commodities 
    
For a few years after the failure of the Prebisch Plan, with sustained 
diminishing volatility in commodity prices and international institutions 
dominated  by  issues  flowing  from  the  Cold  War,  the  ‘commodities 
problem’ appeared to recede into the political background. Between 
UNCTAD I (1964) and UNCTAD II (1968), ‘there was much noise, many 
meetings, but nothing concrete happened’ (Raffaelli 2009:18)  besides the 
adoption of a commodity-by-commodity approach as a reasonable basis 
for discussion and action.  By the time of UNCTAD II, it has been claimed, 
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the place of economic analysis had been taken by value judgements 
regarding both what should be done and how best to do it (Law 1970). 
The second UNCTAD Conference, held at New Delhi in the spring of 1968, 
had  limited  immediate  success  regarding  commodity  agreements. 
Prebisch himself claimed that ‘New Delhi was unmanageable. I could not 
see what was going on’ (Dosman 2006:40), but there was still ample 
evidence of unqualified support from many of the 137 countries 
represented for a massive extensive of ICAs (Law 1970:88). This support, 
however, still did not translate into achievement. Between UNCTAD II 
(1968) and UNCTAD III (1972), only a new Sugar Agreement was 
concluded, in late 1968 In 1972 an International Cocoa Agreement (1972- 
1988) was finally concluded, after close to sixteen years of efforts 
(excluding previous attempts prior to and after World War I and after 
World War II) but the USA, the largest consumer, chose not to participate’ 
(Law 1970:18, Gilligan & Simonelli 2006:9). 
   
The OPEC cartel was the next stimulus. Following the sharp rise in oil 
prices in 1973/4, the focus of attention quickly turned to the need to 
expand the short-term financing facilities of the IMF to assist oil-importing 
developing countries, and the proposal for a supplementary financing 
scheme was finally dropped.   Through the proposed New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), the Group of 77 developing countries (G-77) 
sought changes in international economic relations with the goal of 
altering the relationship of dependency between the developed and 
developing countries. It sought changes in international trade, including 
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adjustment  in   the   terms  of   trade,   to   stabilise   the   prices  of   such 
commodities as  coffee, cocoa,  bauxite, tin, and sugar (Mingst &  Karns 
2007:151). 
    
In the 1970s there were only very limited futures markets (Powers & Tosini 
 
1977) concentrated in DMEs, and there was much discussion about actual 
stabilisation, through the buying and selling of physical stocks. In 1974, 
developing countries launched a campaign for a Common Fund for 
Commodities (CFC) whose aim was to support the prices of key 
commodities,  coupled  to  an  indexation  principle  that  resembled  the 
‘parity’  principle  in  OECD  farm  policies  (Koning,  Calo,  &  Jongeneel 
 
2004:4).  This  campaign  led  in  1975  to  UNCTAD  passing  a  resolution 
calling for an Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC). The IPC 
covered ten core commodities: its implementation gave rise to bodies such 
as the International Grains Council, the International Jute Organisation, 
and the International Tropical Timber Organisation. The times appeared, 
at least superficially, more favourable to this supply-demand management 
approach. In his report for UNCTAD IV (1976) the Secretary-General said 
that the IPC aimed at dealing with the problem in a comprehensive and 
systematic way and comprised five basic elements:  (a ) The establishment 
of internationally-owned stocks covering a wide range of commodities (b) 
The  establishment  of  a  common  financing  fund  that  would  make 
resources available for the acquisition of stocks (c) The institution, in 
circumstances which justified it, of a system of medium-term to long-term 
commitments to purchase and sell commodities at agreed prices (d) The 
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institution of more adequate measures than were at the time available to 
provide compensatory financing to producers to cover shortfalls in export 
earnings and (e) The initiation of an extensive programme of measures to 
further the processing of commodities by the producing countries 
themselves. 
   
The Secretariat’s IPC proposals in the field of commodities were finally 
embraced at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in 1976, which adopted without 
dissent a resolution on the IPC, Resolution 93(IV) d. The resolution 
identified 18 commodities on which meetings preparatory to negotiating 
conferences should be held and completed before February 1978. The 
resolution also provided for the negotiation of a Common Fund [the CFC] 
which would act as a common source of financing for all the commodities 
of the IPC and directed the Secretary-General to convene a Negotiating 
Conference on the Common Fund (Raffaelli 2009:23). 
   
The IPC approach clearly differed radically from the Prebisch Plan. It 
followed Maizel’s third approach, supply and demand management. 
Notably though the ten largest exporters of the 18 commodities of the IPC 
were the USA, Brazil, Malaysia, Cuba, Indonesia, France, West Germany, 
Australia,  USSR  and  Canada.  ‘The  picture,  thus,  never  was   –  and 
UNCTAD’s Secretariat never said so – one of the South producing 
commodities for the North to import’ (Raffaelli 2009:24). Prebisch himself 
was disappointed with the OPEC countries’ attitude to the IPC, 
commenting ‘They did not commit a single penny’ (Dosman 2006:57). 
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This left ICAs. Under the auspices of UNCTAD ICAs were also implemented 
to stabilise prices: the Cocoa Agreement (1972–88), and the International 
Natural Rubber Agreement (1979–99). The ICAs for cocoa, rubber and tin 
relied wholly or partly on buffer stocks: those for coffee, sugar and tin 
wholly or partly on export controls. As UNCTAD noted, ‘international 
stocking arrangements are provided for in the agreements on tin and 
cocoa, while provision is made in the coffee agreement for a study of the 
feasibility of such arrangements’ (UNCTAD 1977:3). It was further noted 
that   ‘the   new   International   Sugar   Agreement,   1977,   provides   an 
illustration  of  arrangements  for  the  holding  of  co-ordinated  national 
stocks. Financial assistance to exporting members holding such stocks is 
provided from a Stock Financing Fund, financed through a levy on free 
market sugar imported into or exported from member countries, 
supplemented by voluntary contributions and loans raised by the 
International Sugar Council’ (UNCTAD 1977:3). In 1977 UNCTAD 
pronouncements still exuded considerable confidence in the system of 
international agreements, where stocking arrangements were to be 
considered as only one of a number of alternative policy options. For 
example, ‘Pricing arrangements exist in the agreements relating to cocoa, 
coffee, sugar and tin, and provision is made for the mandatory review of 
prices at specified periods and when special circumstances so require’ 
(UNCTAD 1977:3) whereas ‘Supply management measures in the form of 
export quotas, with provision for exemption for small exporters and for the 
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redistribution of shortfalls with preference to small exporters, exist in the 
 
four agreements having economic clauses’ (UNCTAD 1977:3). 
    
The  commodity-specific  approach  being  taken  by  UNCTAD  after  the 
failure of the Prebisch Plan did lead to some other successes, such as the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement and  the International Rubber 
and Jute Agreements. It also led to the International Commodity bodies 
such as the Cocoa, Coffee, Wheat, Sugar and Olive Oil Councils. These 
agreements were intended to address declining terms of trade through 
supply management, and price volatility through buffer stock operations 
(Larson, Varangis & Yabuki 1998:6)  Unfortunately for those who believed 
in interventionist approaches to commodity risk management, as 
exemplified by the IPC, by the time of UNCTAD V (1979) there had only 
been preparatory meetings held for only some of the 18 commodities. All 
international agreements then in force with economic clauses (i.e. with 
stock and/or quota provisions in operation - Cocoa, Coffee and Tin) 
preceded the IPC. Two of them even preceded UNCTAD itself. As their 
strongest supporter pointed out in 1982, ‘Since the inauguration of the 
UNCTAD  Integrated  Programme  for  Commodities  in  1976,  with 
Conference resolution 93(IV), interest in international commodity 
agreements was greatly increased, as has the intensity of the negotiating 
process itself. Though five years have passed since that resolution was 
adopted, the hopes and expectations which it engendered, of the 
establishment  of  market  regulation  mechanisms  for  a  wide  range  of 
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commodities of export interest to developing countries, have so far been 
largely frustrated’ (Maizels 1982:1). 
   
The writing was on the wall for anyone who cared to read. In the USA 
there were those who did, for example in the US State Department. In a 
review   of   commodity   agreements   it    was    noted    that    although 
‘Theoretically, such agreements could produce modest benefits by 
facilitating the commitment of a more appropriate level of resources to 
production over time. It has proven extremely difficult to realise these 
benefits in practice, however, due to the continuing vagaries of supply 
and  demand  and  continuing  competition  for  market  shares  (Amery 
1981:1). Amery further argued that price stabilisation efforts could 
themselves stimulate output if producers believed that their risk of low 
prices has been decreased, whilst he commented that recent commodity 
agreements had tried several means for dealing with market competition 
problems: keeping price goals modest, signing up all major producers, and 
enrolling importer nations, who agree not  to  increase their  purchases 
from non-members – his implication being that none of them had actually 
been successful. 
   
In fact even a decade after UNCTAD IV (held in Nairobi in 1976), only one 
new commodity stabilisation agreement, for natural rubber, had been 
negotiated. An existing agreement on cocoa was not operative, and 
agreements on tin and sugar had collapsed (Larson, Varangis & Yabuki 
1998, Gilbert 1996, Lines 2007).   The International Tin Agreement had 
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worked in offsetting the disruptive effects of the release of tin stocks from 
the USA (Fox 1974:343), but collapsed in 1985 (Yamey 1992). The Cocoa 
Agreement was blocked after 1988. While the International Coffee 
Agreement  achieved   its   main   objective  of   raising   coffee   prices,   it 
eventually succumbed to competitive pressures and successive attempts to 
negotiate a renewal then failed (Bohman & Jarvis 1990).   The Sugar 
Agreement continued to be purely administrative. The Rubber Agreement 
endured  longer,  though  only  by  being  ‘relatively  innocuous’  (Gilbert 
1996:15): it was renewed in 1987, and was operating with economic 
clauses until 1992, but soon after disagreements among its participants 
put it into doubt as a fully operational commodity agreement.  In a review 
– entitled an ‘obituary’ - of ICAs well after the end of their halcyon period, 
Gilbert concluded that: ‘Commodity agreements fit uneasily in a world in 
which markets are becoming globalized and increasingly competitive’ 
(Gilbert1996:16). 
   
UNCTAD had by then turned some of its efforts toward the promotion of a 
new compensatory financing facility, apparently realising, perhaps 
belatedly, that, although there was some sympathy among industrialised 
countries for the difficulties faced by primary producers, a radical 
transformation of the market-oriented principles and norms of the current 
international commodities regime was (and remains) politically 
unacceptable to DME countries (Ravenhill 1984:538). The CFC, finally 
established  in  1980,  was  allocated  a  US$500  million  endowment  to 
provide  liquidity  to   the  IPC   to   support  their   mandate   to   stabilise 
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commodity prices, although it had not yet come into operation at the time 
of UNCTAD VII (1987). The CFC never fulfilled its original purpose and its 
activities were limited to using the interest accruing from its original 
endowment to fund commodity research and development programmes 
(Bower & Kamel 2003). 
   
Two practical problems had emerged with ICAs. First had been the 
difficulty in setting the price range and updating it over time in response 
to changes in either costs or consumer tastes. Secondly, finding sufficient 
funds to keep prices within the specified range had proved impossible, a 
problem that was especially acute if there was a run of years of high 
production/ low prices and stocks had to be held over a long period 
(Gilbert 1996). All of the ICAs eventually collapsed and as Gilbert suggests 
it was perhaps the dramatic collapse of the International Tin Agreement in 
1985 that finally persuaded the developed world that commodity price 
stabilisation was infeasible (Anderson & Gilbert 1988, Yamey 1992, Gilbert 
1996:6). In the face of the inflationary impact of the second oil price shock, 
the USA declined to renew its commitment to the agreement, just as there 
was a rapid accumulation of stocks. As a result, financial resources were 
quickly depleted, causing large losses to tin traders, and even threatening 
the viability of the London Metal Exchange. According to the World Bank, 
whilst parastatals had some success in stabilising prices for a year, they 
were rarely able to stabilise across all years and exhausted resources. In 
times when prices were low, they could rarely compensate having saved 
insufficient during periods of high prices. Thus producers were effectively 
145
134 
trading market risks for risks involving policy and the performance of the 
parastatal (Akiyama 2001). 
   
Government Insurance and subsidies to resolve the ‘commodity problem’ 
    
The idea of supplementary financing did not die immediately with the 
failure of the Prebisch Plan.  When commodity prices exhibited prolonged 
low relative values (or put another way, when the terms of trade moved 
against and stayed unfavourable to developing countries) as they did 
during the 1980s, a Supplementary Facility on the limited scale envisaged 
decades before would have had only a marginal, though none the less 
useful, role to play. But the original concept, of an international agency 
disposing of longer-term finance to support development programmes in 
danger of disruption as a result of adverse changes in the world economy, 
might have been even more relevant in subsequent decades than it was in 
the 1960s. In 1989 a Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, 
argued that the adjustment programmes of the 1980s had failed because 
nothing was done to protect developing countries against adverse 
developments in their external environment. He proposed ‘Development 
Contracts’ instead:   the donor community would, on this proposal, not 
only agree to provide aid to underwrite the development plan, but would 
also  be  committed  to  providing  some  form  of  compensatory  finance 
should export expectations underlying the plan, or the terms of trade, be 
undermined by developments outside the country’s control (the 
Supplementary Financing element). As the quid pro quo, the developing 
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country would undertake to maintain a domestic policy framework that 
would effectively support its development programme. However it was 
argued that historical experience strongly suggested that markets for crop 
price insurance would fail to exist without government subsidies (Kramer 
1983) and developing countries did not possess the budgets to implement 
similar schemes. 
   
Another route thought of was government insurance, which operated 
substantially at the national level (notably through the USDA and the 
Common Agricultural Policy in the EU). Historically, concerns with price 
risks led many countries to adopt a wide variety of schemes aimed at, 
among other purposes, stabilising domestic prices, often for an entire 
season and frequently at considerable public expense (Newbery & Stiglitz 
1981). By the 1980s unilateral or multilateral intervention in agricultural 
commodity markets had become the norm for developed countries. The 
USA for example used support prices and inventories to manage domestic 
prices. The USDA and private insurance companies developed three major 
programmes, Income Protection (IP), Crop Revenue coverage (CRC), and 
Revenue Assurance (RA) which are there to assist the farmer's own risk 
management   options   (Harwood,   Heifner,   Coble,   Perry   &   Somwaru 
1999:1). It has been argued that the ‘decoupling’ of US and EU farm 
subsidies from production has caused structurally low prices, benefiting 
agro-trading and processing companies rather than farmers (Lines 2007, 
Ray 2007). 
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A  number  of  commodity-specific  supply/demand  management 
agreements were established post-war by industrialised nations, especially 
former colonial powers with their traditional trading  partners in 
developing countries. Both the UK and France, notably, administered 
import policies favourable to their former colonies (e.g. the UK’s import 
discrimination  in  favour  of  New  Zealand  butter  and  Australian  wool, 
which continued until the UK’s accession to the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (now the EU) in 1973). in the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations, the US launched a campaign for international agricultural 
trade   liberalisation.  The   main   thrust   was   against   European  export 
subsidies that hindered American grain exports, but the rhetoric also 
emphasised the importance of trade  liberalisation for  developing 
countries. In 1993, in the Uruguay trade round, ‘a US-EU compromise led 
to an agreement that prescribed reductions in traditional price supports 
but exempted certain direct payments to farmers. In the years that 
followed, substitution of such payments for price supports allowed both 
powers to maintain high levels of exports below their costs of production 
in spite of the restriction of export subsidies’ (Koning, Calo & Jongeneel 
2004:5). The issue of financing of food imports by LIFDCs featured 
prominently in the discussions leading to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), and gave rise 
to the ‘Decision on measures concerning the possible negative effects of 
the reform programme on least-developed and net food-importing 
developing countries’, also known as the ‘Marrakesh Decision’ (article 16.1 
of the URAA).   The Marrakesh Decision stated ‘that  as a result of the 
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Uruguay Round certain developing countries may experience short-term 
difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports and that these 
countries  may  be  eligible  to  draw  on  the  resources  of  international 
financial institutions under existing facilities, or such facilities as may be 
established, in the context of adjustment programmes, in order to address 
such financing difficulties’ (Sarris 2009:4). But the emphasis continued to 
lie with possibility, not the certainty of fresh practical arrangements. 
   
The EU also acted. It operated a special system of commodity-specific 
exchange rates (‘green rates’) for trade among EU members. But also, 
under the first Lomé agreement signed in 1975 the EU also began offering 
its own compensatory financing schemes to the agricultural sector in ACP 
countries  under  the  STABEX  (1975)  and  SYSMIN  (1985)  programmes. 
These programmes lasted until the turn of the millennium. STABEX was a 
concessional compensatory scheme that provided for transfers from the 
European Development Fund to ACP states if their earnings from exports 
to the EEC from a product included in the scheme fell below a reference 
level (Ravenhill 1984:543-544). The EU’s STABEX, which was also designed 
for non-conditional support to ACP countries experiencing commodity 
price-related balance of payments problems, dated from the first Lomé 
Convention. Unlike with the IMF facilities, loans were interest free. Sharply 
falling commodity prices in the early 1990s, following the demise of the 
International Commodity Agreements, led to major resource drains from 
the Compensatory Finance Facility and STABEX, mainly as a result both of 
increased  eligibility  for  assistance.  STABEX  disbursements  have  been 
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described as ‘rapid but sometimes purposeless’ (Hewitt 2007:7), and they 
 
threatened to distort EU lending as a whole, forming 13% of all EU aid in 
 
1990-1 despite allocated funds being only 42% of eligible applications, 
whilst repayments collapsed (Gibbon 2005:12). The EU responded in the 
short-term by converting existing STABEX loans to grants, but at the same 
time both it and in 1983 the IMF made any further access to these funds 
conditional on the readiness of countries to negotiate their policies with 
them (Maizels 1992). Both because of this, and the high interest rates 
involved, the Compensatory Finance Facility was hardly drawn on after 
1989 and the Buffer Stock Financing Facility was last used in 1984 (IMF 
 
1999).  The  EU  also  became  involved  in  commodity  price  stabilisation 
efforts both between its members and with particular external trading 
partners. The EU had a similar scheme to the USA, individual member 
states such as the UK operating a ‘deficiency payments scheme’ to farmers 
guaranteeing a minimum price for their production, but the EU also 
operated a  special  set  of  commodity-specific exchange  rates,  so-called 
‘green rates’, for trade among EU members. 
    
According  to  one  analysis  STABEX  transfers  accounted  for  almost  a 
quarter of total government revenue in Ethiopia and Uganda during some 
years of this period (Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont & Gunning 1999). 
Under the Cotonou Agreement, the EU replaced STABEX with FLEX in 
2000 (Hewitt 2007). FLEX’s eligibility criteria were more stringent than 
STABEX’s and the levels of real compensation they could trigger were 
lower. ACP countries had to register a year-on-year 10% loss in export 
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earnings (2% in the case of LDCs) as well as a year-on-year 10% worsening 
of their programmed public deficit. Of 51 applications up to the end of 
2002, only six were found to have met both these criteria and 
disbursements were much lower than under STABEX. Under the ‘Cotonou’ 
trade regime the EU had granted better trade preferences to the ACP than 
to similar developing countries but without any corresponding ACP 
opening.  In fact their share of EU and world trade was shrinking. In 
addition, the Cotonou trade regime did not comply with EU and ACP 
commitments at the WTO that trade agreements must not discriminate 
between groups of countries unless they fully open trade between the 
countries concerned. Subsequent negotiations between the EU and ACP 
countries resulted in ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’ because the 
system of trade preferences that was in place before EPAs, the ‘Cotonou’ 
trade regime, was allegedly failing to help ACP economies diversify and 
develop their trade. 
   
Other DME and developing country Governments also began to run 
domestic stabilisation programmes. Marketing boards and stabilisation 
funds were common in both developed and developing countries, for 
example, for wool in Australia and for coffee in Uganda. By 1990 such 
programmes included: buffer stock schemes (examples at that time 
included Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines and South 
Korea), buffer funds (examples included Papua New Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire 
and South Korea), marketing boards with monopolies on trade (examples 
included most of Africa, India, Ecuador and Malaysia), and variable tariff 
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schemes (examples included Malaysia, Chile and Venezuela) (Knudsen & 
Nash 1990, Dana & Gilbert 2008:3). For those commodities produced 
primarily in developing countries, interventions were either multilateral, for 
example through buffer stock or export control agreements under the 
auspices of the remaining international commodity agreements: cocoa, 
coffee, natural rubber and sugar (Gilbert 1987, 1996) or through domestic 
agencies. Marketing boards and stabilisation funds were common in 
developed and developing countries: many remain in place e.g. in East 
and Sub-Saharan Africa (Jayne & Tschirley 2010:4). The USA used support 
prices and inventories to manage domestic prices. 
   
Evaluation of ICAs 
    
For a variety of reasons, most (if not all) of the large-scale government-led 
price stabilisation schemes have proven to be unsustainable in the long 
run,  largely  due  to  their  cost  and  difficulties  in  administering  them 
equitably and efficiently. This unsustainability was recognised more than 
two decades ago (Gardner 1987, Gilbert 1996). The impetus to manage 
commodity risk through buffer stocks and government intervention 
therefore dissolved during the 1980s, precisely for such reasons: the costs 
became increasingly apparent and unacceptable to governments, many of 
which were seeking to reduce, not expand, their role in demand and price 
management. 
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The limitations of ICAs were clearly identified even during World War II, 
but in the absence of initiatives focused on organised derivatives markets, 
few alternatives were suggested even by evident sceptics of Keynes’ 
enthusiasm for ICAs (e.g. Davis 1942). In proposing a revitalisation of fair 
trade commodity organisations at a much later time, analysts suggested 
four immediate reasons why commodity agreements collapsed:  (a) What 
they  described  as  the  ‘free  rider  problem’  of  producing  countries. 
Individual producer countries were able to remain outside an agreement 
and still benefit from it. Power was unevenly distributed between all 
players, for example between established producers and new low-cost 
producers. (b) The domestic price supports by DMEs. (c) This funding in 
part precluded funding for ICA buffer stocks and the CFC, because DMEs 
declined to co-operate. (c) There was no effective supply management: 
oversupply defeated export quotas. Critics who were supportive of market- 
based  solutions therefore suggested that  the  efficacy of the ICAs was 
‘questionable’ (Varangis and Larson 1996:1). The most well-known 
reviewer suggested that ICAs can only be effective when there was an 
industry consensus, that they are not robust with regard to exchange rate 
changes, and that existing agreements were poorly drafted. He concluded 
that the demand for answers to the original problems posed by Keynes in 
1938 would therefore continue irrespective of the expansion of derivative 
markets to developing countries (Gilbert 1996). As one observer who had 
been involved in their working declared, ‘The heyday of commodity 
agreements had been an illusion, a promise which never materialised. Or 
perhaps one should say it had been like a meteor:  it offered a good show 
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and provoked a lot of talk, but had soon vanished, leaving no trace’ 
(Raffaelli 2009:23). There are still some supporters, who suggest e.g. that 
some types of ICAs could if correctly implemented (Van Groenendaal & 
Vingerhoets 1995) reduce market distortions due to market concentration 
and reinstate trade transparency, improve quality, and blend trade 
concerns with technical and financial assistance, but to the example of the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement cited (Nadal 2008) might be 
added the fact that it is concerned with the promotion of trade and 
diversification of sustainable tropical timber, not the imposition of price 
ceilings or floors, or other more traditional functions of an ICA (UNCTAD 
1994e). 
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Part II - Market Based Mechanisms 
    
The definition and use of market based agricultural risk management 
instruments 
   
Derivative contracts, whether forward, futures, options or swaps - as well 
as yield and weather insurance, which subsumes a price derivative in a 
wider product - are widely used by commodity producers for the purposes 
of price risk management. The most popular derivative contracts are 
forward markets, futures, options and swaps. Market agents, confronted 
with price risk that arises mainly from supply and demand imbalance in 
the market, have for centuries been able to use derivatives instruments e.g. 
for wheat and herring on the Antwerp Exchange in the mid-17th Century 
(Poitras 2006:2) to control price (and perhaps yield) risk by transferring it 
to other individuals who are willing to bear it.  Derivative contracts have 
evolved to be available in many types. 
   
Forward contracts 
    
For many centuries the main market-based mechanism used in agriculture 
was the forward contract:  farmers sold their produce for future delivery at 
a  price  agreed  in  advance.  This  provided  some  degree  of  price  and 
revenue assurance, depending on counterparty risk and yield. Using 
derivative contracts to provide insurance against adverse movements in 
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price (and latterly other variables such as yield, revenue and even weather 
conditions) is known as hedging. If a producer prefers to hedge both price 
and basis risk, forward contracting would be an appropriate risk 
management tool. Forward contracting agricultural commodities allows 
producers  to  secure  a  price  for  their  crop  prior  to  harvest.  Hedging 
reduces or even eliminates risk from declining prices: adherents of forward 
contracts argue that they facilitate more consistent planning and better 
investment decisions as  well as  transfer basis  risk  to  the counterparty, 
whilst avoiding the administrative costs and time associated with hedging 
in the futures market. However producers who use forward contracts 
usually receive a lower price for their crop than available in the physical 
spot market because the price and basis risk have been transferred to the 
end user and there are fewer transaction costs than hedging (i.e. 
commission costs, margins, interest on margins) (Taylor, Dhuyvetter & 
Kastens 2003). It remains, however, a popular form of price risk 
management for commodity producers, even in the USA where futures 
and options markets for agricultural commodities are widely available 
(USDA 1996). 
   
Contract Farming 
    
An extension of forward contract is known as ‘contract farming’ which has 
been defined as ‘an agreement between farmers and processing and/or 
marketing firms for the production and supply of agricultural products 
under  forward  agreements,  frequently  at  predetermined  prices  and 
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usually with production support from the purchaser’ (Eaton & Shepherd 
 
2001:2).     Contract  farming  has  excited  fierce  debate,  with  its  critics 
claiming that farmers in developing countries lose out and its supporters, 
exactly the reverse. The FAO is now generally supportive (FAO 2011b). 
   
Futures Contracts 
    
An agricultural futures contract, by contrast to a forward, is an agreement 
to buy or sell a standard quantity and quality of a commodity at an agreed 
time in the future, in a guaranteed and reliable market-place (an 
Exchange), with terms agreed in advance. The principle idea behind 
hedging using futures contracts is to protect the holder against adverse 
price movements prior to a cash sale or purchase of commodity in the 
future by taking an equal and opposite position in the futures market to 
that held in the physical commodity. For farmers to hedge, this involves 
selling futures and profiting when prices fall as the futures will be able to 
be bought back more cheaply than they  were purchased. There have 
been for decades numerous analyses of agricultural hedging strategies 
available (for example Chicago Board of Trade 1996, Bittman 2008) 
although obvious issues for farmers in developing countries are literacy 
and the availability of alternative methods of explanation, as well as the 
availability of providers of the services at affordable prices to farmers at all 
ends of the size and income spectrum. 
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There are active futures markets for each of the commodities which have 
been subject to international control (Gilbert 1996:17). Hedging using 
futures contracts can be effective in eliminating price risk, but may also 
lead to other risks including basis risk. Holding a futures contract also 
importantly involves potential daily expenditures that can be exceptionally 
onerous for farmers. As sellers of futures contracts, hedging their future 
production,  if  crop  prices  rise,  they  will  be  called  upon  for  variation 
margins on their futures contracts. This will be at a time when the crop, 
though now more valuable than previously predicted, may be difficult to 
monetise, thereby catching the farmer in a cash squeeze. Moreover, many 
futures contracts have high financial requirements precisely because of 
these potential cash demands. Their use has historically been less than 
universal, even in the USA where they are generally well understood and 
have been available for decades (US General Accounting Office 1999, 
USDA 1999). On the US grain markets, the largest groups of hedgers are 
believed to be grain merchants and processing firms (Sarris 1997). It is 
widely  accepted  that  the  most  active  users  of  agricultural  risk 
management instruments, especially derivatives, are US farmers – their 
level of derivative education is highest, the markets are most accessible, 
and the tradition of using derivative markets now has a long history 
(Harwood, Heifner, Coble, Perry & Somwaru 1999). Yet even by the mid- 
1990s the direct use of futures by US farmers still remained modest 
compared  to   other  risk   management   tools.   A   survey   in   Montana 
suggested that in the early 1990s fewer than 15% of the crop producers in 
that area used futures (Sakong, Hayes & Hallam 1993). Another survey 
158
147 
indicated that fewer than 30% of the farmers in the Corn Belt and in the 
South-East production regions used them, in the Southern Plains fewer 
than 15% (Harwood, Dismukes, Vandeveer & Heifner 2000). According to 
Alizadeh & Nomikos, (2005:8), a report commissioned by the UK Futures 
and Options Association, only 11% of grain producers actively use 
derivatives for the purposes of risk management, a figure repeated 
elsewhere (EU 2006:74). They explained this low usage as a result of the 
Common Agricultural Policy of agricultural support, low levels of 
knowledge about derivatives, affordability, regulation, and the use of 
alternative ‘primitive’ risk management techniques. As was argued by 
Rabobank, just before they were appointed to run the pilot studies 
discussed below (Chapter Five), ‘price-risk insurance for primary producers 
is not an option. This insurance service was done earlier by governments 
of some coffee producing countries, but in reality this was a subsidy when 
prices fell. In reality, one cannot insure a market price because one cannot 
guarantee a market price. No private or mutual insurance can give such a 
guarantee without making the insurance premium equal to the insured 
deficit (Van Diepenbeek Van Empel,   Duff, Costa, Ortiz, Wortelboer 
Rozenbdaal, Faber & Scott 2002:21). For these reasons many supporters of 
the use of market based mechanisms for farmers have suggested that 
direct access by farmers to futures markets is rarely appropriate, even in 
the USA (e.g. Commodities Futures Trading Commission 2001:22fn) let 
alone in developing countries (Dana & Gilbert 2008). 
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Options Contracts 
    
These problems have given rise to arguments for the use of option 
contracts by agricultural producers. These give their holders the right, but 
not the obligation, to buy (call option) or sell (put option) an underlying 
asset (e.g. wheat) at a certain price, known as the strike price, and at a 
certain time or times in the futures, known as the expiration date or the 
maturity of the option. Taking out a put option at a strike price that 
represents a minimum required level of profit is another hedging strategy, 
one that is frequently recommended by advisers to farmers. (e.g. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2001) Options trading, either 
Exchange or Over-The-Counter (OTC), priced off the futures markets, has 
now become more prevalent in farming as a hedging method – and more 
supported by advisers - than using futures directly. Yet the same Montana 
study suggested that only about 19% of farmers used options (Sakong, 
Hayes & Hallam 1993). 
   
Swap contracts 
    
Mention should also be made of the swap contract, normally concluded 
not on an Exchange but with an OTC counterparty such as an agricultural 
wholesaler (on a small scale) or an investment bank (on a larger scale), 
which is an agreement whereby a floating price for a commodity is 
exchanged for  a  fixed price for  the same  commodity over a  specified 
period for a defined volume. The floating price is normally the prevailing 
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market (spot) price for the asset and the fixed price is the price that is 
negotiated and agreed before the initiation of the swap contract. 
   
The history of the derivative markets 
    
Although  forward  markets  have  existed  for  many  centuries,  futures 
markets have existed since the seventeenth century, when they were 
informally established in coffee shops in Amsterdam and centred on the 
trade in tulips. The modern form began in the nineteenth century with 
exchanges being founded in the United Kingdom and the USA.  However, 
it is probably true that for the main part, most traders on the market were 
not necessarily seeking price insurance as their modern counterparts do. 
Instead, the exchanges were predicated on a need to channel the physical 
exchange of the good (Morgan 2001:144). 
   
Since then, the trading volume as well as the variety of futures and options 
contracts available for trading has increased dramatically, although the 
volume of agricultural derivatives is now dwarfed by financial derivatives 
(Bank for International Settlement 2011). In the European markets, 
agricultural  derivatives  have  been  traded  since  1929  with  the 
establishment of the London Commodity Exchange (LCE) (Alizadeh & 
Nomikos 2005). Well-financed Exchanges with minimal counterparty risk, 
such as the CME and Euronext-LIFFE, which has inherited LCE contracts, 
currently offer a wide range of agricultural price risk management 
derivative contract instruments, mainly futures and options. Agricultural 
161
150 
forward contracts, many options, and swaps, are however mainly traded 
 
‘Over-The-Counter’ (OTC) between commodity producers and major 
financial  providers,  which  inevitably  introduces  an  element  of 
counterparty risk into the transactions, as well as potential difficulties in 
establishing an accurate price: notwithstanding the frequently used Black- 
Scholes model for option pricing, ‘The complexity of the mathematical 
models used to price derivatives, the proliferation of over-the-counter 
transactions, and the very speed of transactions makes it impossible to 
accurately  determine  an  institution’s  risk  at  any  given  time’  (Crockett 
1997:31). A final observation is that many agricultural commodities remain 
outside the scope of derivative markets, in particular outside the scope of 
Exchange-traded futures and options contracts. Tea, for instance, has 
always been traded at auction and still lacks a formal derivative market 
structure worldwide, a fact attributed to ‘the crop's extreme seasonality, its 
infinitely variable quality and because it cannot be stored for long periods 
without losing aroma’ (Commodity Online 2011). Minor agricultural 
commodities such  as  jute,  hemp and  sisal  have  only  had  a  derivative 
market intermittently (in India) (Commodity Online 2011a), whilst others 
such as bananas are produced mainly within vertically integrated 
industries, dominated by large companies such as Chiquita, Del Monte 
and Dole, which utilise long-term sales contracts so that producer hedging 
is not therefore required (Arias, Dankers, Liu & Pilkauskas 2003). 
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Yield and Area Contracts 
    
In addition to price risks, however, farmers face yield risks, due mainly to 
adverse weather but also to pests and diseases.  These risks are usually 
handled through insurance schemes, either offered privately or through 
national agencies (Hazell 1992). In the spring of 1995, for example the 
CBOT introduced crop-yield insurance and futures options for corn 
(research yield contracts). Governments, notably in the USA and Europe, 
have often underwritten crop insurance policies in an effort to curb 
producers’ yield risks (Hazell,  Pomareda  &  Valdes 1986,  Coble, Knight, 
Pope & Williams 1997). 
   
The most widely extended crop insurance in the EU, for example, is hail 
insurance, which often includes other scattered risks such as fire (single 
risk insurance). In many countries this is nearly the only existing type of 
crop insurance (Bielza, Stromblmair & Gallego 2007). Some kind of 
insurance policies cover also the risk of frost or a limited number of 
meteorological events. These are known as combined or all-risk insurance 
(Wright & Hewitt 1994), referred to as Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) 
when provided by the US government to farmers. Problems of asymmetric 
information — including moral hazard (Quiggin 1991, Ramaswami 1993) 
and adverse selection — also affect the private sector’s ability to offer 
individualised Multi-Peril insurance (Ahsan, Ali & Kurian 1982, Chambers 
1983, 1989, Goodwin 2001, Goodwin, Smith & Hammond 2000, Mishra, 
Nimon  &  El-Ost  2005).  Moral  hazard  is  present  when  a  person  can 
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increase his or her expected indemnity by personal intervention after 
buying insurance. Adverse selection occurs when a farmer has more 
information about the risk of loss than does the insurer, and is better able 
to determine the fairness of premium rates (Harwood, Dismukes, 
Vandeveer & Heifner 2000). Although the objective of this thesis is to 
examine perceptions within IGOs of the political and environmental 
implications of market based risk management instruments, principally 
futures and options, a comparison may also be made with perceptions of 
government programmes of crop insurance. 
   
Weather and other derivatives 
    
Finally, weather-based index insurance is a relatively new insurance (or 
risk-management) instrument whose payouts are based on the occurrence 
of a weather event, rather than on actual crop losses. There are several 
ways in which natural-disaster/weather risk may be packaged into various 
forms of potentially tradable financial assets. Some of these instruments 
are packaged as catastrophe bonds, insurance contracts, weather 
derivative contracts, exotic options, or some other derivative financial 
instrument. In any case, they all provide the holder with payments 
contingent upon the occurrence of some risky event. By purchasing these 
instruments, those holding the risk share some of their risk exposure with 
market investors (Varangis, Skees & Barnett 2002). The possibility of index 
based derivatives for animal mortality and water use was also raised at this 
time.  Basis  risk  remained  a  major  concern  however,  as  a  leading 
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proponent conceded: ‘The effectiveness of index insurance as a risk 
management tool depends on how positively correlated farm-yield losses 
are with the underlying area yield or weather index’  (Skees 2003:19). The 
idea was further developed by research work within the World Bank (Hess 
& Syroka 2005), eventually seeing the light of day, so far as developing 
countries are concerned, as a modest World Bank project in Malawi 
launched in 2008, where one of the main advantages was argued by the 
World Bank to be the fact that a payout could be immediate, as it was 
based on an independent weather index, rather than – as with insurance 
– on an estimate of loss (World Bank 2008).  Not stated but equally true is 
the fact that the chance of fraud is equally reduced through the use of an 
independent weather index. These examples are discussed in more detail 
below (in Chapter Six). 
   
Structured (Commodity-Linked) Financing 
    
The  agricultural  sector,  especially  low-income  farmers,  has  also  often 
found access to credit difficult, and both agencies and the private sector 
have been working to overcome these obstacles. ‘Traditional approaches 
were all based on taking a credit risk with regard to the borrower. New 
approaches are based on taking not a credit risk but a performance risk. As 
long as borrowers continue performing as usual in the agricultural supply 
chain,  banks  are  reimbursed’  (UNCTAD  2004:1).  In  this  approach,  the 
banks can then lay off their risks using the price risk management 
instruments described above, enabling them to offer commodity-linked 
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financing  to  farmers,  e.g.  pricing  credit  according  to  the  price  of 
agricultural products. 
   
Commodities Policies after the Demise of the Commodities Agreements 
    
Just three years separated the publication of Maizel’s final work on the 
subject (Maizels 1992) from the first edition of Raffaelli’s work: 1995, but 
subsequently reprinted fourteen years later (Raffaelli 2009). However the 
intellectual gulf between them would be carried forward for decades.  Yet 
even Maizels had recognised the existence of market-based risk 
management instruments, which he described thus:   ‘an alternative 
approach to offsetting short-term shortfalls in foreign exchange earnings 
from commodity exports has been developed in recent years, using new 
kinds of financial instruments involving options, swaps, and commodity- 
based bonds, as well as more traditional futures and forward contracts. 
These instruments now allow for hedging against commodity price falls 
beyond one year’ (Maizels 1992:155). Maizels therefore saw the use of 
market based mechanisms to manage the commodities problem initially as 
a parallel process to ICAs. 
   
In this period of collapse and mothballing of the ICAs, a more general 
change in the macroeconomic environment was taking place. As more 
governments in DMEs espoused monetarist policies, greater emphasis was 
being placed on allowing markets to operate in an unfettered fashion to 
encourage greater efficiency and growth. This policy switch was hard to 
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resist in the case of commodity markets where previous policy had not 
worked. Thus, the emphasis now switched away from the intervention 
approach that had been favoured since the 1930s and toward a system 
that allowed individuals to cope with the impact of price volatility.  Partly 
in response to a global trend towards market liberalisation, agricultural 
price risk management using market-based solutions began to win 
increasing  acceptance  from  the  1980s  onwards,  starting  in  the  USA, 
where markets had been in existence for decades, but rapidly also in other 
developed countries (Gemmill 1988). So from the 1980s onwards, as an 
alternative or complement to the ‘traditional’ non-market mechanisms 
measures such as ICAs described above, commodity producers had some 
opportunities to  use markets,  especially derivative markets,  to  manage 
their price risks (Wright & Newbery 1991). 
   
It was argued that with some qualifications (credit availability and the cost 
of using derivatives), futures markets offered a more effective and welfare- 
raising  method  of  dealing  with  price  volatility  (Gemmill  1985,  Gilbert 
1985).  Academics who were involved with the World Bank policy process 
agreed, identifying the spectacular collapse of the International Tin 
Agreement in 1985 as pivotal:  ‘Since [that time]…there has been a shift in 
emphasis  toward  using  futures  markets  for  risk  management’  (Gilbert 
1996:17).  National commodity market reforms should be seen as part of a 
larger set of economic reforms undertaken because of economic crises or 
prolonged periods of poor economic performance. Commodities 
Exchanges, even in developing countries, and OTC trading in agricultural 
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commodities, have expanded dramatically since the early 1990s when the 
issue of support by IGOs for market-based mechanisms began. Reviewing 
the evolution of global policy in 2001, a World Bank commentator 
observed that ‘As a preference for market-based policy instruments grew 
among development economists, a number of political and economic 
events reinforced the notion that market interventions stifle growth and 
economic opportunity, creating a foundation for reform. Among these 
events were China’s successful introduction of market-oriented domestic 
agricultural policies, the failure of several commodity agreements, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, accumulated debt burdens in Latin America 
and Africa, and stepped-up efforts by international financial institutions to 
bring about policy changes’ (Akiyama, Baffes, Larson & Varangis 2001:11). 
   
The reforms swept away what critics described as ‘many of the ineffective 
institutions that were mandated to stabilise domestic markets‘ (Varangis, 
Larson & Anderson, 2002:5) - for example the IMF eliminated its Buffer 
Stock Financing Facility in February 2000 and by 2003 an IMF paper on 
‘Fund Assistance for Countries Facing Exogenous Shocks’ made no 
mention of it (IMF 2003). However  they did not, nor were they designed 
to, address two key remaining problems related to commodity risks: (i) the 
inability of some governments to prudently manage revenue and 
expenditures that are volatile (ii) the high cost paid by vulnerable rural 
households in terms of forgone productivity to limit the consequences of 
risks (IMF 2003). The history of the international community’s attempts to 
deal  with  the  ‘commodity  problem’  through  ICAs  does  bear  out  the 
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validity of Maizels’ pessimistic conclusion with which this chapter began. 
Whereas the 1970s which saw widespread support for ICAs and buffer 
stocks as a means of taming commodity markets, and indeed the 
negotiation of the ICAs was a key plank of the NIEO, by 1996, the WTO 
had been created and the ICAs were having their obituaries written 
(Gilbert 1996).  As for compensatory finance facilities, it was observed that 
whilst they ‘can clearly play a positive role in mitigating the effects of 
falling commodity prices, the levels envisaged will have to be increased 
sharply if they are to have any impact’ (Gibbon 2005:13). 
   
In this context the use of derivative instruments to manage risk was likely 
to win favour, and it did. There can be little doubt that such a market- 
oriented set of solutions as derivatives and insurance instruments fit 
exceedingly comfortably within the collection of norms represented by the 
Washington Consensus and the PWC. ‘To some extent, the counter- 
revolution is in a position to cut through the debate on the exact 
distributional impact of ICAs. It could do this by comparing stabilization 
achieved by ICAs to stabilization achieved by the use of forward markets’ 
(Toye 1987:148). 
   
The USDA though not an IGO, was one of the earliest governmental 
organisations to promote market based agricultural risk management. This 
reflected the fact that agricultural risk management use by farmers began 
earlier   and   was   more   prevalent  in   the   USA   than   anywhere   else 
(Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2001). A major research project 
169
158 
on the use of derivative contracts by US farmers was undertaken by the 
USDA in the mid-1990s as part of the reformulation of US agricultural 
policy. The USDA remains supportive of agricultural risk management 
techniques, runs workshops for farmers, and provides grants for risk 
management partnership agreements. However, USDA officials believed 
that US farmers for the most part can make their own informed decisions 
(Harwood, Heifner, Coble, Perry & Somwaru 1999) in the context of a 
Federal agricultural policy which still involves substantial financial support 
to agriculture, including subsidised crop insurance (Dismukes & Young 
2008).  There are many references throughout the pro-risk management 
literature in many IGOs to the view that the use of derivatives would 
provide a substitute for government or intergovernmental action (e.g. 
Casanova  2000,  Matheson  2000).  At  the  OECD,  for  example,  it  was 
argued that:   ‘the withdrawal of government means that this volatility is 
not absorbed through floor prices and input subsidies, leaving farmers 
exposed. The solution is not to revert to the general agricultural support 
systems of the past, which often produced few benefits for the poor. It is 
to ensure that the public investments support market development of 
appropriate risk management instruments – together with broad-based 
safety nets for risks that cannot be handled by poor people or the market’ 
(OECD 2006:61). 
   
Such  ‘modern’  policies  necessarily  involved  greater  self-reliance,  and 
private  sector  solutions  to  what  formerly  had  been  regarded  as  the 
domain of the state and not the responsibility of any individual farmer or 
170
159 
other producer.   Lamon Rutten put this argument very forcibly:   ‘For 
managers or policy makers, it can be very convenient to complain about 
commodity price volatility, or for that matter, currency fluctuations. It is 
much easier to pose as a victim than to take responsibility for one's own 
destiny. Following the current is an easy and safe strategy. If everything 
goes well, one has done a good job. If things go badly, certainly some 
outside factors to put the blame on can be found. Complaining can be a 
lot of fun. Except for the real victims, who do not have the means to do 
anything about the risks to which governments and companies are 
exposed. The workers who lose their jobs, the farmers who get paid less 
than they had expected, the operators of a mine who have to keep it 
going despite a lack of money for spare parts, the shareholders who see a 
technically efficient company go down the drain’ (Rutten 1998:183). 
   
A further feminist twist to the political argument in favour of price risk 
management was put by the OECD when it was argued that ‘the role of 
private sector institutions needs to  be strengthened to  help address a 
range of problems including: limited access to financial services including 
credit and risk management instruments, to key inputs such as seed and 
fertilizer, and to output markets. These problems are often magnified for 
female producers’ (OECD 2006:12). The point is returned to later in the 
paper: ‘Their [survivalist groups] ability to manage risk and associated 
vulnerability is limited to informal means, thus severely constraining their 
ability to take on higher risk, higher return livelihood opportunities 
embraces many women and female-headed households, who are among 
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the poorest and most exposed in rural areas’  (OECD 2006:26). The OECD 
paper did not stint in its association of market-based risk management 
instruments with other initiatives such as the famous Grameen Bank micro 
credit scheme. Micro credit gives off a warm fuzzy glow of righteousness 
(its actual benefits may be disputed) whereas conventional markets do 
not. Associating weather or price ‘insurance’ with this positively perceived 
activity links the two in the reader’s mind and is obviously intended to do 
so. The OECD conclusion was that ‘ [government] intervention should not 
undermine the development of private/market solutions (Anton 2006:32). 
A similar perspective was taken by the World Bank in relation to the scale 
of informal means:  ‘Most traditional/informal risk management strategies 
will fail during years of widespread disaster, such as drought, pest 
infestation, or flooding, which affect large numbers of people in the same 
village, district, or region’ (World Bank 2006:5). 
   
A second example was that at the Second European Roundtable on 
Sustainable Rural Development, sponsored by the European Commission, 
de Haen specifically referred to ‘Insurance and new risk transfer 
mechanisms’ as examples of adaption mechanisms to climate change in 
rural areas. This is an interesting example of the positive assumption – the 
mention of risk management (here specifically referred to as risk transfer) 
in a positive way, in relation to whatever aspect of agriculture under 
consideration (here, the impact of climate change) without specifying the 
relationship at all. (de Haen 2007). At the same meeting Olthof similarly 
identified risk management similarly as one area in which the European 
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Commission proposed collaboration with the agricultural sector in 
developing countries, aiming to ‘reduce risks related to climate change, 
natural  disasters  and  price  shocks  [through,  inter  alia,  the]  use  of 
innovative financial risk management tools’ (Olthof 2007:8). Risk reduction 
would be a positive political goal, so if such tools helped in doing so, they 
are good by association. 
   
A final point on the use of agricultural risk management instruments was 
that both the ITF and UNCTAD consistently envisaged, following much 
earlier academic work (e.g. Newbery & Stiglitz, 1981) that they would be 
used not just by small-scale producers, but also by governments. Revenue 
stability for developing country governments was assumed to be a 
desirable outcome in the papers relating to this issue. Lamon Rutten in 
particular produced evidence based on his experience of working with the 
Mongolian  government  that  poor  forecasting  of  prices  (in  this  case, 
metals) could  lead  to  wide variations in budgetary outcomes   (Rutten 
2000). The implication, though not expressly stated, was that the cost of 
borrowing for developing governments would be reduced through the 
additional certainty created by hedging of commodity revenues. This 
applies even more definitively to agricultural commodities: governments in 
developing countries in particular cannot entirely step away from control 
of either food prices or food security policy to the markets (Jayne & 
Tschirley 2010, Gilbert & Tabova 2011). With government or other public 
sector agencies appointed by government as the potential purchaser of 
derivatives rather than an individual producer, consumer or supply chain 
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intermediary, intermediation is considerably easier to achieve. In 
considering the application of derivatives for price protection, there is 
agreement that call options offer much more effective protection against 
price spikes for the same outlay than do put options in relation to low 
prices, because commodity price cycles tend to exhibit sharper spikes than 
bottoms (Deaton & Laroque 1992). As a result, a call would provide better 
spike protection for the next harvest year than a put would give lower 
protection, and, because it would need to have a long maturity to cover 
an entire excess supply period, would do so at much higher cost. The 
benefit-cost ratio is therefore much more favourable for call protection 
against possible price spikes. These advantages were to be highlighted in 
the Malawian maize transaction undertaken by the ITF (Dana & Gilbert 
2008, Sarris, Conforti & Prakash 2011). 
 
   
Derivatives, whether used by governments or devolved to the private 
sector, therefore did appear to possess some clear advantages as risk 
management tools. Participation was a matter of choice and the markets 
were deep enough (it was believed) to cope with all requirements of 
developing countries, thus avoiding awkward questions of choice for 
donor countries or IGOs. Derivatives did not involve the need for DMEs to 
spend, as  they  are  a  zero-sum game  and  the  resources to  participate 
would come entirely from developing countries (it was thought). And 
administration was always devolved automatically to the market 
participants  themselves,  whether  countries  or  farmers’  cooperatives,  as 
well as to Exchanges and regulators. Hedging activity of this type, even 
174
163 
the doyen of the commodity agreements Alfred Maizels therefore argued,‘ 
should prove a useful addition to the compensatory schemes of the IMF 
and European Community, though none of these approaches deals (or 
deals adequately) with the underlying causes of supply instability in the 
main international commodity markets (Maizels 1992:155). Within a few 
years, Raffaelli was arguing that ‘Commodity exchanges and commodity 
exchange  brokers  were  against  an  Agreement because  price  stability, 
even if relative, would decrease the number of exchange operations, thus 
reducing their business. Finally, those who speculate in commodities, as 
either a pastime or full-time occupation, would rather do without 
stabilisation agreements’ (Raffaelli 2009:31). He referred specifically to the 
opposition of certain parties to commodity agreements, e.g. that of the 
Brazilian Executive Commission of the Plan for the Rehabilitation of Cocoa 
Culture (Raffaelli 2009:31). The most common techniques of supply 
management  are  production  quotas,  trade  quotas  and  stock 
manipulation. There have been recent proposals to set each of them up in 
new ways, for example active stock management using modern 
technology (e.g. Koning, Calo & Jongeneel 2004), and the creation and 
use of ‘virtual buffer stocks’ using derivatives: in commodities which are 
served by commodities Exchanges, the operating authority could buy and 
sell futures or options contracts in order to keep the price within a 
predetermined range (Parimal 2006).   However, although derivative 
markets   had   their   advantages,   commentators   recognised   that   this 
proposal would require highly skilled traders who understand what these 
complicated markets can do and know where the dangers lie. It would 
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also  greatly  increase  the  financial  risks.  A  ‘virtual’  stockpile  might  not 
require the same outlay of funds on its purchase, but it could place as 
much at risk in the event that its managers misread the market (Lines 
2007:15). 
    
The Effect of the Global Financial Crisis 
   
 
The advent of the GFC in late 2007 reduced the possibilities of introducing 
market based risk management instruments as organisations worldwide 
sought to limit their exposure to risky financial instruments, which in turn 
curbed market liquidity and frustrated market growth. It is also noteworthy 
that after commodity prices began to escalate rapidly in real terms in 
towards the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, calls for active 
management of prices by public authorities began to be heard once more, 
with the alleged effect of futures market speculation increasing spot prices 
and their volatility (e.g. OECD 2008, Abbott 2009). Even calls for 
institutional arrangements largely evaporated, as they have done in the 
past, when price pressures subsided after 2008, but may be predicted to 
return as commodity prices continued to escalate rapidly in succeeding 
years. As will be seen below (in Chapter Seven especially) no serious 
attempt was made during the commodity price spike of 2007-8 to 
reintroduce commodity agreements, however, and as commodity prices 
receded during 2008, the calls for their reintroduction receded with them. 
176
165 
By 2007 two new themes had though entered the mainstream discourse 
of market solutions to environmental issues, that of climate change and 
carbon trading. The first theme was that the very existence of agricultural 
production was held to be under threat in a number of countries and the 
climate change issue began to dwarf more ‘esoteric’ issues such as the 
impact of risk management on the environment (e.g. Maxwell 2006). The 
second theme, advanced for example by the Australian Government, 
suggested that market instruments e.g. futures markets for water, could be 
more effective than regulation in recognising the role of farmers in 
enhancing natural resource management on behalf of the wider 
community (Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006). Market 
based  incentives,  such  as  payments  for  entering  voluntary  covenants, 
offset trading or environmental service auctions, benefit the community 
while recognising the effects that meeting community expectations for the 
environment may have on a farming enterprise’s profitability. On carbon 
trading: for example in the Conference Report of the Second European 
Forum on Sustainable Rural Development, held under European 
Commission auspices in Berlin, June 18-21, 2007, a ‘theme’ of the 
conference was ‘Rural Livelihoods in Africa in the face of globalisation’, 
where the conclusion was that ‘Action is also needed at the macro-level, 
using for instance instruments of risk management, including safety nets 
and rural finance to complement insurance and public contingency 
funding for emergency situations’ (De Haen, Henne & Stoyke 2007:11).  A 
second theme was ‘Environmental Issues in Rural Development’, and it 
was said that: ‘Reducing emissions from agriculture should be seen as 
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contribution to a global public good…Opportunities to utilise funds arising 
 
from  carbon  markets  should  be  explored’  (De  Haen,  Henne  &  Stoyke 
 
2007:8). These new trends and potential markets can be expected to 
influence international thinking about the ‘commodities problem’, and as 
will be seen in the case study chapters of this thesis (Chapters Five-Eight) 
they undoubtedly already have. 
   
That ambiguity and indecision, not to say inconsistency, still existed over 
the now age-old alternatives of global commodity management and 
commercial risk management is well illustrated by a document published 
by the International Institute for Sustainable Development as late as 2009 
(Potts,  Wunderlich,  Cuming  &  Chang  2009).  By  this  time  the  United 
Nations Development Programme had begun a 'Global Initiative on 
Commodities' with participation from inter alia UNCTAD and the CFC. The 
programme  aimed   to   establish   a   new   global   partnership   for   the 
promotion of sustainable commodity production and Trade that would 
amongst other objectives, facilitate access to, and best practice in the 
adoption of, risk management approaches as a means to promoting 
income stability for Southern commodity producers (Potts, Wunderlich, 
Cuming & Chang 2009). But what was best practice? Potts and his 
colleagues argued for both sides of the coin: that ‘Initiatives are required 
that deal with negative effects of instability of commodity prices and 
earnings  from  commodity  exports,  including  through  consideration, 
where appropriate, of supply management schemes in the context of 
international commodity agreements, through price risk management and 
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establishment of viable safety-nets for small producers, and through 
compensatory finance schemes. Such schemes should be timely, easy to 
access, include no conditionalities—it should be sufficient that the country 
itself carries no evident blame for the specific commodity-linked loss that it 
suffered, and should include pass-through mechanisms that take into 
account the interests of producers and consumers’ (Potts, Wunderlich, 
Cuming & Chang 2009:7). Later in the document specific mention was 
made of ‘access to, and capacity building for, using market-based risk 
management instruments such as hedging and crop insurance’ (Potts, 
Wunderlich, Cuming & Chang 2009:9) as a means of reducing income 
volatility in turn requiring ‘training on financial risk management’ (Potts, 
Wunderlich, Cuming & Chang 2009:14) but at no point were commodity 
agreements ruled out.  This initiative should be seen in the context of its 
time. Not only had commodity prices increased rapidly, but the derivative 
markets themselves had been blamed for much of the speculation that for 
example drove oil prices up to a maximum of US$144/barrel in mid-2008 
and pushed food commodity prices such as wheat and rice up to hitherto 
unseen levels. What was equally notable, however, was the evaporation 
of such calls as soon as prices fell the following year, and as will be seen 
below (Chapters Five-Eight), a return by IGOs and others to promoting 
market mechanisms, which subsequent price rises in commodities did not 
derail. 
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Conclusion 
    
Former Brazilian diplomat Marco Raffaelli, who himself worked on 
commodity agreements, outlined a long list of prerequisites that were in 
his opinion necessary for them to be successful. He concluded as early as 
1995 that ‘if the mutual (albeit not necessarily proportionate) advantages 
to be had are not recognised, then we would do better to consider the era 
of ICAs as closed’ (Raffaelli 2009:24) and citing Charles Kindleberger at the 
outset of his book as saying, ‘They all fail’ (Raffaelli 2009:1). Although as 
will be described below there are still those who hanker after the 
reintroduction of State control, and international control, over commodity 
prices, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the practical 
obstacles to introducing such schemes are now insurmountable. This as 
will be seen below (Chapters Five-Eight) is also the view of most IGO 
practitioners, whatever their political inclinations, administrative concerns 
or environmental misgivings. 
   
The impetus for promoting market-based risk management in agricultural 
commodities had shifted to the private sector and the scope for policy 
debate within IGOs has become much more limited. Even amongst earlier 
critics  a  preference  for  market  mechanisms  was  indeed  evident:    ‘in 
general, problems may be effectively attacked by market forces or other 
approaches which interfere less with efficiency and adjustment. In most 
circumstances, aid can be better handled by direct transfers than by ICAs’ 
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(Law 1970:100). The substantive chapters below investigate how IGOs 
responded to this contention. 
   
The international community therefore had to confront the problem of 
commodity price volatility without ICAs on which to rely as a method of 
solving the problem of price volatility and its impact on governments and 
farmers in developing countries. For IGOs, the problem of how to enact an 
international commodities policy to meet the challenges of uncertainty for 
developing  countries  and  their  farmers  now  took  on  certain 
characteristics.  The  problem  is  difficult  to  define  clearly:    uncertainties 
range across price, yield, income, and are affected by local politics, the 
weather, and personal issues as well as international markets. 
   
There are evidently many interdependencies and multi-causal aspects to 
the problem:  how prices are managed affects demand, and vice versa, for 
example. There is also the question of whether policy should be directed 
at the national level, to support the export earnings of commodity- 
producing countries, or at the farm level where the impact of reduced 
prices will be felt most immediately and acutely. Increases in price volatility 
in commodity markets during 2007-8 demonstrated not only that policy 
measures may have unforeseen effects but that the problem of managing 
income for governments and farmers is unstable and continually evolving. 
Moreover, the sums of money involved have been daunting, and even 
during the height of interventionist policy during the 1970s, there was 
never  a  sufficient  consensus  for  the  creation  of  a  new  International 
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Commodities Agency with adequate funding. Subsequently, as will be 
discussed in succeeding Chapters, IGOs such as the World Bank began to 
fall under the influence of critics of all such interventions and look instead 
to the use of market-based mechanisms as potential alternative solutions. 
   
Yet on the other hand it had always been recognised amongst the pro- 
market policy network that the resolution of the problems that ICAs were 
originally designed to solve through futures markets was not possible. 
Derivative markets are too short term in their operation – three years at 
the most - completely and necessarily open to often rapid and substantial 
market fluctuations and their use would not prevent market prices 
reflecting any long term Prebisch-Singer decline in developing countries’ 
terms of trade. A policy of futures sales can only permit the producer or 
producing government to eliminate the uncertainty associated with this 
variability over an annual time horizon. ‘It is therefore a mistake to look to 
futures markets to deliver on the commodity agreements agenda even 
though they will certainly form a central element in commodity policy’ 
(Gilbert 1996:17). However during the period before the GFC these 
objections found little resonance. 
   
Even the global economic slowdown and high food prices exhibited from 
 
2007 onwards, with the accompanying objections to the role of 
speculation, did not produce a global mandate for root and branch reform 
of the global commodities market and a return to the years of statutory 
control.  True,  several  countries  changed  their  approach:    introducing 
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policies designed to  isolate domestic prices from world prices, moving 
from   food   security   based   strategies   to   food   self-sufficiency   based 
strategies, trying to acquire land abroad for securing food and fodder 
procurement, trying to engage in regional trade agreements and even by 
interfering with the private markets through price controls, anti-hoarding 
laws, government intervention in output and input markets (Demeke, 
Pangrazio & Maetz 2009, Sarris 2009:6). Objections to speculation did 
therefore result in certain limitations being placed by government on the 
operation and functioning of commodities exchanges, but these were 
piecemeal and in many cases temporary. After more than twenty years, 
then, international policy towards commodity price risk remains poised 
between two virtually diametrically opposed alternatives, although there is 
no political will evident internationally to introduce interventionist 
instruments to solve the persistent ‘commodity problem’. 
   
With numerous stakeholders, a lack of understanding of risk on the part of 
those most affected, the smallholders, and a consequent unwillingness to 
pay, a lack of successful intermediaries to overcome problems at the retail 
level, and no obvious immediate responsible agency at the international 
level, this challenge continued to be intractable, and certainly not easily 
amenable to solution by the policies of an IGO. 
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Chapter Five: Policy at the World Bank 1 
    
Introduction 
    
Policy at the World Bank is treated first and at greater length than in either 
UNCTAD or the FAO for several reasons. Firstly, relative size and money, as 
noted above (Chapter Three):  ‘By comparison with the World Bank, every 
other agency, including the European Commission, is a corner shop’ 
(Maxwell 2006:2), and ‘Extremely large bureaucracies with a very far- 
reaching mandate will in absolute terms always be more influential than 
small bureaucracies such as treaty secretariats’ (Campe 2009:145). 
Moreover, according to one observer ‘The Bank has worked hard to create 
and protect its image as an extremely able and competent organisation’ 
(Brechin 1997:185) and policy towards risk management provides an 
opportunity to assess these claims. Secondly, although other IGOs have 
been involved in agricultural risk management issues, ‘none has adopted 
such a visible, continuing and sizeable work programme in this area as the 
World Bank’ (Jerry Skees, interview, 31 October 2010). Evidence of e.g. the 
development of policy norms, the influence of the bureaucracy, or non- 
linear policymaking processes, might therefore be expected to be more 
evident,  frequently observed and  even  perhaps more readily  analysed 
than at other NGOs. Professor Sarris, who was a consultant to the World 
Bank as well as later a key official at the FAO, argued that at the level of 
specifics – the number of publications, projects, and of individuals involved 
in the policy, both within the World Bank and as consultants, there was 
184
173 
much to say – much more - than at FAO or UNCTAD (Alexander Sarris, 
interview, 26 January 2009).  Thirdly, more of the academic studies of IGO 
policymaking (e.g. in Park & Vetterlein 2010, Clegg 2010) examine the 
World Bank (and the IMF) than either the FAO or UNCTAD, so there is 
more research on which to draw. 
   
Why did the World Bank get involved in agricultural risk management? 
    
According to officials (e.g. Marc Sadler, interview, 16 March 2011), the 
World Bank initially took an interest in agricultural derivatives not because 
of any increasing availability of the instruments – futures markets had after 
all  been  around  for  many  years  –  but  because  of  the  exposure of  a 
number of clients – i.e. developing countries borrowing from the Bank, 
not  the  Bank’s  influential  donors  such  as  the  USA  or  the  EU  -  to 
agricultural price and output volatility. Whether caused by weather, pests 
or the international market price, in some cases this exposure to volatility 
had a direct fiscal impact on World Bank client governments, extending to 
negative impacts on agricultural production and even sustainability. 
Officials might be expected to express the view that the Bank has always 
been driven by client needs in its policymaking –- but evidence presented 
privately by the Bank suggests this is true (World Bank 2010). This provides 
evidence to suggest that policy responds to external influences, although 
these are not necessarily the direct material interests of influential member 
states. 
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Although this interest at the Bank had originally been spurred by the 
dramatic changes in commodity prices in 1973-74, the first global 
commodity price shock, thereafter there had been diminished agricultural 
price volatility and lower prices overall, so clients’ demand for solutions 
diminished accordingly (Marc Sadler, interview, 16 March 2011). However 
the World Bank itself has had a long tradition of agricultural lending. Some 
of these loans failed because of adverse commodity price fluctuations, 
such  as  a  loan  made  to  Zaire  in  1978  to  revive its  flagging  palm  oil 
business (Caufield 1997:108). Those close to, but outside, the World Bank 
itself also understood this, one important member of the risk management 
policy network having the opinion from reading World Bank publications 
that ‘it was government-level exposure and debt-related risks that led the 
Bank  to  take  up  risk  management  issues’  (Lamon  Rutten,  interview,  7 
December 2007). As noted above (Chapter Four), it was widely thought 
during the 1980s and 1990s that both lower commodity prices and 
diminished commodity price volatility were permanent features of the 
global landscape, at least for the foreseeable future. And without client 
demand, it would not be possible for the Bank to launch a work 
programme in this area: the policy space would not exist. As the head of 
agricultural risk management at the Bank contended, ‘We can’t just 
randomly parachute into  a  country’  (Marc  Sadler,  interview, 16 March 
2011). 
  
  
In the early years of the development of the market based risk 
management policy norm - 1983, for example - a World Bank publication 
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gave academic arguments critical of ICAs an institutional voice, concluding 
that such policy interventions slowed growth (World Bank  1983).  The 
Bank followed this up by citing welfare losses attributable to agricultural 
policy intervention in both industrial and developing countries, noting the 
reduced budgetary stress on scarce national and international 
development resources that market based risk management mechanisms 
entailed. This early theoretical work by the World Bank (e.g. Priovolos & 
Duncan 1991) and in practical applications emphasised that risk in 
agriculture was not only of concern to the individual farmer, but was also 
of importance to society as a whole, as risk-averse behaviour of farmers 
could  lead  to  an  allocation  of  farm  resources  which  is  not  efficient, 
resulting in a sub-optimal overall allocation of resources and consequently 
lower overall welfare. For example, risk-averse farmers might not adopt a 
new productivity-enhancing technology because of potential risks 
associated with it, which would result in a lower increase in output than 
possible (Claessens & Duncan 1993). 
   
During this period the World Bank and the IMF were jointly developing 
pro-market policy norms, with a much wider ambit than agricultural risk 
management. The comparative roles of the IFC and the World Bank itself 
were already changing: whereas in 1984 the ratio of lending was 1:40, by 
1994, it was 1:8 (Caufield 1997). The pro-market conditions commonly 
applied (by the IMF and World Bank) to agricultural commodity subsectors 
(in  developing countries, by  the  1980s)  included  eliminating  or 
significantly  reducing  government  intervention  in  determining  prices, 
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dissolving parastatals or stripping them of some powers, and eliminating 
some agricultural import subsidies (Akiyama 2001). As the wider emerging 
suite of policy norms of the Washington  Consensus (Williamson 1990, 
2000) took hold, World Bank publications, reflecting the policy norms 
taking hold throughout donor Governments, especially the USA, exhibited 
an overtly pro-market position with respect to commodities policy. 
   
This shift had clear implications for agricultural risk management: as noted 
by the Bank, reviewing risk management policy evolution in 2001, ‘With 
liberalisation,  many  countries  have  abandoned  marketing  boards  that 
were   common   to   coffee,   cocoa   and   other   import   crops,   thereby 
eliminating the smoothing effects this guaranteed minimum income had 
for farmers’ (World Bank 2001). This process provided the policy space in 
which   the   Bank   was   able   at   least   to   consider   a   pro-market   risk 
management policy norm, and even as will be seen below, ambitious 
policies in this area. Still however this recognition did not involve the 
immediate adoption of an active policy by the World Bank for the 
promotion of an alternative, market-based risk management approach to 
commodity and agricultural risk management, even though the demise of 
ICAs would inevitably expose World Bank clients and their domestic 
agricultural sector to greater price fluctuations than hitherto and a policy 
vacuum would have emerged if no market-based alternative to the ICAs 
had not been espoused by the Bank. The promulgation of pro-market 
policy norm was not dictated by, nor even encouraged, by donor 
governments despite the existence of a collection of pro-market policy 
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norms firmly entrenched at the level of  donor governments’ policies. It 
developed slowly, internally within the Bank – not in response to 
shareholder pressure but in response to the Bank’s own clients and their 
problems (Marc Sadler, interview, 16 March 2011). 
   
Policy for risk management in agriculture also developed in parallel with 
internal risk management policy, demonstrating the cross-fertilisation of 
ideas within the broad risk management policy network. The World Bank 
itself engaged in derivatives transactions – its first swap, and one of the 
first in the world, was with IBM in August 1981 (Litzenberger 1992:831). 
This and similar transactions served to increase knowledge of derivatives 
within the Bank and helped to provide justification for further work on 
derivatives  for  clients.  For  example  according  to  a  long-serving  FAO 
official, the Bank looked at using forward contracts when it examined 
strategic grain reserves in the 1980s (Ed Seidler, interview, 26 January 
2009), whilst Ron Duncan and his colleagues ‘trained many government 
personnel from Central and South America in the use of financial 
derivatives for hedging risks in coffee, cocoa, and oil’ (Ron Duncan, 
personal e-mail, 29 August 2011). In doing so the World Bank acted to 
broaden the global risk management policy network. However there was 
still internal resistance within the Bank itself: ‘the idea of the developing 
countries being helped to use financial derivatives was resisted very 
strongly by the Agricultural Division’ (Ron Duncan, personal e-mail, 29 
August 2011). The debate therefore arose within the Bank as to how any 
 
Bank  programme  should  work:  in  particular  as  to  whether  the  Bank 
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should become involved in ‘disintermediation’, for example through 
involvement in currency swaps, futures guarantees and other such 
instruments, and if so in what way. Here through the creation of a policy 
norm was the genesis of the International Task Force (ITF) of the following 
decade. 
   
However there is no evidence that policy towards market based risk 
management instruments for agriculture developed in a linear fashion – it 
is more clearly seen emerging out of the writings and commitment of 
officials and consultants (e.g. Claessens & Duncan 1981, Claessens & 
Duncan 1993, 1994, Duncan 1997, Gilbert 1985, 1994) a view confirmed 
by those responsible for originating policy themselves. In the early years, ‘I 
could not get the World Bank interested’ and the rural development 
division was to be disbanded. However, it became clear that the structural 
adjustment programme of the 1980s was costly and ineffective and 
something needed to replace it. The World Bank was helping to develop 
futures markets at this stage. The Swiss appreciated this work and became 
donors to the programme to enable the World Bank to establish country 
risk management units in Central and South America to hedge oil import 
and coffee export risks’ (Ron Duncan, interview, 11 February 2009). 
Notably this early work transcended agriculture (as the risk management 
policy network always did, there being nothing about agricultural risk 
management in theory at least to separate it) and applied to commodities 
more widely, and was confined to advice, not financial assistance such as 
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loan guarantees, as the policy norm was not yet sufficiently advanced 
within the Bank. 
   
The early 1990s was the time at which the policy norm of market-based 
risk management instruments within the World Bank accelerated rapidly 
towards its zenith: what was described as ‘an intense period’ at the World 
Bank (Ron Duncan, interview, 11 February 2009). By the time of the World 
Bank’s annual report on developing countries’ economies in 1994, for 
instance, the Bank claimed that, ‘market-based risk management 
instruments, despite several limitations, offer a promising alternative to 
traditional stabilisation schemes’ (World Bank 1994:4). There was during 
this period a process of intellectual mentoring within the Bank, from 
experienced officials and consultants. The individuals concerned explicitly 
recognise  the  development  of  a  risk  management  policy  community 
within the World Bank (which was later to become the ITF risk 
management community). For example Ulrich Hess, who worked at the 
World Bank and subsequently at the WFP, a supporter of market-based 
risk management, perceived this line of thought as ‘an intellectual torch 
passed  from  official  to  official’  –  what  clearer  description of  internally 
driven policy could one ask for? - and described Ron Duncan in particular 
as the ‘godfather’ of pro-market-based risk management thinking at the 
World Bank – ‘he influenced individuals such as Panos Varangis, who in 
turn  influenced  me  and  others’  (Ulrich  Hess,  interview,  22  September 
2009). Duncan, Claessens, Morduch, Varangis, Hess and others developed 
successive  arguments  in  favour  of  derivative  markets,  e.g.  that  the 
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adoption of government price support schemes in the future would be 
likely to be greatly hampered by agreements to liberalise agriculture under 
the auspices of the World Trade Organisation. These arguments also 
helped to explain the interest which developed in the Bank during the 
1990s in promoting the use of institutional derivative markets, such as 
commodities Exchanges, to manage the price risks affecting commodity 
producers. For example Morduch argued dismissively that traditional 
systems might persist well after they are the best means for addressing 
problems. He suggested that in such cases, risk-mitigating mechanisms 
that are part of a household’s own poverty alleviation strategy may turn 
out to be part of the problem (Morduch 1999). It was further argued that 
‘commodity price instability has a negative impact on economic growth, 
income distribution and poverty alleviation’ (Larson & Varangis 2001:25). 
Mention of the income distribution consequences of risk management 
was not, however substantiated. Already there was evidence of the failure 
by advocates to appreciate all the necessary aspects of coalition building 
for change, as identified by Kotter (1995) and noted above in Chapter 
Three. 
   
Theoretical advocacy preceded practical action: even at this point 
consultants to the bank were well aware that the more favourable the 
external environment was, the more likely would be a successful pro- 
market risk management policy, however individuals envisioned success 
(Panos Varangis, interview, 22 August 2011). However, partly under the 
impact of these persuasive – but not, as time would tell, conclusive – 
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arguments, economic opinion within the World Bank in favour of market- 
based risk management instruments gradually hardened. The norm – one 
could argue pejoratively, organisational myth - of the plausibility of market 
solutions and the ability of the World Bank to deliver them in developing 
countries had taken root. Within the Bank discussion of risk management 
changed: the tentative conclusions drawn in earlier papers were replaced 
by arguments which are notable not only for their unequivocal insistence 
on the dangers posed by lack of market-based risk management in the 
post-ICA world, but the assumption that the responsibility for developing a 
‘strategy’ in response to the multidimensional challenges of risk lay 
predominantly with the household – not the government, still less the 
international community, Justifications for market-based risk management 
instruments were therefore frequently based on analyses of the social 
implications of unmanaged volatility, e.g. ‘When a poor household does 
not have an effective strategy to insure itself against risks, this can send it 
into a catastrophic downward spiral to destitution. This causes the severity 
of poverty to worsen as already-poor households sink deeper into poverty 
and  increases the prevalence of poverty as  previously non-poor 
households fall below the poverty line…Shocks can also have non- 
catastrophic consequences for poor households that nevertheless cause 
them to suffer very high and often irreversible income losses’ (World Bank 
2000:3). 
  
  
World Bank authors further argued that farmers, even if not poor in 
absolute  terms,  were  exposed  to  seasonal  price  fluctuations,  creating 
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uncertainty about the price they will receive for their product when they 
take it to be sold (Anderson, Larson & Varangis 2002). ‘At the farm level, 
this uncertainty in commodity prices makes it difficult for producers to 
allocate resources efficiently, limits their access to credit for productivity- 
enhancing inputs and leads them to adopt low-yield, low-risk production 
technologies, thereby lowering average incomes, contrary to the objective 
of the Washington Consensus. At the macro level, commodity price 
volatility  affects  governments’  fiscal  revenues,  trade  balance,  exchange 
rate and creditworthiness’ (Bryla, Dana, Hess & Varangis 2003:3). Using 
low-risk and low-yield crop and production patterns to ensure a minimum 
income….these production patterns come at the expense of perhaps riskier 
but higher-return production that could create income growth and the 
accumulation of capital (Bryla, Dana, Hess & Varangis 2003:3). 
   
Ulrich Hess, for example, one of the contributing authors to that paper, 
identified the benefits of risk management for farmers as the insurance of 
debt service exposure against catastrophic events to maintain 
creditworthiness, the smoothing of income swings over time, the ability to 
build  up  remunerated  savings  and  collateral,  and  the  eventual 
optimisation of earnings through a credit line (in addition to crop loans) 
(Hess 2003). This view was echoed very precisely by a consultant to the 
World Bank, who following Sandmo (1971) argued that the empirical data 
(from Ugandan coffee farmers) supported the contention that poorer 
households that take on a low risk, low return portfolio compared to richer 
households  (those  that  can  smooth  consumption  and  have  access  to 
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credit markets) who are able to take on more risky activities (Vargas-Hill 
 
2006). A second social point concerning the use of price risk management 
instruments was the claim that farmers pass on part of their price risk to 
seasonal workers. It was argued that low prices affected both the number 
of seasonal workers employed and the salaries (in cash and in kind) that 
they were paid  As an example, in five Central American countries, a total 
of some 42 million labour days were said to be lost in the coffee sector in 
2001. Given the large importance of the coffee sector for seasonal workers 
in Central and Latin America and the dearth of alternative sources of 
employment, the welfare costs of this indirect exposure to coffee price risk 
were argued to be large (Varangis, Siegel, Giovannucci & Lewin 2003). 
   
What was noticeable about many of these rehearsed arguments is that 
they largely appeared to be engaging with hypothetical critics of market- 
based methods in principle, rather than addressing the detailed problems 
of practical implementation. Issues of implementation were never 
completely ignored (e.g. by Debatisse, Tsakok, Claessens & Somel 1993). 
The discourse was not entirely one-sided: although as evidenced there 
was in principle support within the World Bank for many years for yield 
insurance there were also already recognised to be problems with the cost 
and moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems, even from supporters 
of market based solutions (Varangis, Larson & Anderson 2002). A World 
Bank review of the development of risk management policy at this time 
found that a number of governments of commodity-exporting countries 
and  international organisations had  raised the issue of price hedging. 
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Some exporters in developing countries were using hedging instruments 
such as options and futures on coffee traded in New York and London. 
However it was recognised that few small coffee producers had access to 
these instruments, although some hedging programmes were being used 
for other commodities – for instance maize in Mexico and cattle in Canada 
(Akiyama 2001:113). Moreover, although the World Bank believed that 
the structural market reforms for commodities inspired by the Bank and 
the IMF potentially offered some producers, especially coffee, cocoa and 
sugar growers, the opportunity to use market based risk management 
instruments, there were problems of access, as ‘with few exceptions such 
risk mitigation devices had not emerged in developing countries’ domestic 
markets. It was also conceded that the existing commodities Exchanges in 
industrial countries might not be useful because of the high basis and 
exchange rate risk. (Akiyama 2001:117). 
   
The idea of loan packaging was therefore systematically promoted. For 
instance World Bank consultant Chistopher Gilbert declared: ‘My belief is 
that, in the context of developing country farmers commodity risk 
management techniques will, on the main, come to be seen as part of the 
means in which rural credit can be developed and extended, rather than 
as a stand-alone panacea’ (Gilbert 2002:67).  It was recognised even at an 
early stage that implementation would not be straightforward, as even in 
developed countries only the very largest farmers do use derivatives (as 
noted above in Chapter Four), with others lacking credit status, although it 
was thought that problems could be overcome, for example the Bank 
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could play a ‘bundling’ role (Ron Duncan, interview, 11 February 2009). 
But the development of this ‘bundling role’ was eventually to have serious 
administrative consequences. Whereas work on market risk management 
was located within the World Bank, its mandate has always extended to 
governments and the public sector more widely; it is the IFC within it that 
is mandated to work with the private sector (Panos Varangis, interview, 22 
August 2011). 
   
 
Commitment by other IGOs 
 
   
Policy debate and evolution at the World Bank, though internally driven, 
did not proceed in isolation. The global risk management policy network 
already straddled institutions, as policy networks typically do (Schnettler 
2003). World Bank work contributed to increasing the visibility of 
commodity price-risk management not only within the World Bank group 
but also among the IGOs and other institutions (e.g. the IFC, FAO, 
UNCTAD, and donor governments), demonstrating how policy norms 
migrate between organisations. As discussed below (Chapter Seven) 
support was particularly forthcoming at UNCTAD, with the two 
organisations,  and  more  especially  their  risk  management  technical 
experts, in regular contact as part of an international inter-IGO policy 
community  that  included  the  private  sector  and  academics,  including 
those working as consultants to the IGOs, in the extended risk 
management  policy  network.  The  economic  arguments  in  favour  of 
market-based risk management instruments that were developed within 
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the World Bank and UNCTAD during this period formed the foundation 
for advocacy by officials within other IGOs for decades subsequently. For 
example as late as 2007 Rutten and Youssef reiterated the by-then well- 
known arguments put by Morduch (1994), arguing that the costs of 
informal insurance against risk could be very high for poorer households, 
and suggested that households in risk-prone semi-arid areas of India may 
have had to sacrifice as much as 25% of average incomes to reduce 
exposure to shocks (Rutten & Youssef 2007). 
   
UNCTAD, however, was not a Bank donor: the EU was, and within the EU, 
notably, there developed, assisted by the work of consultants, openly 
acknowledged  support  for  agricultural  price  risk  management 
instruments, as part of the pro-market policy norm that, eventually, the 
Common Agricultural Policy would have to be demolished. Cordier 
implicitly assumed in this argument that his readers will believe that 
increased consumption is a prima facie benefit (Cordier 1998). Eventually 
as will be seen below, the advocacy of Cordier and others translated into 
donation by the EU to World Bank initiated programmes. A similar positive 
note was struck in an internal paper of the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB), adopting the same discourse in much the same language, 
where it was argued that it would be possible to ‘reduce systematic risks in 
the rural sector through promotion and validation of various risk control 
techniques such as commodity, futures, and forward markets, hedging, 
and insurance (IADB 1998, p11). 
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Yet another IGO that became involved and published on agricultural risk 
management was (as noted above in Chapter Four) the OECD, which 
held a first workshop in Paris in May 2000. There, pro-market advocacy 
included  the  argument  that  without  risk  management,  intermediary 
agents between the farm and the consumer would add a risk premium to 
their required rate of return on a risky investment, so that the farm gate 
price would be lower and the consumer price higher – with resultant 
lower consumption – than with risk management (Cordier 2000).  Within 
the OECD, a clear policy position in favour of market-based risk 
management   instruments   was   expressed:   ‘Risk   averse   farmers   may 
produce below optimum…There may [therefore] be welfare (efficiency) 
losses for society’ (Anton 2006). However, OECD officials stressed that 
internal  resource  constraints  often  prevented  the  evaluation  of  many 
issues in agriculture: for example, of the thirty people involved in research 
into agriculture in 2008, only one (Jesus Anton himself) was tasked with 
examining risk issues. Anton, like officials at the World Bank, was keen to 
assert that countries – through their national delegations - determine the 
work priorities at OECD, and risk management was not seen by the 
delegations as either a high priority (or in any way bearing on 
environmental issues). OECD in this sense therefore should be considered 
as a ‘norm diffuser’ (Park 2003) rather than a ‘norm creator’ such as the 
World Bank, the latter concept focusing on the active, rather than 
transmission, role of IGOs (Finnemore 1996).   Both Parris and Anton 
stressed that although they were colleagues, their work did not overlap: 
agro-environmental indicators and risk management were seen as two 
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separate  issues  that  did  not  interrelate  (Kevin  Parris,  interview,  15 
 
December 2008, Jesus Anton, interview, 11 December 2008). 
    
The International Task Force (ITF) and the Commodity Risk Management 
Group (CRMG) 
  
  
With the apparent success of the Washington Consensus and the collapse 
of ICAs, as well as what appeared at the time to be a long-term decline in 
real commodity prices, the World Bank abolished its commodity division – 
at one time the biggest in the Bank - at the turn of the millennium 
(Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). Attention then focused on 
the  alternative,  market-based  risk  management  instruments  which  as 
noted above had already received in principle support from within the 
Bank. Bank officials recognised early on that commercial banks’ rural 
lending was faced with a lack of knowledge at a technical level regarding 
risk management instruments. Indeed, according to one observer, even 
‘the operations people within the Bank’  did not show a great deal of 
understanding of the new instruments – which are more complex than 
loans both to understand and administer. Government-to-government 
take-up was limited in any event, for similar reasons (Stijn Claessens, 
interview, 9 December 2009). The very ‘technicality’ of the policy area was, 
at least temporarily, preventing the policy norm from evolving from theory 
to practice, though also isolating it from direction from external donor 
governments. 
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Partly therefore in order to encourage diffusion of the new policy norm 
within the Bank but also with a wider intent, in 1998, at the instigation of 
its then President, James Wolfensohn, the Bank became the catalyst for 
the establishment of the International Task Force (ITF) on Commodity Risk 
Management. The ITF was initially convened as a first meeting In January 
1999) to evaluate the feasibility of providing small (essentially agricultural) 
producers access to risk-management instruments and services in 
developed  countries  (World  Bank  2012a).  (The  larger  non-agricultural 
risks, such as those faced by the oil market, were by this time not deemed 
necessary to resolve institutionally as there were already active derivatives 
markets they could and did access). 
   
The lofty goals of the ITF 
    
As  early  as  1999,  the  idea  was  circulating  at  the  Bank  that  risk 
management work within the Bank should be directed at a much higher 
goal. Documents supporting this assertion are not, however, numerous 
and all date from a particular period in the evolution of Bank policy: from 
the inception of the ITF-CRMG to the eventual decision not to go ahead. 
   
The proposal put forward by the ITF-CRMG was for the establishment of a 
new intermediary to handle agricultural risk. As the ITF paper presenting 
the idea explained: 
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‘An international intermediary would be established to facilitate 
transactions between private providers of price insurance 
instruments (banks, brokers or traders) and potential users of such 
price insurance in developing countries (producer organizations, 
traders,  processors,  local  banks  or  public  sector  entities)…  This 
would require the intermediary to play an active role in mitigating 
risks involved in such transactions, and in providing partial 
guarantees to cover them. The intermediary would also 
exceptionally consider offering its own price insurance, but only 
when it is not available by market providers, and keeping its 
exposure within strictly defined limits. In this respect, the 
intermediary  would  seek  to  offset  the  risk,  to  the  best  extent 
possible, by reinsuring itself through risk management markets. 
Finally, the intermediary would extend to its potential clients 
appropriate  support  and  technical  assistance  to  allow  them  to 
access such price insurance instruments (ITF 1999:10) 
   
According to the ITF-CRMG (ITF 1999) the proposed intermediary would 
a)  rely  on  instruments  which  are  simple,  user-friendly,  and  already 
available in risk management markets – in particular on organised 
commodity exchanges). As observed, the ITF-CRMG’s attempts to devise a 
new system were focused on the key issue of the gap between suppliers 
of the risk management instrument and the demanders of it. The aim was 
to  close  the  gap  between  instruments  and  potential  users  (Morgan 
2001:148). The ITF-CRMG would perform a facilitator role in aiding the 
202
191 
transactions between the private-sector providers of insurance and the 
potential users of insurance in LDCs (ITF 1999:10). The contemporary 
academic explanation of the proposal went on to identify the key practical 
aspects of the proposal  Crucially, there would be some element of partial 
guarantee for the transactions of the LDC traders, thus overcoming the 
fear of default often put forward by brokers as a reason for excluding such 
traders. 
   
Figure 2. The role of the proposed intermediary (ITF 1999:65). 
 
   
      
  
However only ‘exceptionally’ (ITF 1999:10) was it expected that the 
intermediary  would  actually  offer  its  own  price  insurance.  The 
intermediary would be mainly designed to provide advice, knowledge and 
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expertise to countries that are otherwise bereft of such facilities – a 
permanent expression of the pilot studies which the ITF-CRMG. Even as 
early as 1999, then, the Bank stressed that the proposed institution would 
be a complement to, and not a substitute for, current private-sector 
agencies and activities. Consistent with the wider policy goals of the Bank, 
there was found the familiar argument in the 1999 publication – which 
can be seen as an internal manifesto for Bank consumption as much as a 
policy document for external consumption - that the policy would assist in 
providing poverty reduction for small-scale producers. It has often been 
felt that it is the smaller scale, and hence poorer, producers who miss out 
on schemes designed to help them. By focusing specifically on them, the 
ITF-CRMG argued that the scheme hoped to rectify the failing of past 
policies and thus provide help where it was most needed (ITF 1999, 
Morgan 2001). 
   
Institutionally, the possibility of a still further Agency in addition to the IMF 
and the World Bank Group had arisen previously: when the World Bank 
debated the Prebisch proposal, there was a presumption that it would be 
administered either by a new Agency or subsumed within the World 
Bank/IBRD framework. By comparison the 1999 proposal specifically did 
not  call  for  the  establishment of  a  new  organisation,  as  ‘It  would  be 
difficult to consider the creation of a new international inter-governmental 
organization, as this would involve agreement among all potential 
members’ (ITF 1999:23). The ITF went on to argue that ‘An accepted 
alternative is for the intermediary to be created by adding new functions 
204
193 
within a major international organization, drawing on expertise and 
resources across the international community’ (ITF 1999:23). In further 
taking a position that was to have significant negative ramifications for the 
potential success of the policy, the ITF-CRMG envisaged that the 
intermediary would be staffed by people from a range of organisations 
such as the Bank, the exchanges, NGOs and other agencies committed to 
aiding development, a staffing proposal which was designed to enhance 
the credibility of the organisation in the light of potential users. 
Contemporary assessment of this proposal was favourable, for example in 
relation to the proposal to staff the organisation with a mixture of staff 
drawn from IGOs, NGOs and the private sector, including Exchanges, as: 
’If it were to be staffed entirely by financial specialists from the private 
sector, it could be viewed in the same light as existing mechanisms for 
dealing with price risk and thus would not be utilised by LDC traders’ 
(Morgan 2001:148). Additionally, the intermediary would not be seeking 
to attract individual growers to trade as that would be very difficult to 
achieve. Instead the target groups of traders were cooperatives, local 
banks, trade associations and public bodies, all of whom represented small 
growers but who could gain economies of scale in acting on behalf of 
many of them (Morgan 2001:149). This again met favour as ‘a sensible 
strategy on the grounds that it acknowledged the fact that the gap 
between the individual in an LDC and the risk-management market in a 
DME is massive. Its operation would thus try to shorten this gap by 
introducing not one but two intermediaries, one the international body 
and the other assembling collective groups at the LDC level. With the 
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backing of many groups such as the main exchanges, NGOs, governments 
and other interested parties, contemporary comment was that the policy 
did at least start with a reasonable chance of success (Morgan 2001:149). 
Morgan observed also that the Bank was not claiming to provide all the 
answers to all the problems, and had highlighted the fact that the 
intermediary would not cover all commodities, provide income protection, 
nor  did  it  deal  with  the  long-run trend in  commodity prices (Morgan 
2001:149). 
 
   
The plan was nothing if not ambitious. As subsequently sketched out by its 
leading protagonist in a paper (Bower & Kamel 2003) for the Oxford 
Institute of Energy Studies (no longer, it should be noted, in an official 
World Bank publication), a CPI [Commodity Protection Insurance] contract 
– aimed at sovereign governments in the developing world - would 
provide insurance protection against market price risk in each of the 49 
separate commodities, and each of the 8 sub-indices, included in the IMF 
Commodity Index Bower & Kamel aimed to demonstrate how the 
fundamental objectives of Keynes’ buffer stock scheme could be achieved 
in a modern context through the implementation of an International CPI 
scheme under the direction of a new agency – they were explicit on that 
point as the ITF four years earlier had not been - ‘that we shall call the 
Global Commodity Insurer (GCI)’ (Bower & Kamel 2003:7). In their opinion, 
futures and forward contracts offered ‘at least a theoretically complete 
solution to the problem of incomplete markets that result in the welfare 
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loss  arising  from  commodity  price  risk,  and  at  a  lower  cost  than  a 
traditional buffer stock scheme’ (Bower & Kamel 2003:20). 
   
The nominal underlying value of a CPI contract would be tailored to the 
exposure faced by each sovereign government to commodity price risk. 
These contracts would be organised for importers as call options and as 
put options for importers – evidently the risks would offset, reducing the 
net  exposure of  the  GCI.  The  plan  called  for  new  contracts  annually, 
option premiums paid up front and with a minimum maturity of three 
years. Usual option settlement rules would apply. It was envisaged that 
sovereign governments would continuously adjust the degree of price 
and eventually construct a portfolio of CPI holdings with a variety of 
maturities, strike prices and underlying nominal contract values, subject to 
controls to prevent individual governments speculating. GCI would then 
offload what it could in terms of risk into the global markets. A critic could 
observe that the Bower & Kamel paper, written in 2003, completely failed 
to anticipate that those markets might be unable, at some point, to bear 
the risks engendered by extreme volatility: nor did the paper investigate 
any rules to prevent the agglomeration of risk by an individual company. 
The assumption made was on the contrary that the market would always 
be available. Yet the GCI would be faced with risk running into the long 
term, whilst derivative markets could (as noted in Chapter Four) stretch 
only to three years at the outside. 
207
196
 
The progress of the ITF initiative 
    
In the event these criticisms remained theoretical the envisaged 
organisation was never established. What happened? 
   
What had previously been an informal risk management policy network 
had now became a policy community (in the sense of Rhodes 1981, 1988) 
– a ‘group of experts with an organisational voice.  However although the 
ITF included international institutions, producers’ and consumers’ 
organisations, major commodity exchanges, and commodity trading firms 
(UNCTAD 2002, Varangis & Nash 2003), it was never set up as a formal 
organisation, or as a department of the World Bank itself: it was more a 
‘group of the willing’6 – a group of interested parties whose organisations 
 
were  prepared  to  commit  time  at  least,  comprised  mainly  of  middle- 
ranking officials, without a legal structure or formal mandate, and whose 
membership and activities were to evolve over time into a policy 
community with common objectives, perceptions and attitudes to policy 
(Marc Sadler, interview, 16 March 2011). 
   
The ITF-CRMG, following the well-established policy norm already 
ensconced within the Bank, immediately recommended facilitating the use 
of market-based risk-management instruments by commodity producers in 
developing countries (ITF 1999). Testing the approach was conceived of in 
   
6 A term used in retrospect (and in explicit preference to the term ‘coalition of the willing’ 
because of its perceived association with wider political events) by World Bank officials 
who preferred anonymity. 
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three quite rapid stages: the development of prototype cases (January to 
April 2000), the implementation of the prototype cases (May to July 2000), 
and finally a learning period (August to September 2000) (World Bank 
2012a:2). But according to Sarris the problem was that there was initially 
 
‘no  strategy  as  to  what  to  do’.  The  newly  formed  team,  which  had 
received over 50 proposals for potential case studies (World Bank 2000a:4) 
talked to cooperatives, hired related people, and tried to get them to act – 
but ‘you know how strong co-ops are in Africa – a lot of training was 
required’ (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). 
   
The ITF-CRMG focused on the actual delivery of price-risk management 
instruments to small farmers (although later as discussed below there was 
also discussion of weather derivatives). Its initial work can be classified into 
the following three areas: 
   
•         Commodity  sub-sector  analysis,  risk  assessment,  and  feasibility 
studies 
•        Technical assistance (TA in Bank parlance) programmes, focused 
primarily on commodity price risk management 
•         Policy analysis and advice (PAA in Bank parlance) to developing 
country   Governments   focused   primarily   on   commodity   price   risk, 
economic stabilisation, and food security. 
   
These three types of work taken together constituted the implementation 
of World Bank policy towards market-based risk management in the initial 
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stages  of  the  ITF-CRMG  (World  Bank  2010).  As  will  be  seen  below 
(Chapter Seven and Eight), this range of work was shaped and echoed by 
the other IGOs active in this policy area. Noticeably, at this stage the work 
did not include any lending or guarantees of lending.   On the contrary, 
during the first two full years of operation, the primary focus of the ITF- 
CRMG was on desk feasibility studies examining the nature of price risk for 
specific  commodities  in  particular  countries,  and  on  evaluating  the 
potential   for   using   derivatives   and   other   price   risk   management 
techniques to manage these risks. Some attention was also given to cross 
cutting themes and lessons that could be applied broadly in developing 
country contexts, as well as some initial PAA work (World Bank 2010). This 
was accounted for by the stage of development of the policy norm within 
the Bank: no more could be attempted at this stage. 
   
However although this list suggests a linear approach to policy, by 2000 
there was a divergence of opinion between individuals within the ITF 
policy community about how work in this policy area should be carried 
forward. Sarris took the view that what was needed was to demonstrate 
clear ideas of how to use futures and options for risk management. He 
believed it would be hard to convince senior policymakers of the 
importance  of  the  issue,  and  that  the  right  way  was  to  produce 
‘simulations' (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). The CRMG, 
however, was already focused on the next stage, implementation. The 
major challenge of the ITF-CRMG work, Bank officials observed, was to find 
local  institutions  that  could  capably  aggregate  sufficient  volume  from 
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many  small  farmers  to  access  the  international  market  for  risk 
management instruments. To try to demonstrate how this would actually 
work, the first tasks decided upon by the ITF-CRMG (in 2000) were a 
number of so-called ‘pilot’ studies, aimed at evaluating, in some depth, the 
feasibility of making price risk management instruments available to 
producers  in  developing  countries  (as  it  clearly  was  in  developed 
countries) and what would be necessary to make developing country 
derivative markets take hold, develop and eventually flourish (Marc Sadler, 
interview, 16 March 2011). These pilot studies (pilots for what, will be 
examined below) looked at the existence of producer organisations that 
could purchase price insurance for their members. The risk-management 
instrument proposed in the pilot studies was the purchase of put options 
by producers, which was said to be because of the limited exposure to 
counter party (credit) risk (Varangis, Larson & Anderson 2002) but which 
at least did not involve the continuous and potentially ruinous payment of 
variation margins by farmers and other producers as would be the case 
with direct access to futures markets. Within the policy network of the ITF- 
CRMG,  the  myth  grew  rapidly  that  the  pilot  studies  were  part  of  an 
ordered process, but in fact there was no agreed long-term plan, and no 
linear development of policy, because the Global Credit Insurer (GCI) 
initiative (discussed below) had not been agreed. Already, the ITF-CRMG 
was ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 1959). 
   
According to one source, the ITF asked for US$1.5bn from the World Bank 
 
Board, but was ‘rapidly bundled out of the room, and encouraged to put 
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together a more realistic plan’ (The Economist, 19 August 2000, p.73). 
There was internal criticism of the initial proposals made by the ITF from 
Executive Board members - at technical meetings on June 15 2000 and 
July 25 2000, representatives from several Bank Departments7, ‘raised a 
number of concerns regarding the project proposal. Specifically, these 
concerns related to the provision of credit guarantees, the need to do 
more   background   research   demonstrating   costs   and   benefits,   and 
whether it  might  not  be  desirable to  offer  more complex instruments 
rather than the relatively straightforward option-based instruments ("price 
insurance")  which  the  ITF  team  had  highlighted.  No  consensus  was 
reached at the June workshop, nor at the second workshop focusing in 
more depth on one possible test case (Uganda)’ (World Bank 2000b:3). 
   
The ITF responded to these objections in August 2000, by which time the 
ITF had received funding for the further development of its approach from 
the World Bank/Netherlands Partnership Program (World Bank 2000b). 
Subsequently, the European Commission and the Swiss State Secretariat 
for Economic Affairs (SECO) also provided funding support (World Bank 
2010). It was thought possible that the EU would fund the ITF more 
substantially, ‘The EC attaches considerable importance to the ITF's risk 
management initiative as a potential substitute’ and suggested that the ITF 
was finalising a trust agreement with the EU, but this did not materialise 
(World Bank 2000b:4). However there was some commitment of internal 
resources:  ‘The  Bank  will  continue  to  provide  secretariat  support  to 
 
7 The Development Research Group, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, the 
Financial Sector Division and the IFC all participated (World Bank 2000b:3). 
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coordinate this work’ (World Bank 2012a:3) ’The Commodity Risk 
Management Group (CRMG) established at the same time, was the 
Secretariat of the ITF, within the World Bank, as part of its policy, The 
CRMG was housed (from December 2000) in the Agriculture and Rural 
Development  Department  within  the  Bank  and  ITF  operations  were 
funded initially by the Bank (World Bank 2000b:1, 2010)   - it was noted 
that  ‘Management  has  allocated  a  modest  amount,  from  within  the 
current administrative budget, to permit the ITF Secretariat to carry out its 
functions World Bank 2012a:5). 
   
As the idea developed after 2000, a number of consultants – key members 
of  the  risk  management policy  network  -  were hired  to  work  on  the 
project, including  full-time secondments from two  major trading  firms, 
Louis   Dreyfus   and   Cargill.   Alexander   Sarris   spent   six   months   in 
Washington in 2002, and Lamon Rutten, who was seconded from 
UNCTAD for one and a half years during this period.  By the time of the 
2001 meeting of the ITF-CRMG, the Communications and Marketing 
Committee – with private sector members drawn from the wider policy 
network as well as a World Bank CRMG Secretariat staff member, Funke 
Oyewole - reported that their overall strategy and objectives were to raise 
awareness of the need for a market based approach, increase support for 
the approach by communicating the key features and benefits, and 
increase collaboration between partners (Blogg, Fowell & Oyewole 2001). 
This was to be done through the following ‘key messages to the market’: 
that  market  based  mechanisms  could  contribute  to  towards  poverty 
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reduction, that CPR [commodity price risk] management was a major 
development challenge and that the proposal for a Commodities Fund 
that would involve the guarantee of farmers’ initial and variation margins 
and option premia [my italics] would bridge the gap between the 
developing world and international markets. To this end the World Bank 
declared that it was working in partnership with private sector and 
international organisations (Blogg, Fowell & Oyewole 2001:3). The ITF- 
CRMG feasibility studies were therefore – as they were commonly referred 
to - ‘pilot studies’ for what had been envisaged as a grand design: the 
creation of an independent, or at least semi-autonomous, organisation 
that would guarantee farmers’ risk management trading deposits. If there 
were significant problems to overcome, then a significant effort was 
needed to overcome them – an entire new organisation. In one of the 
very few academic articles to pick up at the time on the ambitious goal of 
the Bank, it was observed that:  ‘What concerns the Bank most is the fact 
that there has been an explosion in the number and range of products 
established to manage risk but that these are not available to those 
countries that need them most, that is poorer, producer nations. They 
identify a lack of infrastructure, high costs and, as suggested above, a lack 
of trust as the key factors creating a gap between potential and actual 
usage of futures [commodities] exchanges. To tackle these problems one 
by one would be both time consuming and potentially very inefficient 
and, as a consequence, the Task Force has proposed a scheme to establish 
an intermediary that acts on behalf of traders’ (Morgan 2001:148). 
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Beginning in the 2001-02 fiscal year, the emphasis did shift to 
implementation and a number of these pilot programmes were set up for 
small groups of developing country producers in Uganda, Tanzania, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru. The 2001 CRMG Meeting in London 
included case study reports from Nicaragua and Tanzania, Mongolia and 
Thailand.   In   all   eight   case   studies   were   completed   in   2001   (this 
information was all formerly available on the ITF website, www.itf- 
commrisk.org, now withdrawn). The 2002 CRMG Meeting in Abidjan 
received case study reports from India and Vietnam, coffee, pepper and 
rubber. The primary focus was on cash crops such as coffee and cotton. 
The programme identified a number of significant constraints and barriers 
to the sustainable use of derivatives among small-scale producers and 
producer organisations participating in the pilots (World Bank 2010). 
   
In fact, all the pilots were extremely challenging, for a number of reasons. 
What  was  found  -  intractable  problems  such  as  basis  risk,  correlation 
issues, and lack of willingness to pay for price risk insurance - was not 
exactly encouraging. The ITF-CRMG went through the organisational 
learning process of asking whether the problems with developing market 
based risk management solutions for farmers in developing countries were 
location specific, commodity specific, or universal. World Bank staff and 
consultants examined these problems but found no obvious, inexpensive 
or  widely  applicable  solutions. Some conclusions were drawn:  besides 
gaps in knowledge and experience, the small scale of producing units in 
most developing countries meant - as the Bank had recognised from the 
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start - that risks had to be aggregated across producers in order to meet 
the minimum requirement of standardised volumes inherent in derivative 
contracts. However this aggregation issue (i.e. finding a viable institutional 
structure for aggregating the risks of many small producers) turned out to 
be a particularly difficult problem to solve. Another important constraint 
was credit. Derivative users need access to credit to be able to finance the 
ex-ante payment of option premiums, and/or to manage margin calls if 
they were trading futures. Without credit and a reliable track record of 
doing business with banks, access to derivative markets would inevitably 
be limited. Basis risk was another major constraint to the use of 
international markets to hedge price risk in developing countries. It was 
also found that, in many countries, political and institutional constraints 
severely limited the potential role of market-based price risk management. 
Although ICAs were largely defunct, in many countries, governments still 
played a major role in commodity price determination through 
interventions such as subsidies, price stabilisation funds, administrated 
prices, and public storage programmes. Since such programmes crowded 
out the incentive to participate in market-based price risk management 
they also distorted basis relationships between local prices and prices on 
international   derivative   markets,   rendering   effective   hedging   more 
difficult. 
   
In Latin America and Africa, the two major regions where the ITF-CRMG 
ran pilot programmes, capacity building and education proved to be an 
extremely   significant   barrier   to   greater   use   of   market-based   risk 
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management  tools.  In  many  cases,  education  and  capacity  building 
yielded positive results, though not always in the direction of actual 
hedging transactions.   Instead, producer organisations began to get a 
better sense of how local prices were connected to international prices, 
and were able to improve bargaining power with buyers.   There were 
some successes: for example in Peru, ITF-CRMG education and training 
activities  facilitated  the  use  of  futures  contracts  to  manage  price  risk 
among some of the larger coffee cooperatives (World Bank 2010). 
   
The pilot studies failed to convince the Board, however, and – although 
the Bank has not released any Board minutes concerned with the ITF 
proposal – the idea of any intermediary failed to find favour at director 
level   within   the   Bank,   previous   objections   having   been   deemed 
insurmountable8. Yet the policy norm persisted even if its primary potential 
 
institutional manifestation had never come to fruition. Virtually identical 
arguments in favour of price risk management continued to be presented. 
For  example  at   an   international  conference  in   2003,   World  Bank 
economists continued to argue in favour of market based solutions to risk 
   
8 In response to my request the World Bank identified only four ‘Board-level’ documents 
which their archivist identified as relevant. Three have been publicly released as a direct 
result of my request, cited as World Bank 2000a, 2000b and World Bank 2012a. None of 
these was a Board minute, despite the fact that the documents themselves mention two 
historical informal Board discussions of the proposal (in August 1999 and February 2000) 
and subsequent scheduled Board meetings. The fourth document, which remains 
unreleased, was identified by the Bank as the verbatim transcript of the August 1999 
informal Board meeting, for which no minutes were taken, at which two senior Bank 
officials, including the Chief Economist, commented on the ITF proposal, including its 
legal ramifications: 
 
Statement by Shihata & Perlin - Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries- 
Proposal for a Market-Based Approach (August 30, 1999). 
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management problems: ‘At the farm level, this uncertainty in commodity 
prices makes it difficult for producers to allocate resources efficiently, limits 
their access to credit for productivity enhancing inputs, and leads them to 
adopt low-yield, low-risk production technologies, thereby lowering 
average incomes. At the macro level commodity price volatility affects 
government’s fiscal revenues, trade balance, exchange rate, and 
creditworthiness (Bryla, Dana, Hess & Varangis 2003). 
   
The next steps for the ITF, which were a consequence of its work rather 
than any outside influence, were twofold. Firstly as seen at the 2003 ITF- 
CRMG Meeting in London in June, there was a broadening of the ITF- 
CRMG’s concerns to weather and yield risks (this avenue of policy 
development is discussed in Chapter Six). That meeting also saw the first 
reporting on the extent of the ITF-CRMG’s first price risk management trials 
(Varangis & Nash 2003) which was repeated the following year (Varangis, 
Dana & Hess 2004) in a meeting held at the FAO Headquarters in Rome 
and at which Alexander Sarris, having newly joined the FAO, led it into 
participation in the ITF-CRMG’s activities.   He (and his colleagues) made 
two further presentations to the ITF-CRMG at Interlaken in Switzerland the 
following  year  (Sarris  2005,  Sarris,  Conforti,  Prakash,  Beko  &  Mantzou 
2005),  a  meeting  that  Lamon  Rutten  of  UNCTAD  also  attended.  The 
second continuation of the case studies, however, masked a change in the 
long-term direction of policy that was very significant. Both of these 
changes were at least in part a response to the administrative problems of 
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implementation identified during the case studies and the organisational 
learning that this entailed within the ITF-CRMG. 
   
Why did the ITF-CRMG GCI initiative fail? 
    
The reasons for the failure of the ITF-CRMG to generate the independent 
margin facility organisation (whether contained within the World Bank or 
autonomous) for which it had been originally established as a forerunner 
and the subsequent dramatic cut-back in its work were many. They 
illustrate many of the theoretical perceptions introduced in Chapter Three 
above, in particular the failure of coalition building for change (Kotter 
1995). 
    
Firstly, it would be wrong to ignore the significance of individual 
personalities in the decision-making process at the Bank. Nawal Kamel in 
particular had had come to the task having already played a high profile 
role at the Bank as Chief of the International Finance Division in the 
successful implementation of a debt relief programme for developing 
countries, during which she had earned the trust of the Bank President, 
James Wolfensohn, and built a reputation as a successful change agent 
within the Bank (Momani 2010:38). However she and the supporters of 
the GCI concept failed to build a coalition for change within the Bank to 
deliver a new facility within an existing IGO,  let alone a new IGO. Not all 
policy entrepreneurs succeed. 
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Secondly, there was a leadership and communication failure within the 
World Bank itself. At a very senior level within the Bank there was 
scepticism when the GCI project was revealed in depth, for example even 
from the  Managing  Director responsible for  overseeing the  ITF-CRMG, 
Sven Sandstrom. Nawal Kamel tried to overcome this by attempting to 
bypass senior management in the Bank, including her immediate superior, 
Sandstrom, and to appeal straight to the President, but this extended 
manoeuvre did not bring success. One commentator observed pertinently 
that ‘She seldom lunched, a bad mistake in the World Bank’. This non- 
collegiate approach minimised support within the World Bank for the 
proposal, which was even perceived by some sympathetic to the market 
based norm and even the proposal as an attempt to build a personal 
power base. In retrospect it is easy enough to see that the participants 
within  the  ITF  in  general,  and  in  particular  Nawal  Kamel  and  her 
colleagues within the CRMG, failed in all of Kotter’s criteria for the 
successful  implementation  of  change  within  an  organisation  (Kotter 
1995). The ITF policy community did not communicate or convince within 
the World Bank as a whole. Most notably they failed to assemble a 
powerful enough coalition amongst senior decision-makers, in this case 
directors of the World Bank (Funke Oyewole, interview, 18 March 2011). 
They can be seen as operating in a ‘technical policy bubble’ of mutual 
information exchange, and self-congratulation – what Kotter described as 
‘declaring victory too soon’ (Kotter 1995:66), making apparent progress 
 
whilst not building the required consensus for major policy change. 
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Thirdly, it  has  also been suggested that one important reason for the 
failure of the GCI Initiative was internal criticism of the implied resource 
transfer away from the World Bank towards a new international 
organisation – yet another new international organisation (or, as originally 
mooted, two) -  which as  noted above would not  necessarily even be 
staffed entirely by World Bank staff. Bower & Kamel had even raised the 
question of the structural form of the GCI, as to whether it would best be 
organised as an insurance company or an Exchange – in either form it 
would,  they  conceded,  be  working  partially  in  competition  with  the 
private sector – which was one reason why critics inside the World Bank 
itself opposed the idea. Everyone also wondered who would provide the 
organisation with the necessary risk capital, as in effect the developed 
world would be asked to provide risk capital to an organisation that would 
only partially operate to service their needs. Officials (and consultants) at 
the  level  of  the  CRMG  could  keep  policy  on  a  pro-market  trajectory 
towards GCI for some years, but eventually the sheer scale of the financial 
commitment required for the policy to move to a level of large-scale 
implementation stepped beyond the decision-making capabilities of the 
technical officials, and at the level of the World Bank Board, the initiative 
stumbled and fell. There was a flurry of publications surrounding the 
possibility of the creation of the GCI, but none after this possibility 
evaporated. What is known, according to several sources (who have 
predictably  preferred  to  remain  anonymous),  is  that  there  was 
considerable internal debate and insufficient ‘buy-in’ at senior level within 
the Bank for the idea. Then, whilst himself lamenting the lack ‘personal 
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geometry’ and ‘team spirit’ at the Bank (Caufield 1997:328), President 
James Wolfensohn ‘wanted a little bit of everything’ so he himself was in 
favour: but the Bank’s directors proved unwilling to commit the resources 
required – the ITF had said publicly that the resources needed would 
amount to some US$80 million for one- year insurance, rising to US$350m 
if all entities in all developing countries would be eligible for premium 
support. (ITF1999:21) – and were also concerned, as noted above, at the 
perceived lack of infrastructure to deliver risk management instruments in 
developing countries . Even the ITF-CRMG had been funded mostly with 
trust  fund  money e.g  the  Interlaken  Meeting of  the  ITF  in  2005  was 
funded jointly by the World Bank and the Swiss Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (World Bank 2005) 
   
Fourthly, alternative organisations already existed. There was for example 
already an International Commodities Organisation in the Netherlands 
even if it did not have the same role. In the past, UNCTAD itself had been a 
focus for international commodity policy although it was not suggested 
that it could adopt an executive role for the GCI. Donor organisations such 
as the EU, the UK Department for International Development and the 
Netherlands Government did not eventually throw their weight behind 
the  idea.  There  were  conflicting  priorities  and  expenditure  demands 
within the Bank as well as internal management issues within the ITF- 
CRMG structure: Nawal Kamel had spent US$50m immediately on case 
studies, but Sarris argued that the officials in charge of the GCI project 
were therefore under pressure from their managers to deliver ‘successful’ 
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case studies irrespective of whether the necessary preconditions were in 
place (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). As a result, the case 
studies failed to convince either internally within the Bank or externally in 
other IGOs, e.g. the FAO (see Ed Seidler of FAO’s comments in Chapter 
Eight below) Rutten also saw this as a reason for the failure of the World 
Bank initiative – the ITF-CRMG team was often waylaid to do something 
else, an example of organisational slippage. ‘There was general agreement 
[on the programme] but day to day agreement was difficult’ (Lamon 
Rutten, interview, 15 August 2008). A further problem which Sarris said he 
identified in 2003 was the focus of the ITF-CRMG on the supply side of 
market-based risk management, whilst neglecting demand and cost: a 
version, almost, of ‘build it and they will come’ – a notion promulgated in 
Dubai, it may be noted, at around the same time. Sarris noted that the ITF- 
CRMG did not allow for, and could not control, the fact that countries did 
not realise the costs [involved in establishing risk management 
programmes]. Sarris made the further point that the CRMG staff members 
were not economists but analysts and ex-traders, and so did not make the 
effort to persuade sceptical economists within the Bank that such a project 
could work. It could also be argued that little attention was given in the 
documents produced by the ITF-CRMG to justifying these solutions 
politically,  a  point  noted  by  one  participant  who  in  recognising  the 
internal drivers of the policy argued that in retrospect: ‘The Bank made a 
huge mistake in not educating the governments and its own staff’ 
(Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). The grandiose nature of 
the idea, the lack of thought-out analysis of costs, the absence of political 
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will from the developed world to support the immense risks that would be 
inherent in creating and running a GCI successfully – all these factors 
combined to doom the initiative. Management theory of change, as 
exemplified by Kotter (1995) fits the available evidence of failure well. 
   
However   to   dismiss   the   failure   of   the   GCI   initiative   as   simply   a 
management  issue  within  the  World  Bank  which  could  have  been 
resolved with different leadership would be to overlook a number of other 
issues. A second reason for the failure of the GCI Initiative was intellectual 
opposition within the World Bank of a diametrically opposite nature to 
that which Lamon Rutten faced within UNCTAD or Alexander Sarris 
confronted within FAO. Critics ‘from the right’ believed that it would be 
inappropriate for the World Bank to become involved in the artificial 
creation of liquidity in commodity markets where there was insufficient 
evidence of information and market failure. They therefore thought the 
proposed  Fund  ill-advised  and  potentially  market-distorting.  Their 
influence may not have been sufficient of itself to derail the project – Hess 
did  not  recognise  these  individuals  although  he  conceded  that  some 
might have a concern with undercutting the private sector (Ulrich Hess, 
interview, 22 September 2009) – but they may have had influence at 
Board  level  and  therefore  been  one  factor  in  its  failure.  Ron  Duncan 
argued that specific individuals, notably Gershon Feder, the then head of 
the Development Economics Group, were stumbling blocks within the 
Bank from the beginning. According to Duncan, Feder’s position was that 
there was no market failure and therefore no need for public funds to 
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developing countries would ever be willing to spend money on derivatives 
and waited on donor money (Ulrich Hess, interview, 22 September 2009). 
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support  price  risk  management  (Ron  Duncan,  interview,  11  February 
 
2009).  This  was  a  very  different  position  to  that  expressed  by  his 
colleagues, who wrote that ‘markets that support risk sharing are 
incomplete’ (Larson, Anderson & Varangis 2004:230) Another objection 
ascribed to Feder was a lack of willingness to pay (which subsequent 
events  demonstrated  to  be  an  accurate  criticism).  However,  as  Hess 
pointed  out,  the  World  Bank  is  a  large  place  and  it  would  never  be 
possible to determine easily a single united ‘policy’ towards market-based 
risk management instruments within it - not just one World Bank’s world, 
but many. At the turn of the century, he characterised the view as being 
one of ‘cautious optimism’, especially in the IFC but a little less so at the 
World Bank. (Ulrich Hess, interview, 22 September 2009). Whereas the 
agriculture and insurance departments were keen on pushing and 
developing ideas, the regional economists felt themselves to be more on 
the receiving end and remained sceptical. This scepticism was based on a 
number of factors: firstly, a cynical view of derivatives even within the 
World Bank itself. They had ‘the scent of speculation’. A similar problem of 
education and persuasion often faces protagonists for derivatives in any 
new industry, for example real estate. The second ‘story’ Hess identified 
was a public sector (i.e. World Bank clients) incentive problem. This was a 
problem  with  government  officials  being  loathe  to  spend  taxpayers’ 
money on complex financial instruments that might not be properly 
understood, especially when they lost money. Hence few governments in 
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By 2003, Nawal Kamel had already left the World Bank to work for a 
number  of  years  as  an  Adviser  to  the  Natural  Resources  Minister  in 
Canada9 and the GCI initiative was as good as dead. A combination of 
managerial and intellectual factors had therefore been responsible for the 
fact that the World Bank did not take the lead in creating a new IGO 
dedicated to resolving risk 
   
The Continued Work of the ITF-CRMG 
    
With these lessons learned over 2001-2004 phase of ‘pilot’ projects and 
the collapse of the GCI project, the risk management policy norm within 
the World Bank (and the ITF more widely) was adapted. The ITF-CRMG 
began to investigate targeting of local banks engaged in agricultural 
lending  to  help  facilitate  improved  price  risk  management,  operating 
under the hypothesis that banks shared the same price risks as their 
borrowers. The pilot efforts with banks now focused on testing whether or 
not  local  banks  lending  to  agriculture  would     act  as  financial 
intermediaries to facilitate these trades (i.e. a local bank would establish a 
relationship with an international bank (such as Rabobank) or brokerage 
(such as Hencorp) to facilitate trades by customers). If clients were hedged, 
the bank too would benefit from reduced default risk on the loan portfolio 
and also be able to increase lending limits, along with collecting service 
fees charges from customers undertaking derivative trade. The ITF-CRMG 
   
9 She later returned to work at the World Bank in a different capacity. 
226
implementing  pilot  projects  to  concentrating  on  wider  scale  capacity 
building and a focus on better risk assessment and identifying ways to 
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piloted this approach with CRDB bank in Tanzania and the bank offered 
price risk management services to borrowers in the cotton and coffee 
sector which included cotton ginning companies and cotton and coffee 
cooperatives. In addition, the ITF-CRMG supported the Government of 
Malawi to structure and arrange a large scale hedge of corn imports on 
the South African Exchange, which helped reduce budgetary uncertainty. 
This was entirely consistent with the approval in 2002 by the World Bank 
Board of the Private Sector Development Strategy which included 
references to the importance of risk management techniques, specifically 
including derivatives (World Bank 2002). 
   
An external mid-term review of the ITF-CRMG’s price risk management 
work emphasised that the technical assistance programme had resulted in 
better understanding of overall exposure and led many organisations to 
increase simple back-to-back trading as a means of reducing their 
commodity exposure. Once organisations were able to exploit this low- 
cost risk management technique they were able to reduce the price 
exposure and did not then see the need for more formal financial risk 
management techniques. In short, better risk assessment, coupled with an 
increased understanding of the relationship between local and 
international prices, helped many producer organisations improve physical 
marketing strategies in ways that helped reduced their exposure to price 
risk. Based on this experience, the ITF-CRMG had changed its focus from 
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manage  price  risks  along  the  supply  chain.  Realising  the  very  real 
limitations involved in using financial derivative instruments on a stand- 
alone basis at this level in developing countries, the ITF-CRMG turned its 
focus  to  helping  interested  organisations  look  for  ways  to  use  both 
physical and financial strategies to manage price risk.  ‘The World Bank – 
with support from several donor governments, and in collaboration with 
international organisations and private-sector representatives – has been 
working  as  a  facilitator,  providing  technical  assistance  and  capacity 
building to allow producers in developing countries and local intermediary 
institutions with links to producers to access these instruments. To date, 
seven transactions have been completed between developing-country 
clients (in Uganda, Tanzania and Nicaragua) and international providers 
(mainly major international banks in Europe and the US)’ (Bryla, Dana, 
Hess & Varangis 2003:4). 
   
After  2003,  the  ITF-CRMG  developed  a  comprehensive  training 
programme on coffee price risk management and cotton price risk 
management and developed a market-based commodity price risk 
management course. In addition, the ITF-CRMG became involved in (1) 
macro/sectoral  level  work  e.g.  Malawi  maize  derivative  transaction, 
Burkina Faso cotton sector etc (2) food aid management via advisory work 
with the WFP, and (3) provided input into the design of the global food 
crisis response programme (World Bank 2010). The pilot programmes, 
228
implementing  pilot  projects  to  concentrating  on  wider  scale  capacity 
building and a focus on better risk assessment and identifying ways to 
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while   successful  enough  to   be   repeated,  highlighted   a   variety   of 
229
218
 
challenges related to both contract design and programme 
implementation, including: 
   
1. Education of clients and stakeholders. Farmer education surrounding 
issues such as basis risk needed to be increased. When farmers do not 
understand the underlying foundation of the contract — indexing, this can 
lead to dissatisfaction with the programme, and in some cases to loan 
defaults. 
   
2. Other Risks. There was a need to raise awareness of the limited role that 
weather insurance has in managing the larger spectrum of risks farmers 
face and to control those risks as much as possible within the programme. 
   
3. Organisational Capacity. The groundnut pilot also stressed the 
importance  of  the  organisational  capacity  of  the  participating 
stakeholders. The programme ultimately relies on the participating 
organisations and it is critical that they are comfortable and have the 
specific  competence  to  carry  out  the  roles  required.  (Bryla  &  Syroka 
2007:7) 
    
Successive ITF-CRMG meetings, in Abidjan (2002), London (2003), Rome 
(2004), Interlaken (2005) and Pretoria (2006) discussed the case studies 
and their application, but with the failure of the GCI initiative, as discussed 
above, the tide was already turning against the large-scale work being 
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Chapter Six: Policy at the World Bank 2 
    
Commodities  Policy  at  the  World  Bank  after  the  collapse  of  the  GCI 
 
initiative: the turn to weather derivatives 
    
Once the proposed international organisation and the Commodities Fund 
that would have been its raison d’ être had been rejected at Board level 
within the World Bank, the existence of the ITF-CRMG was never likely to 
be prolonged indefinitely, despite the series of ‘pilot’ studies (World Bank 
2008a). The failure of the GCI initiative did not, however, immediately 
presage the closing of the ITF-CRMG: the last ITF meeting was in Brussels in 
2008, but by then the organisation was felt to have outlived its usefulness, 
added to which the GFC had placed a stress on even funding for meetings, 
let alone more expensive work (Marc Sadler, interview, 16 March 2011). 
The ITF-CRMG website was subsequently closed down and the CRMG itself 
was dissolved. Work on agricultural risk management within the World 
Bank was then substantially scaled back. 
   
The decision not to create the GCI (and eventually to close down the ITF- 
CRMG) was more than just a decision not to create an organisation: it was 
also a recognition that risk management was a problem that could not be 
‘solved’ by any policy of the World Bank or even a collection of IGOs led by 
the World Bank. According to this new version of the market risk 
management policy norm – now being promoted by the international risk 
management policy  network  -  the  GCI  plan  was  too  ambitious: whilst 
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selling put options directly to farmers is not viable, although it might be to 
governments, it could not be run by the Bank directly. The policy would 
now evolve. The only truly sustainable format, the World Bank had now 
understood,  was  insurance/loan  packaging,  embedding  derivatives  in 
easily understandable products sold by banks and other rural financial 
concerns. This would provide the right governance, market players, 
customer protection, insolvency policy, and regulatory oversight (Ulrich 
Hess, interview, 22 September 2009). 
   
Subsequent to the demise of the ITF-CRMG there were staff changes -  only 
a few individuals carried on, some of them consultants  Of the CRMG team 
only   Julie   Dana   remained   working   at   the   World   Bank   in   a   risk 
management capacity (as of end-June 2011). As the ITF-CRMG wound 
down she and her colleagues did however remain in close contact with 
colleagues at UNCTAD and in the private risk management institutions, 
principally the international banks and commodities Exchanges, and for 
example Julie Dana made a contribution to the 2007 UNCTAD Experts’ 
meeting on Malawi’s successful use at the government level of risk 
management solutions for both a deficit and surplus year (Dana 2007). 
This is an example of the enduring quality of the inter-IGO policy network. 
A number of ITF-CRMG pilot studies were also carried through to their 
conclusion, but focus within the World Bank shifted rapidly towards 
weather derivatives (Julie Dana, personal e-mail, 2 September 2008) and 
work  on  risk  management  for  agriculture  was  even  claimed  to  have 
become   ‘a   low-intensity,   individually-based   effort’   (Stijn   Claessens, 
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interview, 9 December 2009) which continued to the cut-off date for the 
research for this thesis (end-June 2011). 
   
Weather Risk Management (WRM): theory and advocacy 
    
The shift towards weather derivatives was an example of the evolution of a 
policy norm within an IGO, whereby one policy (advocacy and pilots of 
CPR, as analysed above in Chapter Five) was over time eclipsed by another 
(the same for WRM, as analysed below).  Integral to this evolution was the 
development of a theoretical justification for WRM by the Bank and its 
consultants. This was that food security and weather risk management 
were inextricably linked. Weather risk management, or the lack of it, 
determined  the  level  of  systemic  risk  in  the  food  security  system,  as 
weather risk (droughts, floods, hail, cyclones, hurricanes etc) is pervasive in 
the agriculture sector, and has negative consequences for farmers and 
other stakeholders in agricultural supply chains. A rise in concern 
worldwide regarding climate change, which was occurring at the same 
time as the demise of the GCI scheme, also contributed as an external 
influence to the shift across to a concern at the World Bank with weather 
derivatives, a further demonstration, the Bank claimed, of the 
responsiveness of policy within the Bank to outside influence and change 
(World Bank 2010). 
   
Early on, the Bank noted that to address weather risk, many developing 
countries   had   implemented  crop   insurance,   largely   Multi-Peril   Crop 
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Insurance  (MPCI)  programmes.  In  the  view  of  protagonists  for  market 
based solutions, however, such programmes had always covered a very 
small segment of farming populations and were not especially sustainable. 
Moral hazard, adverse selection, high transaction costs, and Government 
regulations were some of the factors responsible for low penetration and 
sustainability of agricultural insurance in developing countries. The Bank’s 
consultants even suggested (in an especially notable contribution to the 
pro-market discourse at the Bank) that some (unnamed) commentators 
had gone so far as to state that traditional crop insurance was a global 
failure – that MPCI, which covers all yield risks and adjusts losses on the 
individual farm, was plagued by moral hazard, adverse selection, and high 
monitoring and  administrative  costs.  The  Bank’s  consultants  concluded 
that: ‘The financial experience with publicly-provided, multiple-peril crop 
insurance has been disastrous. In all cases, it was claimed, programmes 
were heavily subsidised and governments not only paid part of the 
premium, but also most of the delivery and service costs, and they covered 
aggregate losses even when the losses exceed targeted levels over long 
periods of time’ (Hess & Syroka 2005:15). 
   
According to  enthusiastic World  Bank  economists writing  at  the  time, 
 
’Weather risk markets by contrast provided new opportunities for 
developing countries to transfer weather-related loss-risks. Policy-makers 
could use weather risk markets to develop and reinsure effective disaster 
assistance programmes that are activated by specific catastrophic weather 
events  that  have  been  defined  ex  ante‘  (Varangis,  Skees  &  Barnett 
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2002:291) -  especially as the catastrophe bond market had not matured as 
had  been  hoped  and  expected  (Varangis,  Skees  &  Barnett  2002:286). 
Later, the point was added that ‘The exposure to weather risk drives overall 
food insecurity (Hess & Syroka 2005:vii). The World Bank perceived that it 
had a role because, as it was reported, ‘The introduction of weather risk 
management  into  emerging  market  economies  requires  development 
work that sometimes cannot be recuperated in trading margins of 
contracts’   (Hess, Richter & Stoppa 2002:285). So whilst recognising that 
policy  changed  away  from  an  all-embracing  GCI,  it  is  important  to 
recognise that support in principle for market-based risk management 
instruments, and for the World Bank policy norm in the area, evolved but 
did not recede in the minds of their supporters as the decade wore on. 
Thus, interviewed in 2009, Ulrich Hess, one of the World Bank employees 
involved in the projects described below, reiterated that derivatives ‘can be 
useful if used properly at the right level with the right partners and the 
right type of government structure’ (Ulrich Hess, interview, 22 September 
2009). 
 
   
WRM: The first steps 
    
The process of policy evolution at the Bank was actually quite prolonged: 
the first weather derivative transaction in U.S. was as early as 1997 and 
weather derivatives were incorporated into the research agenda of the 
World Bank in 1999, in the Nicaragua Risk Management Project which the 
Bank funded (Hess, Richter & Stoppa 2002). As markets for weather risk 
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management evolved, they provided new opportunities for the Bank to re- 
think yield insurance in emerging markets, and in 2000 the Bank and the 
IFC launched a project to investigate this. It was envisaged (e.g. Skees 
2001) - Professor Skees was an influential consultant to the World Bank - 
that an index insurance product would reduce adverse selection, reduce 
moral hazard, eliminate the need of physical field loss assessment, simplify 
information requirement, lower administrative cost, facilitate reinsurance, 
and improve transparency. To overcome the limitations of traditional crop 
insurance programmes, the concept of an index insurance product, 
wherein an index acts as a proxy for actual crop loss, was propagated in 
early 2000 (Skees, Gober, Varangis, Lester & Kalavakonda 2001).  As noted 
at the time, ‘The IFC of the World Bank Group is working toward 
developing weather indexes in developing countries’ (Varangis, Larson & 
Anderson 2002:17). 
   
Specifically, the IFC, as part of the World Bank Group, entered into a 
partnership with a leading weather risk market maker in order to promote 
WRM in emerging markets. IFC also obtained board approval for an 
investment in a weather insurance company to be established in Morocco 
(Haggerty 2007). The following year the World Bank helped the Moroccan 
government to launch an on-field international research project into 
weather derivatives (Hess, Richter & Stoppa 2002). However, the project 
had a short lifespan: the international joint venture partner, Aquila, failed 
in the wake of the Enron collapse, and the Moroccan government gave 
inadequate support to  the  idea  (Haggerty  2007).  As  noted  above  the 
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division of responsibilities between the IFC and the World Bank itself is 
broadly that the former engages with the private sector and the latter with 
governments. With these deals a start at least had been made on the IFC 
taking the lead within the World Bank Group and, with that, an end to the 
bureaucratic problem of  the  work  lying  with  the  World  Bank  but  the 
agreed policy demanding a solution for which the mandate of the IFC 
made it the appropriate organisation to carry out the policy (Panos 
Varangis, interview, 22 August 2011). 
   
WRM: the second stage 
    
In what the World Bank itself viewed as the ‘second stage’ for weather 
derivatives,  2002-2007,  donors  began  to  finance  the  piloting  of  these 
ideas: the balance of forces had changed in favour of practical action. The 
IFC became interested in supporting these innovations so that developing 
countries could participate in emerging weather markets. The feasibility of 
weather-based index insurance was being considered for a number of 
countries, including Nicaragua, Morocco, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Mexico, and 
Argentina. In particular, the ITF-CRMG was allocated trust funds from the 
Swiss and the Dutch governments to pilot weather insurance for farmers, 
initially to ‘complement’ its price risk management work in commodity 
markets. The focus was to be on pilot weather-index insurance projects 
design and implementation (Bryla & Syroka 2007). These provided what 
were described in a workshop in Thailand as ‘interesting experiences at 
national and farmer level’ (Bagazonzya & Kloeppinger-Todd 2007). 
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Weather derivatives had emerged from the ITF-CRMG work as a potentially 
successful resolution of the problems that the pilot studies on price risk 
management had exposed. It should therefore not be thought that the 
World Bank’s work on weather derivatives was only launched when the 
failure of the GCI initiative was already evident. On the contrary, the ITF- 
CRMG   was   involved   in   many   weather   risk   management   technical 
assistance projects to commercial entities in the developing world. The ITF- 
CRMG was involved in its first index-based weather risk management 
transaction in India in June 2003, the first-ever weather insurance project 
in  the  country. After 2003  there were several other pilots  around the 
world, including completed pilots in Ukraine, Ethiopia, and Malawi, and 
upcoming pilots in Kenya, Tanzania, Thailand and Central America (Dana, 
Gilbert & Shim 2006). By 2004, in an example of the evolution of technical 
policy evolves dovetailing into wider policy norms, weather derivative 
initiatives were included in an ‘emerging mozaic’ of World Bank policies 
towards climate change (Mathur, Burton & van Aalst 2004). And the ITF- 
CRMG, with support of its donors, started exploring the feasibility of 
promoting weather index insurance as a market-based risk transfer product 
in  developing  countries.  In  2004  the  Bank  declared  the  ‘need  to  re- 
examine whether there was scope for the international community to 
facilitate low-income countries access to marked-based mechanisms such 
as hedging and insurance, for example…insurance markets for weather 
risks. The use of market mechanisms should be part of exploring ex-ante 
responses to shocks’ (World Bank 2004:28). The World Bank then reviewed 
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developments to date in a paper in 2005 (World Bank 2005). This was as 
clearly as many others a product of its time, with its approbation of 
securitisation, lack of foresight of financial market difficulties for lenders, 
and approval of globalisation of risks. Nevertheless, the weather derivative 
idea was proving more enduring politically than its price risk predecessor, 
mainly because of the practical benefits of managing a range of risks 
together through one insurance contract that weather derivatives offered. 
   
It is important to note, however, that by this time the World Bank had 
already largely shifted its focus towards the much more modest objective 
of encouraging and supporting the provision of contracts by private sector 
organisations such as Rabobank and Swiss Re, rather than any centralised 
facility managed by the World Bank itself, thus demonstrating the 
correctness of the assertion that ‘International organizations may be 
capable of learning’ (Reinalda & Verbeek 2004b:241). At the intermediary 
level it was envisaged that banks could package a loan and the weather 
insurance based on the farmers areas index into a single product: the 
weather-indexed maize production loan (World Bank 2008). As the decade 
wore on too, commercial organisations had taken up the advocacy 
themselves,  as  the  policy  norm  adopted  by  the  World  Bank  diffused 
further. At the farm level, it was argued, weather-based index insurance 
allowed  for  more  stable  income  streams and  could  thus  be  a  way  to 
protect peoples’ livelihoods and improve their access to finance. Weather- 
based insurance instruments could provide financial protection based on 
the performance of a specified index in relation to a specified trigger and 
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they could offer protection against the uncertainty in revenue accruement 
resulting from volume volatility. Buyers would be compensated for 
unfavourable weather fluctuations that adversely impact physical 
production so a farmer or a group of farmers could buy such a product to 
reduce the weather risks in farming (Swiss Re 2008a). 
   
Although the private sector was being encouraged to take the lead, 
consistent with the wider policy norm subscribed to by the Bank, policy 
was still justified as client-driven. One of the Bank’s 2005 publications on 
Agricultural Risk, for example, claimed to respond directly to requests from 
clients within and outside the World Bank such as the Africa Social 
Protection Group (Haque/Alderman) of the World Bank which was 
interested in the use of weather-risk management tools for social transfer 
payments at the micro and meso level, the Rural and Agriculture Sector 
Group Southern Africa (Nucifora/Hess) of the World Bank which was 
interested in the role of weather-based index insurance for food security 
systems in the region, and the WFP which wanted to determine if the 
weather-risk management tools could be used to reinsure WFP’s extreme 
drought exposures or to allocate emergency aid in the territory more 
efficiently. The  FAO’s Commodities Division, Early Warning System Group 
(GIEWS) partnered with the Commodity Risk Management Group (CRMG) 
in the Agriculture and Rural Development department (ARD) wanted to 
determine if index-based insurance can be a tool to protect farmers around 
the world and whether or not the early warning system could be improved 
with these indices (Hess & Syroka 2005:3). The World Bank view in a wide- 
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ranging summary document also of 2005 was therefore that ‘The demand 
for systematic techniques of agricultural risk management in developing 
countries ultimately came from the people who deal with farmers and who 
partly make the farmers’ risks their own’ (World Bank 2005:x). 
   
Many of the documents funded by the World Bank on market-based 
mechanisms performed a defensive role in justifying e.g. index-based 
insurance on economic grounds against potential economic criticisms. In 
the case of index-based insurance schemes, for example, one major 
potential criticism is basis risk (discussed above in Chapter Four), described 
in one World Bank publication on index-based livestock insurance in 
Mongolia  as  their  ‘main  impediment’  (Mahul  &  Skees  2006:1),  The 
proposed solution was a link between the index insurance and both 
agricultural lending and microfinance and herder self-help groups who 
could facilitate informal risk-sharing mechanisms within the group (Mahul 
& Skees 2006:4). 
 
   
Hess now expressed the new policy position shared between the Bank and 
the private sector: ‘Poor people in rural areas are vulnerable to the harsh 
effects of natural hazards, such as drought and floods. Weather index- 
based insurance can dramatically improve their ability to predict and cope 
with the impact of severe weather events exacerbated by climate change… 
Weather derivatives are the right way to go, if there is sufficient support 
from the private sector and the authorities in the country’ (Ulrich Hess, 
interview, 22 September 2009). It is interesting to note, however, as Hess 
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himself pointed out, that even within the broadly supportive policy 
community there was far from unanimous support for derivatives as 
solutions to climate change, especially strategically (Ulrich Hess, interview, 
22 September 2009). For example, Kevin Parris at the OECD – an IGO as 
noted above where the prevailing policy norm has always been in favour 
of market-based mechanisms - argued that the short-term perspective of 
financial instruments rendered them ‘no use at all’ to solve environmental 
problems. Even democratically elected governments, in Parris’ view, took a 
medium-term view based on the electoral cycle which was too short a 
view. He argued that climate change issues had transformed consideration 
of the political objections to market based risk management instruments. 
Farmers  were  now  facing  a  much  more  volatile  market,  and  ‘futures 
markets are too short term to [enable farmers to] react or adapt’ (Kevin 
Parris, interview, 15 December 2008). Parris specifically mentioned the 
failure of the Murray-Darling basin in Australia as an example of the effects 
of climate change on agriculture that markets conspicuously failed to 
control or manage, let alone improve. 
   
At the operational level, however, such concerns did not apply. The ITF- 
CRMG had taken the principle of pilot studies and example projects and 
applied it to weather derivatives, piloting index-based weather insurance 
for developing country producers, agricultural businesses, and banks.  ITF- 
CRMG pilot studies had taken place in a number of countries around the 
world  to  test  this  approach,  including  in  Mexico  (2001),  India  (2003), 
Malawi (2005), Ethiopia (2006), Mongolia (2006) and Thailand (2007). The 
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Malawi project was especially noteworthy as it worked at two levels: the 
programme innovated and developed a macro level index product for 
governments to manage food security risk, with the aim that the resultant 
weather-indexed  insurance   products   would   eventually,   it   was   then 
believed, be reinsured in the global weather-risk market, effectively 
transferring the risk from Malawi to the international reinsurance and 
capital markets. But in addition the ITF-CRMG worked with local 
stakeholders  in  Malawi  to  pilot  index-based  weather insurance for  the 
2005/2006 crop season in order to enhance groundnut farmers’ ability to 
manage drought risk and in turn access credit. In this major pilot study, 892 
groundnut farmers in Malawi bought weather insurance to increase their 
ability to manage drought risk and in turn access credit for better inputs. 
The National Smallholder Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM), in 
conjunction with the Insurance Association of Malawi and the CRMG of 
the World Bank, designed an index-based weather insurance contract that 
would pay out if the rainfall needed for contracts could mitigate the 
weather risk associated with lending to farmers, whilst Opportunity 
International Bank of Malawi and the Malawi Rural Finance Corporation 
agreed to lend farmers the funds necessary to purchase higher-yielding 
seed if the farmers bought weather insurance as part of the loan package. 
These loans stipulated that the bank would be the first beneficiary if there 
is a pay-out from the insurance. NASFAM served to identify the participant 
farmers, provide training to farmers on the products (in conjunction with 
the  banks),  and  provide  marketing  services  at  the  end  of  the  season 
(Kimball 2006). Consultant Joanna Syroka’s time and travel was supported 
244
231 
by SECO, the Trade Department of the Swiss government. The very 
complexity of the scheme illustrated the difficulties of generalising such 
schemes, but also the importance of extending the policy network to 
encompass such organisations in developing countries if the policy norm 
was to be maintained. 
   
In all the ITF-CRMG provided technical assistance and/or designed and 
facilitated implementation of index insurance pilot programmes in 14 
countries including India, Malawi, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burkina Faso, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Thailand, Honduras, Morocco, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Peru, 
Guatemala, and Jamaica. ITF-CRMG also pursued feasibility studies in 
Tanzania, Madagascar and Cambodia (Skees, Hartell & Murphy 2007, 
Sennholz 2009).   The majority of this work focused on developing index 
insurance for drought, although in some cases index insurance for excess 
rainfall was also explored. While most of the insurance products were 
initially targeted at the micro level for individual farmers, realising the 
limitations and challenges of offering farmer-level insurance, the ITF-CRMG 
had demonstrated institutional learning and increasingly focused its 
attention on aggregators (Banks, lead firms, out-grower schemes) as a 
potential user of index-insurance products. The ITF-CRMG also carried out 
applied research and explored the feasibility of developing flood index 
insurance and feasibility of using grid weather data, to overcome the 
limitations of missing data for agricultural insurance. Index insurance, as 
these pilot studies showed, is a technically challenging product with many 
limitations, and despite the enthusiasm about the potential of this product, 
245
234 
there was (and remains)  a limited understanding and dearth of technical 
capacity among developing country stakeholders. However, the technical 
complexity of such a policy lent itself to the creation of a ‘depoliticised’ 
’political technology’ (Shore & Wright 1997) which becomes ‘taken for 
granted’ (Park & Vetterlein 2010), and this is what happened within the 
ITF-CRMG. 
   
The EU also continued to take an active interest in well-functioning futures 
and options markets, evidence of the inter-organisational working of the 
market risk management policy network. It was argued internally within 
the EU, in a manner similar to the evolution of the policy norm at the 
OECD, that firstly, as price support was gradually being reduced (the Doha 
Round of the WTO had already begun at that time, although it remained 
stalled  as  of  end-June  2011),  new  instruments  were  needed  to  help 
farmers across Europe to cope with the increasing price volatility, and 
secondly, futures and options markets contributed to market transparency, 
which favoured the functioning of the EU internal market. As a result the 
EU Council itself concluded in May 2005 that: ‘In order to mitigate the 
impact of exogenous shocks, including price vulnerability, on developing 
countries’ economies, the EU will support the operationalisation of market- 
based insurance schemes….’ (Olthof 2006:6). Olthof’s presentation 
suggested that the European Commission would provide financial support 
(as part of a €45m programme on commodities) to the ‘core work of the 
World Bank’s CRM Group which covered price and weather risk 
management,   product   development,   capacity   building   and   market 
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infrastructure… in selected ACP countries’ (Olthof 2006:10). Wim Othof 
stressed particularly the interest of the Commission in the promotion of 
index insurance with .assistance projected to start in January 2007. This 
financial support from the European Commission – considerable, in terms 
of IGO budgets - provided a politically awkward issue for those who 
opposed market solutions inside other IGOs, which are reliant on external 
funding. Moreover, Olthof’s presentation suggested that further longer- 
term funding was potentially available from other EU funds. 
   
As part of what the World Bank increasingly saw as its role as a Knowledge 
Bank, in overcoming potential practice obstacles to the implementation of 
market based risk management, the ITF-CRMG synthesised its years’ of 
experience and lessons learned from designing, piloting, and rolling-out 
weather index insurance product into two outreach methods. The first was 
the  publication  of  freely  available  documents  on  weather  risk 
management, providing practical guidelines on designing and 
implementing index-insurance programmes for the wider development 
community. In addition, to build capacity of developing country 
stakeholders, ITF-CRMG developed a training programme which detailed 
the key aspects for designing and implementing weather index insurance 
programmes. 
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Partnership with the private sector 
    
What were the achievements of these weather derivative pilot schemes? 
Through its research and development efforts, pilot projects, and technical 
assistance activities, the ITF-CRMG did succeed in translating the concept of 
index insurance into detailed feasibility studies and practical applications 
whilst learning valuable lessons on the way. The programme’s work on 
index insurance resulted in attracting the attention of the development 
community towards index insurance as a potential market-based tool for 
agricultural risk management. Increased donor funding flowed into testing 
and piloting of weather index insurance products in developing countries 
by multiple donor initiatives (e.g. the Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF) 
discussed below, the Gates foundation, the Index Insurance Innovation 
Initiative, and the Rockefeller Foundation). 
   
Private sector involvement and practical initiatives on weather derivatives 
even preceded the demise of the GCI initiative. In 2003, Hyderabad-based 
micro-finance  institution  BASIX  and  Mumbai-based  insurance  company 
ICICI Lombard, with technical assistance from the CRMG, launched the first 
pilot programme for index-based weather insurance in the developing 
world in the Mahahbubnagar district of Andhra Pradesh. This pilot 
programme sold weather insurance policies protecting against low rainfall 
to 200 groundnut and castor farmers. In 2004 BASIX incorporated farmer 
feedback into the design of the second generation of improved weather 
insurance products that were sold to over 700 farmers, several of whom 
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were repeat customers from the 2003 pilot. After 2003, the Indian weather 
insurance market grew rapidly (Sharma & Vashishtha 2007). In 2004 three 
insurers including the state agricultural insurer replicated the product and 
reached 25,000 farmers.  For the 2005 monsoon season, a leading Indian 
seed company bought a bulk weather insurance policy so that it could 
attach free weather insurance coupons for a minimal level of drought 
coverage to its cottonseed packets which were sold to 100,000 farmers in 
Maharashtra  (Bryla  and  Syroka  2007:2).  In  2005  more  than  250,000 
farmers were reached by five insurers, and Swiss Re reinsured part of the 
portfolio to the tune of $US 50 million per year (Barnett, Barrett, Carter, 
Chantarat, Hansen, Mude, Osgood, Skees, Turvey  & Ward 2007). BASIX 
scaled up their programme further, selling over 7,600 policies in 36 
locations in six Indian states. These new policies were refined versions of 
the 2004 products and offered improved risk management features for 
farmers, but had a generic, standardised structure which made it easier for 
BASIX to retail to many clients in many locations. Training sessions with 
loan officers, who became customer service agents, allowed BASIX to offer 
rainfall insurance products to its farmer clients. In 2006, BASIX sold rainfall 
and Multi-Peril weather contracts including temperature and relative 
humidity to over 11,000 customers. In 2008 in Rajasthan alone 675,000 
policies were sold to farmers (Barnett, Barrett, Carter, Chantarat, Hansen, 
Mude, Osgood, Skees, Turvey & Ward 2007) Documents from the Bank 
were explicit: in stating that it had been the vision and inspiration of 
Nachiket Mor, ICICI Bank, India, and Vijay Mahajan, BASIX, India, which 
had  been  the  real  motivation  of  what  by  2005  World  Bank  officials 
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described as the astounding success of weather insurance techniques. ‘The 
present paper and its proposals are unthinkable without ICICI Lombard 
and BASIX weather insurance pilots and the discovery that farmers 
understand and appreciate the transparency and timeliness of the product’ 
(World Bank 2005:viii). As the Banks’ consultants argued, ‘Successes like 
the market growth in India have had significant demonstration effects and 
have proven that weather risk management for farmers in the developing 
world  is  possible  through  insurance-type  instruments’  (Bryla  &  Syroka 
2007:1). These were further examples of the operational role of the private 
sector in the implementation of the policy norm; those working for 
participating firms in relevant positions joined the global market risk 
management policy network as a result. 
   
Private sector programmes began to happen as the norm took hold in the 
private sector in practice: in March 2006, for instance, the WFP announced 
that it had paid the French insurance company AXA Re US$930,000 for an 
IBRTP that would pay up to US$7.1 million to help up to 67,000 Ethiopian 
households in the event of inadequate rainfall during the critical March– 
October period (Barnett, Barrett & Skees 2008:1776). By 2008 there were a 
number of – admittedly small – initiatives at the practical level from other 
IGOs  that  were  drawing  on  the  pioneer  work  of  the  ITF-CRMG.  For 
example in 2008 the WFP and IFAD launched a joint initiative with the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation which aimed to help provide poor rural 
farmers with financial protection following natural hazard events. Under 
the initiative, the foundation provided US$998,000 in funding to support 
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the research and planning for insurance schemes designed to help shield 
small farmers from the impact of natural disasters and climate change. 
   
.In 2008, the World Bank weather derivative programme was sufficiently 
advanced for a further, commercial trial in Malawi. Swiss Re in partnership 
with the International Development Association (IDA), part of the World 
Bank, offered a weather derivative contract whereby Swiss Re would pay 
out up to US$5 million in the event that Malawi’s farmers suffered from a 
drought-related shortfall in maize production. With this transaction, the 
IDA backed its first-ever weather derivative contract with the Government 
of Malawi10. The World Bank officer cited, Gloria Grandolini, Director of the 
 
World Bank Treasury’s Banking and Debt Management Department, was 
quoted as saying that ‘This weather derivative contract is just one 
instrument as part of a World Bank effort to deliver customised financial 
solutions  and  help  members  plan  efficient  responses  to  catastrophic 
events. The use of weather derivatives are most effective as part of a 
broader risk management strategy’ (Swiss Re 2008). This quotation is 
revealing in its caution, in the stress on an integrated approach, and in an 
absence of any commitment to World Bank funding or even any further 
specific projects. The World Bank remained, after the failure of the GCI 
initiative, decidedly cautious about its own future role in the development 
of market-based risk management instruments, but it did not face internal 
  
10   The World Bank, working together with the Government of Malawi, structured the contract as an option on a 
rainfall index. The index linked rainfall and maize production, so that if precipitation fell below a certain level the 
index would reflect the value of the projected loss in maize production. The maximum payout was reached if 
maize production dropped to 10% below the historical average (Swiss Re 2008). 
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opposition of the type found in UNCTAD or FAO, as shown below 
(Chapters Seven and Eight respectively).  This caution was reflected in the 
increased role projected for the private sector in the delivery of market- 
based instruments (certainly by comparison to the GCI concept) expressed 
in the summary of a meeting held by Swiss Re itself in 2008 to analyse the 
possibilities for index based insurance in climate risk management.   ‘The 
government’s role is crucial. It establishes the regulatory environment for 
index insurance, and national meteorological services and agriculture 
extension services provide vital knowledge for insurance design and 
implementation’ (Swiss Re 2008a).  Crucial, yes – but not operational. 
   
It all comes together: the Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF) and the 
 
Agricultural Price Risk Management (APRM) programme 
 
   
Migration to the idea of promoting weather-based derivatives did not 
initially however completely erase the previous idea of direct World Bank 
involvement in the commodities risk markets rather than leaving provision 
entirely to the private sector. For example in 2007 it was proposed (by 
World Bank consultants) that in order to strengthen ex-ante emergency 
risk management, the World Bank could provide a contingent credit facility 
to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries through 
a proposed SADC fund. The World Bank would ‘back-up’ the SADC fund 
with a credit facility that could be called upon when the SADC fund was 
insufficient to cover all member country claims. The World Bank funds 
disbursed to the member countries would then become loans. The donor 
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community could also subsidise premiums or provide some of the SADC 
fund back-up facility as grants rather than loans. For securitisation, the 
World Bank could guarantee the bi-annual premium payments by SADC to 
the  catastrophe  bond  holders.  Such  an   AAA  guarantee  would  be 
necessary to place this bond in the markets with a competitive rating. The 
IFC could play a significant role by investing in warehouse receipt systems 
and in weather-risk transfer mechanisms through private risk funds (Bryla & 
Syroka 2007:x). These concepts, albeit expressed in cautious terms – ‘could 
play’ etc – were a reflection of the continued belief amongst World Bank 
officials (and their consultants) that the Bank would be able to play an 
active role in the provision of market based risk management instruments 
to developing countries. The Bank’s traditional role as a public finance 
institution had started to decline, but the work of the IFC was expanding; 
and the Bank placed increasing emphasis on its ‘unique position as 
knowledge gatherer and disseminator’ (Bayliss, Fine & Van Waeyenberge 
2011:11). 
    
The process of risk management policy development through the 
publication of speculative papers was now well established: the following 
year the World Bank President made a public announcement of risk 
management policy. He said that the Bank was looking at introducing a 
programme whereby it would act as an intermediary to access weather 
derivatives. Countries would be protected against a rise in the price of 
imported maize. Malawi was poised to become the first country to benefit 
from this arrangement. The Bank was also working to help countries gain 
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access to and knowledge about financial risk management products. The 
President also said that the Bank was ‘working with our Board to deploy 
index-related hedges and insurance products to protect poor farmers and 
countries from weather and supply shocks’ (World Bank 2008c). In June of 
that year the Bank’s Board did approve a proposal for its Treasury to act as 
an intermediary for index-based weather derivatives for IBRD and IDA 
countries. Following a severe weather event, clients – developing country 
governments -  would receive a  pay-out from the Bank  with the  value 
based on an index. Malawi became the first of several countries likely to 
use the World Bank as an intermediary to access the weather derivative 
market. The Bank also helped countries structure commodity hedging 
strategies. In Southern Africa this meant working with large trading 
companies and banks who could offer customised contracts to help 
mitigate the risk of maize price and supply volatility. Such approaches, the 
Bank  argued,  could  be  used  as  a  basis  for  building  ‘virtual’  strategic 
reserves, which are more efficient and market-friendly than increasing 
physical reserves. They might also be useful for reducing the financial risk 
and costs of food-aid programmes (World Bank 2008b). 
   
By this time it had been recognised that the relatively small resources of 
the  World  Bank  did  not  themselves  permit  the  establishment  of  a 
worldwide comprehensive weather derivatives facility, even if the universal 
weather data were in place, which they were not. Nor indeed was there a 
policy commitment at the World Bank to take the place of the private 
sector in the provision of derivative contracts.  But this was not to suggest 
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that  a  more  modest  plan  than  the  GCI,  and  focused  on  weather 
derivatives, might not have a chance of success. The World Bank declared 
that further indications of the success of the programme were seen in the 
way that In the wake of the work which the ITF-CRMG had started on 
index-based  insurance  projects  and  pilots,  the  wider  IFC  and  donors 
agreed to create a GIIF backed by a Trust Fund, to be managed by IFC. The 
GIIF is (according to the Bank) a comprehensive risk transfer programme 
created to address the scarcity of affordable insurance protection against 
weather and natural disasters in developing countries. The objective of the 
GIIF is to expand access to insurance products, using an index-based 
approach, in developing countries, and particularly to farmers and people 
in agrarian communities. The GIIF supports existing and new index 
insurance-based projects in achieving their objectives, which includes 
commercial success and a good test of sustainability. GIIF also collaborates 
with regulatory and government authorities to create a suitable regulatory 
and  commercial  environment  for  index-based  insurance  products  to 
ensure that index-based insurance can be offered in full local compliance 
and with the requisite legal and supervision framework. These operational 
parameters reflected longstanding World Bank policy for market based risk 
management, established as a result of the entire experience of the ITF- 
CRMG, and in particular the need to ensure that the private sector 
shouldered the burden of actual delivery, whilst the Bank provided the 
necessary seed capital. 
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The exact way the GIIF was to operate only became clear gradually, as the 
policy evolved. In November 2007 the IFC approved initial capital for the 
establishment of IndexRe. This was intended to be a reinsurance company 
with access to a Global Index Insurance/Reinsurance Facility to establish 
technical and intermediation capacity to reinsure weather and catastrophic 
event (CAT) event risks using index or parametric triggers (Skees, Murphy, 
Collier, McCord & Roth 2007). 
   
Donors followed. The EU All-ACP Commodities Programme had been a 
joint sponsor of the 2008 ITF Meeting in Brussels, for example, along with 
the World Bank itself, the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural 
Cooperation (CTA) the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs, and the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By the end of 2008, the EU had 
stepped forward as the first donor, providing €24.5 million in funding as 
the first donor for the GIIF (European Union 2008). The GIIF Global Trust 
Fund (GTF) was also supported by Japan’s Ministry of Finance with an 
initial grant of US$2 million, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which provided US$500,000 to establish the facility (IFC 2011). 
   
By 2009 the GIIF had actually been launched, although once again 
objectives had been scaled back: ‘At an earlier stage, the Facility had 
included  the  creation  of  a  new,  dedicated  reinsurance entity  through 
equity investments from various international financial institutions as well 
as a technical partner. While this feature is currently being re-examined, if 
technical partners expressed an interest in creating such a  reinsurance 
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company, GTF would be willing to provide funding to help the start-up 
 
phase of such a company’ (dgMarket 2009). 
    
In practice, the GIIF has started to work with private sector organisations 
and other local institutions. Progress could reasonably be described as 
steady  but  unspectacular.    In  November  2010,  GIIF  conferred  its  first 
grants, in Kenya (to the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, 
UAP Insurance and The International Livestock Research Institute) and in 
Rwanda (to MicroEnsure) totalling roughly US$4.1 million to help bring 
weather-related, index-based insurance to about 35,000 farmers and 5,000 
livestock herders over the following three years (IFC 2011). These grants 
and this work represent the contemporary expression of the policy 
originally developed by Kamel and the ITF-CRMG. The key differences 
between the GIIF as it has worked in practice and the GCI as originally 
contemplated show the evolution of a policy norm, responding to external 
influences, management issues and financial constraints. 
   
World Bank policy and the GFC 
  
  
The GFC did not change the broad policy norms of the PWC: World Bank 
President Robert Zoellick referred to private capital as the main driver of 
economic growth, whether in infrastructure, financing business and trade, 
or regional integration in an open global economy (Zoellick 2008). This 
continued policy development ensured that during the GFC World Bank 
policy towards agricultural risk management did not exhibit the same volte 
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face as at, for example, UNCTAD. That there was criticism of derivative 
markets was recognised, but with the twist of observing that such criticism 
can occur either because of high or low prices: ‘they can prove 
controversial when politicians find it convenient to attack futures market 
speculators for price changes which impact adversely on sections of the 
population, for example low coffee prices from 1999 to 2002 and the 2008 
increases in food prices’ (Dana & Gilbert 2008:224).  An important reason 
for the absence of a volte-face was the deep roots of World Bank risk 
management policy, for example as noted above the GIIF was under 
development and there was never any prospect of cancellation. To some 
extent this can be accounted for by a difference between perceptions of 
what was desirable and feasible and the wider policy environment was 
especially acute during this period. In 2009, for example, one former World 
Bank official, a strong supporter of market-based risk management, was 
prepared to argue that the case in favour of market-based mechanisms 
had been conclusively made. ‘There is a large body of evidence [in favour] 
– real [derivative] policies written and derivative- like policies in India, 
Malawi and Mexico – largely [begun] by the World Bank - by now it is a 
private sector driven business’ (Ulrich Hess, interview, 22 September 2009). 
Several commentators (e.g. Ron Duncan, personal e-mail, 29 August 2011) 
also suggested that the eventual implementation of the programme within 
the World Bank owed more than a little to the enthusiasm shown for it by 
Nancy Birdsall and her colleagues at the Center for Global Development 
(Ramachandran, Leo & McCarthy 2010), an illustration of the way in which 
other institutions and a wider policy network can influence reciprocally an 
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IGO such as the World Bank at the centre of global commodities policy, 
rendering even these institutions sometimes ‘norm consumers’. However 
by the time of the World Development Report in 2010, a wobble of even 
World Bank policy towards an entirely market-driven solution to market risk 
was evident, when the Bank – still committed to derivative markets – made 
mention of collective action by countries and raised the possibility of a 
global co-ordinated food reserve. The Bank certainly had not lost its 
previous enthusiasm for futures and options, but recognised that both 
increased regulation and possibly also intervention would have a role to 
play in the future. According to the Bank, ‘Countries need robust national 
stockpiling and the latest instruments in risk hedging, combining small 
physical stockpiles with virtual stockpiles purchased through futures and 
options. Models indicate that futures and options could have saved Egypt 
between 5% and 24% of the roughly US$2.7 billion it spent purchasing 
wheat between November 2007 and October 2008, when prices were 
soaring. Global collective action in managing stocks would also help 
prevent extreme price spikes. A small physical food reserve could allow a 
smooth  response  to  food  emergencies.  An  international  coordinated 
global food reserve could reduce pressures to achieve grain self-sufficiency. 
And an innovative virtual reserve could prevent market price spikes and 
keep prices closer to levels suggested by long-run market fundamentals 
without  putting  the  coordinated  global  reserves  at  risk’  (World  Bank 
2010a:161). However, important reasons for the absence of a policy volte- 
face were the deep roots and the extended timeframe of World Bank risk 
management policy. For example as noted above the GIIF fund was under 
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development when the commodity price spike began: cancelation of the 
programme was never contemplated. Within the World Bank, as expressed 
recently by the President, there is not considered to be a viable alternative 
to assisted market based solutions: ‘The answer to food price volatility is 
not to prosecute or block markets, but to use them better’ (Zoellick 2011). 
   
The continued policy position of the World Bank was stated clearly on its 
website (World Bank 2011).  Commodity price instability has a negative 
impact on economic growth, income distribution, and the poor (World 
Bank  2007)  but  this  was  no  longer to  be  matched  by  a  major  policy 
initiative to ‘solve’ the problem of commodity price instability via market 
mechanisms managed by the World Bank itself. Rather, the Bank and the 
IFC will work with private sector partners in an incremental, deal-by-deal 
approach. This  is  exemplified by  the fact  that,  right  at  the end of the 
research period for this thesis, the IFC announced (on June 20th 2011) that 
 
it had launched a programme with several major international financial 
organisations whereby exposure to agricultural price risk would be shared 
equally. The first deal was a commitment of US$200 million with J.P. 
Morgan taking on at least an equal amount of exposure to them.  The IFC 
estimated that because exposure is typically less than the principal amount, 
these combined credit exposures should enable up to US$4 billion in price 
protection to be arranged (IFC 2011a). 
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Agricultural risk management, the environment and the World Bank 
    
World Bank publications on the impact of agricultural risk management on 
the environment would be absolutely central to the analysis required for 
substantiation or disproval of the hypothesis that environmental concerns 
lay at the heart of objections within IGOs to supporting market based risk 
management  instruments  for  agriculture.  However,  they  are  few.  ITF- 
CRMG documents available on line are principally the presentations made 
at the ITF-CRMG Annual Meetings 2001-2006. None of the many 
documents and presentations made at this Annual Meetings considered 
the environmental implications of market based risk management 
instruments. 
   
Yet of the widespread perception within other IGOs for many years that 
there are serious environmental consequences from increased agricultural 
production there can be no doubt. This has often been made explicit by 
commentators, suggesting for example that ‘there has been an increasing 
recognition that [agricultural output] growth is not without cost. Attempts 
to raise agricultural output very rapidly have been accompanied by 
degradation of the natural resource base. Resource-related problems, such 
as the salinisation of water supplies, soil erosion, as well as pesticide and 
other agro-chemical related pollution have spread along with modern 
agricultural production techniques’ (Tabor & Faber 1998:1). 
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Diversification is the pivot between the economic and environmental 
arguments regarding market based risk management instruments. 
Economically, diversification as a ‘primitive’ risk management mechanism 
can be superseded, proponents argue, by such market mechanisms. ‘Well- 
functioning risk-sharing markets allow firms to protect themselves from risk 
and pursue the advantages that come from specialization’ (Skees 1999, 
Hao 2010:155, my italics). Environmentalists, on the other hand, do not 
tend to support diversification. The scene was therefore set for a potential 
debate. 
   
In most IGO documents concerning risk management, the issue of 
diversification is not discussed. In some cases, however, it was addressed 
specifically. Perhaps because of the potential environmental awkwardness, 
attitudes to diversification on the part of supporters of commodity risk 
management instruments have been noticeably either vague, ambivalent 
or implicitly contradictory.  For example in reviewing Australian agricultural 
income   risk   management,   the   Australian   contributor   to   an   OECD 
workshop presented a short-term choice for individual producers between 
spreading production across a range of markets, or utilising market risk 
management instruments, without drawing any conclusions as to the 
relative merits of either, still less their environmental consequences (Burns 
2000).  In another paper from the same workshop, a representative of Agri- 
Food Canada suggested that because futures markets would not be 
available for all commodities, diversification would continue to be an 
effective means of managing risk, presumably implying that if they were, it 
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would not be (Matheson 2000).  In a further recognition of the importance 
of market based mechanisms in decreasing reliance on diversification, 
Cordier recognised that ‘The sensitivity of final income tends to increase 
when  traditional  crop  diversification  efficiency  is  decreasing’  (Cordier 
2000:5) – Cordier considered diversification purely as one amongst many 
risk management techniques, not as having any intrinsic (environmental) 
benefit of its own. 
   
Moreover although during the same period environmental considerations 
began to play an increasing role in IGO deliberations and policy, these 
documents completely failed to address any environmental implications of 
their adoption. Academic papers written by World Bank practitioners 
together with academics, similar to those written within UNCTAD or even 
FAO, ignored any environmental implications of market-based risk 
management instruments - or government policy (e.g. Byerlee, Jayne & 
Myers 2006). 
   
The World Bank did also instigate research into the environmental 
implications of agriculture generally, for example on Integrated Pest 
Management (Dasgupta, Meisner & Wheeler 2004). Although there are a 
number of IGO publications which discuss the environmental implications 
of agricultural production in general, IGOs, unlike individual academics, 
have defined boundaries within which the environmental consequences 
of agriculture are measured. These are frequently referred to as ‘agro- 
environmental indicators’. OECD indicators on the impact of agriculture on 
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the environment over a 15-year period, for example, showed that the levels 
of environmental damage caused by agriculture remain a key concern to 
policy makers in most OECD countries. The OECD study suggested that on 
balance, there has been reduction in the nitrogen and pesticide loading of 
rivers, lakes and ground-water, and a decrease in the level of agricultural 
greenhouse  gas  emissions.  But  the  OECD  indicators  suggested  that 
farming   was   having   harmful   effects   on   bio-diversity,   habitats   and 
landscape features in some regions, and risks of further soil degradation 
and water resources depletion persisted (OECD 2001). 
   
The World Bank took a similar view in relation to the environmental 
implications of weather derivatives. World Bank projects do now always 
face an environmental assessment, which they did they not always do in 
the days of the ITF-CRMG, which in turn results in an environmental rating, 
depending  on  the  potential  adverse  environmental  impacts.  So  for 
example, those projects that involve infrastructure investments or the 
development of new forms of intensive production would be rated lower 
and subjected to more thorough environmental analysis aimed at 
mitigation as well as weighing the environmental disadvantages against 
social benefits. Weather derivatives have not been subject to such an 
environmental rating because, as for example in Malawi, their use formed 
only part of the wider Malawi Agricultural Support Project which was 
subject to an environmental assessment. 
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Pressed  on  the  question,  Julie  Dana  suggested  that  ‘While  one  could 
predict that there could be a direct or indirect link between the insurance, 
government policies, and investment/production patterns by producers, 
we would presume that the analytical process of preparing the derivatives 
would increase the government's awareness about various risks (i.e. 
climatic, agronomic, financial and environmental), and thus stimulate some 
additional risk mitigation measures. Those mitigation or adaptation 
measures may then have environmental impacts, but the connection to 
the weather derivatives would be indirect’ (Julie Dana, personal e-mail, 2 
September 2008). 
Conclusions 
The World Bank has always been in principle supportive of market based 
instruments. In the broadest sense, therefore, there has been no policy 
change, oscillation or evolution and therefore in the sense of this thesis 
analysing policy change, there is no case to answer, except to explain why 
such a change has not taken place. However to assert no change in 
principle should not be to omit or neglect the real alterations in the policy 
norm over the last two decades - the policy norm has definitely evolved 
within the Bank -  nor the changes in policies themselves, for example over 
the decades towards weather rather than price derivatives. Nor is it to 
deny the significance of the administrative, personnel and policy 
dislocations caused by the abortive GCI project. Still less is it to deny the 
role of change agents: individuals within the World Bank, from successive 
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Presidents down to desk officers and consultants, played important roles in 
challenging, shaping and implementing specific policy initiatives. But it is to 
say that the fundamentally supportive policy stance of the World Bank 
towards market-based agricultural risk management instruments has never 
been seriously challenged. As noted above, from the early 1990s onwards 
there was a series of documents published by World/Bank, supporting the 
use of agricultural risk management instruments, which has continued to 
date. 
   
Advocacy for market based risk management instruments, both within and 
outside the World Bank, paved the way for an active policy to build on the 
policy norm of market solutions to risk management problems. The idea of 
the  GCI  project flowed  from  the  fact  that  the  political  climate 
internationally appeared to be moving permanently in the direction of 
market-based solutions whilst developing country markets, where the 
consequences of failure to manage risks were most serious, were lagging. 
   
The GCI would have provided a measure of price-risk reduction that plainly 
was not previously available to producers in LDCs and if that is what it had 
achieved then one commentator said it could be deemed a success 
(Morgan 2001). As noted above, however, the GCI project did not come to 
fruition. It was, arguably, ahead of its time (Panos Varangis, interview, 22 
August 2011). Nawal Kamel herself therefore described World Bank policy 
towards commodities as ‘one that has failed’ (Nawal Kamel, personal e- 
mail, 17 March 2009). Critics concurred: in Sarris’ view, ‘the whole World 
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Bank approach was ‘an unmitigated disaster’ (Alexander Sarris, interview, 
 
26 January 2009). What judgement, then, should be made on these telling 
 
- but unsubstantiated - judgements? 
    
No internationally agreed criteria for the success or failure of IGO policy 
exist, so the question cannot be answered definitively. True, the original 
ambitious project at the World Bank to create an intermediary institution 
envisaged when the ITF was originally established was never established. 
The initial enthusiasm for the creation of such an agency foundered as 
described above in part on the conclusions drawn from the pilot projects 
initiated by the ITF-CRMG, in the sense of providing insufficient confidence 
for developing market risk management programmes on a much larger 
scale,  and  in  part  as  a  result  of  insurmountable  institutional  obstacles 
within the Bank itself. 
   
One clear and obvious conclusion to be drawn from the history of World 
Bank policy towards market based risk management instruments for 
agriculture is that individual policy objectives can be ranged from easy to 
exceptionally  difficult.  Advocacy  is  easy;  pilot  projects can  be  relatively 
easily arranged (and funded) but an enormous (and expensive) project 
such as originally projected by Nawal Kamel and the ITF-CRMG requires all 
the ingredients of success indicated by change analysts (e.g. Kotter 1995). 
Unlike the debt reduction programme that originally won Nawal Kamel 
her reputation within the Bank, the creation of a separate and new 
organisation  for  derivative  margin  management  would  have  been  a 
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qualitative leap from previous World Bank policies on this subject and 
would have required funding at the IGO level. As the policy entrepeneur 
could not achieve a policy change of this magnitude, lack of policy 
coherence within the Bank (Winters 2004) was then sufficient to kill off the 
idea. 
   
The policy shift within the Bank from the proposed creation of an 
international agency for the management of price risk for agriculture 
through the provision of margin guarantees to modest advocacy of 
weather derivatives - and the channelling of resources to pilot schemes 
conducted by the private sector – is a significant one and requires 
explanation. Neither theories of policy making generally, let alone within 
IGOs, nor empirical studies undertaken, have adequately explained or 
predicted the types of reaction that occur within IGOs when major policy 
initiatives fail – for example, how survivable are the underlying policy 
norms?   What happened in this instance, fairly self-evidently, is that in 
seizing on a relatively promising part of the wider picture, the officials who 
remained working in this area at the Bank – notably Julie Dana but 
including a wide range of consultants in addition (e.g. Ulrich Hess) acted to 
preserve the reputation of the Bank, and in an apt phrase from a former 
Bank  official  who  preferred to  remain  anonymous,  ‘salvage  something 
from the wreckage of the GCI initiative’. 
   
But the failure to establish a new organisation is a harsh criterion by which 
 
to judge all the World Bank’s risk management policies. World Bank policy 
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did attempt to incorporate some of the insights that would eventually 
surface as specific recommendations within the public sector (Australian 
Public Service Commission 2007). For example, in creating the ITF-CRMG in 
the first place the Bank was recognising the importance of working across 
agency boundaries and, implicitly, the existence of a policy network for risk 
management working between institutions, including but not limited to, 
IGOs. The ITF-CRMG and subsequent World Bank initiatives, for example 
on weather derivatives, also did try to reach out to local farmers and other 
relevant stakeholders. 
   
The first and most positive outcome of the papers published and the pilot 
studies carried out by the ITF-CRMG has been the emergence of an 
integrated, consistent policy norm in favour of market-based risk 
management instruments at the World Bank/IFC:  what went wrong and 
why, what is feasible, and how policy should be conducted henceforward. 
As  it  has  been  asserted,  the  Bank’s  aspiration  to  reinvent  itself  as  a 
‘Knowledge Bank, providing objective market and technical information to 
governments and investors alike, ‘hinges crucially on the proposition that 
its activities as an intellectual actor and as a project lender are consistent 
and mutually reinforcing’ (Pincus 2001:183). Policies and practical 
programmes to achieve this are are now in place.  The legacy of the ITF- 
CRMG was therefore certainly not entirely negative and the pro-market 
policy norm proved resilient at the Bank. Nawal Kamel’s departure and the 
collapse of the original intention to create an entirely new organisation, 
combined  with  a  re-focus  on  weather  derivatives,  had  as  one  of  its 
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eventual positive outputs the GIIF which had been foretold in the 2005 
 
World Bank paper on Managing Agricultural Risk (World Bank 2005) and 
raised again by colleagues two years later (Bryla & Syroka 2007). Whilst it is 
conceivable that the GIIF (IFC 2011) and the APRM (IFC 2011a) could have 
developed sui generis, without any precursors, consultants to the Bank 
agree that the length of time that policy takes to evolve at the World Bank 
would suggest that they are descendants of the ITF-CRMG and their 
existence would be hard to conceive without the idea of the GCI before it 
(Panos Varangis, interview, 22 August 2011, Ron Duncan, personal e-mail, 
29 August 2011). It would take a leap of imagination to describe policy 
development as linear: but an often painful process of organisational 
learning and an evolution in policy that has been anything but linear has 
eventually produced a result that works. The GIIF and APRM are the 
contemporary, practical implementation of the original ideas of Nawal 
Kamel. 
   
The reason the policy now works is because of another long-term positive 
outcome  of  the  ITF-CRMG  and  the  follow-on  work  of  the  Bank:  the 
diffusion of the market risk management norm and the resultant gradual 
increase in the involvement of the private sector in the provision of market- 
based risk management instruments to agriculture. Bank officials 
commented privately that some of the World Bank personnel working on 
the ITF-CRMG project did not have all the communication skills and ability 
to work cooperatively that would have been desirable, nor was there 
widespread support within the Bank:   for the future the World Bank is 
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determined to avoid a repetition of this problem. There is therefore now an 
emphasis on communication within the Bank (World Bank 2011b). 
   
Moreover, as the policy of the World Bank Group as a whole has evolved 
towards  collaboration with  the  private  sector, increasingly  the  IFC  has 
taken  the  lead.  This  is  evidenced  by  personnel  migration.  Notably, 
Panayotis (Panos) Varangis, co-author of many of the original papers on 
risk management for the World Bank (e.g. Varangis & Larson 1996, 
Varangis, Larson & Anderson 2002) who worked originally with the ITF, 
(after a period working for an Agricultural Bank in Greece) returned to 
work at the IFC (Panos Varangis, interview, 22 August 2011). 
Communication between the IFC and the internal group of the World 
Bank working in this area, led by Marc Sadler, is now frequent (Panos 
Varangis, interview, 22 August 2011). 
   
Another positive outcome of the papers published and the pilot studies 
launched by the ITF-CRMG was the deepened and continued commitment 
to market-based risk management instruments on the part of other IGOs. 
For example the EU continued to intervene to support the development of 
market based mechanisms, although this was part of a larger ACP project. 
The objective was to develop commodities along the value chain, and the 
agencies receiving funding were the World Bank, ITC, UNCTAD and the 
CFC. As noted above, €45m was to be spent over five years, with an initial 
allocation of €28m, and a second tranche in 2010 (Olthof 2006). The EU 
also as noted above also became a lead donor to the GIIF. 
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An excellent comparative example of the process of inter-IGO 
communication and dialogue between officials can be found in comparing 
the list of individuals cited by Maizels (1992), and the list of individuals cited 
by Ulrich Hess and his colleagues in their World Bank publication of 2005. 
In the former case it is noticeable that both Mehmet Arda of UNCTAD and 
Harmon Thomas (then of FAO) feature, both individuals who attended the 
2005 Barcelona seminar and who perceive themselves as part of a global 
development community. For example Arda (who was Head of the 
Commodities Branch at UNCTAD) co-authored a draft UNCTAD paper on 
gender and commodities for a workshop on gender issues in May 2004 
(Taporaie & Arda 2004) and co-ordinated an UNCTAD programme for 
workshops on diversification the following year (UNCTAD 2001b). Arda’s 
position in the debate over market-based risk management instruments 
was not unequivocal, however, his name appears along with Olivier 
Matringe as contacts in an article published by the UN on line in 2005 as 
one of the ‘Ten Stories the world should hear more about’ praising new 
technology  being used for risk management purposes, the INFOSHARE 
project in the Cameroon and other information providing spot and crop 
futures prices worldwide and the Infothela project in India, which provided 
‘on-line futures trading, offering predictability to farmers’ sales prices’ 
(United Nations 2005) and he even participated in a joint meeting with 
Rutten. The World Bank continued to provide a centre of excellence for 
individuals working within private sector providers of agricultural risk 
management. Regular seminars provided opportunities for the exchange 
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of information and the further development of the risk management policy 
network  which  now  stretches  across  many  more  practitioners  in  the 
private  sector  than  when  the  ITF-CRMG  was  launched,  as  well  as 
academics and public sector experts. 
   
Another more recent intellectual and practical change has been in relation 
to the collation of risks. For many years within the Bank there was a 
persistent  perception  that  different  risks  ought  to  be  analysed  and 
managed separately because ‘agents need to adopt different strategies to 
manage different types of risk’ (Dana & Gilbert 2008:210). Now, however, 
the World Bank not only recognises the importance of a ‘holistic’ approach 
to risk management, which was demonstrated by the name change of the 
CRMG to the ‘Agricultural Risk Management Team’ (ARMT) in December 
2009 (World Bank 2010). Going forward the Bank declared its intention of 
continuing to provide technical assistance and training in its traditional 
lines of work of providing beneficiaries with assistance in the management 
of price and weather risks, henceforth with not just a focus on specific risk 
management instruments, but with a more widespread tolerance within 
the Bank of uncertainty and a recognition that agricultural risk 
management  is  a  long-term  issue,  with  no  quick  or  institutional  fixes, 
whether from market-based instruments or any other mechanisms11. Work 
at the World Bank may have been scaled down but it has not been 
abandoned by any means and it has now been placed what would appear 
  
11  Although it falls outside the cut-off date for research for this thesis, the World Bank 
released a document in April 2012 setting the APRM programme in the wider context of 
the World Bank’s latest partial reinvention of itself, that of catalyst to the private sector 
(World Bank 2012). 
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to be, judging from the experience of the Bank between 2000-2011, a 
secure and long-term basis. 
   
As part of its more modest but long-term policy, the Bank has been able to 
develop a wide range of publications, further pilot schemes and smaller 
initiatives, These policies have been able to be devised, approved and 
executed at lower levels of Bank management.  Moreover, as noted above, 
advocacy of weather derivatives in particular has been taken ‘under the 
wing’ of a wider World Bank focus on climate change policies and for that 
reason  may  be  said  to  have  achieved  considerable  success.  Successful 
World Bank advocacy in this area should be viewed in the wider context of 
achieving international (and within that global IGO) consensus that the 
era of international commodity agreements is dead and buried, which 
despite glitches during the GFC (discussed below for UNCTAD in Chapter 
Six) continues to be the case (as of end-June 2011). 
   
Judged therefore by an admittedly less harsh set of criteria, World Bank 
policy towards market-based agricultural risk management has been far 
from a failure: the Bank initiated, led and continues to lead the most active 
programme of policy in this area amongst IGOs, and has in just over a 
decade, without significant expenditure, contributed to the development 
of actual product offerings by private sector institutions worldwide. 
  
 
However,  criticism  from  poststructuralists  of  the  World  Bank’s  projects 
 
remains as intense as ever.  The fact that market based risk management 
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instruments such as insurance and weather derivatives remain one of the 
Bank’s  allegedly ‘favourite’ tools, despite being described as ‘palliative’ in 
comparison with older state-driven mechamisms (i.e. buffer stocks, ICAs, 
and stabilization boards) is cited as demonstrating respect for a core 
deregulation agenda whilst acknowledging the significance of market risk 
and  volatility.  The  Bank’s  commitment  to  products  and  innovations 
deriving   from   financial   markets   is   also   said   to   reflect   embedded 
“financialisation”‖in World Bank thinking. (Oya 2011). The conclusion that
 
palliative and market-friendly preventative measures to deal with risk and  
vulnerability are likely to assume more prominent roles in the Bank‘s and 
other donors‘ work as a result of the crisis is however correct, as the 
development of the APRM policy has subsequently demonstrated. 
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Chapter Seven: The evolution of Policy towards market-based agricultural 
risk management at UNCTAD 
   
The changing role of UNCTAD 
    
After its formation in 1964, the IGO UNCTAD became the focal point for 
international commodity negotiations, first the abortive Prebisch Plan and 
then under the so-called ‘Integrated Programme on Commodities’ (IPC) 
which was originally put forward as a proposal by UNCTAD in 1968 and 
backed by a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1974 that there 
would be a ‘New Economic Order’, to include an US$11bn buffer stock 
fund to stabilise the prices of IPC commodities (UNCTAD 1974). The IPC 
rested on a commodities policy  for UNCTAD (the exploitation of producer 
countries and the need for coordinated global action) that not only 
provided a raison d’ être for the organisation and an enduring policy 
within it. but also an opportunity to generate numerous internal and 
external networks and connections with the policymaking and academic 
communities in Member States that participated in a wider policy norm 
that incorporated and supported ideas of IGO financial facilities for 
developing economies (UNCTAD 1976). 
   
Although by the early 1980s, as noted above (Chapter Five) the World 
Bank (and indeed also the IMF) was already in the process of questioning 
and then abandoning this policy norm, UNCTAD proposed a 
Complementary   Facility   –   to   generalise   the   STABEX   and   SYSMIN 
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compensatory financing schemes for ACP countries already being run by 
the EU, which had certainly not yet abandoned this path - to provide 
subsidised loans to developing countries to compensate them for shortfalls 
in export earnings, however defined, without any threshold or balance of 
payments tests and with special concessionary terms for least developed 
countries  (UNCTAD  1981,  UNCTAD  1981a).  The  UNCTAD  Secretariat 
made the case that intersectoral compensation was not feasible for many 
developing countries as different commodities were produced in different 
regions or by different segments of the population, and governments may 
want surplus funds from a given sector for their own long-term 
development plans (UNCTAD 1981:10-11). The proposal never got off the 
ground  because  although  UNCTAD  had  been  asked  to  suggest  how 
earlier decisions could be implemented, by the early 1980s key 
governments were no longer interested in following through. By this time 
the World Bank (and the IMF) were committed (as discussed above in 
Chapter Five) to the alternative market development policy norm complex 
now in the ascendant and the Governments of the USA – Ronald Reagan 
was now US President - and Canada refused to consider the issue of 
compensatory finance other than from a balance-of-payments perspective 
and stated that it could not be discussed outside the IMF or the joint IMF- 
IBRD Development Committee.   The UNCTAD proposal was therefore 
criticised as resembling a resource transfer mechanism not an export 
earnings stabilisation instrument (Ravenhill 1984:574n). The increasingly 
unfavourable external environment and hence the implausibility of 
implementing the IPC Programme did not escape the UNCTAD Secretariat, 
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which conceded shortly afterwards that ‘the achievements of the 
Integrated Programme for Commodities have fallen far short of 
expectations, and have not been commensurate with the efforts devoted 
to its implementation’ (UNCTAD 1983a:1) – it might be noted, however, 
that practically a decade passed without UNCTAD changing course, in 
some measure a reflection on the persistence of this policy norm within 
the organisation in the absence of internal change agents. 
   
During the 1980s, however, it became clear that the CFC was never going 
to operate in its original role, nor was UNCTAD ever going to be the 
spearhead of a series of global institutions creating and managing 
commodity stocks  to  control  prices,  and  that  on  the  contrary,  despite 
much work on international price stabilisation and export quotas, existing 
ICAs were falling apart. As an organisation, UNCTAD clearly faced a 
challenge, certainly to its original role and perhaps even to its existence. 
From the standpoint of UNCTAD as a global regulatory agency for 
commodities, worse was to come. Not only did the global economy move 
towards deregulation, but UNCTAD was ‘defanged’ (Bello 2000). At 
UNCTAD VIII in Cartagena in 1992, UNCTAD’s role in the Uruguay Round 
was circumscribed, and there were even subsequent calls for the entire 
organisation to be abolished, on the grounds that the establishment of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 had rendered it obsolete 
(Bello 2000).  The main forum for international discussions on agricultural 
trade did shift to the WTO (FAO 2007:54) but this was never accompanied 
by any mandate for international commodity price stabilisation. On the 
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contrary, the promotion of free trade in agricultural commodities placed 
the WTO in at least theoretical opposition to the price support schemes 
operated by, inter alia, the USA and EU. 
   
In short, therefore, the ‘Washington Consensus’ in favour of free trade and 
deregulation caused organisations that stood outside the dominant policy 
community to lose influence, authority and ultimately also budgets and 
the chance of expansion. UNCTAD was therefore left searching for a role, 
but the organisation was still rooted in administrative and collaborate 
solutions, and despite the significant external pressures noted above, a 
market-based agenda was slow to develop at UNCTAD. 
   
UNCTAD and Risk Management 
 
   
Market based instruments were not entirely unknown within UNCTAD, 
even at this time. Lamon Rutten explained that when he commenced 
work at UNCTAD, in 1990, agricultural risk management and the creation 
of institutions (including local commodity exchanges) in developing 
countries to enable risk management was not a new topic (Lamon Rutten, 
interview, 1 April 2009).  These had been identified in earlier UNCTAD 
studies  as  important  themes,  particularly  in  commodity  industry  and 
market structure studies, of which UNCTAD published a series between 
1975 and 1983.  However while commodity risk management and issues 
of access to commodities Exchanges had figured in a range of UNCTAD 
reports  since  1975,  the  only  paper  suggesting  the  promotion of  new 
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developing country exchanges was in 1983 (UNCTAD 1983). This 
recommendation was not picked up by member governments, and the 
paper did not presage further papers in that decade. Although many of 
the senior staff (the Division Director and Section Chiefs) were aware of 
this work, during the 1980s, they felt that there was no support from 
member countries for further developing such technical work – rather, the 
most vocal UNCTAD constituents, developing country governments, 
continued pushing the organisation towards global market intervention 
schemes.  But the collapse of the two last major schemes, for coffee and 
cocoa, in 1988 and 1989 respectively, created room for innovation in risk 
management and environmental issues. Thus, the external environment 
for UNCTAD was changing with respect to market risk management. And 
despite the growing importance of the WTO, UNCTAD had not come 
away from UNCTAD VIII completely empty-handed: critically for the work 
described  below,  promotion  of  risk  management  was  formally 
incorporated into UNCTAD’s mandate. ‘Governments recognised the 
importance of exploring new approaches to minimising the risks arising 
from commodity market fluctuations and called upon the UNCTAD 
secretariat to address this issue’ (UNCTAD 1998a:5). 
   
Change in the external environment and the advent of a policy 
entrepreneur at middle management level was eventually to make it 
possible for the UNCTAD secretariat to revive these ‘old’ risk management 
themes and build a technical work programme around them unhindered 
(Lamon  Rutten,  interview,  1  April  2009).  Rutten  said  that  on  joining 
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UNCTAD, ‘One of the immediate realisations was that there was an 
underlying  feeling  that  this  [risk  management] was  an  area  of 
interest…that existing policies were insufficient.…[but] to move from this 
recognition to an actual workplan meant investment’ (Lamon Rutten, 
interview, 15 August 2008). Rutten noted that he had been lucky to be 
able to build a team that could invest [both time and money] – these were 
often difficult to get, he contended, because even multilateral institutions 
require quick returns on investment (Lamon Rutten, interview, 15 August 
2008). 
    
UNCTAD’s market-based agenda 
    
UNCTAD therefore seemed to find part of its new role, at least temporarily, 
by changing its commodities risk management policy towards the 
promotion of a market-based agenda focused on research,  advocacy and 
training rather than the provision of an administrative function.  Mention 
had already been made of commodity risk management in the report by 
the UNCTAD Secretariat to UNCTAD VIII in 1992 (UNCTAD 1992) and the 
Secretariat had received a mandate specifically requesting it to work on 
risk   management   and   other   ‘modern’   financial   instruments   (Rutten 
2004:2). When the commodity price risk management work was adopted 
explicitly as an important new part of UNCTAD’s work programme at 
UNCTAD VIII in 1992, UNCTAD had been able to start attracting some 
donor funds – notably a component in a regional UNDP project for Asia, 
and Dutch and Swiss funds. By mid-1993, therefore, the key assumptions 
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underlying UNCTAD’s support of futures and options as commodity risk 
management instruments had already been made clear (UNCTAD 1993, 
1993a,  1993b).  The  way  was  cleared  for  the  publication  of  technical 
papers by the Secretariat in the Commodities Branch analysing, rather 
than   advocating,   market-based   risk   management   mechanisms.   For 
example  the  1993  papers  included  a  review  of  the  technical  and 
regulatory  conditions  influencing  participation  in,  and  usage  of, 
commodity Exchanges by both buyers and sellers of commodities 
(UNCTAD 1993), and input to the improvement of commodity markets 
(UNCTAD  1993a,  1993b).  And  after  joint  UNCTAD/World  Bank 
preparatory work - demonstrating the ability of the organisations to work 
together even at  this  relatively early stage  in  the development of the 
market risk management policy norm within UNCTAD - a study was issued 
on Risk management in Southeast Asia at the first-ever regional workshop 
on commodity Exchanges (UNCTAD 1994a). 
   
Rarely  is  the  status  of  an  IGO  discussed  within  an  IGO  document, 
especially  documents  on  technical   matters   where  IGO   expertise  is 
assumed. For example UNCTAD commented:   ‘An organisation like 
UNCTAD brings a measure of impartiality to the discussion on the use of 
modern risk management and financing tools’ (UNCTAD/SFOA 2006:iii), 
which considering the views of officials on the subject, both for and 
against, is certainly a strong claim and an example of depoliticising policy, 
or at least an attempt by an IGO to do so. One important distinction that 
can be made within the documents provided on the UNCTAD website is 
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(for example) between submissions by the UNCTAD Secretariat to Expert 
Meetings, and  the reports emanating from the Expert Meetings 
themselves. Through comparing the two documents, one prior and the 
other  post-Conference,  it  is  possible  to  trace  the  influence  of  the 
Secretariat in establishing UNCTAD policy as defined by Conferences and 
Expert Meetings. However, competence to judge the environmental 
implications of risk management instruments is not mentioned within 
UNCTAD documents. 
   
The flow of publications was not however completely uniform in the 
direction of market based mechanisms. As late as 1994, Rutten himself 
wrote for the UNCTAD Secretariat a paper (UNCTAD 1994) on export 
diversification (for Colombia that flowed from priorities determined at the 
14th Session of the Committee of Commodities in November 1990 and the 
Standing Committee on Commodities, at its first session, in October 1992, 
both of which emphasised the importance of diversification. But there are 
no further UNCTAD Secretariat papers on diversification as a risk 
management strategy – the Secretariat was able to close off that line of 
research that ran counter to the developing pro-market norm. Rutten’s 
view is that institutionally, governments had decided not to renew the 
Working Group on Diversification after 1992, with a belief in the UNCTAD 
Secretariat that all that Governments needed to do had been spelt out and 
that the next step would be for country-level assistance programmes to be 
introduced, which was beyond UNCTAD’s limited resources. However, 
Rutten stressed that he himself not only drafted the Colombia paper but 
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also wrote another on diversification strategies for LDCs and drafted the 
relevant chapter for UNCTAD VIII, whilst  UNCTAD as an organisation did 
consistently  support  the  creation  of  a  new  diversification  fund  which 
would permit UNCTAD to reengage at a country level, so he saw no 
contradiction between support of market based risk management 
instruments and a keen interest in diversification as a high level policy 
(Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). During 1994 the UNCTAD 
Secretariat produced under Rutten’s direction - and in most cases 
unacknowledged but prolific authorship - a series of papers on agricultural 
risk management, covering such issues as the forms and means of regional 
cooperation of commodity Exchanges (UNCTAD 1994a), national 
institution building (UNCTAD 1994b), counterparty risk (UNCTAD 1994c), 
and  a  survey  of  commodity  risk  management  instruments  (UNCTAD 
1994d). At this level, publication by the Secretariat – policy as advocacy - 
there was little or no influence by member States: the Secretariat had a 
free hand. 
   
Papers continued to be produced in 1995, for example on the grain trade 
(UNCTAD/FAO 1995) – one document which was submitted to the FAO 
Committee on Commodity Problems, Intergovernmental Group on Grains, 
at its Twenty-Sixth Session in Rome between 30 May-2 June 1995 - and 
very specific work, for example on a projected worldwide pepper contract 
(UNCTAD  1995a)  and  on  risk  management  in  the  cotton  market  in 
Pakistan (UNCTAD 1995b). In 1996 the Secretariat continued its 
collaboration  with  the  World  Bank  on  agricultural  risk  management 
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(World Bank/UNCTAD 1996) as well as publishing a series of papers on 
technical issues connected with the implementation of commodity risk 
management   strategies   (UNCTAD   1996,   UNCTAD   1996a,   UNCTAD 
1996b) including the use of warehouse receipts, and held a conference on 
the role of multilaterals in structured commodity finance in Geneva in 
December 1996, this work itself in turn a result of the 1993 Expert Group 
recognising access to credit as one of the main constraints to access to risk 
management markets, and advocating work on, inter alia, warehouse 
receipt finance. Rutten’s view was that the original 1993 Meeting 
influenced not only UNCTAD’s work but also that of the World Bank and 
even FAO: all three started work in this area, which hitherto had been 
ignored by the international community – the difference however was 
that  within  UNCTAD  and  the  World  Bank  there  were  enthusiasts  for 
market  solutions.  Structured  finance  simply  pushed  the  concept  of 
warehouse receipt finance further12, but the degree to which UNCTAD 
 
was  in  the  lead  technically  so  far  as  this  area  was  concerned  was 
illustrated by e.g. the attendance of many CEOs and other representatives 
from  the  private  sector  at  UNCTAD’s  meetings  on  risk  management 
matters (Lamon Rutten, interview, 3 June 2010). Advocacy was consistent: 
for example in a 1996 paper, UNCTAD argued that ‘access to credit at a 
reasonable cost can increase agricultural productivity and improve 
production quality’ (UNCTAD 1996b). Work continued the following year 
with  a  paper  each  on  the  by  now  familiar  themes  of  commodity 
Exchanges (UNCTAD 1997), and new contracts (UNCTAD 1997a). 
  
12 e.g. to commodity-linked bonds. 
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What is noticeable about the dozens of UNCTAD Secretariat papers of the 
early and mid-1990s (a large number by comparison to other IGOs during 
the period) is that the arguments for market based risk management 
instruments as solutions to the commodities problem are not reiterated. 
The battle is largely taken as won. Repetition of the history of failure 
associated with ICAs would have been regarded at the time as 
unnecessary, certainly, and the issues discussed in the papers were largely 
technical, but in Kotter’s terms of building a guiding coalition to supervise 
and maintain change (Kotter 1995), this was eventually to produce a 
backlash, albeit a temporary one, once external conditions changed with 
the GFC. 
   
Meanwhile, a group of experts had already been assembled to support the 
work of the Secretariat – a subset of the global risk management policy 
network - in advancing the cause of Exchanges as the key institutions for 
agricultural commodity risk management (UNCTAD 1993a, 1993b). This 
group was an excellent example of the cross-fertilisation of ideas between 
the private sector and an IGO, and the institutional expression of a policy 
network in an IGO context, making an interesting contrast with the role of 
transnational environmental advocacy groups in promoting the 
environmental identity of the World Bank but certainly an equally good 
example of the way in which IGOs become ‘norm consumers’ as well as 
norm diffusers (Park 2005, 2006). 
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Although  the  Expert  Group  did  recognise  technical  obstacles  (not 
therefore including any political or environmental issues), the Group 
concluded, perhaps unsurprisingly given its membership, that well- 
functioning derivatives contracts were the most transparent and efficient 
mechanism for price discovery and risk sharing for internationally traded 
commodities as well as for commodities traded on domestic or regional 
markets and should be promoted where feasible (UNCTAD 1993b:4). 
Similarly, the 1998 Geneva Expert Meeting document began by extolling 
the economic benefits of risk management:  the UNCTAD Report from this 
meeting began by announcing that:  ‘The experts agreed that there was a 
clear link between exposure to price risks on the one hand, and lower 
investment and growth, and more income inequality, on the other. They 
noted also that the savings on interest costs when using commodities as 
collateral can be considerable. Enhanced use of new tools for commodity 
risk management and collateralised finance can therefore make a large 
contribution to development goals, including the reduction of the 
vulnerability of the world’s poor to the effects of volatile commodity prices’ 
(UNCTAD 1998:2). Although commodity risk management, could not itself 
reduce  price  fluctuations,  it  ‘can  serve  more  modest  goals,  such  as 
securing budgets, improving cash flow management, improving access to 
credit or reducing credit costs’ (UNCTAD 1998:3). Noticeable in these 
documents   is   the   way   in   which   the   pro-market   policy   norm   of 
encouraging market-based commodity risk management instruments was 
presented as a neutral, value-free, technical policy issue, a clear example of 
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the depoliticisation of policy under a cloak of neutrality (Shore & Wright 
 
1997) which was noted above (Chapter Two). 
    
The Lyon Conference and after 
    
As part of what has been described as its historic turn towards market 
solutions (Finger & Magarinos-Ruchat 2003), in the 1990s UNCTAD began 
further to enhance its collaboration with the private sector by building a 
partnership strategy with business actors linked to its technical assistance 
programmes and based on a project-by-project type of integration. The 
objective was to select a few sectors where private partners might be 
interested in working with UNCTAD. The selected topics were e- 
commerce, biotrade, microfinance, global movement of goods, and risk 
management [my  italics].  The  culminating  event  marking  the  official 
starting point of UNCTAD’s partnerships with business took place in 
November 1998 in Lyon, France (Finger & Magarinos-Ruchat 2003:157). 
This path-breaking Lyon Conference of UNCTAD13 gave a fresh impetus to 
 
the  work  of  the  Secretariat  with  respect  to  risk  management  and 
structured commodity finance. The Secretariat’s documentary output 
continued, producing a series of papers as background for Lyon, including 
on ‘modern financial instruments’ (UNCTAD 1998, Rutten 1998) and also 
producing an updated survey of commodity risk management instruments 
(UNCTAD 1998a), a report from the Expert Meeting of that year (UNCTAD 
1998b), an upbeat report on what measures commodity producers should 
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be taking ‘to prepare for the next millennium (UNCTAD 1998c), and a 
collaboration with private firm SGS on documentary risk in commodity 
trade  (UNCTAD/SGS 1998).  In 1999,  the  term  ‘structured finance’  was 
used by the UNCTAD Secretariat in a number of papers (e.g. UNCTAD 
1999).   Further evidence of the close relationship between the private 
sector and UNCTAD during this period is the fact that in 1999, UNCTAD 
and the SFOA jointly established a dedicated Emerging Markets Forum as 
part of the annual Burgenstock Conference which ran for almost a decade 
before a temporary interruption during the GFC, described below. 
   
In between UNCTAD IX and UNCTAD X which was held in Bangkok in 
 
2000, the Commodities Branch consistently produced pro-market risk 
management publications, in marked contrast to the silence of FAO on 
the issue as noted below (Chapter Eight). Rutten and his colleagues 
working  in  UNCTAD  and  the  World  Bank,  and  the  consultants,  both 
market  practitioners  and  academics  in  the  wider  pro-market  policy 
network they employed, though often working independently, had a 
shared  commitment  to  the  pro-market  risk  management  policy  norm, 
albeit nuanced individually. Although certainly this policy network was not 
characterised by any adherence to libertarian political principles more 
widely, this shared commitment between those working at UNCTAD and 
the World Bank frequently carried a moral force (as with the architects of 
the global financial architecture more widely: Best 2008), which was built 
up from two fundamental intellectual perceptions about commodity 
development and which is evidenced by the UNCTAD documents of the 
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period. The first perception was that the ‘old policies’ of commodity 
stabilisation by governments and agencies had failed, and would not be 
reintroduced. For example following a document from the UNCTAD 
Secretariat on the role of government in commodity risk management and 
finance (UNCTAD 1997b) the UNCTAD Commodities Expert Meeting 
document of 1998, whilst rating the liberalisation of the commodity sector 
overall a positive experience, argued that the withdrawal of government 
price support would create a gap which risk management instruments 
would be needed to fill (UNCTAD 1998:2). It was therefore necessary to 
generate policies to deal with the adverse consequences on those who 
were least able to bear it – low-income farmers in particular. There are 
many references throughout the pro-risk management literature to this 
perception (e.g. Casanova 2000). 
   
At this point, in the late 1990s, the process of economic liberalisation was 
perceived by advocates of market based mechanisms as irreversible, and 
inclusion of such arguments was not designed so much to combat any 
potential criticism as to develop a response to what was seen as inevitable: 
‘A basic conclusion has been that commodity price shocks in a number of 
commodities - including coffee - are so long-lasting that they make 
stabilisation   schemes   …   unviable’   (Lewin,   Giovannucci,   &   Varangis 
2004:22). Publications by the UNCTAD Secretariat mirrored this external 
view, e.g.  ‘Attempts to influence either the trend or the variability of 
commodity prices have proved unsustainable’ (UNCTAD 2005a:7). 
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It was recognised within UNCTAD that it was also necessary to generate 
policies to deal with the adverse consequences on those who were least 
able to bear it – low-income farmers in particular. The second part of the 
policy norm, as noted above (Chapter Four) was therefore that market 
instruments could fill that gap. According to Rutten, ‘My ‘drive’ in 
developing this work was that a) there was a problem (international price 
volatility) that could not be resolved but which remained a problem  - 
hence people had to learn how to deal with it and b) the liberalisation and 
privatisation of commodity trade in developing countries resulting from 
World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programmes had often thrown 
away the baby with the bathwater, leaving developing country farmers 
directly exposed to global price volatility – hence a need to create new 
market-based institutions’ (Lamon Rutten, interview, 3 June 2010). 
Publications   from   the   Commodities  Branch   reflected   this   view,   for 
example, commodity exchanges were described as ‘the best way to fill the 
vacuum left by a withdrawal of governments from commodity marketing 
and pricing, and as such, can do much to soften the pains of adjustment 
to a (more) liberalised market economy’ (UNCTAD 1996c:4). In the 
subsequent published document, ‘vacuum’ became ‘void’ and pains 
reduced to the singular, but the message remained the same (UNCTAD 
1997:2). The UNCTAD Secretariat argued that viable futures trading in 
developing countries reduces basis risk and improves access for those 
actors in the supply chain located in the country in question. Developing 
country commodities Exchanges therefore have the potential to facilitate 
risk management in the developing world (Rutten & Youssef 1996) and 
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UNCTAD should – and has - played a leading role in advising on these 
issues – see UNCTAD (2005, 2005a). Rutten maintained the same 
consistent position years later when CEO of MCX, he argued that farmers 
optimise their risk/reward equation, so that the poorer the farmer, the 
larger the risk aversion – in other words, the optimal risk/reward ratio of a 
poor farmer forces his income down more (proportionally) than is the case 
for  a  richer  farmer  (Lamon  Rutten,  interview,  1  April  2009).    Rutten’s 
central argument for the provision of risk management instruments, after 
many years working in the area, was therefore that:  ‘Providing access to a 
wider range of risk management instruments makes it possible for farmers 
to lay off risks in less costly manners – e.g., instead of saving, they can 
invest’ (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). 
   
The change agents’ role 
 
   
By the turn of the century therefore, supporters of market-based 
mechanisms for risk management (Lamon Rutten and his colleagues at 
UNCTAD, Nawal Kamel and hers within the World Bank) believed that 
they had won the policy battle within their IGOs for good. They therefore 
did not see the need for continued proselytising, which would have been 
an unnecessary distraction from the practical work of writing more papers, 
setting up more seminars, and training Exchange staff in developing 
countries. Specifically  within UNCTAD, for example, Rutten’s response to 
the question of whether it would have been a good idea to spend more 
time convincing others of the wisdom of market based mechanisms in the 
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1990s was that ‘it was ‘done that’ – a mandate had been received in 1992 
from governments’ (Lamon Rutten, interview, 15 August 2008). The 
mandate, however, was in the broadest sense only – it did not specify 
how the work was to be undertaken. Many of the publications from the 
UNCTAD Secretariat throughout the decade 1996-2006 were educative 
documents, aimed at an audience that either did not understand how 
agricultural derivatives work, or was sceptical about the ability of 
commodity exchanges to substitute for state intervention. The publications 
themselves  evolved:  as  early  as  1996,  the  feeling  in  the  UNCTAD 
secretariat was that most of the key issues related to risk management – 
importance of risk management, instruments, modalities of use, necessary 
risk  controls,  institution-building,  commodity  exchange  development  – 
had been extensively covered. Most of the later documents (while 
continuing to innovate with respect to commodity finance instruments) 
therefore did not bring fresh arguments to the debate but focussed on 
implementation. They did not discuss the rationale for agricultural 
commodity risk management except in the immediate sense of managing 
price risk. That managing price risk is a good thing was a given. In 2001, 
for example, the Secretariat published further work on structured finance 
(UNCTAD 2001a), and in the following year a paper on ‘Farmers and 
farmers’ associations in developing countries and their use of modern 
financial instruments’ [my italics] (UNCTAD 2002). The stream of practical 
papers from the Secretariat continued in successive years, with papers 
derived in part from the experience of the World Bank’s ITF-CRMG such as 
one on the possibilities for price risk management by cocoa farmers in 
294
281 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, and, more defensively, a primer on 
new techniques used by the sophisticated financial fraudster, with special 
reference to commodity market instruments (UNCTAD 2003). Rutten and 
his colleagues were meanwhile attending and presenting at numerous 
meetings on commodity risk management. The Commodity   Branch’s 
efforts were also being directed at the possibility of creating a pan-African 
commodity  exchange,  e.g.  at  the  meeting  of  the  African  Union  in 
Mauritius in June 2003. In 2004, ‘Financing commodity-based trade and 
development:  Innovative  agriculture  financing  mechanisms’  (UNCTAD 
2004) was published, which was one of the more important UNCTAD 
documents of the era, clearly expressing the Secretariat’s view of the 
importance of agricultural finance in general for the development of the 
agricultural sector and in which there are again many positive references 
to the use of commodity-linked finance. ‘Finance is crucial for the 
development of the commodity sector in developing countries’ (UNCTAD 
2004:1)   ‘How farmers, processors and exporters respond to these 
emerging [market] pressures and opportunities will have a direct impact 
on their livelihood, welfare and survival in the global marketplace’ 
(UNCTAD 2004:1). Failure to adopt this suite of policies may lead to ‘job 
losses’ (UNCTAD 2004:4). In relation to the risk that banks take on when 
lending to farmers, UNCTAD suggested that:  ‘access to new mechanisms 
is improving’ (UNCTAD 2004:13). And the steady flow of publications 
continued  unabated,  with  further  pro-market  risk  management 
documents being issued throughout the year (e.g. UNCTAD 2004a). 
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The success of this type of advocacy from UNCTAD and the World Bank 
was also measurable in its spread to other organisations. For instance 
reference was made by Cordier at the 2000 OECD workshop to the work 
done by the ITF-CRMG - in which UNCTAD was participating - in studying 
the impact of farmers’ analysis of return and risk on production decisions 
and economic development (Cordier 2000). Another example was The 
World Business Council, which argued in 2004 that ‘it is not surprising that 
a lack of price risk management is one of the major reasons that poor 
farmers stay poor’ (World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
2004)’ (Kang & Mahajan 2006:1). Rutten specifically identified his work at 
UNCTAD as including the inclusion of risk management issues in the 
programmes of other organisations, including several of the commodity 
bodies (cocoa, coffee, pepper, rubber, sugar) and FAO (Lamon Rutten, 
interview, 15 August 2008). UNCTAD Secretariat continued to support 
international commodity bodies, but it was noted on the UNCTAD website 
that ‘At present, no existing ICAs (on cocoa, coffee, cotton, grains, olive oil 
and table olives, sugar and tropical timber) contain economic provisions, 
i.e. they are not attempting to regulate markets by supply or price 
management mechanisms’ (UNCTAD 2011a). 
   
In terms of resources, Rutten’s work was originally confined to UNCTAD 
staff - he observed that he was able to build up a fairly large Commodities 
Branch (as it was described within UNCTAD) despite, or maybe thanks to, 
the collapse of the Commodities Division in the early 1990s (the Division 
originally tasked with administering ICAs), and this was complemented by 
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a  French-funded  component  of  UNCTAD’s  programme  for  ‘Train  For 
Trade’   which   focused   on   commodity   risk   management   and   trade. 
Through the funds available for the development of the training 
programme and later, for giving training programmes, Rutten and his 
colleagues  were able  to  meet  extensively  with  industry  experts, 
commodity producers, traders and bankers and government officials.  This 
built a large network that would later support the rapid growth of the 
programme (e.g., meetings organised by the Commodities Branch in 1998 
and 1999 attracted in total well over 2,000 participants) (Lamon Rutten, 
interview, 15 August 2008). There were many reasons for the success of 
the Commodities Branch. For example, one important factor in 
understanding how UNCTAD derived its position is that its risk 
management activities and interests were not confined to agriculture. Oil, 
in particular, was always part of UNCTAD’s remit (UNCTAD 2001). 
However, access to donor funds remained constrained. As a result, Rutten 
and his colleagues were always critical of the lack of financial assistance 
from major donors, especially other IGOs. The major organisation involved 
in promoting viable exchange initiatives has been UNCTAD, which has 
been involved in country-level work in this domain since 1992 (and from 
1975 onwards, had regularly included the development of developing 
country commodity exchanges among its policy recommendations) - and 
this continues to be the case. Some of the exchanges promoted by 
UNCTAD now count among the world’s largest (e.g. MCX in India), but 
UNCTAD had never been successful in obtaining donor support — over 
the  years,  total  official  development  assistance  accounted  to  a  few 
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hundred thousand dollars from the World Bank for work in India (which 
was mostly spent by the Indian governmental counterpart, albeit under 
UNCTAD’s guidance), and to a few tens of thousands for all the work in 
other countries. But overall, donor support stayed very small – in total, in 
the period 1992 to 2006, less than US$750,000 (Lamon Rutten, interview, 
15 August 2008). Some donors, such as the European Community, in 
parallel supported initiatives that went under the commodity exchange 
banner, but these initiatives were largely donor driven and showed little 
potential for commercial uptake—at best, they became subsidised price 
information  schemes  (Lamon  Rutten,  interview,  1  April  2009).  Private 
sector funding for activities was much more important, and a significant 
role was also played by the World Bank – most exceptionally funding the 
activities of the Commodities Branch on the ground directly (rather than 
funding a project in UNCTAD). 
   
In other Divisions where there was less experience with the realities of 
commodities, the approach remained for a longer time that of ‘the 
Government has the solution’, the approach was at times more sceptical – 
these are complicated instruments that can be used only by large 
companies, or even, ‘markets can’t be trusted, so how can you promote 
market-based instruments’. Over time, however, the programme became 
part  of  UNCTAD’s  core  ‘policy message’’  (Lamon Rutten,  interview, 15 
August 2008). 
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UNCTAD’s policy towards market based risk management, and mandate 
for its work in this area, was eventually publicly expressed at UNCTAD XI at 
São Paulo in 2004 (the ‘São Paulo Consensus’). This mandate argued that 
existing compensatory finance schemes should possibly be combined with 
modern risk management and risk-sharing instruments. Quite specifically 
UNCTAD was mandated to work to improve the capacity of developing 
countries  to  apply  modern  commodity  price  risk  management  and 
financial instruments (UNCTAD 2007:2). At the level of the risk and finance 
division the nature of the mandate was spelled out in more detail – 
UNCTAD’s website stated explicitly that it played a leading role in assisting 
commodity-dependent countries to enhance their capacity to use modern 
commodity risk management and finance tools (UNCTAD 2007a). By 2004 
the work of the Secretariat was already focused to a large degree on the 
successful introduction of commodity exchanges worldwide. And in 2005, 
the Secretariat published a report on the development of African 
commodity exchanges (UNCTAD 2005), several practical papers with an 
increasingly African focus, with titles such as ‘Commodity policies for 
development: a new framework for the fight against poverty’ (UNCTAD 
2005a), ‘Enhancing commodity finance and managing shocks in Africa’, 
(UNCTAD 2005b) as well as an assessment of the possibilities for an 
agricultural futures market in Ukraine and a review of the world’s 
commodity exchanges (UNCTAD 2005c) which was the subsequent year 
to develop into a joint publication with the SFOA (UNCTAD/SFOA 2006). 
By this time collaboration with the SFOA for their annual Burgenstock 
Conference was well established, including an annual panel session on 
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the issues facing risk management and commodities exchanges in 
developing countries. By contrast the sporadic nature of collaboration 
between UNCTAD and the FAO, and the different focus of the FAO, was 
illustrated by the FAO’s interest in State Trading Enterprises (Rutten 2007a) 
which illustrated the way in which the Commodities Branch at UNCTAD 
found itself in more comfortable territory when working directly with 
private sector members of the global market based risk management 
network than with the officials of other IGOs, at least until in the case of 
FAO Alexander Sarris took over the relevant department (see below 
Chapter   Eight).   The   World   Bank   was   an   early   exception   to   this 
observation, however: officials and consultants working with the World 
Bank, who had worked closely with Rutten and his colleagues recognised 
that UNCTAD has played a leading role in advising on risk management 
issues (Dana & Gilbert 2008). The original ITF proposal had specifically 
mentioned UNCTAD, suggesting that after the creation of the proposed 
intermediary (see above Chapter Five), 
‘The international community, and in particular UNCTAD, may want to 
redirect some of its activities towards implementation of the scheme’ (ITF 
1999:11). 
 
   
According to its own website at the time (UNCTAD 2007a), UNCTAD 
claimed to play a leading role in assisting commodity-dependent countries 
to enhance their capacity to use modern commodity risk management 
and  finance  tools.  Work  in  this  area  involved  research,  policy  advice, 
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training and technical cooperation activities, geared to both the private 
and the public sectors. The following activities were emphasised: 
•         Integration of commodity marketing, risk management and finance 
operations 
•         Solutions to problems of access to commodity risk management 
and finance markets; training, development of manuals, capacity-building 
for banks, farmers’ associations, etc 
•         Improving the use of financial instruments in oil and gas trade, and 
the financial management of oil and gas resources 
•         Prudential  rules   for   the   safe   use   of   price  risk   management 
instruments 
•         Legal  and  regulatory  reforms  to  reduce  transaction  costs  and 
improve access to international commodity risk management and finance 
markets including means of reducing sovereign risk 
•         The  functioning  of  commodity  exchanges  and  the  role  of  new 
groups of non-trade-related participants in commodity futures markets 
•         The development of regional and national commodity exchanges 
and new futures contracts (see Emerging Commodity Exchanges) 
•         The use of market-based price risk management tools in schemes 
designed to stabilise the income of producers of commodities and in 
arrangement to mitigate the impact of fluctuating commodity prices on 
government revenue. 
  
 
The mandate from UNCTAD XI and the presentation on the website are 
evidence that changes in the external environment in which UNCTAD 
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was operating, principally the rise of market solutions to development 
problems, heavily influenced change in UNCTAD’s commodity policy. 
UNCTAD continued to advocate market-based risk management solutions 
at the time of UNCTAD XI and immediately afterwards. One economic 
argument cited in a subsequent UNCTAD publication was that expressed 
earlier by OECD: ‘In economic theory, there are market solutions enabling 
agents to neutralise risks. In reality, such contingency markets are not 
always available and they have a cost. In their absence or incompleteness, 
uncertainties affect producers’ decisions, and lead them to produce below 
the profit maximising level of output’ (UNCTAD 2005b:19-20). 
   
Commodities Policy and the Environment at UNCTAD 
    
In common with the World Bank and the OECD, in UNCTAD studies of the 
environmental aspects of commodity risk management did not play an 
important – or indeed any – role in UNCTAD’s work during the 1990s and 
beyond. As a result, market-based risk management instruments with 
potential environmental implications could find their way into documents 
without   much   scrutiny.   For   example   in   one   UNCTAD   document 
apparently contradictory positions are set out: ‘Commodity producers and 
processors need access to credit in order to meet working capital needs 
and  to  invest  in  new  farm  assets,  technology,  and  equipment  for 
processing and post-harvest activities. Otherwise they will not be in a 
position to remain competitive, meet the formal sector’s requirements, 
diversify,  or  increase  their  share  in  the  final  value  of  their  products. 
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(UNCTAD 2004:6) This quote, therefore, suggested that diversification was 
a good thing, and that credit could assist farmers to diversify. However, in 
the same document the rarely expressed economic argument against 
diversification was made explicitly, albeit only in a footnote:  ‘Farmers will 
also benefit by using such market-based risk management instruments, 
since they are under less pressure to use diversification as a risk 
management strategy. This traditional risk management strategy now 
results  in   significant   income  losses,  particularly   for   the  rural  poor’ 
(UNCTAD 2004:13f). Rutten agreed that farmers using market based risk 
management instruments would grow more because farmers will be able 
to use more inputs, and because they can be more confident on their 
returns.  He suggested further that the effects of growing a crop under a 
price risk management programme were, by and large, comparable to 
that of growing a crop that has been genetically modified to withstand 
certain pests: the farmer will be less afraid of growing the crop, and more 
willing to risk money on it (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). 
   
Given  the  importance  of  the  environmental  consequences  of  market 
based risk management instruments to their critics, any discussion of the 
environmental implications of risk management must be regarded as 
especially  significant.  In  one  document,  UNCTAD  turned  the 
environmental arguments on its head:  ‘Developing countries' ability to 
engage successfully in agricultural exports to developed countries and to 
enter new markets depends critically on their ability to meet a wide array 
of stringent quality and safety standards. While food products are the ones 
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that first come to mind in this context, the same situation holds for most 
other products, including agricultural raw materials such as cotton and 
other  fibres  and  even  plywood.  The  requirements  go  beyond  the 
traditional quality standards and require suppliers to make responsible use 
of chemicals, energy and water, as well as to reduce social and 
environmental impacts. These high standards change frequently and are 
often difficult and costly to meet’ (UNCTAD 2005a:12) By 2007 a 
presentation by Rutten and Youssef to the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, whilst still strongly advocating the use of price 
risk management instruments for farmers, began at last to tackle the 
practical implications of price volatility for farmers, touching on the 
environmental implications. ‘Coffee is a tree crop, and supply does not 
readily adapt to price fluctuations. When prices are very low for extended 
periods, farmers may uproot their trees, but this is a rather extreme 
measure. The more common response to periods of low prices is that use 
of inputs is reduced, and fewer seasonal workers are employed—which in 
turn exposes farmers to higher yield risks as poorly maintained plantations 
are more at risk from infestations and crop diseases’ (Rutten & Youssef 
2007:7). This is an especially interesting and fresh argument:  that lack of 
price risk management actually encouraged crop diseases. However, the 
authors’ definition of ‘poorly maintained’ included fewer inputs (i.e. 
fertilizers and pesticides) whereas critics would suggest that better 
maintenance (e.g. IPM) would be an alternative to such behaviour. Rutten 
made a different environmentally positive remark in his presentation to the 
FAO Conference on Commodity Exchanges in Istanbul the same year: 
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‘Farmers are now demanding the quality of seeds that allow them to 
 
produce  goods  of  a  quality  that  can  be  delivered  to  MCX’  (Rutten 
 
2007:19).  His view was consistently that risk management has a broadly 
positive effect on the environment: it forced farmers to take a broader, 
longer-term perspective and  position. This will  also  open them  up  for 
wider consideration of risks, including environmental ones (Lamon Rutten, 
interview, 1 April 2009). 
   
The position taken by advocates of market-based mechanisms at the time 
 
– which they continue to uphold – was that the two points are not as 
contradictory as they might appear to critics. Whereas diversification as a 
risk management strategy normally leads to reduced, albeit more stable, 
income streams, diversification in the sense of farmers’ experimenting with 
new crops or seeds, greater use of input or entering into more value- 
added activities, while still risky, can lead to higher incomes. The two forms 
of diversification, driven by two different motives, should therefore be 
expected to have likewise different effects on income and risk (Lamon 
Rutten, interview, 3 June 2010). Criticising diversification for causing 
income losses, however, did not remove its potential environmental 
benefits. At root these two attitudes to diversification may still be 
contradictory.  Even within UNCTAD it was not possible to maintain a 
consistent line against diversification, especially after Rutten’s departure for 
MCX in April 2006.   For example, the 2004 document above may be 
contrasted with the position taken by the Working Group Report on Value 
Chain Issues published in  the Secretariat document for  the May  2007 
305
292 
Brasilia conference which specifically mentioned the need to ‘design viable 
strategies for horizontal and vertical diversification’ (UNCTAD 2007b:10). 
This significant change in emphasis would correlate at least with the 
interview evidence (Lamon Rutten, interview, 15 August 2008, Leonela 
Santana-Boado, interview, 1 April 2009) that there had been a political 
change within UNCTAD and that critics of market based solutions, for 
example in other Divisions, who subscribed to the former dirigiste 
development policy norm were once again gaining ground at that time. 
Rutten later observed that he may have inadvertently contributed to this 
process himself – ‘When I felt that the risk management work was firmly 
enough established , I started pushing for this kind of work [industry and 
market structure studies] (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). For 
example in 1999 Rutten wrote a paper on the impact of changing supply- 
and-demand market structures on commodity prices and exports of major 
interest to developing countries for an Expert Meeting, which provided 
impetus for new work on value chains of which vertical diversification was 
a logical component (UNCTAD 1999a). 
   
Rutten argued that risk management forced farmers to take a broader, 
longer-term perspective and position, allowing them to make a wider 
consideration of risks, including environmental ones.    ‘With risk 
management, they will be less prone to ‘destroy’ their assets in times of 
stress’ (Lamon Rutten, interview, 7 December 2007). In Rutten’s view a 
problem remained that, ‘people are very bad at understanding risk and 
what it implies. They don’t see how risk has a big input on wellbeing. 
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Secondly is the impact of empowerment. People in international 
organisations believe farmers are stupid. As a result the two major impacts 
[of market-based risk management instruments] are underestimated, if not 
basically considered non-existent. How do you educate people in 
something so basic?’ (Lamon Rutten, interview, 15 August 2008). 
   
Rutten himself argued that whilst the use of risk management instruments 
by farmers was desirable, access was likely to be indirect (e.g., in the form 
of a greater range of contract pricing clauses, or bundled together with a 
credit) which in turn would render difficult any assessment of their 
practicality or even effect. Secondly, Rutten pointed out that although 
farmers who do not hedge are by definition speculating on prices, ‘doing 
this over generations has created a bit of an attitude that it’s OK to do this’ 
(Lamon Rutten, interview, 15 August 2008). In practice this means that 
when offered a wider range of price speculation opportunities, some 
farmers  would  speculate  more.    Subsequently,  and  in  response  to  a 
specific request for a riposte to environmental critics, Rutten argued that 
the relationship between risk management and input use was ‘complex’. 
In his comprehensive view of the question, farmers in most developing 
countries under-utilised such inputs, because of three main problems: they 
could not afford the up-front costs (even though the expected returns are 
far superior to the costs). The products were not available in time because 
supply chains were not properly organised. There was also a real risk that 
if because of some external factor (e.g., drought) the crop fails, or if the 
price at harvest is lower than they had anticipated, they would actually 
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make a loss on the purchase of the inputs.  Locking in (minimum) prices 
would take care of the last risk. Some form of weather risk management 
could take care of part of the production risk. Farmers who are involved in 
systematic   risk  management  were,  in  one  way  or  another,  better 
organised and therefore more attractive for sellers of inputs. Finally, better- 
organised supply chains with better risk management were safer for banks 
to finance – so inputs can be financed against the security of future 
production.  But price risk management was only part of the story (Lamon 
Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). 
   
Rutten  responded  to  the  specific  question  about  whether  risk 
management would encourage monocropping by arguing that ‘if you 
replace it [market based risk management instruments] with [for example] 
research, you get the same effect. Would people therefore be against 
research? People are encouraged to specialise if one crop is more efficient 
than another. But in fact risk management enables farmers to deepen 
their portfolio, they can manage risk satisfactorily even if they don’t 
specialise’ (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). 
   
Rutten added that in the early 1990s, whilst he was directing UNCTAD’s 
Commodities Branch towards a greater emphasis on price risk 
management, a parallel programme was being developed in UNCTAD on 
market-based mechanisms for the environment, and in particular, for 
trading carbon credits (this was adopted at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit 
and later was the basis for the Kyoto Protocol).  ‘Such new market-based 
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thinking on environment issues made it easier to ‘sell’ the new market- 
based thinking on commodity issues – UNCTAD staff saw it all as part of a 
new trend. Around the time of the Lyon Conference, and immediately 
before, main division staff were favourable and supportive, but considered 
it a complex issue, and only part of the solution – UNCTAD would have to 
continue working also on other commodity sector approaches (Lamon 
Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). 
   
Commodities policy at UNCTAD in the period of the GFC 
    
Finally in 2006 the UNCTAD Secretariat published a paper on Islamic 
finance and risk management - also authored by Rutten), as by this time it 
was regarded as almost de rigeur for any financial organisation to display 
a knowledge and interest in Islamic finance (UNCTAD 2006). But by this 
time   Rutten   had   left   UNCTAD   in   June   2006,   presented  with   an 
opportunity as Joint Managing Director of the Mumbai Commodity 
Exchange to put into practice (not only in India but also in Africa) the 
ideas he had been advocating at UNCTAD for more than a decade and a 
half. The close relationship between UNCTAD and the Indian market risk 
management  industry  had  already  been  noteworthy  (Prasad  &  Singh 
2006),   with   the   President   of   the   Indian   Pepper   and   Spice   Trade 
Association observing that ‘the efforts of UNCTAD in the earlier years were 
the impetus for IPSTA and India to achieve the milestone of operationising 
the  first  international  commodity  exchange  of  the  country’  (Rutten 
2004:4). 
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Yet at the same time the combination of the temporary failure of markets 
widely known as the GFC and increased attention to environmental issues 
was about to allow critics of market-based solutions to express themselves 
publicly in ways that even a few years before might not have been 
expressed publicly. Nowhere was this more obvious than at UNCTAD. 
Implementing the São  Paulo mandate  had  always  required individuals 
who are both technically knowledgeable and committed to the market 
policy  norm,  and  this  became  more  difficult  after  2006  when  Lamon 
Rutten and Olivier Matringe both left. These changes in personnel were 
themselves a consequence of wider economic and political developments 
including as noted above the opportunities then opening for officials such 
as Rutten to put their advocacy into practice within new Exchanges in the 
developing world (initially MCX and subsequently  its attempt to create an 
Exchange in Africa, Bourse Africa. 
   
The UNCTAD website has undergone constant change, naturally enough, 
but its central policy message has changed little since its inception and 
remained thus even during the GFC, which affected policy more generally 
as discussed below. It is not to the official website, therefore, that it is 
necessary to look to see the change in policy during the GFC. 
   
The UNCTAD staff who remained in the Commodities Branch were soon 
placed under work constraints, as there remained those within UNCTAD 
who were not  as  committed as  Rutten and Matringe to  market-based 
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solutions to agricultural price fluctuation problems. Work on commodity 
risk management within UNCTAD was therefore scaled down after these 
resignations in 2006 with a change in management away from sympathy 
with market based risk management. New management came from 
outside the Branch, and brought with them a 1980s mindset on statutory 
boards and other government-led solutions. 
   
The scaling down involved reduction in UNCTAD’s attendance at 
conferences concerned with market-based risk management mechanisms 
and in resources devoted to the annual Burgenstock conference. 
   
Policy change was however not immediate with Rutten and Matringe’s 
departure. In May 2007 a conference entitled ‘Global initiative on 
commodities:     Re-launching the commodities agenda’  was jointly 
organised by UNCTAD; the CFC; the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States;  and  the United  Nations Development Programme (UNCTAD 
2007b).  As noted above diversification was praised at this conference, 
although the Conference Report was still positive about market based risk 
management instruments: ‘Open-market price discovery and price risk 
management have traditionally been seen as the main benefits that 
commodity futures exchanges would provide to developing country users. 
By reducing price risk, hedging on commodity futures exchanges was also 
seen by some as an alternative to supply management under international 
commodity agreements. Meanwhile, commodity exchanges have come to 
assume  a  broader  developmental  role  as  their  utility  for  developing 
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countries has increasingly been seen as removing or reducing the high 
transaction costs faced by entities along the commodity supply chains 
(UNCTAD 2007b). 
   
At the September 2007 Expert Meeting specifically devoted to the trade 
and development implications of financial services and commodity 
exchanges, the UNCTAD Secretariat did again present a paper identifying 
a series of benefits (66 was the number cited) from commodity exchanges, 
including 'price discovery, price risk management, venue for investment, 
facilitation of physical trade, facilitation of finance and general market 
development' (UNCTAD 2007c:12). 
   
At the Experts’ Meeting in September 2007, ‘Participants urged UNCTAD 
to continue to strengthen its work on commodity exchanges through the 
three pillars of its work – research and analysis, consensus-building and 
technical assistance’ (UNCTAD 2007c:9) and to keep [my italics] its work 
on commodities – including commodity exchanges and associated issues 
– high on the agenda of UNCTAD XII’ (UNCTAD 2007c:9). However 
Secretariat staff were warned by the newly appointed Divisional director 
(Harmon Thomas) that this was the last time such an Experts’ Meeting 
would take place. According to one of his colleagues most directly 
concerned with the Commodities Exchange programme ‘he declared that 
‘This will be the last show you have on Commodity Exchanges’. He is very 
suspicious of any collaboration with the private sector’ (Leonela Santana- 
Boado, interview, 1 April 2009). 
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Then on one notable occasion, demonstrating the importance of personal 
management at  the  divisional  level UNCTAD  staff  were  prevented on 
‘administrative grounds’ from attending a risk management meeting in 
Addis Ababa and on another occasion sent instead to a globalisation 
meeting in Cuba. UNCTAD was even absent from the 2008 Annual 
Meeting of the ITF in Brussels. Rutten took the view that without his own 
coincidental presence at the African Union meeting, after he had left 
UNCTAD but still keen on defending the organisation, ‘UNCTAD would 
have been ejected from African Union consideration for Exchange and 
other   commodity   work’      (Lamon   Rutten,   interview,  1   April  2009) 
describing this himself as an excellent example of the butterfly effect. 
Equally importantly, there were suggestions of editorial interference with 
outside contributions to papers on e.g. commodity speculation published 
by  UNCTAD  in  2009.  And  the  volume  of  written  output  from  the 
Secretariat  slackened  markedly  after  Rutten’s  departure  from  UNCTAD 
(and that of his colleague Olivier Matringe). Staff working on commodity 
risk management issues and the functioning of commodity exchanges 
found themselves at times pressured to present research results in a way 
that was perhaps substantively unjustified, but which better reflected the 
anti-market sentiments of senior staff15. 
   
Rutten’s position was that when he left, the Commodities programme was 
well-alive and well-supported, albeit as a component in a larger supply 
  
15 Understandably, the multiple sources for this information have requested privacy. 
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chain finance and institution-building programme – and for the first time, 
there was large donor funding, from the EC. However, new management 
came from outside the Branch, and brought with them a 1980s mindset 
on statutory boards and other government-led solutions, i.e. a reversion to 
the original policy norm with which UNCTAD had been formed. 
Emphasising  the  role  he  and  other  pro-risk  middle-management 
colleagues had played, Rutten said: ‘When I left, the programme was well- 
alive and well-supported, albeit as a component in a larger supply chain 
finance and institution-building programme – and for the first time, there 
was  large  donor  funding,  from  the  EC  (Lamon  Rutten,  interview,  15 
August 2008). Rutten subsequently suggested that ‘the programme has 
since been largely destroyed, and donor funds were not used as intended’ 
(Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009), going  so far as to argue strongly 
that what happened at UNCTAD after 2007 was ‘scandalous’ (Lamon 
Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). In his view the legacy of work undertaken 
during his tenure at UNCTAD was being ‘sabotaged’ by management, 
with the director in charge of the commodities department able to ‘put 
risk management work on hold’. ‘Since 2007 output has been close to zero 
– almost no publications, no original work, no input to the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC), no collaboration with the 
private sector’ (Lamon Rutten, interview, 15 August 2008). One of the 
issues was that as noted above the director in charge of the department, 
Harmon Thomas, was sceptical of the type of overt collaboration with the 
private sector that Rutten and his colleagues pioneered during the 1990s. 
For example, following the Lyon Conference of 1998 Rutten was able to 
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establish a multi-donor trust fund, which he believes at least at that time 
was unique within UNCTAD. Rutten argued that the multi-donor status of 
this fund enabled UNCTAD staff themselves to prioritise particular projects, 
whilst also ensuring that bureaucracy could be kept to a minimum – 
although Rutten recollected that reallocating monies between projects 
and reacting quickly to opportunities was always challenging (Lamon 
Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). The fund remains in existence, but other 
than the project initiated in 2005 (and started in 2006) as part of the EU 
Commodities Programme, no additional projects have been launched. This 
is clear evidence of the importance that individual managers and directors 
can play in the evolution of policy at UNCTAD, with support for the 
contention coming from several different sources, both internal and 
external to UNCTAD. Under the control of Harmon Thomas, UNCTAD’s 
Commodities Branch was in 2007-9 no longer apparently interested in 
promoting or contributing to the practical use of derivatives markets by 
farmers or co-operatives to lock in producer prices. Instead it appeared to 
have reverted to the role of an international pressure group in favour of 
greater regulation of markets generally, with some role in the collection 
and provision of statistics – which is a full circle to where UNCTAD had 
begun. 
   
However much disheartening for the remaining staff of the Commodities 
Unit the abrupt, dramatic and apparently unchallengeable policy reversal 
at UNCTAD may have been, the evidence suggests that the reversal was 
not  permanent  –  despite  their  fear  and  anger  at  the  time.    Member 
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countries were not willing to give up their support for the programme so 
fast, and the momentum of the work was enough to keep it alive – just – 
until 2009 when the commodity department’s management again 
changed.   UNCTAD national delegations from developing countries, 
morever, did not agree that work on market based risk management 
should cease. Their delegations may have been convinced after so long of 
the merits of market-based risk management instruments; they may have 
been looking to the kind of support that the EU and other donors; or they 
may  simply  have  thought  there  was  no  alternative.  By  the  time  of 
UNCTAD XII in April 2008, the Accra Accord specifically mentioned 
UNCTAD’s roles as including that of developing commodity financing and 
risk management schemes (including commodity exchanges), noting the 
importance of avoiding duplication and therefore working in coordination 
with other relevant actors already active in this area. The work programme 
decided upon for UNCTAD at Accra marked ‘both a continuation and a 
new departure – or revival – of work on commodities in UNCTAD’ 
(UNCTAD 2011c:1) Following the Accra Accord, the existing Commodities 
Branch was to be ‘transformed into an autonomous Unit reporting directly 
to  the  Secretary-General  of  UNCTAD’  (UNCTAD  2011c:2).  The 
Commodities Unit was mandated under its ‘advisory services’ functions 
inter alia to ‘Develop commodity financing and risk management schemes 
(including  commodity  exchanges)’.  Projects  on  commodity  exchanges 
were included in ‘field projects’. Inaction however followed, as the work 
had already evolved (or regressed back) into ‘old-fashioned’ statistical 
analysis and reviews, not the forward-looking consultative work that had 
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typified Rutten’s time at UNCTAD. There was as a result a formal 
investigation into the work of the Commodities Branch, which confirmed a 
number of criticisms of the change in direction. The resultant publication 
itself noted that ‘at Accra, beneficiaries have expressed their 
disappointment over the inadequacy of UNCTAD commodities work in 
addressing their major challenges’ (UNCTAD 2009b:20). The Accra 
commodities agenda   was a rare case of evidence for a traditional 
neofunctionalist view of IGOs as dominated by the perceived interests of 
nation-states, or at least the directions provided by national delegations to 
an IGO. However a question should be raised about whether the 
expectations of the national delegations for the performance of the 
Commodities Unit were themselves based on the previous work 
undertaken  by  the  Commodities Branch  before  Harmon Thomas  took 
over. 
   
Documentary evidence for the change in direction to which the 
delegations objected is difficult to obtain, however a clue was to be found 
in an opinion expressed in UNCTAD News in September-November 2008. 
‘New or stronger commodity exchanges, for example, could concentrate 
 
on such instruments as cash, spot trades, and forward contracts, rather 
than futures’ (UNCTAD 2008:6). The clearest documentary evidence of the 
change in direction dates from late December 2008, with Harmon Thomas 
still in charge of the Commodities Unit, when the UNCTAD Secretariat 
published under his direction a paper on the commodity markets for the 
Multi-year Expert Meeting on commodities and development which struck 
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a markedly different tone to previous publications.  Published at a time of 
considerable volatility in commodity prices, the paper sought to explain 
the reasons. It identified strong global demand, the depreciating dollar 
and ‘speculation, fed by high liquidity in international financial markets 
and   low   interest   rates’   (UNCTAD   2008:4)   combined   with   supply 
constraints as the main reasons for the sudden and dramatic commodity 
price rises and a fall in global demand ‘exacerbated by massive liquidation 
of long positions in commodity futures markets, as financial investors and 
speculators  responded  to  changing  expectations’  as  reasons  for  the 
equally rapid falls’ (UNCTAD 2008:6). As two leading practitioners 
commented, ‘they [market-based mechanisms] can prove controversial 
when politicians find it convenient to attack futures market speculators for 
price changes which impact adversely in sections of the population, for 
example low coffee prices from 1999 to 2002 and the 2008 increases in 
food prices’ (Dana &  Gilbert 2008:17). This is precisely what the 2008 
UNCTAD paper did, in marked contrast to its predecessors. 
    
This sideways swipe at commodity markets was replicated in the reports of 
many other organisations (e.g. IATP 2009). However, what was strongly 
noticeable about the UNCTAD paper was that describing and analysing 
trends in commodity markets was all the paper did:  it did not feature the 
types of problems and proposed remedies commonly found in Secretariat 
papers of the Rutten era at UNCTAD. It was, in fact, a paper remarkably 
reminiscent of the type that Alexander Sarris criticised the FAO for 
producing prior to his time there (as discussed below in Chapter Eight). 
318
305 
  
A similar tone emerged in the much more substantial document UNCTAD 
as a whole published at the beginning of 2009 on the global financial 
crisis (UNCTAD 2009). Prominent at the beginning of this document was 
the statement that ‘The growing role and weight of large-scale financial 
investors on commodities futures markets have affected commodity prices 
and their volatility. Speculative bubbles have emerged for some 
commodities during the boom and have burst after the sub-prime shock 
(UNCTAD 2009:iii).   The recommendations in the next sentence were 
strongly reminiscent of the UNCTAD of the pre-Lyon era:  ‘Regulators need 
access to more comprehensive trading data in order to be able to 
understand what is moving prices and intervene if certain trades look 
problematic, while key loopholes in regulation need to be closed to ensure 
that positions on currently unregulated over-the-counter markets do not 
lead to ‘excessive speculation’’ (UNCTAD 2009: iii). 
   
The theme was developed in more depth in Chapter Three of the 
publication, which discussed what was described as the ‘financialisation’ 
of commodity markets. ‘The efficient market hypothesis fails on commodity 
markets because the number of counterparties (especially those with an 
interest in physical commodities) and the size of their positions are less 
than perfectly elastic’ (UNCTAD 2009:24). The paper drew a distinction 
between traditional speculators, managed funds and index funds, placing 
the responsibility for the price volatility of 2007-8 mainly with index funds 
(UNCTAD 2009:30). The UNCTAD paper argued that if futures market 
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quotations became driven more by the speculative activities of financial 
investors and less by fundamental supply and demand, then price volatility 
would increase, and hedging against commodity price risk would become 
more complex, more expensive, and maybe even unaffordable to 
developing country users, as they might no longer be able to finance 
margin calls (UNCTAD 2009). According to the paper there was already 
some evidence that smaller market participants would be forced to 
withdraw from the market as a result of higher margin calls.  This was not 
new: Rutten had identified these problems in a 1996 paper which had 
also identified solutions such as the greater use of options and improved 
access to finance (UNCTAD 1996a). But instead of reiterating the need for 
such measures, the 2009 UNCTAD publication continued by adding that 
spot and futures market prices were displaying a lack of convergence, in 
turn causing increased uncertainty about the reliability of signals 
emanating  from  the  commodity  exchanges  with  respect  to  making 
storage decisions and managing the risk of market positions. ‘This could 
eventually result in decreased hedging, as commercial users seek 
alternative  mechanisms  for  transferring  and  managing  price  risk’,  the 
paper  argued  (UNCTAD  2009:36),  citing       academic  research  (Irwin, 
Garcia, Good & Kunda 2008) in support. The paper was very much a child 
of its time, however, as since 2008 futures market margins once again fell 
and the heat went out of the debate, at least pro tem. Moreover the paper 
was written from the standpoint of improving futures market efficiency, 
not returning to alternative methods of controlling risk. It is noticeable, 
however, that the paper does not discuss option premia, despite the fact 
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that options, not futures, have always been the recommended route for 
farmers   to   take   in   hedging16.   In   its   following   section,   on   policy 
implications, the UNCTAD paper of 2009 made the clearest statement yet 
that in the view of its authors – and the paper was a publication by 
UNCTAD at the highest administrative level, not a note by the Secretariat 
but an actual publication of the organisation – or at least from one of its 
divisions.  The  critical paragraph  of  the  section  reads:    ‘Given that  the 
financialisation of commodity futures trading has made the functioning of 
commodity exchanges increasingly controversial, [my italics] the question 
that the current financial crisis poses is how the functioning of commodity 
futures exchanges can be improved in such a way that they can fulfil their 
developmental role. In trying to answer this question, it is useful to look at 
regulatory issues regarding commodity futures exchanges per se, before 
addressing broader international policy measures’ (UNCTAD 2009:36). 
   
The paper recommended broader and more significant regulation of 
commodity exchanges, especially in respect of speculative trading, 
international co-ordination of policy measures, and greater information 
availability on OTC trading. The paper did not go as far as suggesting that 
commodity prices should be stabilised by State intervention, but its tenor 
of criticism, even hostility, to commodities exchanges is in marked contrast 
to the publications that emerged from UNCTAD’s Commodities Branch in 
the 1990s. That the timing for such a reversal in political position was ideal 
can  hardly  be  doubted:  the  Chapter on  commodities in  the  UNCTAD 
 
16 although options premia themselves usually increase, sometimes dramatically, during 
periods of intense volatility. 
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paper was preceded by one on regulation generally and followed by one 
on currencies. It was truly a product of its time. 
   
At the April 2009 UNCTAD Experts Meeting there was again discussion of 
the same subject. Professor Christopher Gilbert, an UNCTAD consultant, 
concluded that: index-based investment was a significant factor in 
generalising prices rises (and subsequent falls) across commodities (Gilbert 
2009). Specifically in relation to agricultural prices, he concluded (in 
another contribution to the same meeting) that although the effects were 
difficult to quantify ‘By investing across the entire range of commodity 
futures, index-based investors appear to have inflated commodity food 
prices…all the estimates reported in this paper suggest that futures activity 
was the single most important factor which drove up agricultural prices in 
2007-8’  (Gilbert 2009a:27). Another participant  in the meeting put his 
point  of  view  even  more  extremely:    ‘The  tools  farmers  once  used  to 
protect themselves by hedging prices on agricultural inputs have become 
weapons of mass financial destruction’ (Gagain 2009:5). This was not the 
type of conclusion that would have featured in the previous regime at 
such Expert Meetings, but times had changed both inside and outside 
UNCTAD and Gilbert had been asked by UNCTAD to study this issue 
(Christopher Gilbert, interview, 31 July 2009). 
   
On the other hand it is important to recognise that some officials working 
for IGOs, particularly those appointed before the spread of the received 
wisdom  of market  solutions are not  traditionally  the most enthusiastic 
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about them. Finger & Magarinos-Ruchat (2003) go so far as to talk about 
the   ‘two   UNCTADs’,   the   new  UNCTAD  containing   the  pro-market 
solutions people, led by a new Director-General, and the older generation 
of sceptical officials. In UNCTAD, as risk management was specifically 
identified as one of the areas of cooperation with the private sector to be 
promoted, there was little opposition to  pro-market policies   for many 
years.  However, UNCTAD was very much divided between divisions. As 
Rutten said, one of the main factors driving opposition to market based 
mechanisms within the organisation was ‘a broad distrust of markets (one 
division in UNCTAD has systematically been very sceptical about market 
forces)’  (Lamon  Rutten,  interview,  1  April  2009).  Advocates  of  market 
based risk management instruments recognised throughout the period of 
their growing ascendancy that there was always, even within UNCTAD, a 
reluctance to accept market-based solutions to price volatility. This 
reluctance was based according to Rutten on a number of factors. Firstly, a 
broad distrust  of  markets  (one  division  in  UNCTAD  had  systematically 
been very sceptical about market forces). Secondly, as with critics in FAO 
(see below Chapter Eight) a lack of belief in the practicality: such critics 
argue that whilst market-based risk management for farmers looks good 
on paper, how are you ever going to reach a significant number of 
farmers? Thirdly lack of belief in the relevance: there are many problems 
that are more important for farmers, why talk about this one? And in 
general, ‘risk’ is a blind spot for many people, and the cost of risk exposure 
is often not recognised (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). What had 
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really enabled this lingering scepticism to resurface, however, was the fact 
that the external political climate changed. 
    
 
Return to the new ‘normality’: 2010 and beyond 
    
But the limits of individual influence on the policy of an IGO, when 
combined with the effect of yet another change in the external 
environment, are well illustrated by what happened within the Special 
Unit on Commodities after Harmon Thomas retired, his position remaining 
unfilled for some time, leaving UNCTAD staff in suspense as to who his 
successor would be and how UNCTAD policy on commodities would 
evolve in a new decade. This situation suggests that the dominance of 
specific  policy  norms  may  be,  as  constructivism  ‘plus’;  would  suggest, 
rather more dependent on  individuals,  and  therefore potentially more 
fluid, than previously supposed. By late 2009 this uncertainty had 
apparently been resolved yet again in favour of market-based risk 
management instruments. In late 2009, under pressure from beneficiaries, 
UNCTAD’s Special Unit on Commodities’ technical assistance programme 
had begun to be revived, with meetings arranged between 30 September 
- 2 October 2009 on such pro-market topics as ‘Improving the Functioning 
of  Commodity  Markets  in  Eastern  and  Southern Africa  through 
Warehouse Receipt Systems and Market-based Interventions’ in Lusaka, 
Zambia and between 27 - 29 October 2009 on ‘the Creation of a 
Commodity Exchange in Central Africa, based in Cameroon. Yaoundé, 
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Cameroon’ (UNCTAD 2009a). These meetings were held under the 
auspices of the EU ACP donor programme which was now finally bearing 
fruit: the EU had remained broadly sympathetic to a market agenda and 
so in response to donor funding priorities, an example of the interaction 
between IGOs that also helps shape IGO policy, UNCTAD fairly quickly, at 
least by IGO standards, swung back to a pro-market agenda. The re- 
opening of the pro-market agenda also allowed collaboration with the 
private sector, which the opposite policy precluded:  in the following year, 
2010, the former collaboration with the SFOA at the annual Burgenstock 
meeting, initiated by change agent Rutten a decade previously, was 
revived,  and  another  Experts’  Meeting  was  arranged  for  24-25  March 
2010. It was a remarkable turnaround from the pessimism about market- 
based instruments and the resultant absence of action from the previous 
two years. 
   
The  fresh,  or  at  least  rejuvenated,  (at  least  superficially)  pattern  of 
UNCTAD activity with respect to market-based risk management 
instruments (for agriculture and generally) was presented to the world at 
the Global Commodity Forum (GCF) UNCTAD sponsored in March 2010. 
Several features of this Forum were noticeable. Firstly, the presence of a 
number of private sector leaders as well as representatives from the World 
Bank and other NGOs - over 500 in all - suggests a greater sense of the 
need for  inclusivity  and  scale,  and  it  was  suggested that  the meeting 
should become annual. The meeting as a whole concluded that better 
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regulation of the markets was needed:  on that point both supporters and 
critics of market-based mechanisms could agree (UNCTAD 2010b). 
   
However the revival of interest within UNCTAD for market-based solutions 
did not prevent representatives from other organisations presenting 
proposals thought up during the GFC that were throw-backs to the earlier 
age of ICAs .  Most notable amongst these was the complex two-pronged 
IFPRI proposal which although it rejected a physical, public, globally 
managed  grain  reserve,  suggested  reforming  commodity  exchanges. 
‘Such reforms could include limiting the volume of speculation relative to 
hedging through regulation, making delivery on contracts or portions of 
contracts compulsory, and/or imposing additional capital deposit 
requirements on futures transactions’ (Braun & Torero 2008:1). Their 
proposal, reiterated by one academic contributor at the GCF in March 
2010, was for ‘A small physical food reserves should be established to 
facilitate a smooth response to food emergencies (5% of the current food 
aid flow, managed by the WFP in different locations, backed up by an 
emerging funds 2) An innovative virtual reserve, backed by financial funds, 
and  intervention  mechanisms  in  futures  market  should  be  set  up  to 
prevent price spikes and to keep prices close to fundamentals’ (Nissanke 
2010).  The same contributor was also the editor of a group of essays 
dedicated to Alfred Maizels, in the presentation for which she cited among 
contemporary commodities issues, ‘The case for a new contingent 
financing facility as counter-cyclical demand management as a part of a 
new architecture of global governance and aid-financing facility’ (Nissanke 
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2010a). The contribution by the UNCTAD Secretariat  represents  a bridge 
between two ‘regimes’, and is divided into two sections, the one a 
straightforward commentary on commodity markets (as Thomas had 
wanted the Secretariat to produce) and the second a more lively analysis 
of policy. Whilst again noting the financialisation of international 
commodity markets and deploring the increased price volatility that it had 
brought in its wake, the Secretariat’s view on the policy priority for 
international commodities was ‘how to curb the role of financial investors 
in influencing price movements without undermining the price discovery 
function of such institutional investors’ (UNCTAD 2010:12). At no point in 
the document was a suggestion made along the lines of the IFPRI paper: 
the four concluding suggestions for expert consideration were:   how to 
reduce distortions in the multilateral trading system, whether there were 
any new policy initiatives to address the ‘resource curse’, how to improve 
market information and early warning systems to reduce commodity price 
booms and busts, and whether future commodity demand could be 
forecast  more  accurately  as   a   basis  for  better-informed  investment 
decisions to achieve more flexible supply responses to changes in demand 
for commodities (UNCTAD 2010:14-15). As further, and more conclusive, 
evidence of the rejuvenation of UNCTAD’s pro-market based risk 
management instrument approach, in a second document tabled for the 
meeting by the UNCTAD Secretariat, it was stated that: ‘By providing, inter 
alia, contractual certainty and recognised quality standards, commodity 
exchanges  foster  the  integration  of  the  development  of  commodity 
finance  by  providing  a  sense to  lenders of  the  local  price of  a  given 
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commodity, transaction liquidity (trade volumes) and not least, price risk 
 
protection for borrowers and lenders’ (UNCTAD 2010a:12). 
    
The UNCTAD Secretariat was evidently keeping abreast of recent 
developments in market-based risk management techniques, presenting in 
particular a balanced view (in common with their fellow members of the 
risk management policy network at the World Bank) on weather risk 
insurance. On the positive side the Secretariat believed that weather 
derivatives may be a valuable tool for unlocking rural lending and 
investment opportunities and recognised that there was a growing 
consensus that weather index insurance could play a positive role in 
facilitating climate change adaptation. The Secretariat referred to a 
particular weather index typhoon insurance product piloted in early 2009 
by MicroEnsure in the Philippines. ‘The product, relying on satellite-based 
technology, protects smallholder rice farmers against risks of crop damage. 
Results from the MicroEnsure pilot show that banks lend 15-40% more to 
farmers who have insurance’ (UNCTAD 2010a:14). On the cautious side, 
the Secretariat expressed the view that for weather index insurance to 
become more viable, concerted efforts would be needed to improve 
meteorological data collection systems through technology and 
investment, and there was also a need to establish an appropriate legal 
and regulatory framework for index insurance in the countries where it is 
to be developed. The Secretariat noted that the global market for these 
products  was  still  very  small  and  dominated  by  the  North  American 
market,  with  high  costs  restricting  their  reach  particularly  in  poorer 
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countries and communities. Moreover in the Secretariat’s cautious view, 
the current structure of weather index-based insurance schemes, and their 
essential pilot status, raised questions as to their likely resilience with 
respect to large-scale impacts in the face of major catastrophic events, as 
well as the extent to which they can be relied upon to reduce farmers’ 
insecurity’ (UNCTAD 2010a:14-15). The following year, a balanced paper 
emerged from the Secretariat for the Expert Meeting held on 23–25 March 
2011 which, whilst supporting diversification, refused to allocate blame for 
price volatility to market based risk management instruments (UNCTAD 
2011b).  These  papers  indicate  a  more  positive  attitude  within  the 
UNCTAD Secretariat towards market-based risk management instruments 
for agriculture (and other business) than during the period in which 
Harmon Thomas ran the Special Unit on Commodities, although this may 
have reflected a lack of policy direction altogether as much as a positive 
change. 
  
 
Conclusion 
    
Policy change happened at UNCTAD – dramatic, rapid change - but 
Kotter’s checklist for achieving successful change within an organisation 
can be applied to analyse why the intense efforts of the few advocates of 
market-based risk management mechanisms at UNCTAD did not succeed 
in preventing personnel changes bringing about a reversal in policy, albeit 
a temporary one. 
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(1) Urgency. This was achieved: the entire future of the organisation was 
thought to be at stake. 
   
(2) A guiding coalition. This was a weakness: all along there were those 
within UNCTAD whose support for the new direction of the organisation 
was marginal at best. A decade after the Lyon Conference, the UN Internal 
Audit Department report referred to ‘destructive internal competition’ 
(United Nations 2008:17) between divisions of UNCTAD – evidently the 
relatively small size of UNCTAD compared to IGOs such as the World Bank 
or the FAO is no bar to this type of problem. 
   
(3) Vision and strategy. This the advocates certainly did have. Rutten and 
his colleagues saw UNCTAD partnering the World Bank in delivering 
training and advocacy of market-based mechanisms throughout the 
developing world. 
   
(4) A problem was in communicating this vision: The Commodities Branch 
at UNCTAD, its members, only had limited time and effort available, and 
although an enormous amount of both was put into the production of 
advocacy/explanatory  materials,  there  was  a  tendency  for  them  to 
circulate amongst the already convinced. Senior management remained 
aloof: conscious, no doubt, that the external donor base was moving more 
slowly towards support of market-based mechanisms, and also quite 
possibly  motivated  by  the  institutional  legacy  of  the  different,  older 
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dirigiste  policy  norm  which  had  been  responsible  for  the  creation  of 
 
UNCTAD in the first place. 
   
 
(5) Empowering broad-based action. Here the problem was surely the 
highly technical nature of the work which rendered this virtually 
impossible. Senior management were by the very nature of their work 
never likely to engage at close quarters with the mechanics of technical 
assistance to exchanges in developing countries, for instance. So far as 
collaboration within UNCTAD was concerned, this was limited to training 
provision   via   the   UNCTAD   Virtual   Institute   in   Tanzania   (UNCTAD 
2011c:11)  so  that  commodities  work  remained  a  specialised  function 
within the organisation. 
   
(6) For the same reason, generating a short-term win became impossible, 
especially after the collapse of the World Bank initiative referred to above 
(Chapters Five and Six). The development of market-based mechanisms is 
a slow process: years, sometimes decades, must pass for the creation of 
liquid markets in developing countries. Only by the beginning of another 
new decade is the long-term legacy of the work of Rutten and his team 
beginning to be seen, through the work of the private sector - which 
would have  been at  the  very  least  less  easy  had  it  not  been  for  the 
previous decades’ foundations laid at UNCTAD and other IGOs. This 
timeframe was far too long for Kotter’s criterion of a short-term win (Kotter 
1995) to be remotely possible. 
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(7) Consolidate gains. This proved impossible in the short term with the 
change of Divisional director and the virtually contemporaneous onset of 
the GFC. The Section, now without Rutten himself, found itself in damage 
limitation mode. By the date research concluded for this thesis, end-June 
2011, some recovery had been made, with Thomas retired and the GFC 
replaced by at least modest recovery of global confidence, but there was 
still a lack of central direction and focus for UNCTAD’s commodity work by 
comparison to the dynamism and high levels of document and workshop 
production of the 1990s. Neither external influence nor pressure from 
donor countries can therefore wholly explain the evolution of UNCTAD 
policy with respect to market based risk management instruments. 
   
Change was closely aligned to the work of Lamon Rutten and the 
Commodities Branch. This is evidenced by the effect caused by the 
departure of Lamon Rutten (and Nayana Mahajan) from UNCTAD in the 
spring of 2006 to work for the MCX Exchange. Both wanted to put into 
practice the pro-market based risk management principles that they had 
researched and advocated at UNCTAD. Olivier Matringe left at the same 
time. The consequence of the departure of this group of advocates was 
that there was a decline in publication volume and participation by 
UNCTAD in the global development of Exchanges and market-based risk 
management. This was partly because of the energy and technical skill 
brought to the subject by Rutten, but partly also because within UNCTAD 
he had led a team which was oriented towards the support of market- 
based  risk  management,  and  the  new  management  viewed  these 
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instruments with less enthusiasm. It is possible to identify several examples 
of the curtailment of UNCTAD’s work in this area during the GFC, for 
example the reduction in participation in the Burgenstock Annual 
Conference of the SFOA, and the withdrawal of permission for UNCTAD 
staff to travel to conferences held by Exchanges. This process may be 
regarded as the operation of several change agents, at different levels of 
management (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009, Leonela Santana- 
Boado, interview, 1 April 2009). However, by the middle of the 2000s it 
had become evident to Rutten and others that further development of 
policies related to commodities exchanges needed to be driven by the 
private sector, not by further papers written within what was already a 
changing atmosphere at UNCTAD itself. The haemorrhage of staff 
continued, and in the same direction: after Rutten’s own departure, two 
years later in 2008, Adam Gross, formerly a member of the UNCTAD 
Secretariat, left to become the founding Head of Strategy at MCX Africa 
Limited. 
   
Rutten’s work within UNCTAD is especially noteworthy for two factors. 
Firstly, it exemplifies the behaviour of a ‘change agent’ - one close observer 
commented that Rutten was a ‘one-man band’ (Ron Duncan, interview, 11 
February 2009) whilst another at FAO commented revealingly that he was 
surprised to learn how junior Rutten’s management grade (Section Head) 
actually was. The success of the Commodities Branch (by any measure 
conventionally used to measure output within UNCTAD and other IGOS, 
such as  volume, donor fund attraction, attendee numbers, and  media 
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coverageto create a major policy initiative which involved subscribing to a 
quite different development discourse to that which had underpinned the 
organisation since its  inception. Secondly, it  serves as  evidence of  the 
ability of determined middle management to influence policy within 
UNCTAD.  From the UNCTAD evidence, at least, change agents within 
IGOs, at least at middle management level can create and sustain policy 
change, but only as long as they remain in post. Consolidation of gains 
requires authority over much wider areas of the organisation, especially 
personnel selection, which in an IGO such as UNCTAD depends in large 
measure on the allocation of positions according to donor country 
requirements. 
   
(8) As a result, it therefore became clear during the GFC that adherence to 
market-based risk management mechanisms was much less securely 
anchored in UNCTAD’s organisational culture (and that of several other 
institutions as well, notably IFAD) than had been previously thought e.g. 
Finger and Macharinos-Ruchat (2003) saw policy as evolving, rather than 
rotating, and present a model of policymaking at UNCTAD, and possibly 
by extension within any IGO, which parallels developments in the outside 
world but which causes irrevocable shifts in the political orientation of the 
organisation. There have been even relatively recent authors who do not 
seem to have accepted the argument of structural transformation, the 
’historic   turn’   advanced   by   Finger   and   Magarinos-Ruchat   (2003). 
 
‘Although  UNCTAD  does  attempt  to  offer  some  technical  assistance 
 
programmes  to  countries  dealing  with  the  technical  requirements  of 
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international trade, such as help   with the bureaucratic processes of 
conforming to internationally accepted technical standards, these efforts 
are quite modest. But the resulting freedom from the need to raise funds 
from developed countries gives UNCTAD the political leeway to be more 
critical of market economics than other UN agencies’ (Barkin 2006:110). 
   
The  evidence  from  UNCTAD  policy  towards  market-based  risk 
management instruments suggests differently again: when policy norms 
within an IGO are highly technical, in Sutton’s sense of the term (Sutton 
1999) they may be entirely, and certainly temporarily, reversible if the 
external environment and internal middle-ranking officials at the technical 
core change at the same time. Such changes, it  is evident, can occur 
within months and equally be reversed within months. The turnaround is 
a good example of how swiftly established policy norms (especially those 
based on technical policies) within IGOs can actually ebb and flow, not a 
point frequently observed in the literature (e.g. the presumption of 
irreversibility in Finger & Machinos-Ruchat 2003) but consistent with a 
framework of constructivism ‘plus’. It all says very little for consistent policy 
co-ordination within UNCTAD at a high level. 
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Chapter Eight: The evolution of policy towards market-based agricultural 
risk management at the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO) 
   
The genesis, role and evolution of the FAO 
    
The core organisation of the international commodities and food regime 
the Allies thought they would create after the end of World War II, the 
FAO was established with defined objectives: to increase agricultural 
productivity, to eliminate hunger and improve nutrition, to address 
problems of surpluses and shortages, to establish common standards, and 
to harmonise national agricultural policies with free trade principles‘ 
(Mingst & Karns 2007:149). The first session of the FAO Conference was 
held at Quebec, Canada, establishing the FAO on 16 October 1945 as a 
specialised UN agency, 
   
The creation of FAO was part of the  collective action vision of ‘never 
again’  (never  again  would  there  be  wars  between  nations,  etc)  that 
created the United Nations. In the case of FAO, the vision was of an 
organisation that would ensure a world where never again would there 
be widespread hunger, malnutrition or famine. The FAO Charter left no 
doubt that the founding fathers intended that the Organisation should 
effectively serve as a nascent World Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Nutrition. FAO was charged to collect, analyse, interpret and disseminate 
the agricultural knowledge required for the world to meet the food and 
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nutrition needs of all its citizens. From the outset, therefore, its principal 
objective was to provide effective governance of the global agricultural 
system - amidst a world of nation states in conflict. FAO was at its outset 
sui generis – a unique, one-of-a-kind agency, with no competitors. It would 
be  at  least  fifteen  years,  for  example,  before  the  World  Bank  would 
develop agricultural programmes as described above (Chapters Five and 
Six) and still longer before UNCTAD took the interest in risk management 
described above (Chapter Seven) which included agriculture. The activities 
of foundations, bilateral aid programmes and NGOs, which also became 
extremely important some years later, were also still quite small when FAO 
began its activities (FAO 2007:54). 
   
Over  the  past   six  decades,  it   has   been  suggested,   the  FAO   has 
experienced three phases, which might be characterised as growth, 
maturity and – potentially - decline. In the first, between its inception - in 
1951 as part of its development the organisation moved from Washington 
to new headquarters in Rome where it has been based ever since (FAO 
2010c) - and approximately 1970, the FAO was the pre-eminent 
agricultural IGO, enjoying rapid growth in resources and influence and 
with no serious competitors to the roles it played, a process that 
functionalist analysis would predict. Between 1970 and1980, however, 
whilst at what might in retrospect be seen as FAO’s institutional apogee, 
new competitive actors emerged (notably the WFP, founded in 1963 
(Weiss & Jordan 1976) and IFAD, founded in 1977) and the dominance of 
FAO’s   roles   began   to   be   challenged.   Development   financing   for 
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agriculture, however, continued to expand, as did the FAO’s resources: 
 
for example the Technical Collaboration Programme was established in 
 
1976, and in 1980 FAO concluded 56 agreements for the appointment of 
 
FAO Representatives in developing member countries (FAO 2010c). 
    
The third phase of the FAO according to this analysis has been since 1980, 
when FAO has been challenged on all fronts, its budget curbed (indeed 
capped from 1994-2001) and its size and influence reduced. The USA had 
already reduced its contribution in 1990, alleging politicisation and 
inefficiencies which were aired publicly (Boyles 2005), in the wake of 
serious disagreements with the FAO over e.g. control of the WFP (Shaw 
2007). Although there was a change of Director-General in 1993, the 
appointment of Jacques Diouf to replace Edouard Saouma did not resolve 
the organisation’s continuing perceived problems. In the last decade there 
was e.g. IGO criticism of FAO’s alleged support for biotechnology – Diouf 
insisted that this was an unjust accusation (Diouf 2004) - and the public 
resignation letter of Assistant Director Louise Fresco, citing ‘bureaucratic 
paralysis’   (Fresco   2006).   Criticism   led   to   the   appointment   of   an 
‘Independent External Evaluation’ (IEE), funded by the USA, which 
reported in 2007. The IEE Report found serious flaws in FAO’s operations 
and called for reform, a call which was echoed by the organisation’s own 
staff protesting an organisation that had lost its way (FAO 2007). A rise in 
budget in 2007-8 was only achieved over the opposition of the USA, 
whose delegation argued that ‘The poor financial health of FAO is due to 
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its failure to live within its means’ (US Mission to the UN Agencies in Rome 
 
2007). 
    
Despite funding increases and the calls for internal reform, the FAO was 
evidently unable to prevent the food price spike of 2008-9, and was even 
accused of helping to create it by one African leader who suggested it 
should  be  merged  with  IFAD  (Ba  2008).     After  the  crisis  subsided, 
however, the FAO published a vigorous defence of its role: in delivering 
assistance through agricultural inputs and technical assistance in over 80 
countries, in partnering with the World Bank, WFP and IFAD to deliver 
over 60 assessment missions, and in monitoring markets through the 
GIEWS. Yet this FAO report on its own activity also mentioned the three- 
year Immediate Plan of Action for the agency’s renewal, based on the 
findings of the IEE (FAO 2009b). Almost the final word on FAO’s next 
annual review of its own activities was ‘A comprehensive programme of 
organisational reform and culture change began in 2008’ (FAO 2010c:16). 
   
Although therefore FAO has always had a role, at least in principle, in 
relation to policy it is possible to make a distinction between the FAO on 
the one hand, and other IGOs such as the World Bank and UNCTAD on 
the other. So it has been suggested that whereas the World Bank held to 
the Washington Consensus and then the PWC, the FAO ‘maintained that 
improving agricultural efficiency was the key to improving living standards 
for developing countries (Caufield 1997:62). A senior FAO official with 
experience of working in both the World Bank and the FAO made the 
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point that whereas the World Bank had policies and strategies that were 
agreed positions on certain issues (e.g. on market based risk management 
instruments), in FAO there has  always  been a  wide diversity of views 
(Hafez Ghanem, interview, 1 February 2011). He argued that FAO’s focus 
has always been on developing capacity in countries to have their own 
policies and also to share experiences. ‘But it is very difficult on any specific 
issue to say to say what FAO’s policy is. All the time we debate - should we 
have a clear cut position or is having diversity and points of view a good 
thing?’ (Hafez Ghanem, interview, 1 February 2011) If this were true, 
policies may therefore be more difficult to discern at the FAO than at, for 
example, the World Bank, the IMF or many other IGOs, and an analyst 
may need to work more as a ‘detective’ in determining FAO policy than for 
other IGOs. 
   
The existence of a technical policy network for risk management helped 
facilitate the exchange of research evidence, the creation of joint work 
programmes such as the ITF-CRMG, and even the secondment of officials 
from one IGO to another. Yet the prolonged absence of FAO officials from 
this policy network suggests that the process does not always work 
smoothly. This has already been admitted: the IEE of FAO in 2007 
concluded that: FAO’s policy work in general was found to make little use 
of other organisations’ publications or disseminate them, although many 
were of good quality and addressed pertinent issues (FAO 2007:41). 
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Whilst NGOS accused the FAO of acting in the interests of global 
agribusiness, the IEE Report declared that ‘The short story in this area is 
that FAO has had relatively little contact with the private sector and does 
not understand well the role of private enterprise’ (FAO 2007:213). The 
IEE Report included the following observation: ‘Partnerships with the 
private sector are overall weak. In view of the increasingly significant roles 
played by private firms, there is a need for a clear corporate strategy to 
address this’ (FAO 2007:41). 
   
And in addition to attacks from NGOs and the IEE over relations with the 
private sector, criticism of successive World Food Summits in Rome as 
‘talkfests’ was widespread, with no firm financial commitments from 
participating nations, outrage from several member states at President 
Mugabe’s attendance in 2009 and disagreements on e.g. biofuels (e.g. 
Ariel & D’Emilio 2009). FAO therefore found itself, despite all its work and 
achievements, caught in the middle of a barrage of criticism from different 
quarters: it would scarcely be an exaggeration to describe the FAO by the 
turn of the century as almost an organisation under siege, with an internal 
mythology of incapacity. This is the wider organisational context in which 
the study of FAO policy towards market-based risk management 
instruments should be viewed. 
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FAO policy and risk management - never the twain shall meet? 
    
Within this general context, how did FAO react to the rise of market-based 
agricultural risk management during the 1990s? Within FAO there was no 
Lyons Conference, no new mission statement, no Damascene conversion 
to market solutions, and – for a long while - no working with other IGOs 
on this subject. It is also possible, though not evidenced, that the failure to 
respond  to  changed   external  conditions  (at  least   in  the  sense  of 
embracing market solutions to problems) was one factor driving the USA 
to cut its budget allocation to the FAO in 1990. The FAO’s scepticism 
towards the private sector was not confined to senior management:   in 
the view of the academic who subsequently became the leading advocate 
within the FAO of market-based solutions to agricultural risk management 
problems, ‘The individuals working in the Commodities Branch had 
become accustomed to a particular way of working which in no way 
encompassed the active promotion of market based solutions to their field 
officers  or  working  with  the  private  sector  to  take  these  products  to 
farmers directly’ (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). Whilst 
advertising publicly, for example on its website and in annual reports, its 
willingness to work with the private sector, the internal development 
discourse of the organisational remained rooted in earlier policy 
development policies in which the State and IGOs took the lead. 
   
Study of FAO documents from the last century likewise reveals an 
apparently total absence of references to market based risk management 
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instruments. For example Sarris himself wrote two papers for the FAO 
 
concerning structural adjustment and macroeconomic policy (Sarris 1987, 
 
1990) before he started to write on risk market-based risk management 
instruments (Sarris 1998). A similar absence may  be found in an FAO 
paper from 1994 on interest rates and rural development (FAO 1994) and 
a more general discussion even on risk (Fafchamps 1997). It should be 
recognised in mitigation that many FAO officials saw risk management 
only as a very small part of the solution to the much wider problem of 
rural credit and finance in general. But even in a paper on rural financial 
credit  written  for  the  FAO  (but  with  the  support  of  the  German 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)), risk management, 
though forcefully recommended, is allocated to the financial institution, 
not the farmer: ‘Risk management is an essential element in building a 
sound loan assets portfolio’ (Coffey 1998:45). There is no mention of risk 
management by farmers themselves (or farmers’ co-operatives) in the 
paper, despite the well-known conclusion that managed risks are cheaper 
and make better loan propositions than unmanaged ones (e.g. Wenner 
2010). In a paper specifically devoted to discussion of agricultural finance 
in the same year, the only mention of market based risk management 
methods found in publicly available documents is a critical (if true) one: 
‘only the largest farmers have access to risk management instruments such 
as options’ (FAO 1998). Conversely, the numerous papers from UNCTAD 
and the World Bank concerning agricultural risk management policies and 
instruments did not mention FAO at all (e.g. Hess, Richter & Stoppa 2002) 
or made scant mention (e.g. UNCTAD 2002). 
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Elsewhere in the FAO, outside the Trade and Commodities Division, the 
predominant discourse remained far removed from an acceptance of 
market based solutions more generally. For example, as late as between 
13-15 June 2005 in Barcelona, the International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) organised a ‘Strategic Dialogue on 
Commodities, Trade, Poverty and Sustainable Development’. A participant 
was Harmon Thomas, then at the FAO, who has been identified by many 
IGO officials as a leading critic of market-based mechanisms (see above, 
Chapter   Seven).   From   UNCTAD   came   Mehmet   Ali,   who   was   not 
associated with the Commodities Branch in that IGO. One session 
specifically addressed the ‘option for re-introducing elements of supply 
management  both  at  the  national  and  international  level’  (ICTSD/IIED 
2005),  which  was  a  reference  to  commodities  agreements.  Another 
session   addressed   ‘growing   corporate   concentration   in   commodity 
markets and the impact of imbalances of market power against primary 
producers’ (ICTSD/IIED 2005). There was no mention of market-based 
mechanisms for agricultural risk management in the Agenda for the 
meeting. 
  
 
Equally, however, nowhere in the FAO literature, even during the pre- 
Sarris era, is there specific condemnation of the use of agricultural risk 
management instruments either. The actual position of the FAO, at least 
for the many years of its silence on the issue, needs therefore be sought 
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elsewhere than in its publications, or at least not exclusively there, e.g. 
from interviews and in meeting agendas, or deduced from the absence of 
evidence. Whilst the routes by which seminars organised by IGOs 
eventually influence policy are usually exceptionally difficult to chart, the 
agenda of such meetings can be analysed to reveal the attitudes of 
participants and their organisations towards specific policies. However this 
route  yields  no  evidence  either:  FAO  Commodity  Division  meeting 
agendas from this era did not schedule discussion of market based risk 
management issues (e.g. FAO 1998a). 
   
Equally important therefore is evidence of the presence of critics of market- 
based mechanisms by omission. The paucity of documents concerning this 
issue at  a  time when the use of agricultural futures and  options was 
rapidly expanding (for example traded volumes at the Chicago Board of 
Trade rose dramatically between 1990 and 2000) is surely remarkable. To 
some extent this can be explained by the institutional division of 
responsibilities within the UN system between UNCTAD and the FAO, and 
it cannot be proved from documents alone that the critics stifled debate, 
but the facts of lack of publication are surely startling. 
   
Even when other IGOS such as UNCTAD or the World Bank became active 
in promoting market based risk management instruments for agriculture, 
FAO authors felt no need to support them. In relation to the work of the 
ITF-CRMG, for example, Slangen observed: ‘…new approaches to market- 
based risk management mechanisms should be tried out and, if found 
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positive, [my italics] made widely known’ (Slangen 2002:6). So as late as 
 
2002 at least one FAO author was still prepared to argue that there had 
been no conclusive proof of the benefits of at least ‘new approaches’ to 
market based risk management instruments, despite the fact that they had 
already been in widespread use in developed countries, at least, for 
decades.  And  as  late  as  2005  another  FAO  author  observed  that 
‘Agricultural insurance, although one of the most often quoted tools for 
risk management, can only play a limited role in managing the risks related 
with farming… The acid test of developing and operating an insurance 
programme to complement other risk management measures depends on 
the cost/benefit ratio - to the farmer and to the potential insurance 
providers’ (Roberts 2005:vii). The introduction to his document specifically 
mentioned the ‘growing business’ of agricultural insurance, which was 
stated to have been driven by the increasing commercialisation of 
agriculture. It is crucial to recognise that within the FAO and for the 
audience the introduction was writing for, increased commercialisation 
would not necessarily be regarded favourably and therefore nor would by 
association agricultural insurance. Roberts’ paper concentrated mainly on 
issues  such  as  basis  risk  and  economic  impediments  to  the  efficient 
running of private sector agricultural insurance, but did not address any 
environmental issues. 
   
For many years, then, FAO as an organisation seems in fact to have 
behaved as if market agricultural price, yield or other risk management 
mechanisms were peripheral to the FAO’s role in global agriculture and 
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therefore of no institutional concern. FAO did not have a policy in favour 
of, or against, market based risk management instruments: it had no policy 
towards them at all. For those consultants, academics, risk management 
practitioners and policymakers vitally concerned with market-based risk 
management instruments – the policy network involving the World Bank 
and UNCTAD - this might have seemed impossible to fathom, but the wide 
scope of the FAO’s institutional concerns must be born in mind – market- 
based risk management instruments could only ever form a very small part 
of an analytical and policy task which encompasses the whole scope of 
global agriculture (FAO 2010c). In addition, the FAO’s links with those 
IGOs where market-based risk management was a live issue were slight: 
Referring to that time a leading consultant to the World Bank commented: 
‘The FAO is not an IGO that comes up much at the [World] Bank – there is 
just no institutional link’ (Stijn Claessens, interview, 9 December 2009). 
Jerry Skees expressed an almost identical view: ‘the FAO did not seem to 
be making a big effort in the area’ (Jerry Skees, interview, 31 October 
2010).   Nor did FAO officials attend UNCTAD or World Bank ITF risk 
management conferences or participate in their round tables until the 
pivotal appointment of Alexander Sarris, discussed below. What can be 
recognised here is that the FAO stood outside not only the policy 
community of the ITF-CRMG, but also the wider policy network of market 
agricultural risk management. Indeed, FAO’s policies largely excluded 
explicit advocacy of market based solutions to most problems (and 
therefore  the  Washington  Consensus),  so  for  both  reasons  the  FAO 
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avoided discussion of market based risk management solutions to 
agricultural risk. 
   
FAO lack of expertise and interest in market-based risk management 
instruments was readily recognised by other IGOs. As early as 1995, the 
UNCTAD Secretariat, presenting a paper to the Committee on Commodity 
Problems, Intergovernmental Group on Grains’ Twenty-Sixth Session in 
Rome between 30 May and 2 June 1995, offered to help FAO 
(UNCTAD/FAO 1995). From the evidence of documents available on the 
FAO website, and from discussions with officials, it was only around this 
time, prodded from outside, that FAO even began to engage with market 
based risk management instruments for agriculture. The UNCTAD 
Secretariat suggested: ‘UNCTAD could assist in placing at the disposal of 
member countries their extensive experience in this field, in cooperation 
with FAO, where opportune’ (UNCTAD/FAO 1995:9). But this did not 
happen. The offer was not so much overtly rebuffed as that there was no 
one within FAO to take up the offer of collaboration. The few FAO papers 
even  to  discuss  risk  remained  isolated  from  the  World  Bank/UNCTAD 
policy  norm  –  tea,  the  subject  of  one  such  paper,  is  one  of  the 
commodities that does not have an active derivatives market (e.g. FAO 
1999). The point was specifically conceded within FAO: ‘With the 
retirement of Richard Roberts, Chief of [Marketing and Rural Finance 
Service] AGSM, remaining staff have no specific technical competence in 
agricultural insurance. Instead, it is envisaged to strengthen in the near 
future the overall risk management capabilities of the rural finance staff’ 
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(Slangen 2002:3). UNCTAD - and the World Bank - therefore pursued their 
commodity (and within that, agricultural) risk management programme 
quite independently of FAO (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009). 
   
The reasons why the FAO remained outside the risk management policy 
network  are  several.  First,  that  the  mandate  of  the  organisation  was 
always directly connected with the technical aspects of agriculture (which 
explains a reluctance to accept other market policies, for example why the 
FAO was slow to accept the idea of contract farming, not publishing a 
broadly sympathetic paper until the turn of the century (Eaton & Shepherd 
2001). Second, and related to this, the FAO’s employees as noted below 
were commodities specialists who were not familiar with – and distrusted 
– the derivatives markets (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009), 
and thirdly, that the organisational culture of the FAO was based on 
resistance to the wider policy norms of the Washington Consensus and 
continued scepticism as it was transformed into the PWC (Caufield 1997). 
   
The tide turns 
    
Alexander Sarris, at the time not yet full-time with the FAO but a Professor 
at Athens University and a Research Fellow at the World Bank, had staked 
out his position in favour of market based instruments before he joined 
FAO (Sarris 1998, Sarris 2002a). He had argued that the uncertainty and 
risk were detrimental to investment and growth for poor producers and 
countries,  and  that  in  the  absence  of  agricultural  risk  management 
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instruments, they would be forced back to ‘primitive’ risk management 
strategies,  ‘which  include  diversification,  large  concentration  in 
subsistence food staples, and avoidance of large dependence on volatile 
exportable crops or other primary products’ (Sarris 2002:2). These are 
costly, he argued, because of foregone income gains from specialisation 
and the inability to make more productive but irreversible investments 
(Sarris 2002:2) Quite unafraid of potential criticism that using such 
instruments would lead to monocropping, Sarris made the explicit point 
that specialisation was an advantage [my italics] of the adoption of risk 
management instruments (Sarris 2002:2). Later he qualified this, 
responding to a question with the view that whilst monocropping was an 
issue in Europe for large concerns with price insurance it was unlikely to 
be much of an issue in developing countries, irrespective of risk 
management issues (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). .Sarris’ 
argument therefore was quite explicitly that ‘primitive’ risk management 
strategies such as diversification lead to loss of income and are inefficient 
(and that more sophisticated risk management strategies avoid this) but 
he did not address the environmental consequences of a move away from 
such ‘primitive’ risk management strategies. This view was a direct parallel 
to similar views being expressed by World Bank consultants at the same 
time:  farmers cope with these risks mainly through diversification (other 
crops and off farm income) and self-insurance (savings, other assets, 
consumption smoothing, etc.)   In the absence of risk markets (formal or 
informal), some choices about diversification and asset allocation can lead 
to lower investment and incomes (Varangis & Nash 2003:2). There could 
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never have been any doubt, therefore, that if appointed to a management 
position  Sarris  would  advocate  pro-market  risk  management  policies 
within FAO. 
   
Sarris had already presented to the ITF-CRMG before joining the FAO so 
brought the first institutional connection between the FAO and the work 
of the World Bank on risk management (Sarris 1999). Further evidence 
can be viewed in the presentation written in December 2003 by Sarris and 
other FAO consultants on the use of futures and options for agricultural 
risk management (Sarris, Conforti & Prakash 2003). This presentation 
contained the same view as Sarris had made in the paper discussed in the 
paragraph above: the actual conclusions of the presentation, that ‘Profits 
depend on [the] period of simulation’ (Sarris, Conforti & Prakash 2003:26) 
were not startling. The fact of the presentation was important, however, 
as   it   was   to   a   ITF   Meeting   and   shows   clear   evidence   of   the 
commencement of policy change at the FAO: the integration of personnel 
and a commonality of outlook, joint participation in a technical policy 
network between IGOs. 
   
The external environment alters and the change agent acts 
 
  
 
Professor  Sarris  joined   FAO   full   time   in   2004   as   Director   of   the 
Commodities and Trade Division. He then did indeed advocate market 
based risk management and became the main protagonist for it within the 
FAO. Moreover his extensive connections with the World Bank, with other 
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IGOs and with the academic community assisted the integration of the 
FAO’s position with that of other IGOs, drawing his Division into the policy 
community of risk management experts within and between IGOs, 
especially the World Bank/ITF and UNCTAD. 
   
The difficulty of the task facing him, however, was illustrated by the fact 
that when he was appointed at the FAO, on secondment from Athens 
University, there were some in UNCTAD and the World Bank who were 
not only surprised by the appointment but thought that his support for 
market  based  solutions  to  agricultural  risk  management  (and  market 
solutions  generally)  would  render  his  tenure  there  relatively  short17. 
 
However Sarris’ appointment and the work programme for his Division 
encompassed much more than risk management advocacy - it was a 
response to dramatically changed background international conditions 
which provided the opportunity for senior management to support the 
changes he was to bring about in the Division. He himself explained the 
effect of the changes: more than a dozen of the Commodity Agreements 
signed in the 1970s (see above Chapter Four) had resulted in the creation 
and maintenance of intergovernmental commodity groups. Some had 
independent membership like International Coffee and Cocoa 
Organisations, whereas some relied on FAO to provide a secretariat – jute, 
cereals, rice, tropical fruits, bananas, meat and dairy, tea, and oilseeds 
amongst them. The Commodities division was big because people had 
been hired in that context – some 140 people. Most had been hired to 
  
17 Officials made this suggestion to me privately at the time. 
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provide statistical analysis and analyse markets, and to provide information 
to the developing world. As the developing countries increased their skills, 
Sarris  contended,  (and  he  might  have  added,  as  information  became 
easier to access and process) the purpose of FAO providing information 
shrank (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). This was one of the 
reasons why FAO’s role was under threat. In international trade there was 
also observed an increasing lack of emphasis on commodities during this 
period: even in the World Trade Organisation commodity problems were 
rarely discussed during this period, except for cotton and some tropical 
fruits. The World Bank abolished its commodity division at the turn of the 
millennium and FAO began to downsize – so, Sarris stressed, the process 
had begun long before his own appointment, although if this were so it 
took many years before the advocacy of market based risk management 
appeared within FAO, despite the enthusiasm for market solutions of 
donor countries such as the USA. After six months in the job Sarris 
assembled his Division for a retreat in Umbria, to produce a fundamental 
document on divisional strategy. This, Sarris said, was the first time that the 
Division had ever done this. Sarris always wanted his Division to undertake 
analytic work, not provide summaries of what was already known. He was 
proud that the division had performed analytic work in five areas in 
response to ‘hotly asked’ requests from member Governments.   Risk 
management was one of them, value chain analysis, another. Trade policy 
and agricultural development were also in demand. Sarris decided that the 
qualifications, experience and abilities of his existing staff was not 
appropriate for the econometric and other analytical work that he wished 
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to have the Division undertake. ‘Specialist commodity analysts could 
describe but not analyse [these were] not even economists, [they were] 
traders,  ex-commodity  house  workers’  (Alexander  Sarris,  interview,  26 
January 2009). They neither were, nor could become, members of the 
policy network of market based risk management: whether or not they 
shared the commitment to the policy norm itself or the broader principles 
of the PWC. 
   
Specifically in relation to the use of market-based risk management tools, 
Sarris himself as evidenced above was always convinced that they could 
be of use as a development tool. But ‘When I first discussed this with my 
people here [in 2004] they thought I was coming from the moon. I faced 
outright  hostility’  (Alexander  Sarris,  interview,  26  January  2009). 
According to Sarris, partly this was because FAO had not done any work 
in this area except to a limited extent in the AGS division with work by Ed 
Seidler. Echoing the comments of World Bank consultants above, Sarris 
explained that ‘Risk management expertise was not considered to be one 
of the core technologies of FAO’ (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 
2009). 
 
   
Sarris’  actions  within  FAO  typify  those  of  a  change  agent.  He  moved 
quickly to ensure that his Division made contributions regarding market 
based risk management. He, Ali Gurkan and the few other risk 
management experts at FAO, and consultants, produced a series of texts 
published as FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Papers 
354
341 
(e.g. Sarris & Mantzou 2005, Sarris, Conforti & Prakash 2005, Rapsomanikis 
 
& Sarris 2005). By 2005 the balance of policy (and personnel) within his 
Division, at least, had changed to the extent that Sarris was able to make a 
report to the Annual Meeting of the ITF on ‘FAO current activities on price 
and weather risk management’ (Sarris 2005). Sarris told the ITF, explaining 
FAO’s new policy supportive of market based risk management 
instruments, that the FAO was engaged in household survey based 
research of price and weather induced risks in two regions of Tanzania, 
jointly with the World Bank, had undertaken two detailed country desk 
studies to explore the feasibility of cereal import price insurance (Malawi, 
Tanzania) a desk study of ex-post simulation of import export price risk 
management for several countries (maize, wheat, robusta coffee), and had 
presented a proposal to WTO in collaboration with UNCTAD on a Food 
Import Financing Facility (FIFF) to be supported by risk management. FAO 
was also working to develop a weather-based maize yield index to be 
used for crop insurance purposes in Malawi (Sarris 2005). No mention was 
made in any of these proposals for a study of the environmental 
implications of the adoption of any programme. Also by 2005, agricultural 
risk management was the subject of a paper, influenced, as discussed 
below, by the UNCTAD Secretariat) at the 65th Session of the Committee 
on Commodity Problems which, drawing on Keynes, took a very positive 
view of risk management (FAO 2005). In a separate document economists 
from the Commodities Division argued that ‘Price risk management is very 
critical to the success of agriculture (Kang & Mahajan 2006:v) because.’ 
scourges of short-term price volatility manifest themselves in many ways. 
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Revenue  uncertainty  not  only  threatens  the  livelihoods  of  the 
agriculturists, but limits farm credit, trapping them in vicious cycles of low 
investment. The ‘commodity problem’ has been rightly described as a 
combination of declining terms of trade (i.e. commodity prices rising less 
rapidly than those of manufactured prices) and price volatility (Page and 
Hewitt 2001)’ (Kang & Mahajan 2006, Preface). As with the policy 
documents produced within UNCTAD, at this level the divisional director 
had latitude to orient the division’s work independently of outside 
influence from member states. 
   
Noticeably in many FAO documents of this period, the benefits of market- 
based mechanisms were frequently mentioned by reference to another 
author, for example a footnote in one of the earliest FAO publications 
specifically    devoted    to    agricultural    risk    management    suggested: 
‘Concerning the theoretical and empirical studies that contributed to a 
change in thinking from price stabilisation to risk management (Larson, 
Varangis and Yabuki (1998) and Varangis, Larson and Anderson (2002)’ 
(Kang  &  Mahajan  2006:3fn).  The  language  used  in  this  paragraph  is 
obtuse. Whose change in thinking is being referred to? The language 
used in the FAO text, however, does not indicate whose change in 
thinking, nor does it suggest that the texts cited actually influenced this 
thinking, merely they are relevant. So the answer to that question had to 
be sought through interviews. It would be more obvious to read a text 
such as: ‘FAO thinking changed away from price stabilisation towards risk 
management,  influenced  by  World  Bank  research’,  etc.  but  such  an 
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admission is not explicitly made. Yet the titles of these World Bank texts, 
 
‘Dealing  with  commodity  price  uncertainty’  and  even  more  explicitly. 
 
‘Agricultural markets and risks: management of the latter, not the former’ 
are openly supportive of market-based risk management solutions. In Kang 
(2007), the relevant text he cited is Makki (2002).  Another example:  ‘…it 
has been shown that income instability in the presence of liquidity 
constraints and inadequate assets, which features rather prominently in 
many  developing  countries,  can  create  poverty  traps  (Zimmerman  & 
Carter 2003)’ (Rapsomanikis & Sarris, 2005:1). 
   
By 2006 the FAO as a whole had even changed its policy sufficiently to be 
a co-sponsor of an International Workshop on Agrometeorological Risk 
Management held under the auspices of the World Meteorological 
Organisation in New Delhi. Perhaps predictably, however, the speakers on 
weather derivatives were Ulrich Hess, from the WFP, and a representative 
of ICICI, the leading Indian investment bank, with a stake in the success of 
weather derivatives (World Meteorological Organisation 2006). That the 
FAO had been a sponsor, however, marked a significant change in policy 
– such sponsorship of conferences addressing market based solutions did 
not happen in earlier years. The FAO followed this up (although a draft 
had been produced two years earlier), (Kang 2005) with a broader survey 
of ‘Innovative agricultural insurance products and schemes’ (Kang 2007). 
Kang listed these as revenue and yield insurance, weather insurance and 
contracts, and structured finance as well as market-based price risk 
management   instruments   and   catastrophe   bonds.   Kang   compared 
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disaster aid and risk management, arguing that the former had negative 
externalities, in particular that: it tended to encourage production in 
marginal situations by indiscriminately covering crop losses – e.g. in fragile, 
arid  countryside  or  flood-prone  wetlands.  He  argued  that  insurance 
should be seen as an alternative to disaster aid: in contrast, crop insurance 
actively reduces risk exposure by promoting public and private risk 
management (Ortloff 1998) (Kang 2007:39). 
   
These contributions to ITF meetings, and papers published within FAO, 
amounted to a change in FAO policy towards market based risk 
management. However, it is worth noting that this policy was still largely 
concentrated within Sarris’ Commodties Division, which (by now, with 
newly recruited staff whose training and analytical skills, as economists, 
permitted them to participate in the market based risk management norm) 
had an analytic function and a role of engaging with Governments, trade 
bodies and commerce. It was however not the case that the Division was 
empowered (or funded) to work closely with farmers to encourage them 
to use market based mechanisms. The Commodities Division remained at 
one remove from FAO’s practical activities in the field. In an important 
sense, therefore, FAO’s core technologies in field assistance to farmers 
continued to be isolated from risk management. The policy community of 
field assistance to farmers, as will be seen below, remained distinct from 
that of the ITF, UNCTAD and the IGO risk management community of 
which Sarris had been a member before he joined FAO and of which 
personnel of his Division were now active members. 
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A pro-market policy consensus? 
    
By 2006 therefore at least one FAO division had been energised by 
Alexander Sarris working as a change agent. The internal policy discourse 
in  FAO  as  a  whole  also  began  to  change.  For  example  the  FAO 
Agricultural Management, Marketing and Finance Service (AGSF) 
Agricultural  Support  Systems  Division  published  ‘An  introduction  to 
market-based instruments for agricultural price risk management’ (Kang & 
Mahajan 2006). The authors recognised that: The expected commodity 
price, prices of competing crops and government programmes play 
important roles in determining the area to be planted’ (Kang & Mahajan 
2006:1).  Mention  was  also  made  of  the  macro-economic  benefits  of 
market-based risk management:  ‘Commodity risk management has the 
potential of simplifying governments’ budgetary planning, improving 
budgetary control, and avoiding the need for crisis management due to 
unforeseen revenue shortfalls’ (Kang & Mahajan 2006:1) but without any 
environmental implications mentioned or any environmental concerns 
evident (that might have led to avoiding the subject altogether). They also 
referred positively to market based agricultural risk management 
instruments: ‘the issue of ‘increasing environmental protection 
requirements’  (Kang  &  Marajan  2006:2)  –  insurance  can  help  meet 
‘environmental protection’ concerns – later referred to as ‘a controlled 
environment’ (Kang 2007:15) and, very importantly for the environmental 
argument, also wrote a footnote criticising subsidies, which ‘may cause 
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cropping   to   be   extended   to   environmentally   fragile   lands’   (Kang 
 
2007:39f).   A similar indirect argument in favour of market-based risk 
management instruments was made by academics who argued that self- 
insurance strategies included ‘more intensive use of common natural 
resources’ (Barnett, Barrett & Skees 2008:11). 
   
A further ‘heartstring’ association of risk with a social evil, in this case 
failure of children to attend school, is found in Karfakis and Sarris’ paper on 
crop income instability effects on consumption smoothing and self- 
insurance among farmers in rural Tanzania (Karfakis & Sarris 2007). They 
cite the research already reviewed above to suggest that income 
fluctuations have significant negative effects on schooling (Kazianga & 
Udry 2006, Gubert & Robillard 2006). This is an interesting attempt to 
place pro-income smoothing policies (which by extension include market 
based   risk   management   instruments)   as   objectively   desirable,   ‘This 
masking of the political under the cloak of neutrality is a key feature of 
modern power’ (Shore & Wright 1997)’ (Sutton 1999:8). 
   
The principal review paper of market based risk management instruments 
produced during this period within FAO referred to the ‘incisive guidance’ 
of Lamon Rutten (Kang & Mahajan 2006:vii)18.  Lamon Rutten did write 
papers on risk management for FAO, but at the same time, he and Frida 
Youssef worked with Sarris on the Marrakesh Agreement, which was a 
politically highly controversial proposal to create a new financing facility 
 
18 Nayana Mahajan, having formerly worked for UNCTAD, was already working with 
Rutten at MCX. 
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for net food-importing developing countries to continue importing even at 
a time of high world food prices. Officials from FAO and UNCTAD spoke 
jointly at a number of meetings in UNCTAD, the WTO and FAO on this 
topic, and FAO published a book drafted by the UNCTAD Secretariat. FAO 
also paid for some of UNCTAD’s risk management work, for example in 
the  Ukraine  (Lamon  Rutten,  interview,  3  June  2010),  This  is  a  clear 
practical application of the theory of change agents working not only 
within an organisation but between organisations. 
   
In 2007, Sarris and a colleague published under joint FAO-World Bank 
auspices an academic paper analysing (inter alia) willingness to pay for 
weather  insurance  on  the  part  of  Tanzanian  farmers  (Sarris  & 
Christiaensen 2007). 2007 was also the year in which the IEE Report on 
the FAO was published. Although there was no specific discussion of 
agricultural risk management in this influential external evaluation of the 
FAO, it recognised implicitly some of the issues elaborated in this thesis. 
The report found that it was widely agreed that FAO had a comparative 
advantage  in  commodity market  analysis  relative to  the  OECD,  World 
Bank and UNCTAD. The report concluded that UNCTAD’s commodity 
market and trade analysis is very limited for agricultural products and there 
was   no   significant   overlap  but   no   significant   synergies  had   been 
developed either (FAO 2007). ‘This IEE evaluation also agreed with the 
evaluation of the Commodities and Trade evaluation that the Committee 
on Commodity Problems (CCP) should, from now on, hold its meetings in 
Geneva’ (FAO 2007:192). The pressure that led to these two reports is one 
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of the main factors that helped Sarris and his colleagues to propel the FAO 
into the then prevailing IGO policy community of risk management 
expertise. The prevailing presentation in that community, as noted above 
(Chapters Five and Six), was to combine empirical analysis of the results of 
market-based risk management, as for example reflected in Sarris’ own 
presentations, with an assumption of their welfare benefits whilst largely 
ignoring implementation difficulties and completely ignoring their 
environmental implications (e.g. Sarris 2007).  As noted above, exceptions 
that stressed the practical implementation difficulties (eg. Gilbert 2002). 
were relatively rare. 
   
However, there was evidence that within FAO more widely there was 
gradual acceptance of market based risk management instruments. For 
example, Hess’ list of advantages, written for the World Bank (Hess 2003) 
was cited by a Rural Finance Officer, of the FAO at the International Food 
and Agribusiness Management Association International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Association 17th Annual World Forum and 
Symposium in June 2007, which demonstrates that by 2007 this analysis 
had become accepted even within the FAO more widely, not just within 
the Commodities Division (Pagura 2007). 
   
The role of senior management 
  
  
A change agent can often only succeed with the tacit support, at least, of 
senior  management.  Sarris  himself  pointed  to  the  importance  for  his 
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project of remoulding the Commodities Division – including FAO’s policy 
towards market-based risk management instruments - of having support 
higher up within FAO – Assistant Director, Hafez Ghanem, appointed in 
2007, was formerly employed at the World Bank (Alexander Sarris, 
interview, 22 September 2009). Ghanem himself was modest about the 
influence that he exerted as a Director, stressing the collaborative nature 
of the way his Department manages its work programme, noting the 
existence of a departmental management team which included divisional 
directors and deputies, meeting weekly, and going on retreat twice a year. 
One of the key roles of this group is to set out work programme across the 
divisions, allocate resources, determine budgets and outline timeframes. 
Specifically in relation to the role of senior management, Ghanem took the 
view that the support he could offer was in relation to coordinating 
discussion, allocating budgets and, thirdly, to protect the agreed work 
programme from outside interference from other parts of the organisation 
(Hafez Ghanem, interview, 1 February 2011). 
   
The Policy Cycle 
 
   
The cyclical nature of institutional policy change was reflected well in the 
fact that at the same time as UNCTAD reversed course, the FAO had 
virtually completed the first part of its own journey of policy change. FAO 
documents produced by, or under the control of Sarris, are a notable 
indicator of this change. How far attitudes within the FAO had changed is 
illustrated by the fact that by 2007 joint Intergovernmental groups at the 
363
350 
FAO regularly reviewed market risk management mechanisms, presenting 
them as replacements for price setting by governments (FAO 2007a). In 
May 2007 the FAO even hosted a ‘Conference on Commodity Exchanges 
and their role in Market Development and Transparency’ in Istanbul (FAO 
2007b).  Both  MCX  and  UNCTAD  presented  at  that  Conference  (FAO 
 
2007a) as did Sarris himself and Ali Gurkan (Sarris 2007).  It remained the 
case however that inter-agency collaboration was not complete: for 
example those agricultural risk management meetings which were still 
sponsored by UNCTAD (e.g. the Experts Meeting in September 2007) had 
no participation from FAO. Whilst it is often difficult to show a clear 
example of the correctness of a theoretical approach, these conferences 
and presentations demonstrate a form of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio 
& Powell 1983), as FAO followed the paths set by other apparently more 
successful institutions – UNCTAD, and the World Bank. 
   
Other FAO Perspectives: the limits of change 
    
Although Sarris, backed by senior management and other staff members 
such as Ali Gurkan, was able to act as a change agent for the Division he 
headed, there were still mid-ranking officials within the FAO who never 
shared Sarris’ enthusiasm for market-based mechanisms.  Many of these 
officials were based in the AGS division which works closely alongside the 
Commodities  Division.     For  example  longstanding  FAO  AGS  official 
Andrew Shepherd said that he had attended one of the World Bank/ITF 
meetings  and  found  it  ‘very  much  a  private  sector  sort  of  meeting’ 
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(Andrew Shepherd, interview, 25 January 2009). He thought it was ‘a 
bunch of academics dreaming up good ideas’ (Andrew Shepherd, 
interview, 25 January 2009). The lack of communication between the 
World Bank and at least part of the FAO was evidenced by the fact that as 
of January 2009 he (Shepherd) did not even realise that the ITF-CRMG had 
been abolished. His colleague Ed Seidler added that the work of the AGS 
was highly practical, with an implied contrast to the theoretical work of 
the Commodities Branch. As for the work of the World Bank’s ITF-CRMG, 
he described it as convincing theoretically, but observed that ‘if you look at 
the scale of operations of these bodies, they have to be fairly significant 
players. People seem to overestimate either the ability of the farmers’ 
organisations to get quantities of product significant enough to sell 
forward – the need for institutional support is underestimated. He went so 
far as to suggest that the pilot studies were ‘faked’ – in the sense that the 
banks arranged for the farmers and co-operatives to take contracts (Ed 
Seidler, interview, 25 January 2009). 
   
So  very  importantly,  whilst  FAO  mid-ranking  officials  outside  Sarris’ 
Division frequently held and continue to hold the view that whilst market 
based risk management mechanisms may be theoretically desirable, they 
also contended that they are in many cases impractical to create or use. 
This objection, as the evidence from interviews amply demonstrates, was 
probably the single most important objection to the enthusiastic adoption 
of active programmes of market based risk management education within 
the FAO. If there was much doubt amongst many IGO officials about the 
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use of risk management instruments by farmers, some of it concerned 
simply the extent of understanding. 
   
Many officials, especially those in FAO with longstanding experience of 
working with farmers themselves, certainly did (and do) believe that there 
are major, even insuperable, administrative difficulties in getting farmers to 
adopt   these   practices   (Calvin   Miller,   interview,   26   January   2009). 
Advocates  of  market  based  solutions  were  aware  of  these  criticisms: 
Rutten himself readily conceded that whilst the use of risk management 
instruments by farmers was desirable, access was likely to be indirect (e.g., 
in the form of a greater range of contract pricing clauses, or bundled 
together with a credit) (Lamon Rutten, interview, 1 April 2009) which in 
turn would render difficult any assessment of their practicality or even 
effect. Secondly, Rutten pointed out that although farmers who do not 
hedge are by definition speculating on prices, ‘doing this over generations 
has created a bit of an attitude that it’s OK to do this’ (Lamon Rutten, 
interview, 1 April 2009). In practice this means that when offered a wider 
range  of  price  speculation  opportunities,  some  farmers  will  speculate 
more. A particular example was the widely reported problems with hedge- 
to-arrive contracts in the USA in the later years of last century (e.g. USDA 
1996a, Lemieux 1999). FAO officials were acutely aware of these issues. 
Finally, there is a certain cost element to use risk management markets 
(variation margins in particular are a regular problem) and for this reason, 
some intermediary is usually required for farmers even in developed 
countries, let alone in developing countries (Christopher Gilbert, interview, 
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31 July 2009). Options and in particular, options built into contractual 
arrangements (for inputs, production or credit) are widely regarded as 
much more suitable for lower income users as they involve a fixed 
expenditure and therefore limit potential losses and therefore cap risk. This 
combination of difficulty of access, problems with speculation, and costs, 
combined to make many officials at the FAO, especially those outside the 
Commodities Division, sceptical of the use of risk management instruments 
even if in principle they were sympathetic. 
   
Within the AGS the resultant sense of scepticism, even as late as interviews 
held in 2009, was palpable. Calvin Miller, from the AGS, suggested that 
whereas understanding and usage were rare amongst poorer farmers, 
paradoxically they were the ones who ought to use price risk mitigation 
more than rich ones. Any farmer in a precarious situation should be told to 
contract everything, but small farmer organisations do not understand the 
intricacies so they do not use price risk mechanisms optimally for example, 
they sell everything ahead. Co-ops and farmer organisations can get into a 
downward spiral, giving out bonuses when times are good but failing to 
cover risk. That and accounts payable are the two reasons farmers 
organisations go bust. (Calvin Miller, interview, 25 January 2009). His chief 
of department Doyle Baker suggested that over the years farmers and 
SMEs had become more market oriented, so in context of credit cards, 
agro-input networks, downstream transportation and market information 
available on mobile phones so that local traders do not outfox farmers – ‘it 
seems  inconceivable  that  not  only  commodity  exchanges  and  futures 
367
354 
markets will build services to farmers. Small farmers producing only for 
themselves  and  a  small  surplus  are  a  disappearing  way  of  life’  (Doyle 
Baker, interview, 26 January 2009). 
   
Risk management and the environment 
    
It is possible to view the views of such critics (whether explicit or implicit) 
as part of a very traditional ‘development narrative’, that of overgrazing 
and desertification which are rooted in the ecological belief that 
environmental change occurs when there is a departure from ecological 
ideals and the concept of a carrying capacity (Leach & Mearns 1996). 
   
During the same time period as its work on agricultural risk management 
(1990- present) the FAO did publish a number of papers on the 
environmental aspects of agriculture (e.g. Glantz 2003). The FAO also 
expended considerable effort during the 1990s in the production of agro- 
environmental indicators, creating a division called Sustainable Agriculture 
and Rural Development (SARD) which produced its own agro-economic 
indicators, the officer responsible being Jeff Tschirley (FAO 1997). These 
indicators were supplemented by another (unpublished) list from within 
the Statistics Department of FAO. Notably, neither list of agro- 
environmental indicators contained any reference to monocropping, the 
main perceived environmental disadvantage of the use of market based 
risk management, nor indeed to risk management. 
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There might be regarded as good reason for this: as noted above (Chapter 
Two) the question of the link, if any, between risk management and 
pesticide, fertilizer and insecticide use was only discussed in a limited 
number of academic articles prior to 2000, and the authors, based on US 
data, had produced contradictory conclusions, This was one main reason 
why proponents of market based risk management instruments neither 
felt the need nor had the data or conclusions available to debate the issue. 
   
How far is it possible to discern a specifically environmental objection to 
risk management instruments identifiable in the FAO documents? What 
would be really conclusive is what we cannot find, explicit denunciation of 
market-based risk management instruments on environmental grounds. 
(Closest arguably are these remarks:  ‘Agricultural insurance can play only 
a limited role in managing the risks related with farming, as basic risk 
management measures in agriculture rest with other disciplines’ (Slangen 
2002:4)). This is because although many of its departments have a wide 
interest in environmental matters, FAO has never commissioned a study 
on the welfare impact of derivative use or more specifically on the 
environmental impact of market based risk management instruments. The 
explanation for this lies partly in the fact that the experts within FAO on 
agro-environmental indicators, Jeff Tschirley for example, did not reside 
within Sarris’ department and therefore do not form part of the FAO’s 
policy towards market based risk management instruments. Moreover, the 
remaining critics of market based mechanisms within FAO had by the time 
Sarris started to publish been virtually forced ‘underground’, compelled 
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into silence on the question of agricultural risk management, distanced 
from Sarris’ division in any event and not required to develop policy on 
market based risk management instruments, still less on their 
environmental implications. Those who held critical views during this 
period,  held  them  privately  and  were  too  afraid  that  their  view  was 
against a prevailing global consensus to express it publicly. However it 
would also have been a matter of resource allocation and public relations. 
For the FAO to have released a study arguing that agricultural risk 
management was environmentally damaging would have had a number 
of consequences. Firstly, it would have opened up the debate globally on 
the negative environmental consequences of agricultural production 
generally, that it is not in the FAO’s interests to promote or even much 
discuss. In subsequent years they have been forced to confront this issue, 
but even now not to a significant or consistent extent. Secondly, it would 
have opened the FAO up to the criticism that their lack of support for 
agricultural risk management instruments was actually underlaid by a wish 
to return to government control, and that the FAO was therefore ‘out of 
touch’ with ‘modern’ market solutions to risk issues.  Thirdly, it would have 
sparked off a major inter-agency conflict with the World Bank (the ITF- 
CRMG in particular) and UNCTAD over agricultural risk management 
instruments as these agencies would then have been forced to respond 
with studies of their own. From the limited academic work seen on the 
question (e.g. Babcock, Fraser & Lekakis 2003), it seems clear that clarity 
on the issue would not have been forthcoming and that a range of 
different   conclusions   would   be   reached   by   any   empirical   studies. 
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Choosing particular farmers, crops and countries within a study could 
produce an answer sympathetic to the critics’ view of agricultural risk 
management, or the reverse. As a result there would seem little point in 
the FAO opening the can of worms. Fourthly, the FAO had numerous 
other resource priorities, and even in the mid-1990s it was obvious to 
officials there, even the critics, that outright and public opposition to 
agricultural risk management would alienate many of their stakeholders. 
Fifthly, if the FAO had wanted to investigate the environmental 
implications of agricultural risk management, this would most probably 
have had to be mediated (as discussed in Chapter Two) through agro- 
environmental indicators, and in particular the FAO’s SARD concept which 
was  neither  closely  defined  or  uncontroversial,  but  which  certainly 
involved   a   concept   of   balancing   environmental   versus   social   and 
economic interests. Neither the FAO nor the OECD indicators produced 
an answer to the balancing question between income (especially for the 
rural poor) and environmental damage. Finally, agricultural risk 
management is a highly technical field of study, and FAO desk officers in 
particular had no especial expertise to analyse it. The absence of any study 
on the environmental implications of risk management can also be seen as 
part of a much wider FAO attitude of indifference towards agricultural risk 
management discussed above. Whatever the balance between these 
causes of inaction, the practical result was that the FAO preferred to look 
in the other direction and largely ignore agricultural risk management 
altogether, including its environmental implications. In Sarris’ division 
meanwhile, even  those  who  were  sceptical  of  the  advantages  of  risk 
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management did not necessarily consider the environmental aspects. This 
example of policymaking, or the lack of it, demonstrates resource 
dependency within the organisation: without the necessary studies and 
evidence, opposition to market based mechanisms could not crystallise 
into policy. 
   
Nevertheless, that environmental concerns played at least a part in the 
scepticism of FAO officials towards market-based risk management 
instruments is highly plausible. The critics contend that successful risk 
management results in increased plantings, and this in turn leads to the 
cultivation of marginal land. Marginal land almost by definition, but 
especially in developing countries, is widely held to be subject to rapid 
environmental degradation when used for agricultural production 
(Frankenberger & Goldstein 1990, Tunji Titilola & Jeje 2008) which is 
therefore  a  prima facie argument  against  any  agricultural  risk 
management measure that leads to increased production. This is the core 
of the argument. A senior FAO official told me in the late 1990s (off the 
record) that he would rather see farmers go bankrupt than use market- 
based risk management instruments because their use would lead to 
monocropping and environmental damage. A rather different and much 
broader view emerged from an interview with a senior FAO official a 
decade later. In this later view financial incentives will lead to a greater 
concentration of enterprises, with production inevitably less friendly to the 
environment. Greater use of risk management was therefore similar to 
saying  that  the move to  any  type  of market  based  solution will  have 
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environmental risks – minor components of the mix drop out as soil 
declines in quality. The same senior official also pointed to population 
growth as well: he pointed to ‘the need to introduce compensating risk 
management techniques affecting the profitability of modified production 
practice to get a sustainable outcome, and the need for complementary 
extension advice on sustainability. There is a concern but like stopping 
time [arresting the move away from small-scale production] cannot be 
done…it is only a question of mitigating risks’. And whereas in OECD 
countries  the  risk  to  environment  can  be  mitigated  by  e.g.  set-aside 
policies, in low income countries the economic system is not developed to 
a level of efficiency that can tax away benefits from poor environmental 
compliance (Doyle Baker, interview, 26 January 2009). 
   
Full circle?  The effect of the 2008-9 commodity price spike on FAO policy 
 
   
Support for market based mechanisms as solutions to economic problems 
ebbs and flows internationally, and the years immediately after the credit 
crunch were not fertile ground for supporters of market-based solutions. 
The rapid rise in commodity prices in the later part of the first decade of 
the  21st  century  provides  a  further  window  through  which  to  see 
potential political objections to market based instruments through 
commentaries on the role of derivative markets in the creation of high 
prices and increased volatility (Domanski & Heath 2007, Doyle, Hill & Jack 
2007). Before this rapid rise in volatility blamed on derivative markets, 
however, writers of e.g.  World Bank  papers felt relatively  confident in 
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arguing that: ‘It is not clear that speculative activity has necessarily led to 
an increase in market volatility. Studies of futures markets for commodities, 
such as cocoa and petroleum, concluded that investment funds can 
actually increase liquidity and speed the reversion to ‘fair value’’ (Lewin, 
Giovannucci & Varangis 2004:22).  These particular World Bank authors 
cited practitioner and academic texts to support their argument (Gilbert 
1994, Weiner 2002). Notably however although in 2006 it was identified 
that many public sector investments in agriculture had the indirect effect 
of reducing market risk (World Bank 2006:3). 
   
So by 2008, the external policy environment for FAO had changed 
abruptly. The rapid rise in commodity prices in 2006-8 provided an 
opportunity for the critics to express their views publicly at last. Critics of 
the role of the derivative markets in setting agricultural prices were no 
longer impossible to find. In some countries, such as the USA, the criticisms 
of derivative markets were that in some cases wholesalers had reached 
their credit limits and had been forced to stop making new futures 
contracts with farmers or to limit their size and duration, but even in the 
USA there was some suggestions (in testimony to Congressional hearings) 
by 2008 that futures speculators were driving up prices (Irwin 2008, 
Hagstrom 2008). 
   
Whilst this was not the case at the departmental or divisional level within 
FAO, the commodity price spikes of 2008 produced a reversion to type so 
far as public comment was concerned. FAO chief Jacques Diouf pointed 
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to speculation by ‘hedge funds, index funds, and so on’ as a factor in price 
increases (Young 2008:10). He was far from alone amongst IGOs: so did 
the head of the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN's Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, prominent politicians in many countries, 
and well-placed financial analysts joined the criticism. For example Todd 
Kemp of the U.S. National Grain and Feed Association told Business Week, 
‘The enormous influx of capital has resulted in the futures markets no 
longer reflecting supply and demand’ (Young 2008:10). In 2008, it was 
suggested in the OECD/FAO Agricultural Outlook to 2017 that ‘The 
aggregate effect of all their [speculative] activities may be upward pressure 
on derivative market prices in the short term. The jury is still out on the 
longer term impacts on price levels’ (FAO/OECD 2008:37).  Lamon Rutten, 
by this time Joint Managing Director of the Indian Commodities Exchange 
MCX,  argued however that  speculation was  not  a  big  problem (IFPRI 
2008:4). But increased price volatility seems a plausible result given the 
volume of these non-commercial investments and given the fact that ‘they 
may move in and out of commodity trading as alternative profit 
opportunities dictate’ (FAO/OECD 2008:37). 
   
In 2008 the FAO, which had got ‘even more interested.in market based 
mechanisms  after  the  crisis  hit’  (Hafez  Ghanem,  interview,  1  February 
2011) reviewed rapidly escalating food prices. Here was evidence of an 
FAO policy position even in the face of the crisis. In this document the 
FAO argued that market-oriented policies were gradually making 
agricultural markets more transparent and that derivatives markets based 
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on agricultural markets were offering an expanding range of financial 
instruments to financial institutions, enabling them to increase portfolio 
diversification and reduce risk exposure. The FAO further argued that the 
abundance of liquidity in certain parts of the world that reflect favourable 
economic performances (notably among emerging economies), coupled 
with low interest rates and high petroleum prices, was making such 
derivative markets a magnet for speculators looking to spread their risk 
and pursue more lucrative returns. This influx of liquidity, particularly prior 
to the global credit crunch, and the turmoil it caused in the financial 
markets, seems, the FAO argued, to have influenced the underlying spot 
markets to the extent that they affected the decisions of farmers, traders 
and processors of agricultural commodities (FAO 2008:12). Tantalisingly, 
however, the document then stops short of saying how these decisions 
were altered, although it would be surprising if they were altered in favour 
of reduced production. However, it is reasonable to note that the tone of 
this document was not sympathetic to market-based mechanisms; there is 
no mention in the document of the use of the same markets by farmers to 
hedge. The FAO however also noted (FAO 2009a) that a recent IMF study 
had analysed the nature of the relationship between this type of financial 
flow into the futures markets and cash/spot prices (actually of five 
commodities, including those of sugar, coffee and cotton). The empirical 
tests employed by the IMF indicated that the short-run causality ran, in 
general, from spot  prices to  this  type  of  financial  flows,  implying  that 
higher  spot  prices  are  the  cause  rather  than  the  effect  of  increased 
investor participation The same type of empirical causality was also found 
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where there were long-term equilibrium relationships among the variables 
concerned (IMF 2008). 
   
A more recent OECD study (OECD 2008) noted that ‘there have been 
problems achieving convergence in the corn, wheat and soybeans futures 
markets at times in recent years, i.e. the link between cash and futures 
prices may have been broken down occasionally. This could be due to a 
number of technical issues, such as available storage capacity in the 
delivery area and the incentives to engage in arbitrage’. In particular, the 
study stated, ‘Conceivably, it could also be due to the ‘inflation’ of futures 
prices being caused by increasingly large long position placed by 
institutional investors. Could the strong upward pressure on futures prices 
be putting such stress on cash-futures price link that it breaks from time to 
time?’  The  same  study  also  notes  that  the  more  or  less  predictable 
seasonal differences between cash and futures prices are weakening and 
adds if ‘the large long positions of the institutional investors are boosting 
the futures prices higher than warranted by cash market supply and 
demand fundamentals, as these investors’ growing shares of long side of 
the market suggest, this could be a cause of the weak basis and the 
resulting difficulties in pricing the cash corn, wheat and soybeans’ (OECD 
2008:10). A similar analysis was found in an UNCTAD review of 
commodities (UNCTAD 2008a), which was a measure of how far official 
thinking within UNCTAD had changed since 2006. Noticeable amongst 
the policy conclusions in the FAO and UNCTAD papers during this period 
is a complete absence of recommendations that the use of market-based 
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instruments should be increased.  These criticism were in marked contrast 
to the International Monetary Fund position on commodity price 
speculation,  which  was  expressed  by  the  then  IMF  chief  Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn:  ‘We  ....  need  a  new  approach  to  risk  mitigation  and 
insurance at the level of both individual farmers and countries [including] 
robust futures markets. Freer agricultural markets offer the promise of 
greater  potential  rewards  for  producers,  and,  in  turn,  greater  food 
supplies, but the increased output only comes when farmers invest more 
labor and capital, and thus risk more’ (Strauss-Kahn 2008). The commodity 
price spike of 2008 proved short-lived and did not serve to deflect 
departmental activity. As of 2009, when interviewed just before his 
retirement, Sarris was advocating (as Gilbert had earlier (Gilbert 2002)) the 
potential use of risk management to facilitate credit, seeing insurance not 
as an independent product but bundled with loans, a product range of 
great potential interest to banks. This was under discussion with the Gates 
Foundation. He stressed that ‘The best partners are private banks along 
with traders and private people, [who can be] used as a conduit to get to 
the smallholders’ (Alexander Sarris, interview, 26 January 2009). 
   
In October 2009, the FAO held another Expert Meeting to consider the 
volatility  of  commodity  prices  and  appropriate  responses  from 
governments and the private sector. Participants observed that the 
predominant focus of the meeting was at this high strategic level, not by 
any means focused on the use of market-based risk management 
instruments. The result, given the changed political environment in which 
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FAO was operating, was a very wide range of papers and other 
submissions (e.g. FAO 2009). Most concerned the cause of speculation 
and  the  structure  of  commodity  price  bubbles  and  has  been  hotly 
disputed (e.g. Sanders & Irwin 2010, Gilbert 2009). Although there was 
support expressed at that meeting for non-market solutions, following 
recent IFPRI work (Braun & Torero 2008) senior management stressed that 
these  expressions  were  not  FAO  policy  (Hafez  Ghanem,  interview,  1 
February  2011).  From  this  observation  it  is  possible  to  derive  the 
conclusion that not only was there a pro-market instruments FAO policy 
by 2009, but that its supporters were prepared to defend that policy 
against what one official called ‘crazy’ proposals. 
   
Pro-market support however came in many forms at the time. In a paper 
for that meeting even Alexander Sarris (writing in a personal capacity 
rather than as Director of the FAO Trade and Markets Division), proposed 
‘a new international institution designed to instil more confidence, 
predictability and assurance in global markets of basic food commodities, 
with the ultimate purpose to render less likely future food price spikes’ 
(Sarris 2009:1) noting the way in which Africa in particular was now a net 
agricultural importer, observed that as LDCs become more dependent on 
international markets, they will become more exposed to international 
market instability.  Describing ICAs as ‘justifiably not currently regarded as 
an option’ (Sarris 2009:9) and noting that domestic price control of 
commodities through either trade policy or direct market intervention had 
also  proven to  be  very  expensive, either financially  or  from a  growth 
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perspective) Reviewing market-based mechanisms, Sarris observed that 
while the modern markets for risk management instruments are open to 
all, entities within developing countries have not been very active in using 
them. The majority of his paper concerned the use of futures and options 
markets to manage price risk. However because of the fact that most 
international commodity trade contracts are effectively OTC, with 
counterparty risk, Sarris proposed an International Grain Clearing 
Arrangement (IGCA). The objective of an IGCA would be to guarantee or 
insure performance of grain import trade contracts (short, medium and 
long term) between countries or private entities. The IGCA, in order to 
guarantee that physical supplies are available to execute the contracts, 
would invest its financial reserves in grain commodity reserves, in the form 
of either physical stocks of grain in given locations of excess supplies, or in 
the  form  of  futures  contracts  in  relevant  organised  exchanges  (Sarris 
2009:22). The papers presented at these conferences represent excellent 
examples  of  lagged  policy  response:  by  the  time  the  October  2009 
Conference was held, for instance, food prices were already falling and 
the crisis appeared to be receding. The likelihood of the establishment of 
an IGCA, for example, receded with it. 
   
Thus therefore at the 68th Session of the Committee on Commodity 
Problems in Rome, held between 14-16 June 2010, the Committee 
recognised that since the last food crisis in the 1970s there had been a 
series of developments which were likely to impinge on global agricultural 
food  markets  and  trade,  including  ‘policies  towards  better  farm  risk 
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management’ (FAO 2010a:2), although what these policies were was left 
unsaid. Amongst the work priorities for trade and commodity markets 
(including policies to support smallholder market integration via value 
chains, and international food trade and dependence issue) however, was 
‘Analysis of market volatility and its impact on food security’, and here it 
was noted: ‘While a variety of policy responses has been adopted by 
various  countries,  the   priority  is   to   explore  through  country-based 
analyses,   best   practices,   lessons   learned,   and   policy   guidance   for 
managing external and internal price spikes. At the international level, the 
priority  is  to  explore  workable  and  market  based  systems  to  manage 
global price shocks’ (FAO 2010a:2). 
   
For the management of price volatility, at least, even the commodity price 
spike of 2008-9 had not persuaded the Committee to abandon the idea of 
market-based solutions, although the drafting referred to market-based 
risk management instruments in terms of providing ‘insurance of excessive 
country import costs [that] could provide fast disbursing funds in such 
cases’  (FAO  2010:10).  Backing  up  this  contention,  FAO  authors  had 
argued the previous year that too little policy emphasis has been given to 
developing such institutions as agricultural commodity exchanges, which, 
in combination with warehouse receipts, have historically been shown to 
improve market efficiency and alleviate credit and insurance constraints. 
As the private sector grows and the roles of parastatals diminish, there will 
be  a  need  to  promote  these  mechanisms,  which  have  proven  track 
records  to  mitigate  price  risks,  reduce  public  expenditure  on  price 
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stabilisation, and minimise the size of buffer stocks (Cummings & Gulati 
 
2009:10). Moreover, by 2010 the FAO was prepared itself to present the 
case against overly blaming derivative markets themselves for price 
volatility, shifting the blame to speculators: ‘While this ‘financialisation of 
commodities’ is generally not viewed as the source of price turbulence, 
evidence suggests that trading in futures markets may have amplified 
volatility in the short term’ (FAO 2010d:1). 
   
These  papers  are  evidence  that  the  baton  of  outright  criticism  of 
derivatives markets has now passed to other (less directly involved) UN 
agencies, for example that of the Special Rapporteur on Food Security, 
who presented a paper in September 2010 calling for greater regulation 
of derivative (including OTC) markets including restrictions on market 
participation, distinctions between types of speculation, and the need for 
physical reserves (De Schutter 2010:1). The author cited an FAO paper of 
June 2010 (FAO 2010b) as arguing that because only 2% of all futures 
contracts result in the delivery of the underlying physical commodity, 
trading such futures is attractive to investors who have no interest in the 
commodity, but only in making a speculative gain. Actually, however, the 
FAO  paper  argued  for  increasing  transparency  and  the  amount  of 
available information on futures trading, and close supervision of trading 
limits, not the kind of regulation proposed by De Schutter. The FAO paper 
concluded by stating that: ‘Commodity futures have become an integral 
part of food markets, and they perform an important role for many market 
participants. Adequate regulation should improve, not ban, speculative 
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trading in order to foster market performance’ (FAO 2010b:3). FAO policy 
 
– and there now is policy - is not now easily swayed in the direction of 
outright criticism of derivative markets, even in the face of relatively rapid 
commodity price swings and food price hikes. Indeed one senior 
management official made the point quite explicitly that the effect of the 
commodity price spike and increased volatility served to increase, not 
decrease, FAO’s interest in research with respect to market based risk 
management instruments (Hafez Ghanem, interview, 1 February 2011). 
Evidence for this was the publication by FAO of a major book on risk 
management during 2011, as commodity prices climbed even to levels not 
seen during the 2008-9 spike, which particularly addressed the causes of 
commodity price volatility – essentially, increasing tightness of markets - 
and what can be done about it (Prakash 2011). 
   
Conclusion 
 
   
The distinction noted above between the FAO and the other IGOs 
analysed may contribute in future to a typology of IGOs, but despite the 
detective  work  involved  it  is  possible  to  discern  FAO  policy  towards 
market-based risk-management. The FAO’s policy towards market-based 
risk management instruments has been on a journey over the past twenty 
years. The FAO started by turning a blind eye and pretending market 
based mechanisms did not exist, leaving the field entirely to other IGOs, 
notably the World Bank and UNCTAD. Public criticisms of the World Bank, 
or of market based mechanisms are exceptionally rare, but on occasion 
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retired FAO senior officials, at least, do take aim at the World Bank (e.g. All- 
Africa.com 2008). 
   
The importance of Sarris’ appointment should not be underestimated and 
is a prominent example of the role of a change agent within an IGO. Once 
he was appointed, the FAO found itself subjected to internal advocacy 
from such a change agent: a personality with both the intellectual 
equipment and the strong bureaucratic abilities to carry through radical 
reform of an entire Division. In the course of his tenure policy towards 
market based risk management was deliberately altered to bring the FAO 
into participation in World Bank and UNCTAD policy. 
   
The shift in the external environment at the end of the last decade, 
however, briefly brought the many hitherto silent critics of the market to 
the fore, with a flurry of administrative policy proposals echoing the 
development policy norm of decades before. But the resurgence proved 
short-lived; the changes instituted during the previous decade were 
resilient. Appointed to succeed Sarris in 2010, a new Divisional Director, 
David Hallam, himself an experienced agricultural economist with 
considerable expertise in market based risk management matters, took the 
opportunity to build on Sarris’ work to create, within the Commodities 
Division at least, a consistent, comprehensive and above all continuing, 
consensus policy on market based risk management instruments (David 
Hallam, interview, 8 July 2011). 
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Notably more recently, FAO has stressed the importance of working with 
other agencies in its annual reports (FAO 2009b, FAO 2010c). One of the 
fruits  of  this  policy  was  a  pro-market  risk  management  document 
published  under  FAO  auspices  but  under  the  aegis  of  a  remarkable 
number of IGOs, including UNCTAD and the World Bank (FAO 2011a). 
Insufficient time has elapsed to evaluate whether resource dependency 
will proceed from this collaboration, but it, like the contemporary seminars 
of the World Bank (World Bank 2011b) is certainly evidence of the reach 
of the global risk management policy network. 
   
Despite this opportunity, the final conclusion, however, must still be that 
evolution of FAO policy towards market based risk management 
instruments, though a direction is clear enough to detect in retrospect, at 
least within one Department, has been a slow and relatively confused 
trajectory, heavily influenced by the perspectives of the senior managers 
involved and much less so by developments in the external environment 
of the FAO, in particular the move towards market risk management 
globally and in terms of research, advocacy and training in other IGOs 
such as UNCTAD and the World Bank. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
    
Introduction 
    
The thesis began with the initial empirical puzzle of why policy towards 
market based risk management evolved differently in three particular IGOs 
concerned with them. Although there have been other IGOs (e.g. the 
OECD and the CFC) involved in policymaking in this area, these are the 
three IGOs where the research question was sited – and also where the 
relevant policy network has been most concentrated - and they continue 
to be the leading IGOs concerned with agricultural risk management. This 
initial research question led to other more general questions in regard to 
what the causes of evolution in policy have been and a number of 
decisions regarding the scope of the research. It was firstly necessary to 
analyse what ’policy’ at an institution is generally, and in particular, what 
‘policy’ is at an IGO. More specifically, the thesis examined what ‘policy’ 
towards market based risk management instruments at different IGOs has 
been, what evidence there is for its existence or otherwise, and how 
evolution is such a policy is observable. 
   
Given a satisfactory analysis of what ‘policy’ at an IGO is, and what 
evidence for policies towards market-based risk management for 
agriculture at the selected IGOs exists, the thesis examined what the 
determinants of evolution in policy have been. In particular, this involved 
an  analysis  of  the  extent  to  which  evolution  in  IGO  policy  can  be 
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explained by influences external to the IGO, such as macro-economic and 
political trends, both long-term and short-term, by comparison to internal 
causes of the evolution of policy, e.g. which individuals are in charge of 
programmes within the IGO. This analysis entailed a review of how the 
external trends potentially relevant to policy towards market-based risk 
management instruments themselves evolved during the period under 
study.  A further subsidiary research question was why policy on optimal 
methods of agricultural risk management by farmers and governments 
evolved so slowly towards a consensus within and between IGOs, given 
the substantial amount of time and resources expended in this policy area 
within certain IGOs. The causes of this lack of consensus were then 
analysed, including to what extent this and evolution in policy can be 
explained by different political perceptions at varying levels within the 
IGOs studied of the impact of agricultural risk management, or by different 
opinions as to its impact on the environment. The final question analysed 
has been the extent to which risk management policy as ‘policy unusual’ 
must be analysed differently to .the ‘usual’ range of policy e.g. lending at 
the World Bank. 
   
This concluding chapter presents the answers of the thesis to these 
questions, against the theoretical background of constructivism ‘plus’ 
elucidated   above   (in   Chapter   Three)   and   from   the   standpoint   of 
‘passionate humility’ (Yanow 1997) regarding the subject matter. 
Conclusions are drawn about the initial research question and the 
concomitant  questions  about  policy  evolution  at  IGOs,  specifically  in 
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relation to market based risk management instruments for agriculture. It 
also presents the contribution of the thesis to the literature concerning 
IGO policymaking and international politics, and in particular the debate 
over the extent of materialist versus constructivist explanations of IGO 
policy and behaviour. 
   
Steps in the Analysis 
    
In order to answer the research questions, it was necessary to analyse a 
number of component issues sequentially. The first task was to analyse 
what policy in an IGO is, specifically in the area of commodity risk 
management consists. The result of this was to show that in this area IGO 
policy largely been confined to research, advocacy and training in 
documents and seminars, supported in some cases by limited financial 
support for pilot studies, and eventually, in the case of the World Bank, 
partnership with the private sector. The thesis made a study of what 
theories and evidence of policymaking at IGOs (and more widely) already 
exist, to determine the determinants of policy and causes of policy 
evolution. Both internal and external factors were identified. Because of 
the potential importance of external factors, it was necessary to present a 
review of the policy area more widely – i.e. the history of global attempts 
to manage commodity price and other risks through non-market 
mechanisms, arguments for and against the use of market-based risk 
management  instruments  as  alternatives  to  a  system  of  non-market 
control widely perceived to be failing, and finally the chequered history to 
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date of market-based mechanisms for managing agricultural risk. Within 
IGOs, policy has been demonstrated to be largely observable through 
publications, and it  has been shown, just as  policies differed between 
IGOs, there was accordingly a significant difference in the volume, 
frequency and content of publications and other actions on agricultural 
risk management between different IGOs. Case studies were presented 
analysing the evolution of policy at each of these IGOs. These case studies 
were aimed at elucidating the answers to the questions posed above for 
each IGO separately as well as drawing out what there was in common 
between them. One of the most surprising facts to emerge from 
documentary analysis of all three IGOs was the relative paucity of the 
number of documents within some IGOs compared to others; it is also 
noteworthy how the documents were issued within very specific time 
frames relating to individuals’ tenure. 
   
Conclusions about policy and its evolution at IGOs 
    
Several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, consistent with much theory on 
policy development and how organisations work, and the theoretical 
framework of constructivism ‘plus’, policy towards market based risk 
management instruments within IGOs has varied considerably, so that 
between IGOs it has lacked both coherence and consistency. 
   
Secondly, that these policies are heavily influenced by a range of factors. 
First   amongst   these   factors   should   be   mentioned   the   historical 
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background of the IGOs themselves, including the reasons for the creation 
of the organisations. The Prebisch-Maizels legacy of international control 
of commodities (Prebisch 1964, Maizels 1992) laid heavily on UNCTAD for 
many decades – it was virtually the reason for the creation of UNCTAD in 
the first place - and the FAO was equally dominated by this intellectual 
tradition. Quite different was the advocacy of the World Bank, which from 
its   inception   had   been   dominated   by   intellectual   traditions   more 
associated with market forces. The second influencing factor is the 
evolution of the external environment in which the IGOs operate: the 
growth of derivative markets has not been without its critics, whose 
political authority has waxed and waned depending on the perceived 
benefits and costs of market based risk management instruments. It is 
further   hypothesised  that   these   factors   do   not   work   in   isolation: 
individuals with particular policy agendas may find them more or less 
achievable in large measure because of the external environment in which 
the IGO is operating. 
   
Thirdly, a constructivist conclusion that the causes for these policy 
differences lie primarily within the organisations themselves, and more 
especially the roles played by key individuals, and not from the control of 
outside bodies – nation states in particular.   To attribute the policies of 
IGOs to individuals, it has been argued, ‘Decision-making structures would 
need to be elaborated upon to ascertain the degree to which some 
individuals have more control and therefore normative influence than 
others’   (Park   2006:44).   This   thesis   examined   these  decision-making 
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structures, so far as IGO policies towards risk management policies for 
agriculture  are  concerned.  A  conclusion  is  that  policies  within  IGOs 
towards agricultural risk management oscillate in large measure because 
individuals with particular policy agendas (e.g. market-oriented, 
environmental) are, for a time, able to direct resources and otherwise 
promote these agendas within IGOs. This involved addressing critical 
research questions such as whether IGO policy depends on personnel 
changes, both those employed and those working as consultants within 
the  organisation,  and  on  changes  in  individual  employees  and 
consultants’  perception  of  the  political  and  environmental  implications 
(and other benefits and disadvantages) of agricultural risk management. 
Equally important to address was the extent to which there are there 
other, institutional, structural factors at work, such as response to changes 
in the external environment. What is lacking, it was concluded, is any 
consistency of agenda or policy coherence between IGOs, which 
frequently find themselves at different points on an oscillating ‘policy 
pendulum’, driven in part by a wider pendulum of the external 
environment for such instruments. 
   
These  conclusions  were  reached  after  identifying  and  selecting 
appropriate theories for IGO behaviour.  Although there are numerous 
theoretical concepts to explain policy determination and evolution, the 
thesis distinguished those that are of use in examining IGOs. One 
important theory of policy development and evolution, the P-A model (as 
described above in Chapter Two) portrays IGO policies as determined by 
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the actions of self-interested nation states - with identifiable interests and 
concomitant policies - that create, fund and direct them. If this model of 
IGO behaviour and policy evolution were to be at all accurate, it might be 
expected that there be some pattern of correlation between positions 
taken with respect to agricultural risk management (and its impact on the 
environment) and national interests, (or at least individuals’ perception of 
them). Moreover, there should be numerous observable instances of the 
intervention of national delegations – with equally observable national 
objectives. The resultant actions of national delegations would be closely 
correlated with internal policy evolution within their IGOs. 
   
From the evidence of the IGOs studied in this thesis, however, there are 
very few examples of such actions in the policy area of risk management. 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, it is difficult to envisage an exact 
correlation between the use of agricultural risk management instruments 
and any particular national interest. The closest that could be conceived is 
the fact that a large (albeit diminishing) percentage of traded futures and 
options exchanges are based in the USA. US officials and academics might 
therefore be expected to exhibit on this basis the greatest degree of 
support for agricultural risk management and the fewest objections to it 
on environmental grounds. In practice this was not observed to be the 
case. 
   
Little can be gleaned from any putative politics of national identify either. 
 
:Greece has no especial connection with commodity risk management; 
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there are no commodity exchanges in Greece and it is not possible to 
identify a national benefit from the adoption of commodity risk 
management elsewhere in the world but, two of the most prominent 
advocates of agricultural risk management, Panos Varangis and Alexander 
Sarris, were of Greek origin.  The most of a national interest that could be 
construed is very tentative: I did once myself hear that Athens was being 
considered as the potential location for the staff of the proposed 
commodity risk intermediary (the GCI, in the terminology of Bower and 
Kamel 2003), but there was no suggestion that any Greeks were behind 
this suggestion, and as noted above (in Chapter Five) the organisation 
never came into being. 
   
A  few  other  examples  of  national  roles  were  identified  during  the 
research, both in different ways confirming the conclusion that national 
interests play little or no role in this policy area. Firstly, it is not possible to 
correlate the financial support provided by the Swiss and Netherlands 
governments for World Bank and UNCTAD policies (as discussed above in 
Chapters Six and Seven) with any particular national interest; nor had 
Norway’s objections at the WFP to a pro market based risk management 
instruments policy anything to do with Norway’s interests as a country: on 
the contrary they were again allegedly the result of the opinions of a 
single individual (Ulrich Hess, interview 22 September 2009). FAO sources 
also indicated privately that French representatives did raise objections to 
pro-market based risk management policies during the preparation of the 
joint IGO document on commodity price volatility and risk management 
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(FAO 2011a). The last and strongest example of the intervention of 
national delegations was the agenda re-setting at UNCTAD XII in Accra, in 
view of their dissatisfaction with the work of the Commodities Branch 
around that time (again from information provided privately by officials). 
These are however relatively rare examples of the intervention of state 
actors within the risk management policy of UNCTAD, or indeed of any of 
the IGOs analysed here. By contrast, the Netherlands, Lamon Rutten’s 
home country, does have some connection with agricultural risk 
management in that it is home to the University of Wageningen, one of 
Europe’s premier agricultural universities. However Rutten did not attend 
the university and has had no particular connections with it.   The 
conclusion therefore drawn is that national interests in this policy area are 
either impossible to identify, inadequately specified or poorly expressed. 
The result is that national delegations have not represented the driving 
force behind policy evolution in this area. This is not to suggest that state 
actors, in the form of national delegations, do not have influence over 
IGOs in other, more mainstream areas of policy, e.g. in poverty reduction 
(Clegg 2010) but it is to suggest that it is not clearly established that the P- 
A approach, or even an integration of the P-A and constructivist 
approaches is always necessary or useful in explaining policy evolution 
within an IGO, and especially in technical policy areas such as risk 
management. 
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The appropriateness of constructivist models 
    
Constructivist models, as noted above, would on the other hand expect 
policy evolution in any area to evolve from numerous influences, without 
any clear policy direction from national delegations. The conclusion of this 
thesis is that constructivist theory provides a much more accurate 
characterisation of the process of policy evolution towards market based 
risk management instruments at the World Bank, FAO and UNCTAD than 
any explanatory theory of IGO policy based on the interests, role, or 
direction of the policy process by the rationally motivated agents of 
national states acting in national interests. 
   
In terms of the ‘four major themes’ identified by Reinalda & Verbeek 
(2004a), a conclusion can be drawn that in the case of risk management 
they do not play an important role. The reasons were: 
   
(a) as a private sector-dominated area (at least after the idea of a public 
sector intermediary was dismissed), there was no agreement between 
member states to be signed (although it would be possible to conceive of 
such an agreement e.g. relating to free trade and the regulation in 
derivatives residing perhaps within the WTO) 
   
(b) again as a private-sector dominated area, the IGOs in question did not 
seek (with the possible exception of the period of the GFC when such an 
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attempt was at least canvassed) to affect the global policy agenda – just to 
reinforce it 
   
(c) the IGOs concerned did not fight turf wars: the problem with their 
collaboration was a different one, that of securing the support of one (the 
FAO) for the policy norm endorsed by the other two 
   
(d) as a result of benevolence, and financial support, from national 
governments, and the technical aspects of risk management work, the 
officials involved did not experience conflicts of interest in the sense of 
tension between their national and international identities. 
   
None of this is to suggest that the work done on risk management within 
the IGOs concerned, both by officials and consultants, was without 
impediment, let alone easy, but it is to suggest that the technical aspect of 
the  work  provided  significant  protection  from  the  type  of  political 
pressures – from national governments, NGOs and other stakeholders. 
This changed during the GFC where intense public scrutiny of derivatives 
emerged relatively suddenly, but even this proved insufficient to divert 
policy within the IGOs studied from the market based risk management 
norm. 
   
Nor is it to suggest that policy towards risk management within the IGOs 
studied was developed in isolation: the evidence presented in this thesis 
suggests that the influence of the external environment on the evolution 
396
383 
of technical policymaking towards market based risk management 
instruments  within  IGOs  during  the  period  under  consideration  was 
highly significant, to the extent that policy evolution in large measure 
reflected the changing external environment in which the IGOs operated 
and the roles they were called upon to play in the world as a result. 
During the 1970s, before the rise of the Washington Consensus, when 
ICAs were still being signed and the world was looking to direct control of 
commodity prices, FAO provided the administrative support for many of 
these agreements, whilst UNCTAD was the starting point for others. A 
decade   of   complete   uncertainty   in   the   1980s   –   the   Washington 
Consensus was good at promoting risk, but had little to say about how to 
control it - was mirrored by little innovation at the IGOs. But as these ICAs 
were shown to fail, and commodity derivatives began to take hold during 
the 1990s, the IGOs, led by the World Bank, began to operate in this space 
with increasing determination and vigour. Although the results were 
mixed, gradually acceptance and even encouragement of market-based 
mechanisms became the rule in the relevant IGOs, accompanied by 
changes in work orientation and staff skills. 
   
Academic studies of IGO policy, as noted above, have made particular use 
of the concept of ‘policy norms’. A consensus view has now emerged 
amongst analysts of IGO policy that ‘policy norms’ emerge and reach 
dominance, but then may oscillate within IGOs, declining and reviving 
within even a period of months. The concept of policy norms is closely 
linked   with   constructivist   explanations   of   policy   development   and 
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evolution within IGOs. One evident conclusion from the rapid rise of pro- 
market risk management sentiment at the World Bank in particular is the 
way in which advocacy preceded implementation, or more analytically 
(and causally) argued, the promulgation of a particular (pro-market) 
discourse more widely promoted the establishment of the market-based 
policy norm within the IGO. 
   
Another important conclusion is the interdependence of market based risk 
management  instruments  for  agriculture  with  those  for  other 
commodities, e.g. energy and metals, and also with financial derivatives. 
Sheer traded volume indicates why: in the second half of 2010, for 
instance, commodities as a whole, even including energy derivatives, 
formed only less than 1% of total traded OTC financial instruments (Bank 
for International Settlements 2011). 
   
Then – in another demonstration of the importance of external influence - 
the combination of the GFC and the more gradual influence of greater 
environmental awareness once again brought ideas of administration and 
planning to the fore as markets appeared to be failing in their purpose of 
providing greater efficiency and welfare. Specifically as noted above (in 
Chapter Seven) Harmon Thomas therefore found it easier to promise his 
anti-market agenda at UNCTAD because of the commodity price surge 
and the GFC.   The cyclical nature of policy formulation within the three 
IGOs selected for study, including e.g. reactions to the GFC do therefore 
suggest that external influences play a vital role in determining IGO policy, 
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as Nawal Kamel herself has stressed (Nawal Kamel, personal e-mail, 17 
 
March 2009).  The conclusion is irresistible that policy on risk management 
within IGOs has become a mirror, albeit a distorted one, of cyclical largely 
political  trends  in  the  outside  world.  This  both  P-A  and  constructivist 
theory would have predicted, but the significance in favouring a 
constructivist approach lies in the absence of mediation through national 
delegations and interests and the reciprocal relationship between IGO 
policy and the external environment in which they operate. 
   
The role of individuals as change agents 
    
As  it  was  established  that  national  interests  did  not  result  in  the 
formulation of risk management policy within IGOs, yet the policy in large 
measure reflected the external environment, the process of internalisation 
required analysis.   However useful in general, constructivist models of 
policy evolution at IGOs do not focus on a number of issues in 
policymaking  that  have  been  shown  to  play  an  important  role  with 
respect to the evolution of policymaking towards market-based risk 
management instruments at the World Bank, UNCTAD and FAO. Perhaps 
the most glaring of these is the role of individuals in policymaking. 
Although the concepts of the ‘change agent’, and ‘public entrepreneur’, 
widely adopted in management theory and discussed above (in Chapter 
Two) emphasises the role of the individual in driving policy, this has largely 
not permeated into case studies of IGO policymaking. Yet both 
documentary and interview evidence point to the importance of specific 
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individuals working as change agents within IGOs so far as policy towards 
agricultural risk management is concerned. The thesis sought to explain 
how far the role of individuals can explain changes in institutional focus 
and priorities, e.g. the FAO’s long-term silence on market-based 
mechanisms for agricultural price risk management, and UNCTAD’s 
turnaround in policy at the time of the GFC. The evidence of this thesis is 
that the way in which this debate has been conducted within IGOs has 
indeed revolved around the personalities, priorities and policy preferences 
of individuals. Precisely because risk management and derivatives are a 
highly technical and specialised area of policy, as numerous interviewees 
have made clear, virtually everyone in the global risk management policy 
network knows (or least knows of) everyone else, and senior policymakers 
rarely get involved. The result has been that individuals at middle- 
management level, for example those with a pro-market orientation such 
as Lamon Rutten and Alexander Sarris, were able to act as change agents, 
to drive forward programmes in their respective IGOs with little limitation 
or check. As discussed above (Chapter Seven) it was Rutten who was the 
driving force behind the adoption of a risk management workplan at 
UNCTAD, despite his nominal junior rank in the organisation, For example 
there were virtually no documents published by UNCTAD concerning 
agricultural risk management prior to 1990 whilst there was a plethora 
thereafter. As noted above (Chapter Seven) this period exactly coincides 
with Rutten’s tenure at UNCTAD, and he was the author of the majority of 
those documents. And after his departure the programmes were 
downplayed, allowed to decay, or even allegedly ‘sabotaged’: there were 
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comparatively few UNCTAD publications on risk management after 2006. 
By contrast, in Sarris’ case, the pro-risk management orientation of the 
FAO grew more slowly, but assisted by the continuation and development 
of his work by his successor, who placed more emphasis on collaboration 
with other IGOs. The fact that each of these individuals’ policy positions is 
a function of their environment and experience surely does not detract 
from what may seem to outsiders a surprising degree of individual 
influence in policymaking on a sensitive and important, albeit highly 
technical, subject for organisations such as UNCTAD, the FAO and the 
World Bank. Not all attempts by change agents succeed, however: the 
experience of Nawal Kamel in the World Bank is an example of a failure to 
build a coalition for change that resulted in what she herself described as 
a ‘failure’ in policy. 
   
Two further research questions emerged once it became clear that 
individuals played a very significant role in policy development in this area 
within IGOs. It was necessary to examine what caused individual 
perceptions to develop and change, and to consider to what extent the P- 
A model was more accurate as an explanation of individual perceptions 
than as a model of IGO behaviour. Secondly, at the World Bank, it has 
been suggested that whereas for ‘policy usual’, (i.e. lending) the role of 
individuals was unimportant, ‘for policy unusual, the individual is 
everything’ (Nawal Kamel, interview, 17 March 2011). It was therefore 
necessary to arrive at a conclusion as to the extent to which individuals 
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owed their policymaking role to the specialist nature of risk management 
policy. 
   
A possible ‘fault line’ between individuals, aside from national identity, 
might have been between those from an academic, or principally 
academic,  background, and  practitioners. This  could  have  gone either 
way: academics might not foresee practical difficulties with the 
implementation of agricultural risk management and therefore exaggerate 
the  extent  to  which  it  might  be  useful, or  they  might  be  those  who 
worried   most   about   the   environmental   consequences   of   its   use, 
irrespective of practical economic benefits to farmers and others. In fact, 
some academics are paid by pro-risk management institutions or even run 
risk management consultancies and are enthusiastic members of the pro- 
market  risk  management  policy  network  (e.g.  Professor  Jerry  Skees). 
Neither of these caricatures therefore proves satisfactory, and in fact the 
fault line runs between academics and practitioners. 
   
Some of the individuals who feature in the substantive chapters of this 
thesis as officials of IGOs, helping to make policy towards market-based 
risk management instruments, began their careers at the time that market 
based risk management instruments were only just beginning to attain 
prominence. For example, Alexander Sarris, who played a key role in the 
evolution of commodities policy at FAO, began his own career in the 
1970s,  at  a  time  when  there  was  also  a  commodity  crisis.    Another 
example:  Alfred  Maizels  in  his  book  (Maizels  1992)  specifically  thanks 
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Harmon Thomas and Mehmet Ali, two officials who were closely involved 
with policy towards agricultural risk management within their IGOs. These 
examples demonstrate that the IGO officials who were working in the 
area of commodities in the 1980s had been exposed to a wide range of – 
admittedly   largely   unsuccessful   –   proposals   on   a   grand   scale   for 
commodity price and supply management at the global level, such as the 
Stoltenberg Plan. Alfred Maizels, and those who thought like him, were 
responsible for the introduction of the CFC in 1989, but as noted above it 
was far from the original aggressively interventionist conception and 
amounted to little more than a relatively small fund for research and 
development  contracts.  Commodity  price  stabilisation  remained 
completely elusive, despite the fact that commodity income uncertainty 
was  widely  acknowledged  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  economic 
growth and well-being in developing countries. ‘By 1992, all efforts made 
in the forum of UNCTAD seemed to have been useless. The CFC entered 
partially into force in 1989, but this coincided with the disappearance or 
inoperability of practically all commodity agreements’ (Maizel1992:24). 
Moreover, the relative price of primary commodities deteriorated during 
this period. The options Maizels presented ranged offsetting unforeseen 
and prolonged declines in real commodity export earnings by 
supplementary financing from international sources through measures of 
price  support  for  imported  agricultural  products  through  to  supply 
(Maizels 1992). 
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By contrast, the policy entrepreneurs working in the World Bank, UNCTAD 
and the consultants they employed believed, as members of the risk 
management policy network that supported market based solutions to risk 
management problems for agriculture and other sectors (e.g. energy) that 
market based mechanisms appeared to offer a way for the private sector 
to resolve the complex problems of risk management whilst reducing 
budgetary burdens for states. In that sense their policy entrepreneurship 
and the wider group of policy norms characterised as the PWC is 
identifiable. As has been noted in a wider context, ‘The Bank was 
instrumental in promoting the neo-liberal perspectives on development 
that came to dominate the agenda of many international development 
actors during the 1980s’ (Bayliss, Fine & Van Waeyenberge 2011a:6). 
Although the contents of the pro-market IGO documents are confined to 
empirical analysis of farmers’ reaction to risk and the implications for their 
income, the underlying sentiments of the authors are those of this shared 
commitment to the wider norm complex of private sector solutions to 
intractable problems that had (according to this norm) eluded statist 
solutions, such as that of commodity price volatility. 
   
As described in the case study chapters above, this commitment frequently 
carried   a   moral   force,   which   was   derived   from   two   fundamental 
intellectual perceptions. The first was that the ‘old policies’ of commodity 
stabilisation by governments and agencies had failed, and would not be 
reintroduced. Secondly, that ‘modern’ risk management policies – 
derivatives and products with derivatives embedded - necessarily involved 
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private  sector  solutions  to  what  formerly  had  been  regarded  as  the 
domain of the state and not the responsibility of any individual farmer or 
other producer. As quoted above (in Chapter Four and Seven) Lamon 
Rutten for example put these arguments very forcibly early on (Rutten 
1998), Yanow’s perception about subjectivity discussed above in Chapter 
Three (Yanow 2000), is surely highly relevant to the way in which the 
individuals who drove policy evolution at the World Bank, UNCTAD, FAO 
and  the  other  IGOs  saw  previous  attitudes  to  agricultural  risk 
management. For them the apparent puzzle of why previous attitudes 
within their IGOs had been unsympathetic was explained by a lack of 
technical knowledge about agricultural risk management instruments. 
Once this understanding had been conveyed they were convinced (and 
as shown in this thesis remain largely convinced) that the adoption of pro- 
agricultural risk management instruments by the institution concerned will 
be ‘inevitable’. This perception was reinforced by the absence of proof 
either way discussed below. 
   
Conclusions about the way in which policy towards market based 
mechanisms evolved led to further consideration of why policies evolved 
in the way they did, and in particular, the extent to which the 'technical' 
aspect of policy in this area lent itself to policymaking at middle- 
management level From the evidence of this thesis, it does not seem that 
the practitioners themselves believed they were at the mercy of political 
cycles. The evidence of hubris from the supporters of market-based 
solutions after 1992 is therefore compelling. With a political climate they 
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believed now permanently favourable, and apparently convinced that 
there  were  either  no  adverse  environmental  consequences,  or 
insignificant ones, they published IGO documents, initiated policies and 
spent donor money without regard to potential opposition. In large 
measure they took advantage of the prevailing political climate to advance 
an agenda which they knew would not be regarded favourably either by 
those who favoured non-market solutions to risk management problems 
such as previously advocated within IGOs such as UNCTAD, or, if they had 
thought about it, environmentalists either. 
   
A certain caution, even defensiveness, on the part of those who have 
promoted policy norms in favour of market based instruments might have 
been expected in view of the history of non-market advocacy in this area. 
The evidence however also points to these change agents leaving 
themselves few ‘escape hatches’ within their IGOs: they all stood or fell by 
the success of market based risk management instruments and left 
themselves few lines of policy retreat. This evidence suggests a degree of 
commitment and a wish for the legacy of their work to be preserved and if 
possible enhanced within their respective IGOs, on the part of the officials 
most closely associated with pro-market policies. It also however suggests 
a degree of insularity of the policy network to which they belonged which 
indicates a policy community, in Rhodes’ sense of the term (Rhodes 1981, 
1988). However in all the published IGO papers, the arguments in favour 
of market based risk management are treated cursorily and no objections 
to them, whether political or environmental, are examined in detail. The 
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argument is usually taken as won – a good example of declaring victory 
too  early  (Kotter  1995).  From  such  cursory  summary  of  arguments in 
favour onwards, therefore, the papers are concerned only with how risk 
management and collateralised finance can be promoted, and what role 
organisations such as the World Bank, UNCTAD or the FAO can and 
should play in the process. In none of these papers are either the 
environmental implications of  any  resultant crop specialisation in 
particular ever addressed, or the desirability of increased income ever 
questioned. Nor was there any attempt to integrate pro-market risk 
management policies with the work being done at IGOs (notably at the 
FAO and the OECD) on agro-environmental indicators – as noted above 
(in Chapters Five and Eight) the two policy communities did not interact - 
leading  to  further  difficulties  with  quantifying  the  alleged  benefits  of 
market based risk management policies. Nor is there any evidence of any 
correlation between the evolution of technical policy towards market 
based risk management (and the turn towards weather derivatives) and 
wider political debates within the Bank over the trajectory of the PWC 
(Carroll 2010:64). For example there is no mention of risk management 
policy in the two key contemporary academic texts often cited as 
instrumental  in  the  debate  over  the  role  of  the  World  Bank  (Fine, 
Lapavitsas & Pincus 2001, Pincus & Winter 2002). 
   
Although it had been predicted (e.g. Rajan 2005), only once the GFC 
struck did protagonists of risk management realise they had to defend 
their programmes on wider political as well as purely economic grounds. 
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And after it passed, in this as in many other areas of policy, whether at 
IGOs or in the wider world, and despite evidence of continued threats to 
global economic recovery, policy rapidly became a case of returning to 
‘business as usual’, illustrated by the last comprehensive risk management 
document reviewed for this thesis, published on the FAO website, 
remarkable only for its presentation of a policy consensus amongst so 
many different IGOs (FAO 2011a) 
   
The critics 
    
By contrast, as noted above, for many years critics of market based 
mechanisms did not express their views in print. It is not therefore possible 
to find economic analyses published by IGOs during the period analysed 
in this thesis (which covers the rapid rise of derivative markets worldwide), 
that are actively antagonistic to market based mechanisms, whether on 
political,  administrative  or  environmental  grounds.  However,  evidence 
from interviews (especially off-the-record) has indicated that support for 
market based agricultural price risk management instruments is not 
universal even within organisation such as the World Bank or UNCTAD, let 
alone FAO. Within the FAO, in particular, and extending across to other 
international organisations including at times UNCTAD, there remained 
opponents to market based agricultural risk management, for three 
principal reasons. 
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Firstly, as was revealed through interviews at the IGOs, especially at the 
FAO, as well as to a limited degree from documentary analysis, there were 
practical objections to market based risk management instruments, These 
were more significant in the minds of critics than either political ones (from 
either the interventionist or free market camps) or environmental ones . 
Critics, notably from the FAO (discussed in Chapter Eight) primarily based 
their  objections  on  what  they  perceive  as  the  lofty  and  unrealistic 
ambitions of the advocates of market based risk management instruments. 
Whilst Rutten may have put it quite extremely in arguing that opponents 
of market mechanisms believe farmers are stupid, many officials, especially 
those in FAO with longstanding experience of working with farmers 
themselves, certainly still do believe that there are major, even insuperable, 
administrative difficulties in getting farmers to adopt market-based risk 
management instruments. 
   
The second objection has been based on individual preferences for certain 
types of political solution to risk problems, what may be described as 
political objections. Many of the individuals working for FAO, and even for 
UNCTAD, started their careers at a time when the many problems caused 
by commodity price fluctuations were believed to be best solved by non- 
market based mechanisms such as ICAs, national commodity boards, 
government intervention to set maximum prices, and subsidies to farmers, 
with significant inputs from, even direction and administration by, IGOs 
(Gardner 1987). During the period of the development and promulgation 
of the norms of the PWC, opponents of market based risk management 
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solutions, especially silent opponents at the FAO and elsewhere, bided 
their time. As the GFC developed these opponents were able to act, and 
they acted to curb IGO promotion of market-based mechanisms, to try to 
‘turn the clock back’ and jettison decades of experience and work with the 
private sector. During the GFC, proposals were presented for international 
price stabilisation regimes (Braun & Torero 2008) and as described above, 
notably in 2008 work on market based risk management instruments was 
curtailed at UNCTAD, previously a mainspring of support for market based 
risk management instruments. What the critics succeeded in doing, 
however, was merely to distance their IGOs from the private sector, which 
continued to work to provide the price and other risk management 
solutions that governments were unwilling - or unable - to provide. 
However there remain those who, not for environmental reasons but for 
ideological reasons hanker after state and regulatory solutions to 
commodity price volatility. 
   
The third and final objection, environmental, requires a more detailed 
exposition. One protagonist for market based risk management concluded 
that the political and environmental grounds of opposition to risk 
management are in a sense contradictory. Those who support political 
interference with the market by national governments or supranational 
agencies are aiming to keep farmers in business and encourage 
production. Their interest in environmental matters is secondary at best 
and minimal at worst. Conversely those who do oppose the use of market 
based risk management instruments for environmental reasons would not 
410
397 
be inclined to support state marketing boards (Jesus Anton, interview, 11 
 
December 2008) 
    
The hypothesis investigated in this thesis is that contrary to the apparent 
absence of discussion within the literature, the negative environmental 
implications of agricultural risk management were one of the reasons why 
international organisations, especially the FAO, did not rush to adopt 
support for market based risk management solutions. This hypothesis in 
turn rests in part on the argument that although the 1990s saw a dramatic 
expansion in global interest in environmental issues, proponents and 
exponents of agricultural risk management alike did not see fit to discuss 
the environmental implications of these rapidly expanding techniques, let 
alone   to   examine   them   or   defend   them   from   an   environmental 
perspective. That environmental, and more particularly climate change, 
issues have become vastly more significant across a range of studies, 
policies and institutions is obvious enough. So too is the fact that after the 
GFC, IGO officials perceived that market based solutions would be viewed 
by commentators and analysts alike with more scepticism than hitherto. 
The question therefore presented itself, as to why environmental issues did 
not play a greater role in the deliberations of pro-market officials. 
   
Through a review of the documents and interviews, it was demonstrated 
that although there are many publications from IGOs on agricultural price 
risk management, overwhelmingly positive in their assessment, analysis of 
the impact of price risk management on the environment is a relatively 
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recent and comparatively sparse area of academic and policy study, 
especially   within   the   IGOs   that   have   become   committed   to   the 
replacement of government intervention in markets with market 
mechanisms. That such research has not been done at all though, outside 
an academic environment, demanded an explanation. The easiest 
explanation is that those institutions best placed to commission such work, 
IGOs and government agencies, would not be interested in results that 
might demonstrate the environmental damage of programmes in which 
they have invested time and money.  For example, UNCTAD was not 
without a significant input into environmental affairs, and at the same time 
that agricultural (and energy) risk management was being promoted, 
efforts were also being made which fed directly into the Kyoto process. 
What was missing, however, was any connection between the two. It is 
frankly inconceivable to imagine UNCTAD around the time of the Lyon 
Conference, or the World Bank at the time of the launch of the ITF-CRMG 
commissioning such research or even contemplating negative 
environmental considerations of agricultural risk management as an 
argument to be taken seriously and weighed against the welfare 
implications  in  a  world  moving  rapidly  away  from  agricultural  price 
support and in an organisation committed at the time to market-based 
solutions to agricultural price risk problems. The explanation for the 
absence of environmental debate lies, therefore, in the way that policy 
norms   for   risk   management   were   mediated   through  networks.   In 
particular, it is possible to reinforce the conclusion already drawn that the 
risk  management  policy  network  (and  the  ITF  policy  community  in 
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particular)  was  quite  insular,  even  in  respect  of  the  emerging, 
subsequently prevalent (and in one sense competing, but certainly wider) 
policy norms of environmental issues. 
   
The critics of market based mechanisms, reluctant to express their views 
publicly, did in fact prefer non-market risk management approaches as 
alternative risk management instruments on the grounds of their superior 
environmental effects, They hold what they believe to be a coherent 
analysis of causal chain relationships between agricultural risk 
management and a number of actions by farmers that would be 
environmentally detrimental. These actions can be divided into two parts. 
Firstly, the argument that the effective management of price (or revenue) 
risk  would allow  farmers to  increase production. As  agricultural 
production itself is a major contributor to environmental damage, this very 
production increase should not be sought, hence agricultural risk 
management should not be encouraged (this analysis was as usual for 
such observations critical of market based risk management instruments 
suggested off-the-record and without any references or proof). Officials of 
the FAO, being concerned with agricultural research and working with 
national Ministries of Agriculture, might be expected to support measures 
that they perceive to result in increased output, in particular. Yet the 
prevalence of criticism within the FAO suggests precisely the opposite: 
FAO officials may have been closer to an antagonistic perception than 
their counterparts in other IGOs. This might seem remarkable, given the 
rate of global population increase, but distributional questions as well as 
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efficiency distinctions between crops may be prayed in aid at this point to 
justify such an apparently paradoxical position. 
   
The second, and more widespread, environmental objection to the use of 
market-based risk management instruments is that so-called traditional risk 
management systems - which would be beneficial to the environment – 
would be abandoned. This would especially include diversification: the use 
of market-based agricultural risk management instruments, according to 
the critics, would result in greater concentration of production on cash 
crops and less diversification, with detrimental results for the environment. 
Even Parris from the OECD agreed that monocropping was a ‘disaster’ 
(Kevin Parris, interview, 15 December 2008). 
   
What is especially remarkable about the entire diversification/risk 
management  debate  is  the  lack  of  proof.  In  Chapter  Two  it  was 
established that there is a complete absence of empirical studies from 
either academics, IGOs or any other institution on the environmental 
implications of agricultural risk management use. Whilst monoculture is 
universally recognised as undesirable by IGO officials, including those 
strongly supportive of market based risk management instruments (e.g. by 
Parris) there is simply no evidence that the use of market based risk 
management  instruments  leads  to  less  diversification  on  the  part  of 
farmers, although as evidenced in the substantive chapters of this thesis, 
critics  and  sometimes  even  supporters  of  market  based  mechanisms 
appear to assume that it will. This absence of an answer, either modelled 
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or empirical, is an extremely important point from the standpoint of both 
those within IGOs who promote market based agricultural risk 
management instruments and those who criticise them. In the absence of 
detailed proof one way or the other, therefore, supporters and critics alike 
can maintain their private positions unchallenged. That is precisely what 
happened. It must be recognised, however, that the opposition to market 
based risk management mechanisms does not rest solely or even largely 
on environmental objections: there is no evidence that the environmental 
implications of any proposed government intervention or stabilisation 
board has ever been studied . 
   
There is thus a complex explanation for the environmental objection to 
market based risk management instruments for agriculture, but an 
important conclusion of this thesis is that the main objection is the much 
simpler one of practical difficulties in implementation, not political or 
environmental objections in principle. 
   
Contact between IGOs and the dissemination of ideas 
    
A   constructivist   approach   to   how   IGOs   work   was   largely   found 
appropriate in analysing how the risk management community operated 
between the IGOs studied. Personal contacts between IGO officials who 
shared a perspective on agricultural (and other) risk management 
mechanisms were always substantial – though by no means uniform or 
co-ordinated,  so  that  an  entire  organisation  can  find  itself  with  no 
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representative official liaising with other IGOs in a particular policy area for 
a  prolonged  period.    This  is  what  happened to  FAO  with  respect to 
market-based risk management instruments in the 1990s. FAO had to wait 
much later, until the arrival of Alexander Sarris in 2004, to publish 
comparable work. UNCTAD briefly reversed course during the GFC under 
Harmon Thomas – a fact that reinforces the idea the implicit conclusion of 
constructivist analysis that ideas lose their influence when the policy 
entrepreneurs who promoted them are no longer in power (Moschella 
2010:8). However, by the end of the period covered by this research, there 
was no longer any IGO where anyone who subscribed to a view overtly 
antipathetic to agricultural risk management could easily find a home. This 
is well demonstrated by the joint IGO publication which for the first time 
represented  the  success  of  the  risk  management  policy  network  in 
creating a ‘common front’ not just within individual IGOs but between 
IGOs – broadly in favour of market based mechanisms but acutely aware 
of the practical difficulties involved in implementing their widespread use 
by farmers (FAO 2011a). The critics have been forced underground, and 
apart from a brief flourishing during the GFC that is where they remain, 
sniping at the dominant policy norm and – no doubt – influencing policy 
implementation. 
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Conclusion 
    
As shown above (in Chapters Two and Three) there have been many 
different theories of how policy is made within institutions (and studies of 
how individual policies have evolved within IGOs. This thesis constitutes 
further empirical research investigating why the World Bank, UNCTAD 
and FAO ‘behave the way they do’ (Park & Vetterlein 2010b:225). A 
theoretical consensus as to how policy is determined and changed has 
remained elusive: although there is now widespread agreement that IGOs 
possess policymaking autonomy, there is no consensus on the degree to 
which this is so, So far as the autonomy of IGO policymaking is concerned, 
and a contribution to the longstanding debate between materialist and 
constructivist explanations of IGO behaviour, the conclusions from this 
cross-sectional analysis of IGO policymaking in one policy area reinforce 
those drawn in previous studies (e.g. Reinalda & Verbeek 1998, Biermann 
& Siebenhũner 2009a). The three case studies of evolving policy towards 
market  based  risk  management  instruments in  Chapters  Five  to  Eight 
above have supported an approach to IGO policymaking in this technical 
area which derives most of the impetus for policy change from a 
combination of individual bureaucratic initiative within the IGO and 
external macro factors, but not a materialist approach based on the 
perceived interests of nation states. In this policy area at least, nation states 
and national interests are distinctly off-stage. The evidence points to a 
considerable – but not absolute – degree of autonomy and independence 
for the bureaucracies of the IGOs studied. The IGO bureaucracies are seen 
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to  have  acted,  in  the  same  way  that  other  authors  have  found,  as 
 
‘knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators, and capacity builders’ 
(Biermann & Siebenhũner 2009a:319). A further conclusion in line with 
previous research, and consistent with the framework of constructivism 
‘plus’, is that different IGO bureaucracies have enjoyed varied levels of 
autonomy in policymaking both between themselves and over time. What 
has  been  demonstrated,  in  support  of  this  contention,  is  that  the 
supporters of market based risk management within IGOs are part of a 
policy  community,  and  a  wider  policy  network,  in  which  they  have 
created, argued for, developed and progressively refined a policy norm 
within their organisations, often working as change agents and policy 
entrepreneurs to do so. 
  
 
The ‘fine-grained’ research issue (Park & Vetterlein 2010), however, is how 
the  ideas  work  their  way  through  the  structure  of  IGOs  -  the  actual 
process of policy formation, changes in policy and the formation of policy 
consensus within IGOs themselves as well as between them. The thesis 
addresses this and makes a contribution to the literature by analysing 
comparatively the way policies were often developed at middle 
management level in the three IGOs where policies towards market based 
agricultural risk management have been most evident. 
   
From the evidence of this thesis IGO policy towards the problem’ of risk in 
agriculture appears to have been created at a number of different levels, 
for a range of reasons, and can only be explained by the complex interplay 
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of external influences, internal political dynamics, and individual actions 
that certainly characterised the evolution of policy towards market based 
risk management instruments at the World Bank, UNCTAD and the FAO 
during the period under study (although this may not necessarily be true 
of other IGOs concerned with commodities, such as the CFC). The thesis 
has presented evidence that establishing clear, consistent and transparent 
criteria  for  the  evaluation  of  policy  towards  market-based  risk 
management instruments simply does not exist within IGOs. At the World 
Bank,  this  would  be  despite  the  devotion  of  considerable  internal 
resources to project evaluation, for example in the Bank’s agricultural 
lending (e.g. World Bank 2008d).  On the contrary, the conclusion of this 
thesis is that problem of agricultural risk management policy at IGOs 
therefore is not  amenable, to permanent and conclusive resolution. . As a 
direct result of this absence of performance criteria, opportunities have 
occurred for policy to be created and developed, structured and 
maintained, altered and assessed at middle-management level. 
Assumptions about the desirability of certain policy outcomes, e.g. the 
spread of commodity exchanges in developing countries have been made 
without proof of their contribution to the broader policy goals of IGOs. 
The  result  of  this  absence  of  a  solid  justification  for  policy  was  the 
weakness of entrenchment of the pro-market policy norm at UNCTAD and 
potentially the FAO, whilst the strength of the norm at the World Bank has 
been shown to owe much more to the broader politics of the Bank, and its 
raison d’ être generally, rather than any particular success or failure of risk 
management policy for agriculture. The policy norm at the World Bank 
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has survived the difficult administrative legacy of the failure of the GCI 
initiative and the resultant folding of the ITF-CRMG. In terms of the specific 
area of risk management policy, the conclusion of this thesis is that wider 
access to information did nothing to create a consensus: the ideological 
gulf between the two sides was as wide at the time the research for this 
thesis concluded as it had been at the time of the publication of Maizels’ 
and Raffaelli’s books well over a decade and a half earlier. The IGO policy 
norm  that  agricultural  risk  should  be  solved  using  market  risk 
management instruments, and that any environmental impacts were at 
worst debatable or mixed and at best uniformly positive survived the GFC, 
and as at the time of writing remains dominant, albeit without the first 
flush of enthusiasm for its merits (and accompanying absence of caveats 
over implementation) that characterised the early days of the ITF-CRMG. 
As of mid-2011, budgetary deficits and lack of international strongly 
suggested that interventionist solutions were unlikely to come to fruition, 
yet market solutions bring speculation, windfall profits and numerous 
practical  problems  of  implementation  in  their  wake.  What  remains 
constant is that competing policy norms result in differing opinions as to 
solutions within IGOs and it is possible to conclude that IGO policymaking 
in this area has been far from linear. The evidence therefore from the case 
studies in this thesis of a measure of policy cyclicality at IGOs is compelling. 
   
Cyclical changes in policy flow in significant measure from changing 
external influences as well as the ‘changing of the guard’ of bureaucrats; 
but because each IGO is exposed to  external influences in a  different 
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fashion, the conclusion that it is possible to draw is that IGOs’ policies 
towards  agricultural  risk  management  cannot  be  uniformly  explained. 
Even in this one policy area, different external pressures and influences 
can be seen operating over time. The influence of the European Union 
over the World Bank, to continue to fund research into both price and 
weather derivatives – may be cited as a significant example of external 
influence on IGO policy; another example was the pressure placed by 
UNCTAD members to reject the perceived retrogression in commodities 
policies that the organisation was experiencing after Accra. At the World 
Bank, policy has remained stubbornly pro-market. In the case of UNCTAD, 
policy continues to oscillate between advocacy of market-based solutions 
and scepticism towards them. At the FAO, gradual transformation has 
been achieved only at the expense of driving opposition to market based 
mechanisms ‘underground’. This use of IGOs as a political battlefield may 
be inevitable, but it has resulted in a considerable amount of wasted effort 
over the past two decades. These conclusions apply to just these three 
IGOs – further research could usefully encompass the CFC and perhaps 
also the regional Development Banks, and even the IMF, and their policies 
towards agricultural risk management. 
   
A further conclusion moreover is that in this area IGOs have not always 
collaborated as well as they might have done. As has been observed, ‘the 
problem of multiple uncoordinated agencies engaged in similar tasks has 
plagued the UN system from the beginning’ (Mingst & Karns 2007:49). 
The   study   of   IGO  policy   towards   market   based   risk   management 
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instruments in this thesis bears this contention out. The evolution of risk 
management policy at the three IGOs reviewed provides mixed evidence 
of   collaboration,   but   at   least   there   is   very   recently   evidence   of 
improvement – in part at least through the actions of another change 
agent, David Hallam at the FAO, working in a different way to his 
predecessor Alexander Sarris. 
   
The conclusion of this thesis has been moreover to suggest differences 
between IGOs may be sufficient that one unified theory to explain the 
behaviour of IGOs, as previous commentators (e.g. Dijkzeul & Beigbeder 
2003) imply may eventuate may be an unrealistic expectation. 
    
A final caveat should be entered, however: as has been identified at the 
beginning  of  this  thesis,  however,  risk  management  is  a  specialist, 
technical area of policy at IGOs, what has been described as ‘policy 
unusual’. Arguably therefore conclusions drawn in this thesis regarding 
how policy towards risk management instruments evolved, as ‘policy 
unusual’, cannot be easily generalised across to other policy areas – they 
may not be ‘elegant’ (Keohane 1986). As has been stressed throughout 
the ‘paradigm wars’, no one theory should, or perhaps ever can, explain 
everything. An appropriate theoretical  framework for examining one set 
of policies for an IGO may not be appropriate for another. It has been 
suggested that in particular, the degree of materialist interest by states in 
the policies of IGOs will relate to the quantity of material interests they 
have   in   any   policy.   The   promotion   of   successful   agricultural   risk 
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management policy, whilst it may be a public good in many states, does 
not confront national interests as directly as many other issues, ranging 
from ‘high politics’ e.g. peacekeeping operations to matters of close 
national interest e.g. fishing quotas. Therefore the analysis of this thesis 
may have decidedly limited implications for any wider debate about the 
validity or otherwise of constructivist interpretations of IGO behaviour. 
Without a comparative analysis of many areas of policy within IGOs, and 
in particular areas of ‘policy usual’ - if it eventually transpires that this 
distinction is  meaningful and  that  all  IGO policy areas transpire to  be 
‘unusual’ in their own different ways - a very cautious approach should be 
taken towards any final assumption that these conclusions may be applied 
more widely to IGO policy. 
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Appendix: List of Interviews 
  
 
The individuals selected for interview were those closest involved with the 
evolution   of   risk   management   policy   towards   agriculture   at   their 
respective institutions. In many cases they were also authors of IGO papers 
cited above. As the thesis covers the evolution of policy over a significant 
period  of  time,  some  were  currently  serving  at  the  IGOs,  others  had 
moved on either to other institutions or had become academics, or even 
retired. The list below is not, however, exhaustive, for two reasons: firstly, a 
number of other interviews with officials were conducted off-the-record 
because of the sensitivity of their comments about policy and individuals, 
and secondly, a number of relevant conservations with IGO officials were 
held before the commencement of the thesis in the course of the author’s 
collaboration with UNCTAD since 1998. 
   
The  interviews  were  semi-structured:  they  all  followed  a  very  similar 
pattern aimed at establishing the interviewee’s perspective towards the 
evolution of policy at their IGO and more generally. The average length of 
the interviews was approximately forty-five minutes, although there was 
some  variation  around  this  mean.  All  the  interviews  were  conducted 
before 31 July 2011, with two exceptions, that with Panos Varangis (an 
official  who  has  been  closely  involved  throughout),  which  was 
deliberately held back until all research had been completed as a means of 
research audit, and a second interview with Ron Duncan for several points 
of clarification. 
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Date of 
Interview 
Location 
Stijn Claessens Former Lead 
Economist, Financial 
Sector Strategy and 
Policy Group, World 
Bank. 
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2009 
Telecon 
Nawal Kamel Former head of 
CRMG, World Bank 
17 March 2011 Washington 
DC 
Funke 
Oyelwole 
Former Senior 
Programme Officer, 
CRMG, World Bank 
18 March 2011 Washington 
DC 
Marc Sadler Senior Agricultural 
Economist, World 
Bank 
16 March 2011 Washington 
DC 
Panos Varangis Former Lead 
Economist, 
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Development 
Department, World 
Bank currently at the 
IFC 
22 August 
2011 
Telecon 
Kevin Parris Senior Agricultural 
Policy Analyst, OECD 
15 December 
2008 
Telecon 
Lamon Rutten Former Chief, 
Finance, Risk 
Management and 
Information - 
Commodities Branch - 
UNCTAD 
7 December 
2007, 15 
August 2008, 1 
April 2009, 3 
June 2010 
Mumbai, e- 
mail,  Geneva, 
telecom 
Leonela 
Santana-Boado 
Co-ordinator, 
Commodity 
Exchanges, 
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UNCTAD 
1 April 2009 Geneva 
Doyle Baker Chief, Agricultural 
Management, 
Marketing & Finance 
Service, Agricultural 
Support System 
Division, FAO 
26 January 
2009 
Rome 
Hafez Ghanem Assistant Director- 
General, Economic 
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Department, FAO 
1 February 
2011 
Telecon 
David Hallam Director, Trade and 
Market Division, FAO 
8 July 2011 Telecon 
Calvin Miller Senior Rural Finance 26 January Rome 
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Andrew 
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Christopher 
Gilbert 
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